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ABSTRACT
As debates questioning the influence of the United States hegemony increase 
internationally, discussion of Japan’s emergence as a more independent and “normal 
power” has also become more prevalent. If the US-Japan alliance is to remain relevant 
throughout the 21st century, it is crucial to address the nature of Japanese autonomy in 
this context. This thesis investigates what autonomy means in Japanese foreign policy in 
the context of its relationship with the United States and the latter’s hegemony, and 
compares the Japanese theory and practice of autonomy with the concept of autonomy in 
International Relations theory.
Central to this investigation is the use of three contemporary examples which 
demonstrate autonomy in Japan’s post-Second World War foreign policy; Japan’s post- 
1945 oil diplomacy with Iran; its proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997; 
and its relations with North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK), 
with a particular focus on the two nuclear crises (the first in 1993-94, and the second in 
2002). These are examples in which the United States and Japan took different positions 
on a range of issues and which therefore demonstrate that Japan pursues autonomous 
foreign policy within the framework of US hegemony. The analysis also explores the 
restrictions imposed on Japanese foreign policy by US hegemony and how Japan 
overcomes those restrictions in order to create an autonomous foreign policy while still 
maintaining its alliance relationship with the United States.
The central argument of this thesis is that autonomy, as conceptualised and 
practised in post-1945 Japanese foreign policy, is more limited and restricted than 
conventionally assumed in rationalist International Relations theory, because it is carried 
out in the context of US hegemony and the US-Japan alliance. As a result, the study 
interprets autonomy as being defined by specific circumstances which challenge the 
objective, static and contextually unspecific notions of autonomy in rationalist, anarchy- 
based International Relations theory. While the main thrust of the enquiry lies in the 
analysis of Japanese foreign policy, the thesis also scrutinises the somewhat narrow 
understanding of “autonomy” within International Relations theory and seeks to further 
refine the concept of autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis investigates what autonomy in Japan’s foreign policy means in the context of 
its relationship with the United States and compares the Japanese theory and practice of 
autonomy with the concept of autonomy in International Relations theory. As debates 
on the influence of the United States increase internationally on the one hand, 
discussion of Japan’s emergence as a more independent and “normal power” has, on the 
other, also become more frequent.1 If the US-Japan alliance, a unique alliance that 
requires the United States to come to the aid of Japan, but does not necessarily require 
the same level of reciprocity from Japan under the provisions of the Japanese 
Constitution Article 9, is indeed still relevant in the 21st century, then it is crucial to 
address the nature of Japanese autonomy in this context.
The argument of this thesis is that autonomy, as conceptualised and practised in 
post-1945 Japanese foreign policy, is more limited and restricted than conventionally 
assumed in International Relations theory because it is carried out within the context of 
US hegemony and the US-Japan alliance. This argument is a significant and interesting 
proposal in that it interprets autonomy as being defined by specific circumstances which 
challenge the objective, static and contextually unspecific notions of autonomy in 
rationalist, anarchy-based International Relations theory. The main focus of the thesis is 
this restricted and often overlooked form of autonomy that is practised by Japan in the 
context of its relationship with the United States. As a necessary step towards 
understanding this notion of autonomy, the thesis also seeks to clarify the use of the 
term “autonomy” in International Relations theory. This introduction first briefly 
defines autonomy and hegemony and outlines the background behind the study. It then 
discusses the project’s central question and main argument, case selection and 
methodology and, finally, the structure of the thesis.
See Kurt M. Campbell, “The End of Alliances? Not So Fast”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, 
Spring 2004, pp. 151-63; Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (eds.), The Future of 
America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, Stanford, Asia-Pacific Research Centre, 2004; Takashi 
Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Japan’s Emerging Role as a ‘Global Ordinary Power’”, International 
Relations o f the Asia-Pacific, vol. 6, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1-21; James J. Przystup, “US-Japan Relations: 
Progress Toward a Mature Partnership”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 2, 
June 2005.
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Definitions and a Background to the Investigation
In International Relations theory, hegemony is defined as a situation when “one state 
has a preponderance of material resources” 2 and “is powerful enough to maintain the 
essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so” .3 Under hegemony, 
hegemons have not only the material preponderance to enforce rules, but also the power 
to subvert these rules and bend them to their own ends, or to simply set them aside. 
Autonomy in rationalist International Relations theory is typically defined as the 
principle and the liberty of a state which enables it to exercise control over its allocation 
of resources and choice of government4 and to determine the conditions of its own 
affairs, as long as it does not negate the rights of other states. 5 On the other hand, 
Japanese autonomy, as exercised within US hegemony, is defined in this study as a 
process whereby state interests are negotiated in order to meet domestic and 
international expectations without challenging US hegemony.6
Existing analyses of Japanese foreign policy under the US alliance system often 
swing between two extremes. The first extreme places emphasis on a widely held 
perception that Japan has very little autonomy in its foreign and security policy. This is 
attributed to the persistent dilemma of “entrapment versus abandonment” in Japan’s 
alliance relationship with the United States. The dilemma emerges from the 
asymmetries of power in the relationship, which developed from the famous “Yoshida 
Doctrine”, in which Japan is seen to have exchanged deference to US interests for 
assistance in economic recovery, growth and a guarantee of national security in the 
years immediately following World War. 7 In this alliance of unequal military 
capabilities, Japan faces the quandary of becoming entrapped within those US political, 
economic and strategic interests which do not always coincide with Japanese interests,
2 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 32.
3 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977, p.44. Hegemony and its definition will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter One.
4 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1999, pp. 235-36.
David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 147.
6 Autonomy in International Relations will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter One, and Japanese 
concepts of autonomy in Chapter Three.
7 Bert Edström, Japan 's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 1999, pp. 8-25. Inverted commas are used here because Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida 
never spoke of a “doctrine” as such. See Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japan Question: Power and Purpose 
in a New Era, Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992, p. 25n.
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from fear that the United States will abandon its alliance commitment.8 This dilemma 
has continued well beyond the immediate post-1945 period and, as a consequence, has 
led to the perception that Japan’s foreign policy is largely deferential to the US 
position.9 These assessments of Japan further suggest that it exercises little autonomy 
internationally.
Yet does this perception adequately describe the most critical aspects of the 
foreign policies Japan pursues in the context of its relationship with the United States? 
The real picture is more complex. There are instances in post-1945 history that suggest 
Japan is pursuing a far more independent line than is often recognised. Japan’s policies 
toward the Middle East, and its relations with Myanmar, both suggest that the reality of 
autonomy in Japanese foreign policy is not one of complete deference to the United 
States. Autonomy in post-Second World War Japanese foreign policy is clearly evident 
in Japan’s stance during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the following Oil Crises,10 in 
its relations with Iran, and also in its continuing aid to Myanmar’s military government. 
All of these policies appear contrary to those of the United States."
Yet examples of Japanese foreign policy that are different from the US position 
have also generated unsatisfactory explanations, particularly in International Relations 
theory. These interpretations portray contemporary Japan as a potentially offensive 
power connecting increased economic power and independence in its foreign policy 
with Japan’s militaristic past and a search for absolute autonomy. They therefore 
suggest that Japan might again attempt to become a militarily aggressive state12 and, 
indeed, realists in particular take this view. John J. Mearsheimer argues that “the 
international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to
8 Pyle, The Japan Question, p. 25n.
9 Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State”, 
World Politics, vol. 40, no. 4, July 1988, 517-41, p. 518; Yöichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New 
World Order”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, Issue 5, Winter 1991/1992, pp. 58-74; Akitoshi Miyashita, 
Limits to Power: Asymmetric Dependence and Japanese Foreign Aid Policy, Lanham, Lexington 
Books, 2003, Roger W. Bowen, “Japan’s Foreign Policy”, PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 25, 
no. 1, March 1992, pp. 57-73, pp. 57-58, Dennis Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan’s 
Foreign Policy, London, Macmillan, 1995.
10 Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p. 250.
11 Donald M. Seekins, “Japan’s Aid Relations with Military Regimes in Burma, 1962-1991: The 
Kokunaika Process”, Asian Survey, vol. 32, no. 3, May 1992, pp. 246-62.
12 Sabine Fruehstueck, “Normalization and the Management of Violence in the Japan’s Armed Forces”, 
as quoted in Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the case for 
Analytical Eclecticism”, International Security, vol. 26, no. 3, Winter 2001/2002, pp. 153-185, p. 
156; Yong Deng, “Japan in APEC: The Problematic Leadership Role”, Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 4, 
April 1997, pp. 353-367, p. 357, “‘Aratana Gunbi Zökyö no Osore’ ChQgoku gawa, Nihon no MD ni 
Kenen”, Asahi Shimbun, 5 September 2003.
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gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the 
benefits outweigh the costs”.13 While Mearsheimer’s argument is in reference to great 
powers,14 his offensive realist theory emphasises in general that states will seek to 
maximise their power to the best of their ability in the context of anarchy.
Other realists argue that it is “not normal” for a state with the international 
standing and influence of Japan to be restricted by its relationship with the United 
States. Christopher Layne, for example, argues that increased independent actions from 
Japan (along with Germany) indicate a challenge to US hegemony in the post-Cold War 
period. Layne bases his argument on patterns o f hegemony in the late 17 and 19 
centuries (French and British hegemony respectively), which suggest that “unipolar 
moments cause geopolitical backlashes that lead to multipolarity”.15 He argues that the 
anarchical structure of the international system impels states in order to act to maximise 
security and autonomy in international relations. Furthermore, states with increasing 
economic power, which can translate to technological and military power, strive to 
become great powers, “regardless of what the United States does or does not do”.16 Thus, 
Layne views budding Japanese self-reliance in intelligence gathering, its burgeoning use 
of nuclear energy utilising European plutonium, the dispatch of the Self-Defence Force 
in UN peacekeeping operations and diplomatic assertiveness through the United Nations 
as indications of Japan desiring great power status independent from the United States.17 
Such claims leave little room for a powerful country like Japan to remain within a 
military alliance with the United States while pursuing different policy lines, without 
interpreting it as being a challenge to the United States.
Kenneth Waltz takes a similar position to Layne. In 1993 he argued that, in the 
next 10-20 years, Japan was likely to rise to great power status and described Japan as a 
mercantilist state that could challenge the United States through economic and 
technological competition.18 He was sceptical of Japan’s recent moves to define itself as 
a civilian power, and argued that security burden-sharing, instability in the US-Japan 
relationship and the rise of China as a new threat in the region would lead Japan to act
13 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics, New York, Norton, 2001, p. 21.
14 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f Great Power Politics, pp. 55-56.
15 Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, International 
Security, vol. 17, no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51, p. 32.
16 Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”, p. 47.
17 Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion”, pp. 38-39.
18 Kenneth Waltz, “Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, 
Autumn 1993, pp. 44-79, p. 59. This view is also supported by Edward Olsen, “Target Japan as 
America’s Economic Foe”, Orbis, vol. 36, issue 4, Fall 1992, pp. 491-504, p. 496.
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more frequently in its own interests. In his view, “for a country to choose not to become 
a great power is a structural anomaly”19 and, therefore, Japan would inevitably head 
towards great power status. Waltz reiterated this position again in 2000, arguing that “its 
concerted regional activity, its seeking and gaining prominence in bodies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and its obvious pride in 
economic and technological achievements” were all indications that Japan aspired to a 
larger international role. Waltz also predicted that Japan would ultimately equip itself 
with nuclear weapons for defensive purposes.20
Two flaws in Waltz’s argument are similar to those faults in Layne’s argument. 
Firstly, the perception that self-help interests motivate state behaviour assumes that, in 
the context of anarchy, states have the autonomy to translate material wealth into 
military power. Secondly, in according to Waltz, nuclear armament cannot occur within 
Japan’s alliance with the United States. As a consequence, any moves towards greater 
military independence of Japan would be viewed as contrary to both the US-Japan 
alliance and the dominant US presence in the region. In other words, these realists 
perceive autonomy as being the “rational” ability of sovereign states to translate 
economic capabilities into military ones relatively free of external influences, and to 
pursue self interest on the basis of these means.
Constructivist theorists in particular have criticised this simplistic realist 
interpretation of Japanese foreign policy. Rather, they argue that Japan’s new identity as 
an antimilitarist state informs its actions. Peter J. Katzenstein argues that the domestic 
political process of the 1950s, rather than the defeat in the war itself, cultivated 
antimilitarism, and that this culture influences Japan’s foreign policy.21 He argues that 
this normative context affects Japanese policymakers and continues to shape Japanese 
interests today.22 Thomas U. Berger presents a similar argument in explaining Japan and 
Germany acting contrary to realist predictions. Instead of becoming great military 
powers based on their economic great power status, Berger argues that both states have 
been slow to assume a greater security role because of the domestic cultural-institutional
19 Waltz, “Emerging Structure of International Politics”, p. 66.
20 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, 
Summer 2000, pp. 5-41, p. 34.
21 Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, 
Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 153.
22 Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 154.
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context in which their defence policy is made, namely antimilitarism. 23 This 
constructivist view argues that antimilitarism has been deeply institutionalised in 
domestic and societal norms since 1945 and, therefore, dramatic changes in Japan’s 
security posture seem unlikely.24
However, this particular constructivist explanation is unconvincing. Firstly, it 
does not adequately explain the expansion of Japan’s military role in UN peacekeeping 
operations and also in other roles of support. Secondly, an explanation of Japanese 
foreign policy through antimilitarist culture suggests reliance on certain “Japanese 
idiosyncrasies” to explain state behaviour rather than as a result of international 
circumstances and resulting changes in power relationships. Secondly, the development 
of an antimilitarist culture within Japan essentially depends on a broader Japanese 
culture and identity that sees itself as functioning under US hegemony. Without US 
influence over the implementation of Japan’s pacifist constitution and the subsequent 
US security guarantee, Japan would not have been afforded the luxury of developing a 
culture that is “very reluctant to use violence”.25 While the argument of this thesis does 
not reject the constructivist argument that identity and culture drive state interest, it 
perceives antimilitarist culture as effectively being part of a broader culture determined 
by US hegemony.
Two points emerge from the preceding analysis. The first is that the primary 
context of Japanese foreign policy and international relations is US hegemony, meaning 
anarchy-based theories are poorly equipped to explain Japanese foreign policy within 
this setting. Following from this, the second observation is that the definition, exercise 
and value of autonomy to states can differ according to historical, social and political 
contexts. In other words, Japan exercises autonomy in its own distinctive ways and its 
autonomous actions do not necessarily correspond to the assumptions of the rational 
actor dominant in anarchy-based International Relations theory.
Discussion of the varying viewpoints on Japanese foreign policy has one common 
theme—that Japan’s relationship with the United States, institutionalised in the US- 
Japan security alliance, is the main framework for Japanese foreign policy.
23 Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan” in Peter J. 
Katzenstein, The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 317-356, p. 318.
24 Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, Spring, 
1993, pp. 119-150; Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, 
Norms, and Policies,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, Spring, 1993, pp. 84-118.
23 Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 1.
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Consequently, this thesis bases its arguments on the assumption that Japan functions 
under the hegemony of the United States. There are two reasons for assuming US 
hegemony. Firstly, on the level of international relations in general, there is a large 
consensus that US involvement in reconstructing Europe and Japan and establishing 
global institutions after the Second World War made it a period of US hegemony. 26 
Secondly, the US occupation of Japan at the end of the war had a profound and lasting 
impact on the political, economic and social reconstruction of Japan, which continues to 
colour aspects of the relationship today, and thus the majority of its foreign policies 
need to take US interests into consideration. 27 US interests, the US-Japan alliance and 
US hegemony are crucial aspects of Japan’s reality that cannot be ignored, and serve as 
its starting point in formulating foreign policy. As a result, the analysis of Japanese 
autonomy in this study will be made within this broader context of hegemony.
The extremes in the analyses on Japan’s foreign policy suggest that conventional 
theories in International Relations are poorly equipped to provide an explanation of 
Japanese autonomy within the US hegemonic system. Yoshihide Socya raises this point 
in his argument that post-Second World War Japan cannot be viewed effectively by 
exclusively focusing on either realism or constructivism. 28 The primary reason for this is 
that there are no nuanced conceptions of autonomy, and there is little discussion in 
International Relations theory that deals with it directly as an issue. As Chapter One of 
this thesis will demonstrate, the meaning of autonomy as used in International Relations 
and Japanese foreign policy literature must be derived from the concept of sovereignty 
because it is rarely analysed in its own right. This is despite the fact that in the practice 
of international politics, it is often the case that a state has sovereignty (that is authority 
over territory and diplomatic recognition), but a restricted capability to implement 
independent policies. This applies to all states in international relations, but the 
restriction is further exacerbated in the case of Japan because of its dependence for 
security on the United States. Therefore, although they are closely related, sovereignty
26 For some examples, see Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One- 
Superpower World, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994; David Calleo, Beyond American 
Hegemony: The Future o f the Western Alliance, New York, Basic Books, 1987; Raymond Aron, 
Peace and War: A Theory o f International Relations, translated by R. Howard and A. Baker Fox. 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966; G. John Ikenberry and Charles A Kupchan in David P. 
Rapkin (ed.), World Leadership and Hegemony, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1990; Keohane, After 
Hegemony.
27 See John Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 
1945-1960, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005; Schaller, Altered States. This aspect will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.
28 Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives” in Muthiah 
Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practices: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1998, pp. 198-233.
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and autonomy are different concepts, and autonomy does not always follow from the 
possession of formal sovereignty.
There is also significant evidence to suggest that the autonomy of a “rational, 
independent actor” does not fit with the autonomy being pursued in Japanese foreign 
policy since the Second World War. As Chapter Two will reveal, post-Second World 
War Japan has become deeply integrated into the US hegemonic system. As a 
consequence, policy decisions take its relationship with the United States as a basic 
starting point, making Japan constantly mindful of the United States. Because of this, 
Japan has less freedom as a “rational, independent actor” than theories would assume. 
However, this does not necessarily make Japan an “irrational” actor, but rather suggests 
that states can rarely act on such “rationality” in the actual practice of international 
relations. 29 Again, the discussion of autonomy and sovereignty in Chapter One will 
demonstrate that rationalist theories view the ability to undertake independent action as 
an intrinsic characteristic of the sovereign state, but that the manifestation of autonomy 
in Japanese foreign policy is somewhat contrary to these rationalist descriptions of 
autonomy. This suggests that the definition, exercise and value of autonomy can differ 
according to historical, social and political contexts, and that Japan exercises autonomy 
in its own distinctive ways.
In other words, autonomy for Japan is a distinct foreign policy position that is not 
completely deferential to the United States, but remains conscious of the limits to its 
freedom of action. Consequently, Japan’s foreign policy maintains the US-Japan 
alliance as its foundation, and remains within the hegemony of the United States. 
However, there is very little scholarly focus on Japanese autonomy. Although Japan is 
often portrayed as deferring to the United States, there are patterns in Japanese foreign 
policy that suggest Japan does, to a certain extent, pursue an autonomous foreign policy. 
It is important therefore to investigate what autonomy means in the Japanese context, 
and to provide balance in the scholarly portrayal of Japanese foreign policy in the 
existing literature.
29 In this thesis, “rationality” indicates the rationalism associated with rational choice theories, which 
explains the behaviour of individual actors as being driven by the maximisation of their utility and 
benefits. It should not be confused with Grotian concepts of rationalism, which perceive rationality as 
justice that is separated from self interest or expediency. See Robert Keohane, “International 
Institutions: Two Approaches”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 32, December 1988, pp. 379-96.
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Central Questions
These observations provide the starting point of this thesis, and generate three central 
research questions:
• What does autonomy mean in Japanese foreign policy?
• How is autonomy pursued in Japanese foreign policy?
• Does Japan pursue autonomy in order to gain independence from the United States?
The overriding theme of these questions necessitates studying Japanese foreign 
policy and Japan’s relationship with the United States to answer what autonomy means 
in the Japanese context.
Main Argument
The main argument of this thesis is that autonomy, as conceptualised and practised in 
post-1945 Japanese foreign policy, is more limited and restricted than conventionally 
assumed in International Relations theory. This is because autonomy in Japan’s case is 
pursued in the context of US hegemony. Since Japanese autonomy is practised within 
US hegemony and is therefore narrower than conventionally assumed, autonomous 
Japanese foreign policy does not represent self-help behaviour at the expense of the 
United States as expected under anarchy. Rather, Japanese autonomy is often pursued 
through the modification of its initiatives within the restrictions imposed by US interests.
While the main thrust of the enquiry lies in the analysis of Japanese foreign policy, 
this thesis also scrutinises the somewhat narrow understanding of “autonomy” within 
International Relations theory and seeks to the further refine the concept of autonomy in 
the theoretical literature. Thus it also argues that autonomy is determined by socio- 
historical specific circumstances, and challenges the objective, static and context 
unspecific notions of autonomy in rationalist International Relations theory.
Theoretical Framework o f the Study
The thrust of the discussion so far has been that realist theory, in particular, is ill-suited to 
explaining how autonomy is practised in Japanese foreign policy. Given that a major 
concern of this thesis is to discuss Japanese autonomy with a greater emphasis on the 
specific historical and social context in which it is pursued, more sociological 
explanations of state behaviour and international relations are required. To do this, the
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argument in this thesis draws upon two core positions in constructivist theory to explain 
Japanese autonomy under US hegemony.
Firstly, constructivist theory questions self-help as being an inherent feature of 
anarchy. It instead argues that actors respond to situations on the basis of the meaning it 
holds for them; that “[t]he distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, 
but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on 
the ‘distribution of knowledge,’ that constitute their conceptions of self and other”.30 As 
a consequence, anarchy does not necessarily have to create an outcome of competitive, 
aggressive self-help behaviour amongst states. This thesis uses this constructivist 
argument to support the contention that Japanese autonomous behaviour does not follow 
self-help motivated initiatives which seek to undermine its security relationship with the 
United States and US hegemony more generally. This is because Japan’s alliance with 
the United States and US hegemony serve as the fundamental framework of its foreign 
policy rather than anarchic self-help. US hegemony is thus the foundation on which 
Japan’s policies are created; hence, policies that are seemingly independent of the US 
line are often still complementary to US interests or are broadly conducted within US 
hegemony.
Secondly, in maintaining that self-help is not an inherent characteristic of anarchy, 
constructivism argues that it is a socially and historically constructed interpretation 
based on socially specific interests. Wendt argues that socially constructed notions 
develop as states acquire role-specific understandings of themselves and others; this 
then becomes state identity, which in turn affects state actions.31 In other words, he 
reasons that “identities are the basis of interests”.32 The thesis follows this line of 
argument to both demonstrate that Japan’s post-1945 identity as a subordinate state 
under US hegemony is the main factor that determines the form of autonomy it pursues, 
and also to examine how this is achieved. The argument is that, as a consequence of 
Japan identifying itself as a subordinate state within this system, autonomy for Japan is 
essentially narrower and more restricted than conventionally assumed in International 
Relations theories because it remains bounded by US hegemony despite Japan’s 
significant economic capabilities. Identities are socially constructed and influence state 
behaviour; therefore autonomy too is a context-specific and socially-constructed
30 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 
International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425, p. 396.
31 Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it”, p. 398.
Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it”, p. 398.32
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concept. Consequently, post-1945 Japanese autonomy is uniquely defined by its 
situation of being firmly integrated into US hegemony.
PROCESSINSTITUTIONS
(5) State B’s action
(3) State A’s action
State B with identities and 
interests
(1) Stimulus requiring action
State A with identities and 
interests
(2) State A’s definition of the 
situation
(4) State B’s interpretation of 
A’s action and B’s own 
definition of the situation
Intersubjective understandings 
and expectations possessed by 
and constitutive of A and B
Diagram 1.1 The co-determination of institutions and process, from Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what 
States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2. 
Spring 1992, pp. 391^425, p. 406.
In other words, in the case of Japan and US hegemony, Wendt would argue that 
the two states share an institution, the US-Japan security alliance, in recognition of the 
wider institution of US hegemony. This institution then in turn influences the identities 
of both states and, as a consequence, their identities influence their actions toward each 
other.
However, there are some shortcomings in this application of Wendt’s theory to the 
US-Japan alliance. By asserting that actors have shared norms and institutions, it 
assumes that this shared institution is interpreted and practiced in the same way across 
states. The argument to follow is that, while constitutive institutions can be appreciated 
by two states, their understandings and application of it can vary if they are 
asymmetrical powers. As a consequence, the institution can affect states and also be 
implemented in differing ways. This thesis asserts that the US-Japan security alliance 
and the wider institution of hegemony are interpreted differently by the United States
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and Japan. These differences in interpretation emerge due to the fact that both states 
have an asymmetric power relationship in which Japan is fundamentally more 
dependent on the United States for its national security. For example, for the United 
States, the world’s most powerful military actor, the alliance is one of a network of 
alliances it has internationally. However, for Japan, it is the single most important 
institution designed to guarantee its national security. Thus, the asymmetric power 
relationship between Japan and the United States causes differences in the significance, 
understanding and anticipation of the alliance. This aspect is not recognised in 
constructivist theories and, as a result, it assumes that intersubjective understandings 
and expectations remain the same across all constituent states.
This shortcoming can be redressed by incorporating David C. Kang’s theory of 
hierarchy. While Kang’s theory is essentially realist, it fundamentally differs from 
conventional realist theory in that it specifically explains how states behave when there 
is a recognised inequality—particularly in the case of a central power and subordinate 
states.33 Therefore, rather than assuming equality between states, by incorporating 
Kang’s notion of inequality into the constructivist notions of identity and socially 
constructed concepts, this thesis argues that different interpretations and expectations of 
a single constitutive institution can exist. More specifically, the argument is that the 
United States and Japan have different interpretations of hegemony. Japan accepts its 
position as subordinate under the United States and, while it can and does adopt 
autonomous policies, it does not stray too far outside the interests of the United States 
because of the importance of the alliance for Japan. On the other hand, despite Japan’s 
long history as an ally and identity as a subordinate state under US hegemony, the 
United States has a more realist outlook on its hegemony. This makes the United States 
constantly wary of maintaining its position as hegemon, and, consequently, it is cautious 
of Japan’s autonomous policies.
33 David C. Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations” in G. John Ikenberry and 
Michael Mastanduno (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 163-89.
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PROCESSINSTITUTIONS
(5) State B’s action
State B with identities and 
interests
(1) Stimulus requiring action
(3) State A ’s action
State A with identities and 
interests
(2) State A’s definition of the 
situationState A ’s interpretation o f  the 
intersubjective understandings 
and expectations possessed by 
and constitutive of A and B
State B ’s interpretation o f 
intersubjective understandings 
and expectations possessed by 
and constitutive of A and B
(4) State B’s interpretation of 
A’s action and B’s own 
definition of the situation
Diagram 1.2 A modification of the co-determination of institutions and process representing the 
theoretical argument of this study.
Contribution
This study contributes to the literature on Japanese foreign policy and International 
Relations in several ways. Firstly, it offers a more nuanced and theoretically informed 
explanation of Japan’s foreign policy choices within the structure of the US hegemonic 
system. Secondly, it contributes to a much-needed discussion on autonomy in 
International Relations theory. Autonomy is still perceived as an important value for 
states in international relations, 34 despite the fact that theorists such as Stephen D. 
Krasner argue “breaches of the Westphalian model have been an enduring characteristic 
of the international environment” . 35 Despite its importance, autonomy is often not the 
central focus of scholarly analysis. Furthermore, autonomy is not automatically 
predicated on sovereignty, which is demonstrated in the practice of international
34 Daniel Philpott strongly endorses my assertion here in “Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty?”, 
World Politics, vol. 53, no. 2, January 2001, pp. 297-324.
Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia”, International Security, vol. 20, no. 3, Winter 
1995-1996, p. 115.
35
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relations, and yet significant freedom and capacity to convert material capabilities to 
action is implicitly assumed in rationalist theories. With regard to the analysis of 
Japanese foreign policy in particular, this thesis illuminates the dynamics between 
Japanese conceptualisations of autonomy as practised by the Japanese government and 
the expectations of autonomy in the international system which come with modem 
statehood. It argues that autonomous Japanese behaviour is not a rigid pursuit of 
rationally defined autonomy, but rather a process informed by the specific context of 
Japan’s alliance with the United States in the broader context of US hegemony. This 
approach to conceptualising autonomy provides an effective analytical framework that 
is able to account for greater variations in forms of autonomy and subsequently take into 
account independent Japanese initiatives that do not necessarily violate the US 
hegemonic framework.
With regard to International Relations theory, the thesis makes a contribution to 
the discipline by providing greater insight into the specific nature of Japanese 
autonomy, and by departing from Euro-centric interpretations in the tradition of political 
philosophy which do not accurately reflect the reality of international political life. It 
does this by firstly challenging the assumption that autonomy is a characteristic of 
sovereignty, and secondly by presenting a context-specific explanation of autonomy. 
Non-rationalist theorists argue that autonomy is often given token recognition and then 
forgotten in the discussion, because rationalists seek to solve problems and do not 
question foundational elements of their theories. 36 As a result, concepts such as 
autonomy are assumed to be a part of sovereignty, and merged into notions such as state 
independence. In reality, Westphalian sovereignty—the legal recognition and formal 
independence of the state—is distinct from the ability to undertake independent and 
autonomous actions in international relations. This is addressed in the thesis, which also 
argues that autonomy is context-specific. Wendt has argued that independent policies in 
the international realm are difficult to implement because of the specific political, 
economic and social power dynamics that a state faces in its relations with other states. 37 
Yet this context is hardly addressed by rationalist theories. As a result, a gap emerges 
between the representation of independence of the state in an anarchic international
36 See Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1996; R.B.J. Walker, “From International Relations to World Politics” in J. 
Camilleri, A. Jarvis and A. Paolini (eds.), The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space, 
Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, pp. 21-38; Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
37 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, pp. 235-36.
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system and actual autonomy itself. It is this gap that has created a blurring between 
sovereignty and autonomy.
Methodology
Three Examples o f Restricted Japanese Autonomy
Central to this investigation of Japanese autonomy is the use of three contemporary 
examples which demonstrate autonomy in Japan’s post-Second World War foreign 
policy. The three examples selected to answer the research questions are Japan’s post- 
1945 oil diplomacy with Iran; its proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in 1997; 
and its relations with North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK), 
with a particular focus on the two nuclear crises (the first in 1993-94, and the second in 
2002).
The examples have been selected for two reasons. Firstly, all three are examples 
in which the United States and Japan take different positions on a range of significant 
issue areas—resource diplomacy, financial and monetary influence in Asia, and a 
regional security issue. They are important issue areas over which the US could have 
been reasonably expected to want Japan to follow its lead and are therefore significant 
examples. While divergent from those of the US, Japan’s policies do not ultimately 
undermine US hegemony, and thereby demonstrate that Japan pursues autonomy within 
the limits imposed by US hegemony. Secondly, they are intended to illustrate the 
restrictions imposed on Japanese foreign policy by US hegemony and how Japan was 
able to overcome them to create an autonomous foreign policy while still maintaining 
its alliance relationship with the United States. In this way, the three examples pose a 
challenge to the existing explanations of sovereignty in International Relations and 
analyses of Japanese foreign in relation to this.
These examples may invite the criticism that a generalisation of Japanese 
autonomy based on the three cannot be made on the grounds that they are 
unrepresentative of Japanese foreign policy. However, examples can be categorised into 
several types, and this study of Japanese foreign policy fits into a deviant case study 
category. Tom Mackie and David Marsh identify five types of case studies: (i) 
interpretive case studies which utilise an existing theory to illuminate the case; (ii) 
hypothesis-generating case studies; (iii) case studies which are designed to interrogate
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or test a theory (‘theory-infirming’ case studies); (iv) theory-confirming case studies; 
and (v) deviant case studies. 38
The three cases chosen provide good examples of being exceptions to the 
dominant perceptions across both International Relations theory and Japanese foreign 
policy analysis. These “deviant” cases cannot and should not be ignored for the sake of 
the smooth functioning of existing theories. Whilst the three examples may not be 
characteristic of Japan’s foreign policy style on average over the during the post-Second 
World War period, or typical actions of state autonomy, they are nonetheless significant 
examples that should not be ignored for the sake of analytical coherence of “typical” 
foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, a limited selection of “deviant” cases allows in- 
depth analysis and the implications for the concept of autonomy. As the discussion 
framing the central questions of the thesis demonstrates, Japan’s autonomy is exercised 
on an understated level, which has been neglected in broader analyses of Japanese 
diplomatic history. The particular examples chosen show that contrary to more common 
perceptions, Japan has in important cases, exercised a more subtle and restricted 
autonomy in its foreign policy. They illuminate both the process in which this autonomy 
has developed and its political and social context.
Japan’s relations with so-called “rogue states” other than Iran, such as Burma, or 
its autonomous initiatives on international small-arms reduction are two alternative 
examples of autonomous Japanese foreign policy initiatives. However, in terms of their 
significance vis-ä-vis the United States, the region or internationally, these examples 
face considerably less objection from the United States. They are thus less important 
instances of Japanese autonomy and for that reason were not included in this study. The 
examples also represent an emerging alternative style of Japanese diplomacy, and the 
fact that there is more than one of them suggests that it may increasingly be the shape of 
future Japanese foreign policy.
Chapter One of this thesis deals with concepts of autonomy in International 
Relations, and demonstrates that the autonomous actions of states cannot always be 
defined by “objective” criteria which motivate the state in the “reality” of the anarchic 
international environment. This is because the subjective contexts in which states 
function influence the circumstances in which states operate and define autonomy. The
38 Tom Mackie and David Marsh, “Methodological Questions: The Comparative Method” in David 
Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science, New York, St. Martin’s 
Press, 1997, p. 177.
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chosen examples demonstrate this point, as they illuminate the highly particularistic 
instances in which Japan exercises autonomy within the limits of the US-Japan alliance. 
In addition, the examples do not fit the explanations of Japan being a reactive state and 
having little autonomy, or indeed other alternative explanations which argue that Japan 
seeks to maximise its gains at the expense of the United States. As the discussion 
establishing the central questions of the thesis demonstrates, Japan’s autonomy is 
exercised on a more understated level that can go undetected in a broader analysis of 
Japanese diplomatic history. Therefore, a selection of particular examples in the post- 
1945 period will better illuminate instances of a more subtle and restricted autonomy 
that Japan exercises in its foreign policy, the process in which it is developed, and its 
political and social context.
The examples have also been chosen from relatively recent events to take into 
account Japan’s increased status, wealth, and greater potential as an international power, 
which in theory should give it more leverage and freedom in creating an autonomous 
foreign policy. It goes without saying that US-Japan relations did not begin in 1945, and 
various tensions associated with the exercise of, and resistance to, external influence 
have been evident throughout the history of the bilateral relationship. Arguably, the 
arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry on the Black Ships in 1853 (which marked the 
end of Japan’s isolationist policy and the beginning of its modernisation), can be 
interpreted as the start of a unique power relationship between Japan and the United 
States.39 However, the focus here is on events after 1945, as the post-Second World War 
period is the crucial stage in which the current and distinctly hegemonic role of the 
United States shaped the US-Japan relationship. Each example demonstrates Japanese 
policies that take an independent position from US policy, and yet at no stage do they 
signify a major rejection of US hegemony. They also show the limitations resulting 
from readjustments of the initiatives based on the expressed opinions and interests of 
the United States. This balance between independence and subordination reflects the 
more restricted form of autonomy that is the focus of this thesis.
The first example examines Japan’s oil diplomacy with Iran. While Iran maintains 
a good relationship with Japan, it has a long history of conflict with the United States. 
This example has been chosen because it provides an historical account of Japanese 
autonomous behaviour with its beginnings situated in a Cold War structure. During the
39 In 1853, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Uraga Bay and pressed for the opening of 
several Japanese ports and diplomatic relations with Japan. See Walter LaFeber, The Clash: US- 
Japanese Relations Throughout History, W. W. Norton and Company, New York, 1997, pp. 13-17.
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Cold War, Japan arguably had greater interest in adhering to US initiatives, partly 
because of its own weakness and its reliance on the US security guarantee to counter the 
Soviet threat. In more recent times, Japan has also come under pressure from the United 
States not to sign oil contracts with Iran. This is because Iran, seen by the United States 
as supporting terrorist activities, is considered a member of the “Axis of Evil”. Iran is 
now also the subject of international condemnation for its ambition to develop nuclear 
weapons.40 The example of Iran-Japanese relations highlights Japan’s dilemma over the 
political complications it faces in its relations with the United States, but also its need 
for energy security. Thus, it is a good example by which to gauge the specific issues 
over which Japan makes compromises and how it formulates autonomous foreign 
policies, particularly with regard to contentious regions such as the Middle East.
The Asian Monetary Fund example examines a policy initiative where Japan 
modified a proposal originally independent of the United States following American 
criticism. The AMF proposal was a Japanese initiative designed in 1997 as a response to 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Japan’s suggestion of establishing an alternative monetary 
fund implied that the IMF might not provide solutions best suited to the region.41 The 
United States interpreted this motion as undermining the authority of the United States 
and the IMF, and therefore strongly opposed the proposal.42 While the AMF never 
eventuated, the alternative regional monetary arrangements made in the wake of the 
proposal were modified to balance US criticism and to include the United States. In 
other words, while the original AMF model was altered because of US pressure, Japan 
nonetheless established a similar monetary system in the region, based on financial 
support at bilateral levels, and was able to fulfil the original purpose of the proposal to 
establish a regional monetary network.43 This case therefore suggests that, while an 
initiative that was out-right independent of the United States was deemed unacceptable, 
restricted Japanese autonomy was maintained by altering the proposal with similar 
functions to the AMF.
The final example of differences in US and Japanese foreign policy concerns 
Japan’s relations with North Korea. Throughout the post-1945 period, Japan’s position
40 “Japan: Resentment over US pressure on Iran oil plan”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation: Asia 
Pacific, http://www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/s949858.htm, accessed 24 September 2003.
41 Jirö Saitö and Takeshi Hamashita, Ajia Daikonran, Tokyo, NTT Shuppan, 1998, p. 402.
42 Amy E. Searight, “International Organizations” in Steven K. Vogel (ed.), US-Japan Relations in a 
Changing World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2002, pp. 160-97, p. 180.
43 Jennifer Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism? Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund”, Pacific 
Economic Papers, no. 331, September 2002, Canberra, Australia-Japan Research Centre, p. 10.
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on North Korea has been generally in support of US policy; however, there are 
significant historical and domestic reasons for their differences over engagement with 
North Korea, and perspectives on long-term goals on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, 
differences between the two allies have been pronounced since the inauguration of 
George W. Bush as President. Prior to the formation of the Bush administration and the 
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Japan supported South Korea’s “Sunshine 
Policy”,44 which was renamed “peace and prosperity policy” under President Roh Moo- 
Hyun.45 This policy rested on the idea that North Korea’s threatening posture was due to 
its insecurities about being internationally isolated. Therefore, the “Sunshine Policy” 
argued that engagement with the DPRK was essential in order to avoid nuclear 
proliferation on the peninsula. On the other hand, since George W. Bush took office in 
January 2001, the US administration has perceived engagement with North Korea as 
either being strictly in exchange for the abandonment of its hostile position or as a 
process to expose the malevolent intentions of the DPRK and take punitive action.46 The 
lukewarm response from Washington to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to 
Pyongyang in September 2002 appears to reflect differences in US and Japanese 
policies.47 However, the argument of this thesis is that Japan’s position of engagement is 
an autonomous line that takes account of the US position and is ultimately compatible 
with the hard-line stance of Washington. Therefore, this example also supports the idea 
of the pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy within the restrictions imposed by the 
hegemony of the United States.
Levels o f  Analysis
The discussion so far has briefly examined some existing analyses of Japanese foreign 
policy and, in doing so, has spoken of “Japan” as its central subject. However, is it 
appropriate or even feasible to discuss the Japanese state as a unitary actor? Structuralist 
theories, and in particular realism, are often criticised for treating the state like a “black 
box” that pursues a unified “national interest”, and for totally ignoring how domestic
44 Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over Policies 
Toward North Korea, Santa Monica, RAND, 2002, pp. 23-31.
45 See Kang In-Duk, “Toward Peace and Prosperity: The New Government’s North Korea Policy”, East 
Asian Review, vol. 15, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 3-18.
46 Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81. no. 3, May/June 2002, pp. 79- 
92, p. 82.
47 “Koizumi’s Dangerous Gambit”, Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 165, Issue 36, 12 September 
2002, p. 8; David Pilling, “Japan engagement pledge may worry US: Koizumi vows to revive stalled 
talks with N Korea”, Financial Times (London), 16 December 2002; James Dao, “Korean Issue 
Shapes Powell’s Asia Agenda”, The New York Times, 21 February 2003, p. 17.
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interests affect decisions at the international level. Those who are critical of the state as 
a unitary actor often explain Japan’s international behaviour through the lens of 
domestic ministries and party factions, 48 or argue that a predictable domestic political 
environment gives the bureaucracy its efficiency, legitimacy and the power to influence 
foreign policy. 49 It is true that domestic politics, as an explanation of international 
behaviour, incorporates the distinctive domestic contexts of policies often overlooked in 
realist theory. However, these domestic-focused theories also often treat the government, 
party politics or various ministerial interests like a “black box” for processing domestic 
interests and fall short of being a comprehensive explanation for those situations where 
there are strong international pressures or dramatic changes in the international 
environment.
One theory that seeks to reconcile the domestic and structural analyses is Robert 
D. Putnam’s two-level games approach. In this bargaining model, Putnam argues that 
domestic and international influence flow both ways in international policy 
negotiations. 50 Leonard J. Schoppa draws on Putnam’s model and expands it by arguing 
that Putnam’s model is not comprehensive in its examination of the Level I 
(international negotiations) and Level II (domestic negotiations) interactions, and 
consequently does not explain how, in the particular case of the US-Japan negotiations 
for the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), foreign pressure (gaiatsu) from the 
United States was successful only in some areas and not in others. 51 Schoppa presents a 
more refined model which takes into account efforts to reshape both US and Japanese 
domestic politics to their respective advantages through strategies such as the 
internationalisation of domestic issues or by drawing media attention to certain issues. 
He argues that the internationalisation of domestic issues emphasises the importance of 
maintaining smooth relations between the United States and Japan on the one hand, 
while media attention can be used to deliver gaiatsu issues to the wider public and, in 
some cases, mobilise sentiments sympathetic to gaiatsu?2
48 T.J. Pempel, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: The Domestic Bases for International Behaviour”, 
International Organization, vol. 31, no. 4, Autumn 1977, pp. 723-74, Nester, The Foundation of 
Japanese Power.
49 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982.
50 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,” International 
Organization, vol. 42, no. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 427-60.
51 Leonard J. Schoppa, “Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan 
in Some Cases but not Others,” International Organization, vol. 47, no. 3, Summer, 1993, pp. 353- 
86 .
52 Schoppa, “Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes”, p. 384.
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This study of Japanese foreign policy does not suggest that domestic influences 
are unimportant: it recognises that these elements have significant influence on the 
outcome of negotiations and policies. Consequently, domestic pressures and interests 
are mentioned in the analyses where they are significant. However, while there may be 
conflicting interests between ministries and factions within the Japanese government, or 
particular politicians and bureaucrats behind certain policies, ultimately a consensus is 
generated between the parties involved to form a policy that represents a position of the 
Japanese government. Whoever influences and decides policies, once a policy position 
is reached, it is ultimately the state which implements it. Furthermore, the primary focus 
of this study is state autonomy in the external relations between Japan and the United 
States. Therefore, in order to maintain this focus, when referring to “Japan”, the 
discussion does not necessarily assume a unitary actor, but views “Japan” as the 
representation of the final outcome of two-level dynamics such as argued by Schoppa, 
and that the domestic and national interests are both incorporated in policies that Japan 
makes on the international level.
Structure of the Thesis
As well as this introduction and a conclusion, the thesis contains six core chapters. 
Chapter One explores the broader theoretical issues of hegemony and autonomy in 
International Relations in order to define the use of the two concepts in the discipline, 
and locate the deficiencies in the theoretical literature when explaining Japanese foreign 
policy. Chapter Two then tracks the establishment of US hegemony in the latter half of 
the 20th century in order to decipher the precise characteristics of US hegemony and the 
impact and constraints it had on emerging Japanese foreign policy. Chapter Three 
discusses how state autonomy is perceived in Japanese political philosophy by both the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the academic field of Japanese foreign 
policy analysis. The final three chapters of this thesis present three examples of 
autonomy in Japanese foreign policy, in addition to analysing what autonomy means in 
these contexts and how it is pursued. Chapter Four deals with Japan’s relations with 
Iran; Chapter Five investigates the AMF proposal; and Chapter Six considers Japan’s 
relations with North Korea. The conclusion summarises the findings, reiterates the main 
arguments, and comments on the implications for both Japanese foreign policy analysis 
and International Relations theory.
CHAPTER ONE
CONCEPTS OF HEGEMONY AND AUTONOMY
To begin the investigation of limited and restricted autonomy in Japanese foreign policy, 
this chapter analyses the concept of hegemony and autonomy in International Relations 
theory. It firstly surveys the literature to elicit the varying accounts of hegemony, its 
characteristics and consequences, and then establishes a definition of hegemony. It 
secondly discusses theories of state sovereignty in order to demonstrate how autonomy 
is often overlooked as a central theme for discussion and then draws a definition of 
autonomy in International Relations from the discussion of sovereignty. It is important 
to grasp a clear notion of the theoretical context in which these two concepts are 
situated and define them at this stage, as their definition supports the task of 
illuminating the character of US hegemony, which forms the historical and social 
background to the larger question of how Japanese autonomy is defined and pursued in 
its foreign policy.
This study defines hegemony fairly conventionally as a situation when a hegemon 
is powerful enough and willing to maintain the essential rules governing the interstate 
relations of subordinate states, and also has the compliance of these states in supporting 
this position. However, this chapter demonstrates and defines differences in the 
perception of hegemony between Japan and the United States, and how this also 
influences their perceptions of autonomy. Whilst having the support of the majority of 
states in the international system as the hegemon, the United States perceives an 
anarchic international system, and therefore remains vigilant and cautious of the 
behaviour and actions of other states. Japan, on the other hand, firstly views itself as 
being clearly subordinate to the United States and, secondly, sees challenging the 
United States as being counterproductive. These two perceptions of US hegemony lead 
to two very different anticipations of autonomy, with the United States perceiving a 
narrower margin of autonomy than Japan.
The definition of autonomy, on the other hand, is more complex, and thus the 
discussion of the concept in this chapter is restricted to how sovereignty and autonomy 
are conceptualised in International Relations theory. Rationalist and non-rationalist 
analyses of sovereignty are examined and, as mentioned briefly in the Introduction, 
autonomy is defined as the liberty of a state, which enables it to exercise control over its
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allocation of resources and choice of government.1 However, these theories reveal the 
many rationalist biases hidden in this conception. Non-rationalist theories help to 
dismantle these biases, but a more detailed discussion of Japanese conceptions of 
autonomy and its definition is contained in Chapter Three.
This chapter is divided into two parts, dealing first with hegemony and then with 
autonomy. The first section on hegemony surveys realist, liberal and Gramscian theories 
of hegemony. It then discusses concepts of legitimacy and the relationship that it has to 
hegemony and how this is an enduring and defining characteristic of post-1945 US 
hegemony. The discussion also draws on the theory of hierarchy as a means of 
describing international relations in the Asian region, and discusses the similarities and 
differences between hierarchy and hegemony. The section concludes with a critical 
analysis of the theories and a definition of hegemony as it is used in this thesis. The 
second section on autonomy deals with how the concept is discussed in International 
Relations theory by drawing on theories of sovereignty. It analyses how rationalist 
theories discuss sovereignty and compares sovereignty to David Held’s theory of 
autonomy and nautonomy, before moving beyond rationalist theories to conclude with a 
discussion of non-rationalist theories and finally a definition of autonomy.
Definition of Hegemony
Theories of hegemony can be categorised as those that focus predominantly on the 
behaviour of a hegemon, and those that shed light on how the lesser states might 
perceive hegemony. In recognition of these differences, this thesis gives both a single 
definition of hegemony and two different perceptions of the hegemonic international 
system. Hegemony in international relations is defined as a situation when “one state 
has a preponderance of material resources”2 and “is powerful enough to maintain the 
essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so”3. In addition to this, it 
is important to add that the hegemon is also seen as having won the consensus of 
subordinate states to be in this position, and therefore hegemony also sources its power 
from legitimacy. This distinguishes hegemony from simple dominance and, thus, 
hegemony is based on a broad consensus internationally that a dominant power should, 
and can, take leadership in world order.4
1 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, pp. 235-36.
2 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 32.
3 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 44.
4 Cox with Sinclair, Approaches to World Orders, p. 120.
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In the context of US-Japan relations, it is important to distinguish between two 
perceptions of hegemony in the context of studying Japanese autonomy: firstly, how the 
United States perceives international relations under hegemonic leadership; and 
secondly the nature of the hegemonic international system as Japan perceives it, 
particularly in its alliance relationship with the United States. These different 
perceptions of hegemony are important, as they significantly influence Japan’s 
perceptions of boundaries of autonomous foreign policy, and are therefore crucial in 
delineating a Japanese autonomy that is more limited and restricted than conventionally 
assumed in International Relations theory.
The hegemon, in this case the United States, perceives its surroundings as an 
anarchic international order where states are in competition with each other and act on 
self-help and self-preservation principles. As a result, while it exercises political, 
economic and moral leadership as best it can through legitimate means and by 
encouraging lesser states to socialise into hegemonic norms, the United States is also 
highly attentive of how and when its hegemony might be undermined. Consequently, it 
is cautious of subordinate state behaviour that might indicate opposition to its 
hegemonic values and interests. Despite having won the consent of subordinate states, 
the hegemon views the emergent hegemonic international system as being 
fundamentally anarchic, and the uncertainties typified by realist analyses of 
international relations do not totally dissipate for the central power.
The second perception of the hegemonic international system is that of the 
subordinate state—in this case Japan. In practice, Japan’s perception of international 
relations under hegemony is different from that of the United States. While the United 
States views the international system as being anarchic and being one of many equal 
states, Japan sees an international system that is closer to David C. Kang’s theory of 
hierarchy.5 Japan regards itself as clearly subordinate to the hegemon and perceives 
challenging the hegemon as counterproductive. The argument of this chapter is that 
these two different views emerge from Japan’s loss in the Second World War, and its 
recognition and socialisation into subsequent post-1945 hegemonic norms. It argues that 
Japan assumes that it need not always defer to the hegemon on all issues based on its 
comprehensive appreciation of this asymmetrical power relation, and that greater 
autonomy can therefore be exercised.
5 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, pp. 163-89.
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As a result, the hegemon sees the world as an anarchic international order, and 
assumes that subordinate states have been socialised to accept the values and norms of 
the hegemon. However, because its worldview is predominantly influenced by anarchy6 
and a stronger perception of the equality of states, the hegemon believes that 
subordinate states are likely to take actions motivated by self-help that may eventually 
seek to challenge the hegemon. Therefore, the hegemon perceives a need to exercise 
caution and coercion, even though it is the central global power and interprets divergent 
subordinate state behaviour with suspicion and with greater sensitivity. By contrast, this 
thesis argues that subordinate states perceive a hegemonic system closer to Kang’s 
theory of hierarchy, which concedes the global preponderance of the hegemon. 7 Because 
a subordinate state recognises itself as lower in the pecking order instead of an equal 
sovereign state, it participates in greater incidents of policy deference. However, 
subordinate states also see themselves as being less threatening to the central power, and 
thus perceive greater scope for autonomy; yet this does not necessarily mean a 
challenge to the authority or centrality of the hegemon.
Theories o f Hegemony in International Relations
Works representative of realist, English School, liberal institutionalist and Gramscian 
analyses of hegemony are Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics, Martin 
Wight’s Power Politics, Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in 
World Politics, Robert O. Keohane’s After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy, and Robert W. Cox’s “Social forces, States, and World 
Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”. These theories are all helpful when 
considering the nature of US leadership, the various stages it moved through in 
international relations in the latter half of the twentieth century, and what this reflects on 
the nature of hegemony itself. Three more recent evaluations of hegemony by G. John 
Ikenberry, Christian Reus-Smit and Mlada Bukovansky are then examined for the light 
that they shed on the importance of legitimacy in maintaining hegemony. An analysis of 
these works is important for this study, as it is necessary to clarify the characteristics of 
US hegemony in order to accurately explain the context in which Japanese autonomy is 
conducted and how this context influences its autonomy or the lack of it. A detailed 
analysis of hegemony and legitimacy also serves to reject the realist argument that
6 Anarchy in International Relations does not imply chaos and the breakdown of order, but the absence 
of political authority in a system of states.
7 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 168.
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hegemony can be established and sustained on material resources alone. US hegemony 
is instead strongly dependent on the consent of other states and their perceptions of the 
exercise of US power as being legitimate.
After the discussion of hegemony, an analysis of David C. Kang’s non-Westem 
view of international relations is examined. Kang’s theory does not assume equality of 
states and a state of constant conflict, but instead presents a model of hierarchy to 
explain the international relations of Asia. Kang argues that hierarchy involves “a 
central power that still operates in anarchy, but does not cause other nations to balance 
against the largest power in the system, and does not fold them under its wing in 
empire”8. Drawing from this, it is argued below that, whilst the hegemonic power does 
include subordinate states in a sphere of influence or an informal empire, it perceives a 
world of anarchy amongst equal states. At the same time, the lesser states are more 
influenced by the order of hegemony, and less influenced by an anarchic view of the 
world. In other words, if the United States has one perception of its position in the 
world, then other subordinate states—including Japan—have another perception of the 
world. This leads to different expectations regarding behaviour and, consequently, 
differences in views on the boundaries of autonomy in hegemonic relationships like that 
which exists between the United States and Japan.
A Realist Theory o f Hegemony
Robert Gilpin presents a realist explanation of hegemony and his analysis maintains that 
states make strategic calculations of national interest, and that powerful states create the 
international system to rationally advance their selfish political, economic or other types 
of interests. 9 Gilpin defines hegemony simply “from the Greek, [which] refers to the 
leadership of one state (the hegemon) over other states in the system. ” 10 His actual 
theory suggests that it is much more. Hegemony as perceived by realists is summarised 
more eloquently by Owen Harries:
What exactly does [hegemony] mean? If, like me, you depend mainly on the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, you will find that the only definition it gives is, in its 
entirety, ‘leadership, especially by one state of a confederacy’. As far as its current 
usage in international politics is concerned, this is not very helpful...hegemony
8 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166
9 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, 
p. 9.
10 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 116n.
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implies domination, not merely leadership— domination resulting from superior 
power."
In other words, realist theorists argue that the hegemon exerts leadership and 
dominates an international system based on its material preponderance—particularly in 
terms of military capacity.
Gilpin’s theory of hegemony and international change is based on five 
assumptions about the behaviour of the state. Firstly, he theorises that the international 
system will remain stable if member states see no profit in challenging the existing 
international structure. 12 In other words, the balance of power and the hegemonic 
position of a dominant state will be maintained if there are no shifts in state interests and 
state capacity. Secondly, a state will only challenge the international system if the 
benefits are perceived likely to outweigh the costs. 13 Thirdly, Gilpin theorises that a state 
will seek to change the international system through territorial, political and economic 
expansion, until the costs outweigh the benefits. 14 While Gilpin stipulates that territorial 
expansion is less likely in current international relations, he argues that this in itself 
does not mean that the “imperialist impulse” has been eradicated from international 
relations; rather, that specific environmental circumstances make territorial expansion 
less profitable. 15 Therefore, Gilpin argues that, when the environmental elements 
become favourable and there is sufficient domestic initiative, it cannot be ruled out that 
dominant powers might once again turn to territorial expansion. The post-Second World 
War strategy of the United States, including its stationing of military bases in Europe 
and Asia, and its temporary occupation of countries like Iraq, are the more common 
forms of “temporary territorial expansion” in recent international relations. Fourthly, 
once equilibrium between the cost and benefits of further change and expansion is 
reached, Gilpin argues that the economic costs of maintaining the newly established 
status quo rises faster than the economic capacity to support it. 16 Finally, when the 
balance of power is destabilised, it will be re-established through a redistribution of 
power. 17 If the disequilibrium between the costs and the benefits of maintaining the 
international system is not resolved, the system will change, resulting in a new
11 Owen Harries, Benign or Imperial?: Reflections on American Hegemony, Sydney, ABC Books, 
2001, pp. 3-4.
12 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 50.
13 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 50.
14 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 106.
15 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 110.
16 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 156.
17 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 186.
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equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power. 18 Based on these five principles, 
Gilpin argues that hegemonic stability is maintained until the next hegemon rises, and 
changes occur through major international conflict, or what he terms “hegemonic 
wars” 19
The complexity and success of US hegemony cannot be discussed without 
addressing the concept of legitimacy. Gilpin deals with this concept in his theory, but 
only within the context of realist representations of state behaviour as represented in his 
five assumptions. He addresses legitimacy through the concept of prestige, which 
indicates recognition of power and legitimacy as a dominant state. 20 Power for Gilpin 
refers to the economic, military and related capabilities of a state, whereas prestige 
refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and 
its ability and willingness to exercise its power. Gilpin goes so far as to say that “in the 
first place, although prestige is largely a function of economic and military capabilities, 
it is achieved primarily through successful use of power, and especially through victory 
in war. ” 21 Gilpin therefore essentially argues that the hierarchy of prestige in an 
international system ultimately rests on economic and military power. A dominant state 
will often promote its interests through a particular religion or ideology that presents 
dominant state interests as public goods (such as international stability, economic 
order) . 22 Based on this prestige, the lesser states in an international system follow the 
leadership of more powerful states, in part because they accept the legitimacy and utility 
of the existing order, but also because they prefer the certainty of the status quo to the 
uncertainties of change. 23
There are several shortcomings to Gilpin’s assumptions about state behaviour and, 
as a consequence, the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Firstly, in arguing that 
hegemonic change is only achieved through major international conflict, Gilpin’s theory 
immediately loses explanatory power when considering the end of the Cold War. To 
begin with, the Cold War involved two hegemons exercising preponderance over their 
respective spheres of influence and, more importantly, the end of the ideological 
conflict and the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon did not involve a 
major hegemonic war.
18 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 10-11.
19 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 199-200.
20 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 30-31.
21 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 32.
22 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 30.
23 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 30.
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Secondly, and more relevantly to this discussion of Japan’s autonomous foreign 
policy under US hegemony, is that the behaviour of states on which Gilpin bases his 
theory of hegemony does not accord with the state actions of Japan. For example, within 
the US sphere of interest, during the 1980s Takashi Inoguchi anticipated a scenario of 
“bigemony”, with two hegemons— the United States and Japan.24 In other words, 
Gilpin’s theory failed to take into account the increase of Japanese power under US 
hegemony that did not attempt to “change the rules governing the international system, 
the division of the spheres of influence.. .and the international distribution of territory”25. 
If Gilpin’s theory is to be followed, he would argue that increases in Japan’s 
international power would signify a shift in a state’s interest and capacity, and would 
therefore influence the balance of power, and that Japan would seek to do this because it 
perceives that the benefits of challenging the United States outweigh the costs. This was 
clearly not what Japan was trying to achieve. Consequently, Gilpin’s five assumptions 
of state behaviour neither accurately describe Japanese state behaviour nor accurately 
portray the complexities of US hegemony in which Japan functions.
Thirdly, in relation to Gilpin’s notion of status, the discussion on legitimacy later 
in this chapter reveals that the US hegemony in which Japan exercises its foreign policy 
bases its legitimacy on more than the economic and material preponderance upon which 
Gilpin bases his notion of status. This factor also makes Gilpin’s analysis of hegemony 
in International Relations unsuitable in characterising US hegemony in this thesis.
English School Theories o f Hegemony
Another school of thought incorporating realist perceptions of power and state 
behaviour is the English School. English School theorist Martin Wight is not a realist in 
his analysis of international relations; rather, he argues that accuracy of analysis in 
international politics is best derived from a debate between Machiavellian, Grotian and 
Kantian traditions.26 The fundamental difference between the realist and English school
24 Takashi Inoguchi, “Four Scenarios for the Future”, The International Relations o f Japan, Kathleen 
Newland (ed.), London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 211.
25 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 187.
26 Martin Wight, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, London, Leicester 
University Press, 1995, p. 19. Niccolo Machiavelli is a classical realist who argues that state leaders 
need to practise a different code of ethics in order to achieve maximum state interests, and is highly 
sceptical of good human nature. Hugo Grotius, who is considered the “father of international law”, 
argued that war could be restricted by clarifying acceptable standards of conduct that could govern 
the relations between all independence states regardless of religious doctrines. Immanuel Kant was a 
liberal internationalist thinker of the Enlightenment period, who argued that “perpetual peace” could 
be achieved by changing individual consciousness, enforcing republican constitutionalism and a 
federal contract between states to abolish war. See Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by
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perspectives of the balance of power is that English school theorists argue that states 
must want a balance of power to work, and must be committed to making the state 
system work. Consequently, the international society within anarchy, which the English 
school argues, is created on norm-based relationships. 27 Wight’s discussion is an 
important example of theories that emphasise the importance of material power and his 
interpretation of international relations and hegemony is similar to realist theories:
The most conspicuous theme in international history is not the growth of 
internationalism. It is the series of efforts, by one power after another, to gain 
mastery of the states-system—efforts that have been defeated only by a coalition of 
the majority of other powers at the cost of an exhausting general war.28
Wight refers to hegemons as “dominant powers”—states that exercise territorial 
and ideological aggrandisement and hold authority over a “limited range of influence”29, 
such as the position of superpowers in their various spheres of influence during the Cold 
War. They appeal to “some design of international unity and solidarity”30, which 
suggests the relevance of legitimacy in claiming the position of hegemon. Like Gilpin’s 
theory, Wight maintains that the dominant power is usually challenged by a coalition of 
states through violence and war; however, ideally, a hegemon “can confidently 
contemplate war against any likely combination of other powers” . 31 When there is no 
dominant power, that international order is managed by a club of “great powers”.
Unfortunately, like Gilpin’s theory, Wight’s argument over-emphasises the 
importance of material power, despite alluding to other factors such as legitimacy. 
Furthermore, Wight’s discussion of international relations is largely about state 
behaviour in historical and contemporary Europe and, consequently, is not always 
relevant to the predominance of one global superpower that we see in post-Cold War 
international relations.
Another thinker from the English School, Eledley Bull, maintains that balance of 
power ensures that no one state has a universal empire, which informs his perceptions of 
hegemony. 32 Like Wight, Bull is not a realist, but argues that a society of states with
Harvey C. Mansfield, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998; Hugo Grotius, The Rights o f  War 
and Peace, translated by A. C. Campbell, New York, M. Walter Dunne, 1901, and Immanuel Kant, 
Perpetual Peace, edited by Lewis White Beck, New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1957.
27 Wight, Power Politics, p. 19; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World 
Politics, London, Macmillan, 1985, p. 106.
28 Wight, Power Politics, p. 30.
29 Wight, Power Politics, p. 36, 41.
30 Wight, Power Politics, p. 36.
31 Wight, Power Politics, p. 52.
32 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 106.
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common values and institutions is possible within anarchy. Thus, he perceives 
international relations as having features of realism—for example, anarchy, balance of 
power and war—but bound and guided by liberal and pluralist values:
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.33
Bull essentially argues that the balance of power between states not only protects 
international society from a preponderant universal power, but also “serves to protect 
the independence of states in particular areas from absorption and domination” and 
provides “the conditions in which other institutions on which international order 
depends (diplomacy, war, international law, great power management) ” . 34
However, Bull argues that, within a system of complex balance of power, there 
can be dominant and subordinate balances of power, where some balances have effects 
greater than others. 35 He states that, historically, the needs of greater powers have been 
maintained through the absorption and partition of weaker states, and that “the needs of 
the dominant balance must take precedence over those of subordinate balances” 36 in 
order to maintain the balance of power, which Bull sees as the guardian of the state- 
system. The international order that the great powers maintain “is their preferred order, 
and there are always forces abroad in the international system that will seek to replace 
this order with one that will embody some different values. ” 37 More importantly, the 
position of guardianship that the great powers have is based on an acceptability of their 
authority and special privileges to other states. 38 In other words, Bull recognised that, in 
order for great powers to maintain international order, they require legitimacy in the 
eyes of other states. Furthermore, this legitimate recognition of the greater powers’ 
status means that the international order they maintain “[embodies] a principle of 
hierarchy that [is] at loggerheads with the principle of equal sovereignty of states” . 39
33 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13.
34 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 106-107.
35 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 102-103.
36 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 108.
37 Hedley Bull, “The Great Irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order”, 
International Journal, vol. 25, 1980, pp. 439-A7, p. 440.
38 Bull, “The Great Irresponsibles?”, p. 441.
39 Bull, “The Great Irresponsibles?”, p. 441.
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Bull argues that hegemony is one type of influence exerted by great powers. He 
describes hegemonic power as being between dominance40 and primacy41 as follows:
Where a great power exercises hegemony over the lesser powers in a particular 
area or constellation, there is resort to force and the threat of force, but this is not 
habitual and uninhibited but occasional and reluctant. The great power prefers to 
rely upon instruments other than the direct use or threat of force, and will employ 
the latter only in situations of extremity and with a sense that in doing so it is 
incurring a political cost. The great power is ready to violate the rights of 
sovereignty, equality and independence enjoyed by the lesser states, but it does not 
disregard them; it recognises that these rights exists, and justifies violation of them 
by appeal to some specific overriding principle. As Georg Schwarzenberger has 
written, hegemony is ‘imperialism with good manners’ .42
The reality of international relations is that the balance of power has done little to 
protect weaker states from economic absorption and domination in the context of a 
globalised economy, which is a major feature of hegemony today. Given this enduring 
feature of US hegemony, Bull’s belief that the normative commitment of states to 
maintain a particular balance of power for the sake of an international society seems to 
speak largely to the analysis of why dominant powers take particular decisions, but does 
not sufficiently explain why subordinate states would choose to defer to the leadership 
of a hegemon and submit to the status quo.43 As this thesis focuses on why Japan 
chooses to restrict its autonomy in its foreign policy under US hegemony, this 
deficiency in Bull’s theory is particularly significant and diminishes its utility.
However, Bull’s challenging of the principle of the equality through the 
recognition of hierarchy amongst states is an important one, and relates to the argument 
that Japan’s identity, interests and foreign policy are tied to its perception of being a 
subordinate state under US hegemony. Yet, because the foundation of Bull’s theory is 
anarchy, it assumes that this unequal order is constantly under threat and that other great 
powers will seek to challenge this order. In this context, Japan is described as being “a 
potential...power”,44 thus implying it has some potential of challenging international 
order in the future. Nevertheless, post-1945 history suggests that it can be more
40 Bull defines dominance as “the habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states 
compromising its hinterland, and by habitual disregard of the universal norms of interstate behaviour 
that confer rights of sovereignty, equality and independence upon these states”. See Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, p. 214.
41 Bull argues “[a] great power’s preponderance in relation to a group of lesser states takes the form of 
primacy when it is achieved without any resort to force or the threat of force, and with no more than 
the ordinary degree of disregard for norms of sovereignty, equality and independence.” See Bull, The 
Anarchical Society, p. 214.
42 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 215-16.
43 Hidemi Suganami, “On Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society”, 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/suganami-bull01.htm, accessed 7 February 2006.
44 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 112.
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accurately described as a state that accepts the legitimate authority of the great powers, 
like the lesser states. Thus, while Bull’s theory is more perceptive than realist theory, it 
does not quite present a basis for an accurate account of Japan’s position under US 
hegemony.
A Liberal Theory o f Hegemony
While liberal theorists emphasise the potential for co-operation amongst states and are 
concerned with the concepts of norms and the creation of regimes over time, they are 
not totally critical of realism and therefore more or less base their arguments about 
hegemony on a similar view of hegemonic stability. 45 Therefore, while the concept of 
power remains relatively similar to realist assumptions of “power as a simple 
capability” , 46 liberal theories of hegemony also touch on issues of “power as 
legitimacy” 47 and the potential for power to be constituted in institutions and processes 
of co-operation of individual actors.
Keohane defines hegemony as being when “one state is powerful enough to 
maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so” 48 He 
maintains that “hegemony is defined as [a] preponderance of material resources” 49 more 
in an economic context, but importantly argues that strength itself does not 
automatically create incentives to project a hegemon’s power abroad. A key theme in 
his book is international order and co-operation after hegemony. However, while he 
disagrees with the view that non-hegemonic states are victims within a hegemonic 
international structure as often portrayed by Marxists, Keohane uses the Gramscian 
meaning of hegemony, where it does not simply mean dominance, but power that 
involves consensus:
Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between 
objective material forces and ethico-political ideas—in Marxian terms, a unity of 
structure and superstructure—in which power based on dominance over production 
is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus 
between dominant and subordinate groups. A hegemonial structure of world order 
is one in which power takes a primarily consensual form, as distinguished from a
45 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 3 1^48.
46 Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, pp. 43-44.
47 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, pp. 43^44.
48 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 44.
Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 32.49
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non-hegemonic order in which there are manifestly rival powers and no power has
been able to establish the legitimacy of its dominance.50
Keohane’s theory of hegemony rejects realist assumptions that co-operation can 
only emerge in conflict situations as strategic alliances, and emphasises the importance 
of international institutions that can benefit a system and other states. Drawing from 
institutionalist theory, Keohane maintains that the increase of interdependence would 
create a greater need for co-operation, whereas realists argue that the diffusion of power 
would cause instability.
As a consequence, Keohane dismisses the two major assumptions of realist 
hegemonic stability theory—firstly, that a single dominant power typically creates 
world order, and secondly that the maintenance of this order, including the maintenance 
of international regimes, requires continued hegemony.51 Keohane argues that the 
dominance of one power may contribute to co-operation and order, but a single power 
does not necessarily guarantee this. In other words, material predominance (such as 
control over raw materials, sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive 
advantages in the production of highly valued goods) alone does not guarantee either 
stability or effective leadership.52
Firstly, Keohane argues that leadership and a position of power does not 
automatically follow material capabilities, because a hegemon depends on certain forms 
of asymmetrical co-operation from other members of the order—the hegemon provides 
its partners with leadership in return for deference, but it cannot make and enforce rules 
without a certain degree o f consent from other sovereign states.™ Therefore, the 
hegemon must be willing to potentially invest resources in institutions to ensure that its 
preferred rules will guide the behaviour of other countries.54 This creates the greater 
component to hegemony, order and co-operation.
Secondly, he argues that realist hegemonic stability theory does not explain 
situations when hegemony erodes. Keohane raises the example of the increases in co­
operation during the hegemonic decline of the 1960s and 1970s (as seen in the 
deterioration of the Bretton Woods system) and that co-operation does not necessarily
50 Robert W. Cox, “Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory”, 
Journal o f International Studies, Millennium, vol. 10, no. 2, Summer, 1981, pp. 126-55, p. 153, as 
quoted in Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 44-45.
51 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 32-39.
52 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 32-39.
33 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 49.
54 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 177-81.
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require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have been 
established. 55 Despite originating from hegemonic interests, Keohane argues that 
international institutions are largely collectively beneficial enough to withstand the 
decline of hegemonic support. Patterns of co-operation persist in the face of declining 
hegemony, because regimes perform functions demanded by states with shared 
interests. Therefore, Keohane argues that a liberal monetary regime was maintained 
after the end of pegged exchange rates, despite it being weaker and with less explicit 
rules. 56 Keohane thus attributes the deficiency in the analytical power of hegemonic 
stability theory to the lack of recognition of international institutions that foster and 
shape patterns of co-operation.
Like Keohane’s argument of the resilience of international institutions and 
regimes, John Gerard Ruggie argues that the sources of power and the purposes of 
institutions do not necessarily co-vary, and that changes in the power of the hegemon do 
not necessarily mean changes in regimes. 57 Ruggie argues that the rules and procedures 
in achieving these goals may change, but the fundamental normative framework of the 
regime does not and it is therefore possible for regimes to hold shared and constant 
purposes beyond the influence of a hegemon. 58 He uses the example of the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
Keohane’s theory of hegemony is a compelling one and, by including the 
importance of consensus from other states in his explanation, he gives hegemony depth 
beyond an explanation focused on leadership through material preponderance. While 
US hegemony did not continue to decline as much as Keohane may have originally 
anticipated, 59 the institutional manifestation of US hegemony in the Japanese context— 
the US-Japan alliance—and also other alliances in Europe such as North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), have endured beyond its Cold War purpose, signifying the 
continued relevance and importance of US hegemony for these regions.
Keohane’s theory is more inclusive of the role other states play in supporting and 
maintaining hegemony, because the main objective of his theory is to highlight its co-
53 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 141-43.
56 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 209, 215.
37 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order”, International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 379-415, p. 
384.
38 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 384.
39 The argument of this thesis is that, while there was a perceived relative decline in US power during 
the 1970s and 1980s, US hegemony remained relatively stable throughout the Cold War period, and 
regained strength after the Cold War. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.
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operative and multi-state aspects. However, by rejecting that states under hegemony are 
not necessarily victims of the hegemonic system, he underplays the power inequalities 
that exist in reality. By contrast, Bull’s theory pointed to the idea of hierarchy. While 
the argument of this thesis is also not to portray Japan as a state manipulated under US 
hegemony, it does argue that Japan’s loss in the Second World War is the departure 
point for socialisation into US hegemony. These beginnings give Japan a unique 
position and role within US hegemony that was bom out of distinctly unequal power 
relations whose effects should not be under-emphasised. Therefore, when assessing US 
hegemony in this study, a theory is required that not only accounts for these greater 
power inequalities, but also examines their influences on state behaviour.
Gramscian Theory and Hegemony
Like Gilpin and Keohane, Cox’s discussion of hegemony also centres on international 
political economy. He draws on Marxism and Gramsci’s conception of hegemony. 
Unlike the Marxist usage of the term “hegemony”, which suggested the political 
leadership of the proletariat, Gramsci’s perception of hegemony focused on the 
domination of capitalist bourgeois culture that was entrenched in the politics and 
economics of society. He maintained that these values had permeated to such an extent 
as to have become normalised These bourgeois hegemonic values became the values of 
the working class, preventing the inevitable socialist revolution that Marxist theorists 
had predicted. 60 Cox draws on this conception of hegemony, and applies it to 
international political and economic relations as well as to world order.
Cox describes hegemony as involving a state founding and protecting “a world 
order which was universal in conception; in other words, not an order in which one state 
directly exploits others but an order which most other states (or at least those within 
reach of hegemony) could find compatible with their interest. ” 61 This entailed the 
dominance of a state in a world order based on an internationalisation of production. 
Cox theorised that the internationalisation of production would create social classes that 
support the dominant mode of production within a state, which creates and controls 
social institutions, culture and technology. 62 These social mechanisms would eventually
60 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1998, pp. 261-64. Also see “Gramsci, 
hegemony and international relations: an essay in method”, in Robert Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, 
Approaches to World Order, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 124-43, pp. 125-26.
61 Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders”, p. 136.
62 Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders”, p. 136.
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transcend the state and be emulated by other states, thereby establishing a hegemonic 
order on a world scale.
Cox argued that the hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon 
the regulation of inter-state conflict, but also upon a globally conceived civil society. 
This necessitates world hegemony as being a social, economic and political order that 
manifests itself through universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which strives to 
bring about links among social classes across countries. International norms and 
institutions become the rules of behaviour for states and the domestic forces which 
support the dominant mode of production, therefore becoming tools of the hegemonic 
structure.63
...Indeed, international organization functions as the process through which the 
institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. Among the features of 
international organizations which express its hegemonic role are the following: (1) 
the institutions embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic 
world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world orders;
(3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the 
elites from peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb counterhegemonic ideas.64
Under a fully developed hegemony, a “war of movement”65— such as the Russian 
Revolution— can achieve change with little resistance from civil society. However, in 
states where capitalist hegemony prevails, a war of movement would face resistance 
from civil society, which is embedded with hegemonic values, and it would most likely 
prove unsuccessful. Thus, Gramsci and Cox argue that hegemonic change can only 
occur when sufficient support is gained for a war of position “which slowly builds up 
the strength of the social foundations of a new state”.66 This means creating alternative 
institutions and intellectual resources within the existing hegemony, while resisting the 
pressures and temptations to relapse back into the framework of bourgeois hegemony.67
The argument of this thesis is that the idea of US hegemony has become so 
normal for Japan, that its alliance with the United States is the very starting point of its 
foreign policy and, therefore, that Gramsci and Cox’s theories describe well the extent 
to which Japan has socialised US hegemonic ideas into its own domestic values and 
policies. Also, unlike the theories of hegemony previously discussed, Gramscian
63 Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders”, p. 137.
64 Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders”, pp. 137-38.
65 A “war of movement” in this case was where a small and disciplined group of the working class led 
the underdeveloped civil society to overwhelm and takeover the state. See Cox, “Gramsci, hegemony 
and international relations”, p. 128.
66 Cox, “Gramsci, hegemony and international relations”, p. 128.
67 Cox, “Gramsci, hegemony and international relations”, p. 129.
CHAPTER ONE 38
theories of hegemony focus on the effect that hegemony has on subordinate states and, 
as such, have benefits for this study. However, because it interprets subordinate states 
largely as victims that have been hoodwinked into hegemony, it does not leave much 
room for interpretations of autonomous action by these states, other than in the context 
of war of movement. The examples of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six demonstrate that, while Japan is embedded in US hegemony, Japan’s 
actions do not necessarily translate to war of movement initiatives, which makes 
Gramsci and Cox’s theories unsuitable for this study of Japanese autonomy.
The survey of realist, English School, liberal and Gramscian theories of hegemony 
helped to identify the difference between dominance and hegemony. Hegemony from 
the realist theoretical point of view was based on the material preponderance of a single 
state that was constantly under threat from rival challenges in an international system of 
anarchy. Liberal theorists perceived a similar situation of hegemony—dominance of one 
state—but argued very different outcomes of this hegemony. Keohane argued that 
international institutions, which were originally established under hegemony, could be 
sustained even after the demise of the hegemon, suggesting that hegemony was based 
on a consensus of common goals to a certain extent, and that co-operation was not 
always contingent on the continued presence of a dominant state. Gramscian theories 
argued that hegemony was based on the political, economic, social and ideological 
domination of one state or class that manifested itself through universal norms, 
institutions and mechanisms.
However, given that the central task of this study is to explain the autonomous 
actions of subordinate states under hegemony, all these theories are limited. Keohane’s 
theory and Gramscian theories are both persuasive theories of hegemony that include 
the role of other states in maintaining hegemony, and also discusses how unequal power 
relations play into this co-operative form of hegemony. They are limited in 
demonstrating the capacity of subordinate states to conduct autonomous foreign policy 
under hegemony. This is because these theories overly focus on the hegemon or 
implicitly assume that, given limited material capacities, subordinate states have little 
scope for autonomy under hegemony.
Legitimacy
What becomes obvious in the survey of these three major works on hegemony is that all 
of them argue, to varying degrees, that hegemonic power is based on some sort of
CHAPTER ONE 39
legitimacy. Even Gilpin, who bases his hegemonic stability theory on the notion of 
“power as capacity”, includes his concept of prestige as being dependent on the 
recognised legitimacy of a hegemon.68 Whilst Gilpin bases legitimacy on the successful 
use of superior economic and military capabilities through w ar,69 Keohane also 
acknowledges the importance o f consensus in hegemonic structures, and argues that this 
consensus formed the basis of legitimating a hegemon’s dominance.70 Given that 
Keohane’s argument of the importance of consensus in hegemonic structures is derived 
from Gramsci, it goes without saying that Gramscian theories have also placed weight 
on the concept of legitimacy. Cox argued that consensus through universal norms and 
institutions was an essential component in order for a hegemon to achieve a structure 
that manifests itself socially, politically and economically, all of which were rooted in a 
particular mode of production.71 Consequently, while many theories have different 
conceptions of hegemony, they have surprisingly similar insights on legitimacy, which 
suggests it cannot be ignored when thinking about hegemonic power.
Christian Reus-Smit defines legitimacy as follows:
[T]he language of legitimacy is employed to describe not just the capacity to act, 
but the right or entitlement to act. Mark Suchman captures this when he defines 
legitimacy as “a generalized perception or social constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: 
Strategic and Institutional Approaches, Academy o f  Management Review, vol. 20, 
no. 3, July 1995, pp. 571-610, p. 574.). It is in the political realm, though, that the 
original meaning of the term lies, deriving as it does from the quintessential 
politico-legal term legislate. Here legitimacy is generally taken to mean the right to 
rule, or the right to govern (Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A 
Contribution to the Study o f  Political Right and Political Responsibility, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 10)....[Legitimacy thus refers to 
an entitlement to control, which generally means an entitlement to issue 
authoritative commands that require compliance from those subject to them. An 
actor can be said to command legitimacy, therefore, when its decisions and actions 
(and I would contend identities and interest) are socially sanctioned.72
These theorists demonstrate that the element of legitimacy is a defining aspect of 
US hegemony in the 20th century. It becomes clear that, across various theories and 
particularly in non-realist analyses of hegemony, consensus, political culture, social 
norms and rules become important in conceptualising hegemony. This has been 
particularly noticeable in the international order since the Second World War. In
68 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 30-32.
69 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 32.
70 Cox, “Social forces, states and world orders”, p. 153.
71 Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders”, p. 137.
72 Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crisis of Legitimacy”, International Politics, vol. 44, issue 2, 
2007, forthcoming.
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contrast to power as a capacity, which based power on the quantifiable material means 
of power, legitimacy as a source of power is based on a broad consensus that a 
dominant power should and can take leadership in world order. 73 In this case power is 
relational rather than possessive, and “only when an actor seeks to have a transformative 
effect in relationship to other actors can they be said to have, or not to have, power. ” 74 
Hegemony based on this type of power— as argued previously by Keohane , 75 Gramsci, 76 
and by John G. Ikenberry77 and Mlada Bukovansky78 below— are ideational, which 
signifies that “that power is constituted not just by the distribution of material 
capabilities, but more fundamentally by social institutions, broadly construed as 
complexes of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures . ” 79 Reus-Smit 
also argues that legitimacy is based on a social context; in other words, power sourced 
by legitimacy needs to be recognised by other actors and practised within a society for it 
to be relevant or effective . 80
Ikenberry, a leading scholar on the concept of legitimacy, also expands on these 
ideas and goes into greater detail as to how legitimacy plays into hegemonic power. 
Like Keohane and Gramsci, Ikenberry argues that it is insufficient to simply focus on 
the material resources in order to understand hegemonic power, and that non-material 
power also plays an integral part of legitimate international dominance. In other words, 
hegemonic power must be based on perceptions of “right” as much as “might” for it to 
be effective . 81
Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan argue that a hegemon establishes legitimacy 
when secondary and smaller states internalise hegemonic norms and principles, which 
then consolidate the hegemon’s position internationally:
We propose that legitimate domination comes about when smaller powers, through 
the influence or example of the hegemon, experience a shift in value orientation 
that induces them to buy it and accept as justified and principled the normative 
order espoused by the hegemon. It is essential that the process involve change in 
norms, and not simply a shift in practices...The state is still capable of rationally 
pursuing its own interests, but new norms guide the choices states make to advance 
those interests. The process of legitimation is thus one in which states internalize
73 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, pp. 43—44.
74 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, p. 43.
75 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 45.
76 Gramsci, Selections, p. 264.
77 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”, p. 49.
78 Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 8.
79 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, p. 43.
80 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, p. 43.
81 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”, p. 49.
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these new norms and become socialized in the community formed by the hegemon 
and those states that accept its leadership position.82
Ikenberry and Kupchan note Western Europe and Japan following the Second 
World War as examples of how hegemonic norms and rules created a value shift in 
these regions through a process of socialisation. A hegemonic international system was 
established based on the norms and vision of the hegemon as articulated by the 
Roosevelt administration. These norms centred on liberal multilateralism, 83 which 
politically entailed foreign policies that observed the charter of the United Nations, and 
economic policies around the Bretton Woods system and International Trade 
Organisation. 84 They argue that Western Europe and Japan eventually responded to what 
were US coercion and inducement strategies, which had the effect of changing policies 
and ultimately transformed the normative preferences of both Western Europe and 
Japan in accordance with US hegemonic principles.85
Mlada Bukovansky supports Ikenberry and Kupchan’s analysis of legitimacy. 
Like many of the previously discussed theorists of hegemony, Bukovansky argues that 
material power by itself does not lead to international preponderance, and that cultural 
conditions such as shared norms are also important.
The existence of a dominant form of legitimate authority in the international 
system is a feature of its culture, and that culture is a feature of its structure. The 
existence of a dominant form of legitimate authority thus indicates the presence of 
hegemony in the system. In my use of the term, hegemony does not simply signify 
the presence of a preponderantly powerful state; rather, it signifies the existence of 
a dominant form of legitimate authority.86
82 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”, p. 55.
83 Multilateralism is “the tendency for functional aspect of international relations, such as security, trade 
or environmental management to be organized around large numbers of states, or universally, rather 
than by unilateral state action.” See John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 637.
84 The Bretton Woods system was established to create a secure international economic environment for
post-World War II recovery. This meant that all currencies would be fixed to a constant value of 
US$35 to an ounce of gold stable exchange rate. There are three main institutions to the Bretton 
Woods system: the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), which later became the World Bank; and also the International Trade 
Organization (ITO). One element of the ITO later became the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT). The International Monetary Fund was established at the Bretton Woods Conference 
in 1944 with the aim of ensuring the smooth running of this currency exchange system, and also the 
provision of emergency assistance when states face balance of payment crises. The IBRD was also 
founded at the Bretton Woods conference in order to foster reconstruction in war-tom and developing 
countries. The GATT was established in 1947 as a forum for negotiations on trade liberalisation. See 
“The IMF and the World Bank”, International Monetary Fund Website,
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm, accessed 15 December 2005, Eric Helleiner, 
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1994.
85 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”, p. 56.
86 Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, p. 8.
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This study of US hegemony in the context of US-Japan relations acknowledges 
that legitimacy is an important consideration for a hegemon when exercising effective 
control over the international system, and that the United States does indeed use 
elements of its power that go beyond material preponderance. However, these theories 
are essentially all explanations of hegemonic power, and little emphasis is placed on 
how the subordinate states might actually perceive this system. Ikenberry and Kupchan 
argue that socialisation encourages states to go beyond a simple change of policies 
brought about by coercion and inducements, and to take on the hegemonic norms and 
values as their own. However, it is difficult to conclude whether subordinate states have, 
or have not, taken on hegemonic norms as their own based on theories that ultimately 
focus on the nature and exercise of power as seen by the hegemon of an international 
system. Therefore, given that this thesis is a study of Japanese autonomy within US 
hegemony, and not one of US power, it is also necessary to expand the investigation of 
hegemony beyond theories that focus on great powers in order to greater understand 
Japan’s perspective.
Theory o f  Hierarchy
The discussion now turns to David C. Kang’s theory of hierarchy in the international 
relations of Asia in order to explore theories that go beyond hegemon-focused 
international relations. Kang argues that the perception of Asia as being “ripe for 
rivalry”, because of its lack of formal multinational economic and security institutions, 
is actually based on Western-centric views of international relations . 87 In contrast, Kang 
claims that international relations in Asia have traditionally been hierarchical in nature 
and therefore that states within the region perceive security and international relations 
differently:
...Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations, while 
allowing considerable informal equity. Consisting of China as the central state, and 
the peripheral states as lesser states or “vassals,” as long as hierarchy was observed 
there was little need for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the western 
tradition of international relations that consisted of formal equality between nation­
states, informal hierarchy, and almost constant interstate conflict. . . . 88
While his theory of hierarchy is based on the Chinese tributary system, Kang does 
not necessarily perceive the central power as being either China or Japan in the case of 
Japan’s international relations. Instead, he positions the United States as the central
87 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 164.
88 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 164.
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power in modem Japan’s worldview. Kang’s theory is essentially realist in nature, but 
he modifies it by “explicitly [recognising] that nation-states are not equal when acting 
on the world stage. ” 89 He also presents “a hypothetical middle path that involves a 
central power that still operates in anarchy, but does not cause other nations to balance 
against the largest power in the system, and does not fold them under its wing in 
empire. ” 90 He argues that, unlike realist theories that often predict that alliances are 
formed to balance the central power, hierarchy induces greater incidents of the 
subordinate states bandwagoning with the central power for profit. It is thus a realist 
view of international relations with an additional variation that recognises a “pecking 
order that is known by all states” and Kang argues that, as long as this order is 
acknowledged, stability is maintained.91
Kang explicitly distinguishes hierarchy from hegemony. He argues that his 
conception of hierarchy is unlike hegemony because “hegemony is more intrusive” 92 in 
the domestic politics and other policies of vassal states. He also maintains that his 
theory of hierarchy is more effective in explaining international relations in Asia 
because it “is more concerned with the interaction of states up and down the hierarchy” 93 
than with a strong focus on a single hegemonic power, and recognises “substantial 
autonomy and freedom among the lesser states” . 94 Lesser states have greater freedom 
under hierarchy, because there are costs involved in the central power conquering them, 
but equilibrium is maintained because they know that opposing the central power would 
be unachievable, given the inequalities in power. 95 Kang argues that “as long as the 
lesser states acknowledge the unrivalled position of the central state, the central state 
respects the autonomy and sovereignty of the lesser states. ” 96 In this sense hierarchy, too, 
is maintained by recognition of the central power’s preponderance, and is therefore a 
legitimacy and consent-based order.
Kang also specifically applies his theory to Japan, and criticises two conventional 
realist assumptions that are often conflated in International Relations literature—the 
“Great Power Hypothesis”, which assumes that Japan is so rich and its economy so
89 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
90 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
91 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 168.
92 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
93 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
94 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166. 
93 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 168.96
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large that it will soon want to re-emerge as a great power, and the “Umbrella 
Hypothesis”, which argues that if or when the United States leaves Japan, it will rearm 
and become a normal power. He reasons that such realist thinking does not 
accommodate the potential for Japan to “be a normal great power and yet sit under the 
U.S. security umbrella”,97 but at the same time argues that it has not done so because it 
forms part of a hierarchical international system and has no need or intention to 
challenge the United States or China.98
There are shortcomings to Kang’s theory in that he assumes that Asia has not 
progressed from fourteenth century international relations, and falls into the very trap 
that he himself criticises, namely the exoticisation of Japanese or Asian culture—which 
assumes that, given its cultural differences, its foreign policy is therefore inherently 
dissimilar. In particular, given that Japan has been conducting Westphalian modes of 
diplomacy for nearly two centuries, it is unlikely that the Asian culture explanation of 
international relations in Asia can totally explain a perception of hierarchy. However, if 
this culturalist aspect is removed from the argument—and replaced with the unique 
political culture of Japan’s subordination under US hegemony stemming from its 
spectacular defeat in the Second World War—the principles of hierarchy can still be 
upheld.
Moreover, Kang’s assertion that vassal states bandwagon with the central power 
for profit is also problematic. Theories of bandwagoning suggest that weaker states will 
enter into alliances with those states that pose the strongest threat in order “to avoid an 
attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere” or “to share the spoils of victory”.99 While 
the “opportunistic aspects of bandwagoning”100 may indeed be true, it implies that the 
weaker state only calculates to benefit from the position of the stronger, without the 
weaker state being of great use to the stronger state in the alliance. Without doubt, Japan 
stands to benefit from being part of the US-Japan alliance and participating in the 
international political and economic system that the United States has led since 1945, 
but the alliance is also geo-strategically important for the United States and helped to 
finance US defence policies during the 1980s.101 The US-Japan relationship is therefore
97 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 174.
9S Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 177.
99 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, International Security, vol. 
9, no. 4, Spring 1985, pp. 3-43, p. 8; Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the 
Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, vol. 19, no. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 72-107, p. 74.
100 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit”, p. 75.
101 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.
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more symbiotic than assumed in bandwagoning theories, and this aspect is not 
encapsulated in Kang’s theory.
Despite Kang arguing that his theory is quite different from hegemony, it 
nonetheless imparts significant insights into this chapter when considering the concept 
of hegemony in the context of US-Japan relations. The compatibility of hegemony and 
hierarchy is defended by Jack Donnelly in his discussion of sovereign inequalities and 
hierarchy within anarchy. He categorises hegemony as being a form of hierarchy, and 
defines hegemony as “[involving] a single preponderant state exercising hierarchical 
control over a state or, usually, a group of states” . 102
Kang’s hierarchy theory is particularly useful in acknowledging that states on 
similar sides of an alliance (like the US-Japan alliance) or federation (like the Western 
and communist blocs during the Cold War) can be of unequal power in international 
relations, but at the same time the autonomy of lesser states can be maintained under a 
central power. As an extension of this argument, Kang’s theory also supports the 
possibility for rearmament and other greater exercises of material power by Japan while 
still remaining under the influence of the United States. Kang’s argument also includes 
elements of legitimacy in that, “as long as the lesser states acknowledge the unrivalled 
position of the central state, the central state respects the autonomy and sovereignty of 
the lesser states.” ' 03
In summary, this section adopts Keohane and Nye’s definition of hegemony at the 
outset, as a situation when “one state has a preponderance of material resources” 104 and 
“is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and 
willing to do so”105. However, a central focus of this chapter on hegemony is whether the 
various theories explain or include the perceptions of subordinate states. The 
subordinate states’ view of hegemony is particularly important, because it influences its 
identity, interests and, consequently, its foreign policy actions and pursuit of autonomy. 
In other words, a state’s view of hegemony influences its perceptions of autonomy. 
Establishing this relationship between hegemony and autonomy is crucial in arguing 
that Japan’s autonomy is more limited under US hegemony than is suggested by 
International Relations theory. In comparison to realist, liberal and Gramscian theories,
102 Jack Donnelly, “Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International 
Society”, European Journal o f International Relations, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 139-70, p. 156.
103 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 168.
104 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 32.
105 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p.44.
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Kang’s theory in particular portrays the subordinate perspective well, and further 
explains how autonomy of action is possible in unequal power relationships. Therefore, 
a perception of hegemony closer to hierarchy is adopted in this study to explain Japan’s 
world view and foreign policy patterns.
Autonomy in International Relations Theory
With the importance of varying perceptions of hegemony in mind, the next section of 
the chapter continues the investigation on limited and restricted autonomy and discusses 
the similarities and differences in the descriptions of sovereignty and autonomy made 
by prominent International Relations theorists concerning different historical periods. In 
International Relations, state behaviour and sovereignty are particularly pertinent to the 
understanding of the meaning of autonomy. From the literature on sovereignty, it is 
possible to derive what is expected of a sovereign state and, as a consequence, what 
expectations of autonomy are attached to sovereign states when pursuing foreign policy.
Kang’s theory of hierarchy enabled greater autonomy of the subordinate states 
under a system with a strong central power. This is precisely the kind of autonomy 
central to this study. To investigate this concept further and compare it to existing 
theories, the discussion now focuses on autonomy in the context of hegemony and the 
two perceptions of the hegemonic international order discussed in the previous section. 
The purpose of this section is to decipher how autonomy is perceived in International 
Relations theory in order to assess whether existing definitions are useful when 
answering the broader question of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy. The following 
section on autonomy therefore discusses and evaluates theories of sovereignty so as to 
deduce evaluations of autonomy in International Relations theory.
Autonomy as an end or a goal is when peoples aspire for sovereign statehood in 
the anticipation that it will lead to greater independence over their internal and external 
affairs. 106 However, the autonomy concerned in this study is not autonomy as an ends, 
but rather autonomy as a tool of the state that enables an already sovereign country to 
pursue its interests and goals. Autonomy as a tool is defined in International Relations 
theory as the principle and the liberty of a state, which enables it to exercise control 
over its allocation of resources and choice of government107 and to determine the
106
107
This notion is most evident in self-determination movements. Gerard Kreijen (ed.), State, 
Sovereignty, and International Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 70.
Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, pp. 235-36.
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conditions of their own affairs, so long as it does not negate the rights of other states. 108 
It is intrinsically tied to notions of legal and actual state independence, and it is 
commonly associated with the promise of independence, independent policies, and 
freedom of action in international politics.
However, formal independence or sovereignty does not necessarily guarantee 
autonomy. In order to locate where ambiguities of the concept emerge, understand why 
this occurs, and investigate how this affects conceptions of autonomy, the theories will 
be broadly grouped into rationalist and non-rationalist theorists. In this instance, 
rationalist theory does not refer to the Grotian concept of rationalism, where particular 
attention is paid to the ways in which the sense of belonging to a community has had a 
stabilising effect on international relations. 109 Rather, the concern here is with “theories 
that are explicitly informed by the assumptions of rational choice”110—in other words, 
theories that are derived from rational choice theory which assume actors are “rational” 
and objectively calculate preferences, options and outcomes in international relations.
Rational choice theory originated in economic theory, which was then applied to 
political science and subsequently spread to other areas of social science, including 
International Relations. " 1 It was assumed that a comparison between economic man and 
political man could be made because “the average individual acts on the basis of the 
same over-all value scale when he participates in market activity and in political 
activity. ” " 2 Its five main assumptions are that rational action of an individual entails 
utility maximisation; an individual’s options and interests can be ordered; each 
individual maximises their interests under conditions of uncertainty; the main 
maximising agents are individuals; and this model applies equally to all individuals. " 3
108 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 147.
109 The connection between law and morality among states and natural law stems from the fact that “a 
clearly perceived distinction between individual and state personality” did not exist in Grotius’ time. 
(A. Claire Cutler, “The ‘Grotian tradition’ in international relations”, p. 46). Furthermore, the fact 
that a state is made up of multiple individuals also indicates that the individual is ultimately the 
referent of moral and legal protection. For a full discussion on Grotian thought and morality, see A. 
Claire Cutler, “The ‘Grotian tradition’ in international relations”, Review o f International Studies, 
vol. 17, no. 1, 1991, pp. 41-65.
110 Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism”, in Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, 
Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True, Theories o f International Relations, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 1995, pp. 209-30, p. 209.
111 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies o f Rational Choice Theories: A Critique of 
Applications in Political Science, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994, p. 2.
112 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus o f Consent, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, 1962, p. 20.
113 Green and Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theories, pp. 14-17.
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Rationalist theories under discussion here are those of realists (Stephen D. 
Krasner and Kenneth N. Waltz) and liberal institutionalists (Robert O. Keohane), which 
are then contrasted to critical theorist David Held’s theory of autonomy and nautonomy. 
While there are differences in the degree to which they are employed, the foundations 
on which these theories are based all reflect the crossover of rational choice theory into 
International Relations theory. The five foundations are that states seek to maximise 
their power in international relations; states have a hierarchy of interests; interests are 
pursued in a context of anarchy; states are the main actors in international relations; and 
this model applies equally to all states. Both Robert Gilpin and Kenneth Waltz draw 
heavily on micro-economic theory and its assumptions of rational choice. While neo­
liberal institutionalists argue that states can choose to pursue absolute gains rather than 
relative gains (as realists presume), they do not depart from rational-choice assumptions 
made in neo-realist theory and its variants.
The application of models used for individual actors onto state actors is further 
examined in this section in David Held’s analysis of autonomy. While Held’s theory 
does not deal with international relations per se, his examination of the autonomy of 
individual actors in a democratic civil society draws useful parallels in thinking about 
state autonomy. Rationalist International Relations theory is then challenged through the 
examination of non-rationalist theorists such as Gramscian and critical theorists (Robert 
W. Cox, R.B.J. Walker, and Cynthia Weber) and constructivists (Alexander Wendt) and 
also through Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn’s critical assessment of rational choice 
theory in studying Asian states.
Rationalist Theories on Sovereignty
Rationalist theorists use the concept of autonomy almost synonymously with 
sovereignty, particularly Westphalian sovereignty. Stephen D. Krasner identifies the 
norm of Westphalian sovereignty as a system where “states exist in specific territories 
within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiter of legitimate 
behaviour.” 114 Sovereignty is divided into the internal and external realms, which 
signifies that Westphalian sovereignty stipulates the supreme authority of the state 
within its territory, and immunity from external interference:
...in the context of the internal structure of a political society, the concept of
sovereignty has involved the belief that there is an absolute political power within
114 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999,
p. 20.
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the community. Applied to the problems which arise in the relations between 
political communities, its function has been to express the antithesis of this 
argument -  the principle that internationally, over and above the collection of 
communities, no supreme authority exists.115
Krasner situates autonomy at the core of Westphalian sovereignty and, therefore, 
when he argues the “compromise of Westphalia” , 116 he is also arguing the compromise 
of autonomy.
Similar understandings of sovereignty permeate other rationalist theories of 
International Relations. 117 For example, although Kenneth N. Waltz makes no specific or 
detailed discussion of autonomy, sovereignty and autonomy are mentioned together in 
his discussion of political units in international relations. Central to Waltz’s theory of 
international relations are political “like units” that are autonomous actors. Waltz argues 
that “to call states ‘like units’ is to say that each state is like all other states in being an 
autonomous political unit. It is another way of saying that states are sovereign. ” 118 In 
other words, Waltz refers to autonomy here to indicate sovereignty—that states are 
independent entities in the international system. Therefore, it can be argued that Waltz 
interprets sovereignty as the “independence and freedom of choice” for the state to 
choose how it deals with situations within the restrictions of Westphalian sovereignty 
and the power balances of the anarchic international system. If autonomy is another 
word for sovereignty, in Waltz’s words, then it follows that this definition of 
sovereignty stands also for autonomy.
This, however, does not imply that these theorists are blind to the realities of 
international politics. In practice, examples abound of states at least partially 
surrendering their autonomy. 119 Some states have allowed a hegemon to play a leading
115 Francis Henry Hinsley, Sovereignty, second edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, 
p. 158.
116 Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia”, pp. 115-51.
117 It must be noted that rationalist theories are not the only theories which subscribe to this particular 
definition of sovereignty. E.H. Carr does not write specifically on autonomy, but contributes to its 
conceptualisation through his discussion of sovereignty. However, this discussion does not centre on 
the nature of state sovereignty and its functions. Because he writes in the context of the First and 
Second World Wars, territorial expansion and empire are his predominant concerns and, in this 
context, he describes sovereignty as being “the independent character of authority claimed and 
exercised by states which no longer recognised even the formal overlordship of the Empire”. In other 
words, sovereignty in this case is in relation to self-determination from imperialist powers. E.H. Carr, 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study o f International Relations, 
London, Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 212. English School theorists, such as Hedley Bull, have similar 
conceptions of state sovereignty. See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 8-9; Wight, International 
Theory: The Three Traditions, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1992, p. 1.
118 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Relations, Reading Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, 
1979, p. 95.
119 For example, during the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States were involved in 
intervening in the internal affairs of their respective blocks to remove counterrevolutionary forces
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part in their foreign relations, as exemplified by the US-Japan example. One of the most 
prominent rationalist theories to consider limits to autonomy has been neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that increased interdependence has 
often meant that states cannot formulate their policies without taking other states’ 
interests into account. One of its chief exponents, Robert Keohane, believes that 
“[sovereignty no longer enables states to exert effective supremacy over what occurs 
within their territories: Decisions are made by firms on a global basis, and other states’ 
policies have major impacts within one’s boundaries. ” 120
Under such circumstances where internal sovereignty is greatly compromised, the 
institution of state sovereignty is not simply a characteristic of political units in an 
anarchic environment. Rather, sovereignty itself becomes an important institution and 
tool infused with mutual values that can foster the pursuit of state interests such as the 
maintenance of rules, extension of power, and appropriation of wealth in a co-operative 
manner. Keohane’s main argument is that state supremacy in a given territory—in other 
words, internal sovereignty—can no longer be absolutely guaranteed in an increasingly 
interdependent world, but that sovereignty continues to be an important institution that 
provides “states with a legal grip on an aspect of a transnational process, whether 
involving multinational investment, the world’s ecology, or the movement of migrants, 
drug dealers, and terrorists. Sovereignty is less a territorially defined barrier than a 
bargaining resource for politics characterized by complex transnational networks. ” 121 
This statement also suggests that it is more useful and accurate to perceive autonomy 
too as being less defined by sovereignty and state territorial boundaries.
Robert Gilpin has noted this by saying that hegemonic systems, in which a “single 
powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system, ” 122 have persisted 
throughout history. Consequently, in these situations, sovereignty does not guard 
autonomy as comprehensibly as assumed in realist theory. However, while realists still 
place great emphasis on the primacy and autonomy of the state, they are also aware of
and “unacceptable” governments. See Robert A. Jones, The Soviet Concept o f ‘Limited Sovereignty ’ 
from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine, London, Macmillan, 1990, p. 212. Also see Roy 
Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-1984, London, Macmillan, 1985 for a 
detailed account of Soviet intervention in Finland’s internal sovereignty and autonomy, and Latin 
America Bureau, Honduras: State for Sale, London, Latin America Bureau, 1985 on US involvement 
in Honduras’ limited national sovereignty.
120 Robert O. Keohane, “Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics”, in Hans- 
Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen (eds.) Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End o f 
the Cold War, Boulder, Westview Press, 1995, pp. 165-86, pp. 176-77.
121 Keohane, “Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics”, p. 177.
122 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 29.
CHAPTER ONE 51
the fact that “total autonomy” cannot always be guaranteed through sovereignty. Waltz 
makes distinctions on what sovereignty is clearly not, which alludes to his perceptions 
of state autonomy and his awareness that the two concepts are often confused:
To say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that 
they are free of others’ influence, that they are able to get what they want. 
Sovereign states may be hardpressed all around, constrained to act in ways they 
would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just as they would like to. The 
sovereignty of states has never entailed their insulation from the effects of other 
states’ actions. To be sovereign and to be dependent are not contradictory 
conditions. Sovereign states have seldom led free and easy lives. What then is 
sovereignty? To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it 
will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek 
assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments 
to them. States develop their own strategies, chart their own courses, make their 
own decisions about how to meet whatever needs they experience and whatever 
desires they develop. 123
Accordingly, Waltz argues here that sovereignty does not equate to autonomy. 
Hans J. Morganthau, who is not essentially a rationalist theorist but a classical realist, 
observes like Waltz that some international treaties, such as peace treaties after wars, 
can have substantial restrictions for states, “with regard to size and quality of the 
military establishments, armaments, fortifications, reparations, economic policies, and 
the conduct of foreign affairs in general” . 124 These states do not necessarily lose their 
sovereignty, but the autonomy of a state can be significantly restricted under 
international law. Similarly, the dependence of one state on another in political, military 
and economic issues can “make it difficult or impossible for certain nations to pursue 
independent domestic and foreign policies, ” 125 but it does not normally alter the state’s 
internal sovereignty, that is the state’s supreme authority to enforce law within its own 
territory.
Morganthau’s observation contradicts W altz’s discussion of Japan’s position in 
international relations raised in the introduction. Waltz argues that Japan’s economic 
and technological capabilities will enable it to develop military capabilities as it pleases 
and get what they want, 126 despite its interdependent relationship with the United States 
in political, economic and security matters. The problem of this argument relates back 
to the flaw in rationalist theories which assume states have the autonomy to translate
123 Waltz, Theory o f International Relations, p. 96.
124 Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, fifth edition, New 
York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, p. 311.
125 Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 311-12.
126 Waltz, “Emerging Structure of International Politics”, p. 66, and “Structural Realism after the Cold 
War”, p. 34.
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material wealth into military power and that it is merely a matter of choice whether or 
not they do this. These issues indicate that, in reality, not all states are equal under 
international law in all circumstances as proponents of anarchy based theorists like to 
assume.
The problem here is that, by assuming that states can, and do, rationally pursue 
their interests, rationalists unwittingly end up reinforcing the narrow notion of 
sovereignty that assumes autonomy as a strong part of sovereignty. Waltz’s statement 
above, which asserts that “a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will 
cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance 
from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them” is, in 
fact, a reassertion of state autonomy. In other words, the rationalist choice approach 
assumes that, provided a state possesses adequate power to do so, it has access to and 
can execute perfect autonomy. It can therefore also “rationally” choose to maximise its 
interests by electing to relinquish its autonomy, and can just as freely reassert its 
autonomy according to its interests.
Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn raise this point when arguing the unsuitability 
of theories based on rational choice theory for understanding Japanese politics. Johnson 
and Keehn reason that rational choice based theories “seek explicitly to replace the 
concept of ‘culture’ with ‘a core set of human interests and beliefs that constitutes the 
basis for much behavior [and] around which cultural variations rotate’ ” 127 In other words, 
in rational choice models, these “rules” are objective and static facts “that have no life 
of their own but simply exist to channel behaviour in ways consistent with individual 
preferences”. 128 Furthermore, rational choice theories fail to realise that their 
generalisations of “human” interests as “the rules of the game” are actually over­
generalisations based on the Anglo-American “West” . 129 Johnson and Keehn argue that 
these biases make rational choice-based theories not only ahistorical, but lacking in the 
cultural and social contexts in which actors find themselves and how this affects their 
actions. 130
127 Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, quoting Daniel Little, “Rational-Choice Models and Asian 
Studies” Journal o f Asian Studies, February 1991,vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 35-52, p. 41 in “A Disaster in 
the Making: Rational Choice and Asian Studies”, The National Interest, issue 36, Summer 1994, pp. 
14-22, p. 15.
128 Johnson and Keehn, “A Disaster in the Making”, p. 16.
129 Johnson and Keehn, “A Disaster in the Making”, p. 15.
130 Johnson and Keehn, “A Disaster in the Making”, p. 18.
CHAPTER ONE 53
The observations of both Johnson and Keehn not only apply to Japanese domestic 
politics, but also to any analysis of Japanese foreign policy. While some of the more 
moderate rationalist International Relations theories, such as liberal institutional theory, 
do have persuasive arguments, their weakness overall is that they assume all states will 
act in certain set ways under anarchy. However, as the discussion in the Introduction has 
demonstrated, Japanese foreign policy does not always fit this model and is 
consequently labelled as an “anomaly” when, in fact, it is only “abnormal” because 
other factors more important in understanding Japanese foreign policy, such as 
hegemony, are excluded from the picture.
In summary, while realists and liberal theorists maintain that autonomy and 
sovereignty should be considered separate, they tend to equate sovereignty with 
autonomy. This is due to a bias in rationalist theory which assumes the equality of 
sovereign states in international relations, and that states are actors that rationally pursue 
their interests, often defined in terms of survival. They “use their powers to create social 
and political institutions that they believe will advance their interests. ” 131 The difference 
between the realists and liberal theorists is the degree to which autonomy is assumed to 
be a part of sovereignty, and the outcomes of rational choice. Liberal theories recognise 
that state supremacy in a given territory is not absolute in an increasingly 
interdependent world, but that sovereignty continues to be an important institution that 
is a resource for dealing with transnational issues. 132 Liberal theories therefore 
demonstrate greater awareness of restrictions in state autonomy than realists. 
Furthermore, realists argue that the outcome of the choice rational actors make reflects 
self-interest, whereas liberal theorists maintain that it reflects a consciousness of shared 
goals, values or norms. However, in either case, the problem lies in the fact that 
rationalists assume states can and do rationally pursue their interests. Firstly, this 
assumption unwittingly reinforces the narrow notion of sovereignty that assumes 
autonomy as a strong part of sovereignty, and secondly, as Johnson and Keehn argue, 
rationalist theory inadvertently reinforces Anglo-American Western biases which 
diminish the utility of these theories in explaining non-Western phenomena such as 
Japanese politics and Japanese foreign policy.
How, then, can Japan’s autonomy within the US hegemonic system be adequately 
explained? It would seem that two steps are essential: first, to move beyond rigid
131
132
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conceptions of autonomy by decoupling sovereign from autonomy; and second, to adopt 
different theoretical perspectives from traditional rationalist theories.
Autonomy and Nautonomy
The dominance of the rationalist approach and its biases, particularly as seen in the 
notion of the rational state actor, can be placed in better perspective when compared to 
Held’s accounts of the individual actor in political philosophy. The previous section 
demonstrated how autonomy is excluded as a subject of substantial discussion through 
the implicit assumption of autonomy within sovereignty in rationalist International 
Relations theory; however, autonomy is discussed at some length in political 
philosophy. 133 Furthermore, the language of sovereignty and independence of the state in 
International Relations strongly resembles the autonomy of the rational individual in the 
context of the rational individual pursuing autonomy through equal membership 
(citizenship) in a pluralistic political environment—for example, freedom from 
intervention, freedom of association, and the equality of states under international law. 
These all have equivalents at the individual-society level, which suggests that a 
crossover of ideas has occurred from the tradition of political philosophy. 134
This part of the discussion draws on David Held’s analysis of sovereignty and 
autonomy. Held’s primary concern is reassessing the effectiveness of democracy in the 
contemporary international context, and he therefore deals with sovereignty and 
autonomy at the level of the individual in a political community. In his discussion, Held 
clearly differentiates between the two concepts and offers valuable insights to elucidate 
what autonomy requires and what restricts it.
Held describes autonomy as the principle that enables the freedom and equality of 
individuals to determine the conditions of their own lives, so long as it does not negate 
the rights of others. 135 He defines it as “the capacity of human beings to reason self­
consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self-determining. It involves the ability to act, 
in principle, as the author or maker of one’s own life, in public and private realms. ” 136 In 
other words, autonomy is conceptualised as a means that should enable “members of a 
political community—citizens...to choose freely the conditions of their own
133 For this point, see Held, Democracy and the Global Order.
134 For a further discussion of analogies between people and states, see Alexander Wendt, “The State as 
Person in International Theory”, Review o f International Studies, vol. 30, 2004, pp. 289-16.
133 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 147 
136 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 151.
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association,”137 and that these autonomous choices should ultimately determine the form 
and direction of their polity.138 It is consequently seen as being a positive development 
of Western democratic culture, and it assumes that the rational individual is empowered 
by autonomy, and that this generates equality of all members of society; yet it is also 
restrictive in the name of the common good.139
What is then required in achieving autonomy for citizens? Clues lie in Held’s 
analysis of situations where the individual’s capacity to pursue autonomy is denied, 
which he calls “nautonomy”. By understanding the situation surrounding the restriction 
of autonomy, it is possible to elucidate the specific circumstances in which autonomy 
can be achieved.
Held describes nautonomy and the environment surrounding it in this way:
Where relations of power systematically generate asymmetries of life-chances they 
may create a situation which can be called ‘nautonomic’. Nautonomy refers to the 
asymmetrical production and distribution o f life-chances which limit and erode the 
possibilities o f political participation. By life-chances, I mean the chances a person 
has of sharing in the socially generated economic, cultural or political goods, 
rewards and opportunities typically found in his or her community (see Giddens,
1980, pp. 130-31). Nautonomy refers to any socially conditioned pattem of 
asymmetrical life-chances which places artificial limits on the creation of a 
common structure of political action.140
In such situations, autonomy under democracy becomes the privilege of those 
who have access to a diverse range of resources, from the material (wealth and income) 
through to the coercive (organised might and the deployment of force) and to the 
cultural— concepts and discourses which mould interpretative frameworks, tastes and 
abilities.141 In other words, just as formal sovereignty does not necessarily guarantee 
external sovereignty and autonomy in international relations, under nautonomic 
structures people can formally be free and equal members of the community, but are not 
guaranteed the rights which shape and facilitate a common structure of political action 
that safeguard their interests.142
Held sees the main cause of nautonomic structures as when the individual has 
restricted access to what he calls the seven sites of power. The sites of power are the 
institutions or interactional contexts in and through which power operates and enables
137 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 145.
138 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 145.
139 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 205.
140 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 171.
141 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 171.
142 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 172.
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people autonomy. These seven sites are the body (or health), welfare, culture, the sphere 
of civic association, the economy, organisation of violence, and regulatory and legal 
institutions. 143 Structural biases embedded within a number of the sites cause restricted 
or asymmetric access amongst individuals, rendering them less power, and therefore 
less autonomy. In other words, “[ajutonomy is, in short, structured through power. ” 144
Held recognises that ultimate autonomy is not achievable for all in any one 
community. However, unlike the rationalist International Relations theorists, he expands 
on this point and more clearly identifies the difference between “ideal” and “attainable” 
autonomy, and argues within the inequalities that may exist in reality, it only becomes 
critical “to the extent that it bears on participative possibilities and enables or restricts 
autonomy...the pursuit of democratic autonomy is not to be conflated with the pursuit 
of equality per se\ it is the pursuit of equal participative opportunities. ” 145 “Attainable” 
autonomy requires that the citizen has access to basic (or what Held describes as 
intermediate) needs, such as property and goods, services and activities (drinking water, 
nutritional food, appropriate housing, health care, adequate education and economic 
security) so that they can fully participate in their political community and have a 
rightful share of the process of governance. Held suggests that “attainable autonomy” 
can be conceived in terms of the “best practice” or “highest standard” presently 
achieved in any political community, either within or without a state, which can become 
policy goals within and across sites of power. 146
Held’s arguments are based on critical theory, and his discussion of autonomy 
involves a more obviously separate notion of sovereignty and autonomy in comparison 
to the other rationalist theories discussed above. This can be attributed to the differences 
between individuals and states as central units of analysis. The individual is not territory, 
which makes for easier recognition of sovereignty and autonomy as separate concepts. 
In the case of the rational individual in society, sovereignty in the very basic sense 
might be analogous to the living human being. For an individual to be bound to slavery 
or other means of physical constraint might be described as a nautonomic situation. 
However, while an individual is alive, if one follows the logic of rational choice, it has 
the opportunity to use autonomy as a means and a goal to determine the condition of 
their lives. However, this distinction between sovereignty and autonomy is less clear
143 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, pp. 176-85.
144 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 185.
14:5 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 208.
Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 213.146
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when applied to states, because of the element of territoriality. A state can lose its 
sovereignty and therefore not officially exist, but the territory it used to occupy and the 
people who inhabit it do not disappear. Therefore, in the case of the state, it can lose 
sovereignty, but can still have the potential to strive for and realise autonomy. While the 
characteristics of the individual and the state are different in this case, the differences 
are not such that it negates the usefulness of Held’s theory. In fact, it is this difference 
that draws greater attention to the need to separate autonomy and sovereignty, and also 
indicates positively the potential to do so.
In addition to this, Held’s theory also holds utility by drawing focus on to varying 
degrees of autonomy. Held’s discussion demonstrates greater recognition of differing 
degrees of autonomy than in International Relations theory through the notion of “ideal” 
and “attainable” autonomy. Ideal autonomy for Held denotes freedom and equality of 
individuals to determine the conditions of their own lives based on the capacity of 
human beings to reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and to be self- 
determining. However, due to power distributions and limited access to power, Held 
recognises that this ideal cannot always be achieved for all citizens and, therefore, 
“attainable autonomy” (that is, the basic rights to participate in a political community) 
becomes a crucial factor in realistically practising autonomy. In other words, attainable 
autonomy signifies autonomy as a means to achieving the goal of ideal autonomy.
Held’s idea therefore provides a foundation to put forward a more sophisticated 
account of state autonomy within International Relations theory. He successfully 
demonstrates that sovereignty and autonomy can be dealt with separately and that the 
rigid conceptualisation of autonomy as described particularly by the realists needs to be 
questioned. In his recognition of relative degrees of autonomy as epitomised in the 
notions of “ideal” and “attainable” autonomy, Held argues that there is a need to 
identify differing degrees of autonomy. His discussion of ideal autonomy, attainable 
autonomy and autonomy also presents a basis to contemplate autonomy under structural 
restrictions.
Non-rationalist Theories and Autonomy
Recognising the relativity of autonomy does not mean a return to Krasner’s famous 
assertion that sovereignty is merely “organised hypocrisy”. Krasner argues that 
Westphalian sovereignty has been compromised throughout its history in line with the 
national interests of states under a system of anarchy, and therefore perceives it as a
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norm with very little substance: it is instead a flexible concept that can be used or 
abandoned according to state interests.
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty have always been 
violated...Westphalian and international legal sovereignty are best understood as 
examples of organized hypocrisy. At times rulers adhere to conventional norms or 
rules because it provides them with resources and support (both material and 
ideational). At other times, rulers have violated the norms, and for the same 
reasons. If rulers want to stay in power and to promote the security, material and 
ideational interests of their constituents, following the conventional practices of 
Westphalian and international legal sovereignty might or might not be an optimal 
policy. 147
While putting forward an interesting case that questions the often reified notion of 
sovereignty, Krasner’s argument is not without its weaknesses. The most important of 
these is that, while successfully demonstrating that the Westphalian sovereignty of the 
state has been subject to much compromise, Krasner is far less effective in showing why 
this norm matters in the first place. If rules are broken, this does not mean that they are 
invalid, or do not exist. As Daniel Philpott argues, “the notion of [compromising 
sovereignty] makes sense only if there are states that other states think are entitled to 
sovereignty in the first place” 148; in other words, Krasner fails to recognise that 
Westphalian sovereignty is a constitutive norm.
This suggests a crucial point: in an international system where sovereignty is 
regarded as a constitutive norm (in spite of the many compromises which Krasner 
points out), there is then the distinctive possibility that perceptions of it varies from state 
to state. Krasner perhaps unintentionally reinforces this point when he demonstrates that 
a state can voluntarily enter into a contract in which its sovereignty is compromised . 149 
Furthermore, this also raises the likelihood that different states may hold different 
conceptions and definitions of autonomy.
However, conventional rationalist theories are ill-equipped to deal with this 
potential variation. Gramscians and the critical theorist Cox also have a very different 
emphasis in their theory of international relations and differing perceptions of the role 
of theory itself compared to rationalists. Cox famously argued that “[t]heory is always 
for  someone and for  some purpose” 150 and therefore contains ideological biases, which 
was pointed out by Johnson and Keehn. Problem-solving theories of the rationalists,
14' Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, p. 24.
I4S Philpott, “Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty?”, p. 308. 
149 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, pp. 33-36.
Cox, “Social forces, states, and world orders”, p. 87.150
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therefore, presupposed continuing ahistorical contexts such as the permanence of 
institutions (of which the state is an example) the power relations which constitute its 
parameters such as anarchy, and concentrated on making these relationships and 
institutions “work smoothly”. As the actual institutions and relationships themselves are 
never called into question, 151 there develops a historically and socially unspecific theory. 
With specific reference to neo-realism, Cox argues as follows:
...[N]eorealist theory has extended itself into such areas as game theory, in which 
the substance at the level of human nature is presented as a rationality assumed to 
be common to the competing actors who appraise the stakes at issue, the alternative 
strategies, and the respective payoffs in a similar manner. These ideas of a common 
rationality reinforce the nonhistorical mode of thinking...For neorealism, this 
rationality is the one appropriate response to a postulated anarchic state 
system.. .security within the postulated inter-state system depends upon each of the 
major actors understanding this system in the same way, that is to say, upon each 
of them adopting neorealist rationality as a guide to action. 152
In other words, the “objectivity” that rationalist theories purport to is actually a 
normative position to maintain a status quo that assumes how states should act, and 
what they should pursue. Cox counter-argues that hegemonic structures of dominance 
influence the forms of states and their motivating behaviour. 153
It can be similarly argued that few discussions of autonomy arise because those 
rationalist theories with fixed notions of state sovereignty dominate International 
Relations scholarship. Postmodernist writings also dispute the unchanging assumptions 
on which sovereign authority rests in problem-solving International Relations theory. 
R.B.J. Walker argues that state sovereignty emerged to resolve certain ontological 
contradictions of history (time and space, universal and particular, as well as self and 
other) , 154 while Cynthia Weber argues that alternate configurations of power and 
knowledge have given rise to different concepts throughout history . 155 In other words, 
these theorists also point to the fact that sovereignty, and the concepts associated with it 
such as autonomy, are historically, socially and purpose-specific. Autonomy as a 
concept has been ignored in International Relations, largely due to the fact that 
“objective” and “scientific” approaches of rationalist theories have created a stagnant 
notion of the state, its environs and what influences its behaviour. As a result, autonomy 
too has been become a static and “natural” part of sovereignty and of little concern for
151 Cox, “Social forces, states and world orders”, pp. 88-89.
152 Cox, “Social forces, states and world orders”, pp. 92-93.
153 Cox, “Social forces, states and world orders”, pp. 119-20.
154 Walker, “From International Relations to World Politics”, pp. 35-36. 
Weber, Simulating Sovereignty, pp. 1-10.155
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theorists, analysts and students of International Relations. This is despite the fact that 
the securing of autonomy can vary from state to state in reality.
Alexander Wendt provides a further useful definition of autonomy that supports 
Held’s idea of sovereignty and autonomy as being separate, by arguing that autonomy 
varied from case to case. Wendt’s theory takes into account both the need to challenge 
rationalist theory and the necessity of empirical applicability, albeit briefly; and alludes 
to these points in Social Theory o f International Relations. He agrees on the 
characteristics of Westphalian sovereignty as a basic definition of sovereignty, and 
defines external sovereignty as “denoting merely the absence of any external authority 
higher than the state, like other states, international law, or a supranational Church—in 
short, “constitutional independence. ” 156 He also takes care to emphasise the difference 
between sovereignty and autonomy, recognising that increased interdependence means 
increased external constraints. To reflect this, he gives a separate definition of 
autonomy:
Autonomy refers to the ability of a state-society complex to exercise control over its 
allocation of resources and choice of government. In order to reproduce its identity 
it is not enough for a state-society complex to merely survive, it must also retain its 
“liberty.” This follows from the fact of state sovereignty. Indeed, a case can be 
made that all organizations, not just states, have an interest in autonomy, since 
without it they will be constrained in their ability to meet internal demands or 
respond to contingencies in the environment. On the other hand, autonomy is 
always a matter of degree and can be traded away when the benefit of dependence 
outweigh the costs. As with survival, what counts as securing autonomy will vary 
from case to case. 157
Wendt’s definition of autonomy is therefore somewhat similar to the definition of 
sovereignty by Waltz and Keohane, thereby demonstrating his attempt to bridge 
rationalist and critical theories. The crucial difference is that Wendt clearly separates 
autonomy from sovereignty, recognises its relativity and is aware that there is an 
increasing “gap between [a state’s] right to do what [it] wants and [its] ability to 
exercise that right” 158—in other words, an increasing gap between sovereignty and 
autonomy. Despite the recognition of this gap, like many of the other International 
Relations theories, Wendt argues that autonomy and what it entails “follows from the 
fact of state sovereignty.”
156
157
158
Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, p. 208. 
Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, pp. 235-36. 
Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, p. 208.
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Non-rationalist theorists therefore make an important contribution to the 
discussion on autonomy by questioning the foundational concepts of rationalist 
International Relations such as the state, and highlight the biases on which these 
theories stand. Non-rationalist theories unconcerned with the particular characteristics 
of sovereignty and how they work in international relations, and do not specifically refer 
to notions of autonomy within their discussions or attempt to define it. However, by 
focusing more on the context in which the concepts have arisen, they are able to draw 
attention to the biases present in rationalist theories, particularly with regard to state 
motivation. In other words, by dismantling the stable building blocks and rules of 
International Relations, such as sovereignty and self-help, and drawing attention to the 
fact that these concepts are results of historical and social contexts and purposes 
themselves, non-rationalist theories help to pave the way for an explanation of Japanese 
state autonomy that is narrower than assumed in rationalist theories because of the 
historically and socially specific circumstances of Japan since the Second World War.
Conclusion: Hegemony and Autonomy—A Fundamental and Irresolvable
Contradiction?
The above survey of literature on hegemony and autonomy has illuminated the various 
characteristics of hegemony and autonomy as assessed in International Relations theory. 
The purpose of analysing hegemony and autonomy in detail is to grasp a clearer notion 
of the theoretical context in which these two concepts are situated. Hegemony has 
various definitions—“leadership of one state (the hegemon) over other states in the 
system, ” 159 “domination, not merely leadership.. .resulting from superior power” , 160 
“‘dominant powers’—states that exercise territorial and ideological aggrandisement and 
hold authority over a limited range of influence” 161, “preponderance of material 
resources” 162 and “when one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules 
governing interstate relations, and willing to do so. ” 163 However, within these various 
definitions, the majority add a dimension of legitimacy to hegemony. 164 In other words, 
preponderance of power does not automatically result in the leadership of subordinate 
states which agree to support hegemony. Therefore, there is always a dimension of
139 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 116n.
160 Harries, Benign or Imperial? pp. 3-4.
161 Wight, Power Politics, p. 36, 41.
162 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 32.
163 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 44.
164 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 30, Wight, Power Politics, p. 36, Keohane, After 
Hegemony, p. 49, Cox, “Gramsci and hegemony”, pp. 125-26.
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common interest, mutual willingness to co-operate and “a certain degree of consent 
from other sovereign states” 165 involved in hegemonic systems.
The analysis of theories of sovereignty in this section suggests that autonomy in 
rationalist theories is best described as the principle and the liberty of a state which 
enables it to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choice of government166, 
and to determine the conditions of their own affairs, as long as it does not negate the 
rights of other states. 167 However, the biases of rationalist theories insists that actors 
follow a set pattern of behaviour under anarchy and that, as a consequence, their 
material capabilities are then able to be converted into state action. On the one hand, the 
survey of literature on sovereignty and discussion of autonomy clarifies that this 
assumption is not compatible for the analysis of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy, 
because Japanese autonomy does not follow self-help patterns under anarchy. On the 
other, non-rationalist theories break down these biases and lay a foundation on which to 
formulate a definition of Japanese autonomy; this will be discussed and clarified in 
Chapter Three.
The fact that hegemony is a system of consent of a particular leadership also 
suggests that autonomy is limited for most states, regardless of the assumptions of 
rational theory that assume the equality of states and their consequent ability to translate 
this into rational autonomous action. Autonomy under hegemony may seem 
contradictory, yet it is possible when biases of rational theory are dispelled. “The liberty 
of a state which enables it to exercise control over its allocation of resources and choice 
of government and to determine the conditions of their own affairs”, as autonomy was 
defined earlier, can be sustained when hegemony is thought of as a system closer to 
Kang’s theory of hierarchy. When the leadership of the central power is accepted and 
subordinate states accept their place in the pecking order, there is greater scope for 
stability and co-operation. In other words, the characteristics of this international system 
are formal inequality of power, but informal equity that recognises “substantial 
autonomy and freedom among the lesser states” . 168
However, the US-Japan relationship is one of hierarchy rather than hegemony. 
Kang argues that hegemony is “more intrusive” 169 than hierarchy, and this is indeed the
165 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 49.
166 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, pp. 235-36.
167 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 147.
168 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.169
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case in the US-Japan relationship. This aspect will be analysed in greater detail in the 
following chapter, which will follow the development of US hegemony in post-1945 
international relations, and evaluate how this directly affected Japanese foreign and 
economic policy and limited Japanese autonomy. It will also draw on Kang’s theory to 
argue that, whilst hegemonic power does include subordinate states in a sphere of 
influence or an informal empire, the hegemon perceives a world of anarchy amongst 
equal states, while the lesser states are more influenced by the order of hegemony. If the 
United States has one perception of its position in the world, while other (subordinate) 
states—in this case Japan—have another perception of the world, this leads to different 
expectations of behaviour, and consequently to differences in views on the boundaries 
of autonomy in hegemonic relationships such as the US-Japan relationship. The next 
chapter demonstrates that, as US hegemony developed, Japan was more co-operative in 
supporting this hegemonic system than the United States assumed, suggesting that the 
United States sees the world through a parsimonious anarchic lens, whereas Japan is 
more accepting of its position within hegemony and thus less influenced by an anarchic 
view of the world.
CHAPTER TWO
THE UNITED STATES AS A HEGEMON 
AND JAPAN UNDER US HEGEMONY
To reiterate, the aim of this thesis is to examine Japanese autonomy in the context of US 
hegemony. The previous chapter explored and analysed the nature of hegemony and 
how different perspectives of hegemony influenced its perceptions of autonomy. This 
chapter continues the investigation of hegemony, this time in the specific context of US 
hegemony. It follows the development of the United States as a hegemon, its 
worldviews and how they influenced Japanese policies throughout the post-Second 
World War period. It seeks to answer two main questions: the extent and impact of US 
hegemony on Japanese foreign policy, and whether the outcome of this reflects two 
differing perceptions of the hegemonic system between the United States and Japan.
There are two reasons for extending the discussion of hegemony in this chapter. 
Firstly, the US occupation of Japan at the end of the Second World War had a profound 
impact on the political, economic and social reconstruction of Japan, which continues to 
colour aspects of the relationship today. Thus, it is important to relate the theoretical 
discussion and definition of hegemony of the previous chapter to this specific historical 
background in order to understand meaningfully Japanese foreign policy within the US- 
Japan relationship. Secondly, the ensuing relationship between these two states has 
often been expressed as being hegemonic, without any substantial investigation on the 
precise nature of this hegemony. Therefore, greater clarification of the nature of US 
hegemony is not only necessary, but can significantly add to understanding the concrete 
ways in which the United States impacts on Japanese foreign policy.
These concerns are addressed by analysing US hegemony in chronological 
periods since the Second World War. This chapter follows its development in the latter 
half of the twentieth century and analyses its specific influence on Japan during this 
time. While there are several historical accounts of US-Japan relations following the 
Second World War, this chapter differs from them in that its specific focus is on 
hegemony. By illustrating and analysing the concrete constraints that the United States 
has placed on the world and, more particularly, on Japan, this chapter establishes the 
development of the United States as a hegemon, the nature of this hegemony and what 
US hegemony in practice has meant for Japan. Four distinct periods or contexts in the 
development of US hegemony are discussed: the immediate post-Second World War
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period; the supposed decline of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s; the post-Cold 
War period; and the more recent post-11 September 2001 period, all of which 
demonstrate varying degrees of US hegemony. The four periods are significant and 
appropriate divisions for analysis in that they represent changes in the material 
capabilities, ideological positions and international influence of the United States. The 
first stage represents a time when the United States first began to establish itself as a 
hegemon in the wake of the Second World War. The second is a period of greater 
Japanese wealth and speculation about a decline in US hegemony. The third is a period 
of US hegemonic renewal and the potentially greater political and economic freedom of 
Japan following the end of ideological conflict and the Cold War. The final post-11 
September 2001 stage signifies a more strident unilateralism and the willingness of the 
United States to use force. While the influence of these changes on Japanese foreign and 
economic policies varies, the implication of this chronological discussion is that the 
continuous influence of American hegemony across the last six decades, as chiefly 
exemplified for Japan in the US-Japan alliance relationship, has limited Japanese 
foreign policy behaviour throughout this period, despite balances between Japan’s 
economic power and levels of US hegemony. It sets the scene in which Japan must 
navigate a more limited autonomy and suggests that at no stage was Japan about to 
dispute the primacy of the United States in the region and the importance of its alliance 
since 1945.
More specifically, on the nature of hegemony in the US-Japan relationship, this 
chapter reasons that two perceptions of hegemony are conceivable, drawing from the 
arguments of Kang in the previous chapter. This chapter argues first that the hegemon 
sees its influence over subordinate states in pessimistic, anarchic terms, because 
throughout the post-1945 period the United States has interpreted Japan’s political 
recovery and rise in economic power as a threat to its own authority, particularly from 
the mid-1980s onwards. Secondly, this chapter also demonstrates that, while Japan did 
significantly increase its economic power and subsequently its political power, it 
remained within US hegemony and at times even went as far as sustaining declining US 
power. Therefore, this chapter argues that Japan is more accepting of its subordinate 
position under hegemony and, as a consequence, its perception of hegemony and of its 
relationship with the United States is less influenced by anarchic perceptions. In other 
words, Japan’s perception of hegemony is closer to Kang’s theory of hierarchy, which 
enables greater autonomy for subordinate states. This observation is an important point 
in the discussion of autonomy, as different perceptions of hegemony lead to different
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expectations of behaviour, which also influence differing perceptions in regard to the 
boundaries of autonomy under a hegemonic system. Because Japan perceives itself in a 
continuing context of US hegemony, the boundaries of its autonomy are defined by 
pressures from the United States and consequently, its autonomy is more limited than is 
assumed by those rationalist theories discussed in the previous chapter.
The Establishment of US Hegemony: 1945-1970
Theorists on the Establishment o f Post-Second World War US Hegemony
There is widespread agreement that the origins of the US hegemonic position in 
international relations began with its economic and political leadership in the aftermath 
of the Second World War. Lea Brilmayer states “American hegemony dates to the end 
of World War II, ” ' and David Calleo similarly characterises the United States as a 
“managing director” for the international system during this period. 1 2 Raymond Aron 
describes the position of the United States in this period as being “responsible for the 
peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of half the planet” and adds that “The West 
had known nothing like it since the Roman Empire. The United States has become the 
first truly world power, given there was no precedent for the global unification of the 
diplomatic scene. ” 3 G. John Ikenberry, who has written extensively on US hegemony, 
also supports the view that its international preponderance began at the end of the 
Second World War. Post-war international order was envisioned by the United States as 
being based on a political and economic order of liberal multilateralism. Concretely, this 
entailed international politics that centred on the charter of the United Nations, and 
international economic relations based on the pegged rate regime of the Bretton Woods 
agreement and the establishment of an International Trade Organisation.4 According to 
Robert Keohane, “American influence rested on three major sets of benefits that its 
partners received from joining American-centred regimes and deferring to U.S. 
leadership”5: a stable international monetary system; provision of open markets for 
goods; and access to oil at stable prices. 6
1 Brilmayer, American Hegemony, p. 15.
2 Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony, p. 13.
3 Aron, Peace and War, .p. 1.
4 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power”, pp. 49-70.
3 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 139.
6 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 139.
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Particularly with regard to the Bretton Woods system, John Gerard Ruggie 
reasons that the United States used its hegemonic authority to establish an economic 
institution based on legitimacy and social purpose.7 It took leadership in establishing an 
international monetary order that not only sought to establish domestic growth within 
the state, but also maintain international monetary stability without.8 Ruggie calls this 
compromise between domestic autonomy and international economic norms “embedded 
liberalism”:
The task of postwar institutional reconstruction...was to maneuver between two 
extremes and to devise a framework which would safeguard and even aid the quest 
for domestic stability without, at the same time, triggering the mutually destructive 
external consequences that had plagued the interwar period. This was the essence 
of the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the economic nationalism of the 
thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold 
standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic 
interventionism.9
The establishment of embedded liberalism in the form of the Bretton Woods 
system meant that the United States not only provided the actual material resources 
required to establish such a framework, but also gave it the influence over how the 
framework was realised.10 Thus, the Bretton Woods system signified a multilateral 
arrangement that remained within the interests of the United States, and also the 
“extraordinary power and perseverance on the United States” * 11 on which it further 
confirmed and developed its status as hegemon.
The view of US hegemony during this period is prevalent among both Western 
and Japanese scholars. Makoto Iokibe perceives US hegemony as based on 
asymmetrical power relations and argues that the post-Second World War international 
order, as envisaged by the United States, involved a hierarchy where the victors would 
preside over world peace by semi-permanently disenabling the defeated states— in 
particular, Germany and Japan.12 Yoneyuki Sugita draws particular attention to the 
historical details from 1941 to 1952 that demonstrate the establishment of US hegemony 
in East Asia in the context of the immediate period after 1945. The US vision entailed
7 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 382.
8 Under such a system, when moves are made “toward greater openness in the international economy, 
[it] is likely to be coupled with measure designed to cushion the domestic economy from external 
disruptions” but such domestic cushioning should be “compatible with the long term expansion of 
international transactions.” See Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 405.
9 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 393.
10 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 406.
11 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 393.
12 Makoto Iokibe, “Senryöka Nihon no ‘Gaikö’” (“Japan’s ‘Diplomacy’ Under Occupation”), in
Makoto Iokibe (ed.), Sengo Nihon Gaiköshi (Post-war Japanese Foreign Policy), Tokyo, Yuhikaku 
Arma, 2000, pp. 21-63, p. 24.
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its active participation in international politics with a global outlook to co-ordinate a 
global system, and enthusiastic and prolonged involvement in Asia. Tatsuo Akaneya 
also argued in his analysis of post-Second World War Japan-Australia relations that a 
significant influencing factor in the bilateral relationship was that of US hegemony.13 
Akeneya, in common with other discussions on US hegemony, also views US intentions 
in the immediate post-1945 period as centring on two main objectives—firstly, to 
implement a global strategy to contain communist states, and secondly to create 
multilateral trade and monetary systems.14
There are also more critical assessments of US hegemony during the post-Second 
World War era. Takahiko Soejima goes as far as to describe Japan in the US-Japan 
relationship as a “tributary state”, where Japan is one of many states that is enmeshed 
into the US international system and cannot easily back out.15 However, he is not so 
much critical of US hegemony as he is of the lack of debate on the situation in Japan. 
He criticises the blind following of the United States on the one hand, and the 
unconstructive anti-US slogans on the other. Consequently, his criticisms are largely 
situated in a view of established and continuing US hegemony.
The Direct Impact o f  US Hegemony on Japan 1945-1960
The beginnings of a hegemonic relationship and the dominance of the United States 
over Japan in the immediate post-Second World War period is evident at the most basic 
level by the fact that the United States largely led the occupation in Japan. While 
occupation in itself does not establish hegemony, by applying the American hegemonic 
vision to Japan, and at the same time making efforts to retain and nurture a sense of 
Japanese independence, a degree of legitimate hegemonic authority was instituted over 
Japan. However, for two reasons—firstly, the realities of unequal power relations 
represented in the American occupation of Japan and secondly, the international 
political circumstances and overall global US strategy during the Cold War—the actual 
implementation of independence and equality remained limited. As a consequence, the 
scope to which Japan could operate autonomously was in effect significantly influenced 
by US parameters.
13 Tatsuo Akaneya, “The Development of Postwar Japan-Australia Relations and the Impact of 
Declining American Hegemony”, Australia-Japan Research Centre Pacific Economic Paper, no. 
153, November 1987.
14 Akaneya, “The Development of Postwar Japan-Australia Relations”, p. 6.
15 Takahiko Soejima, Zokkoku Nihonron: Born on the Planet o f the Apes—Tributary State Theory, 
Tokyo, Satsuki Shobö, 1999.
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In reality, the occupation of Japan was largely a US-led mission, and therefore the 
United States was integral to the military, economic, political and social, rebuilding of 
Japan. It was originally planned as an Allied venture. A Far Eastern Commission 
(FEC)—based in Washington D.C. (with representatives of the Allied Powers that 
fought against Japan) and a smaller Allied Council based in Tokyo—was established to 
advise the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas 
MacArthur.16 However, neither had much practical influence,17 and the United States 
was primarily in charge of enforcing an experimental project to build a complete and 
lasting democracy in Japan, but also to stabilise its economy and immunise it against 
communism. As a consequence, Japan’s war trials and rebuilding were done under 
exceptional circumstances, and almost solely influenced by the United States. 18In this 
process, dominant power interests were infused into Japan, which nurtured political and 
economic co-operation. This hegemonic order became the world in which Japan 
functioned, and the context which continues to influence its international actions.
The unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers after the Second World 
War also meant that the two states were under unequal power relations in the very early 
stages of the post-war period. This power disparity manifested itself in initial American 
attitudes towards the reconstruction of Japan. Originally, the “rehabilitation” and 
integration of Japan into US hegemony, through the enforcement of American political 
culture and social values, were initially deemed central aspects of the Occupation. The 
Roosevelt government recommended “assimilation” of Japan into a liberal system of 
world trade,19 which was followed by the Truman administration’s position that Japan’s 
“rehabilitation” should entail a familiarisation with “the history, institutions, culture and 
the accomplishments of the United States.”20 Importance was placed on democratisation 
and demilitarisation from the perspective in the early post-war period that, “if Japan’s 
military power were destroyed, Japan and its neighbours would live in peace”21 and, 
thus, the rearmament of Japan for self-defence was initially a priority for neither the 
United States nor Japan. To reflect this sentiment, the Japanese Constitution initiated by 
the General Headquarters of the US Occupation in February 1946 and enforced nine
16 Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, pp. 25-26.
17 Schaller, Altered States, p. 8; Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, p. 26.
18 John Dower, Embracing Defeat.' Japan in the Wake o f World War II, New Press,- New York, 1999, 
pp. 21-29.
19 Robert Dallek, The American Style o f Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs, New 
York, Knopf, 1983, p. 147.
20 Dallek, The American Style o f Foreign Policy, p. 149.
21 Martin E. Weinstein, Japan’s Postwar Defense Policy, 1949-1968, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1971, p. 9.
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months later, explicitly prohibited Japan from resorting to war as a means of resolving 
international dispute in Article 9, which states that “[Japan] forever renounces the threat 
of use of force as a means of settling international disputes” and “the right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognised”.22 Even when blanket policies to convert 
Japan to the “American way” were changed to encourage an increased autonomous 
Japanese political, economic and militarily position, the process was largely initiated 
and monitored by the United States.
However, the increased tensions in the Cold War influenced the United States to 
implement a “reverse course” for Japan. Therefore, the SCAP’s emphasis on 
democratisation and demilitarisation was replaced by the integration of Japan into US 
hegemony through rearmament and economic stabilisation. China became a communist 
state under Mao Zedong in 1949 and, following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 
1950, the strategic importance of Japan grew. Consequently the necessity to bring Japan 
strongly on side with the United States increased. In these circumstances, the 
rearmament of Japan and securing of long-term support through a security alliance with 
the United States was prioritised over democratisation and demilitarisation.
As a result of the reverse course, the United States began to strongly encourage 
Japanese military rearmament, despite the earlier creation of the pacifist Japanese 
Constitution. The direction of US occupation in Japan changed from a universalist 
mission aimed at spreading American values across the country to a more specific 
operation of containing Soviet threat in the region. The outbreak of the Korean War in 
particular encouraged US thinking on the military rearmament of Japan, and the SCAP 
authorised the creation of a 200,000-strong National Police Reserve (NPR) on 8 July 
1950.23 This meant that the rearmament of Japan and development of greater defence 
arrangements were prioritised even before the conclusion of a peace treaty between the 
United States and Japan. Rearmament was further emphasised by John Forster Dulles in 
his visit to Japan in January 1951, with his attempt to persuade Japan to rearm and 
secure firm military commitment to the United States.24 Japanese rearmament was 
important, not only to avoid a “military vacuum” in Japan that would be vulnerable to
22 Dower, Embracing Defeat, pp. 82-83.
23 Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, pp. 43-^44.
24 Seigen Miyasato and Shöichi Koseki, “Köwa—Anpo: Senryö no Shüryö to Dokuritsu” (Peace and 
Security Treaties—Independence and the end of the Occupation) in Eiji Takemae and Rinjirö Sodei 
(eds.), Sengo Nihon no Genten: Senryöshi no Genzai [Ge] (The Origins of Post-War Japan—A 
Contemporary History of the Occupation, Volume II), Tokyo, Yushisha, 1992, pp. 241-98, p. 257; 
Akira Yamagiwa, “Chosen Sensö to San Furanshisuko Köwa”, in Masanori Nakamura, Kindai Nihon 
no Kiseki: Senryö to Sengo Kaikaku (Contemporary Japan's Locus—Occupation and Post-War 
Reform), Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1994, p. 216.
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Soviet attack while the US had troops in Korea,25 but also for the purposes of satisfying 
critics in Congress of US forces stationed in Japan after the Occupation. Japan’s 
rearmament was consequently also important in its capacity as a symbol of reciprocity 
in the bilateral alliance—to give a “token contribution” in exchange for having US 
support stationed in Japan.26
US plans for Japanese rearmament were generally met unenthusiastically by both 
the Japanese government and population; but, despite this, the Japanese were forced to 
come to a compromise, which Michael Schaller describes as “the bitter pill” that Japan 
had to swallow in order to arrive at a peace treaty to restore Japanese sovereignty.27 
Firstly, there was public resistance to remilitarisation particularly from socialists and the 
intellectual left, with increasing criticism towards conservative politicians and 
bureaucrats and businesses that they saw as straying from the peace constitution and the 
values of pacifism.28 Secondly, Prime Minister Yoshida remained cautious of the 
economic repercussions that rearmament would have on the Japanese economy.29 On 
numerous occasions, Special Ambassador to Japan John Foster Dulles pressed Yoshida 
for a concrete commitment to military contributions to “the free world”. However, 
Yoshida stood his ground, citing fears of underground militarist movements becoming 
stronger, economic concerns and regional sensitivities as factors weighing against 
Japan’s rearmament.30 These reservations about rearmament and the avoidance of 
military expenditure through the prioritisation of economic recovery became known as 
“the Yoshida Doctrine”. 31 Yoshida continued to frustrate Dulles throughout the 
negotiations towards a peace treaty on the issue of rearmament, and the Yoshida 
Doctrine was able to serve as a brake on over-enthusiastic US plans that urged Japanese 
leaders to create an army of between 300,000 and 350,000 troops during the panic of the 
Korean War.32 Eventually Yoshida compromised, indicating to the United States that 
Japan was willing to agree to an eventual expansion of its military capacity by creating
25 Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, p. 58.
26 Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, Berkley, University of 
California Press, 1992, pp. 280-83.
27 Schaller, Altered States, p. 35.
28 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 548.
29 Mike M. Mochizuki, “US-Japan Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region” in Akira Iriye and Robert A. 
Wampler (eds.), Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001, Tokyo, Kodansha 
International, 2001, pp. 13-32, p. 14.
30 Schaller, Altered States, p. 35 and Iokibe, p. 69.
31 Christopher Hughes and Akiko Fukushima, “US-Japan Security Relations: Toward Bilateralism 
Plus?” in Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (eds.) Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New 
Asia-Pacific, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 55-86, p. 60.
32 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 548.
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an additional 50,000-troop land and sea security forces on top of the existing National 
Police Reserve.33 The Japanese government also agreed to create a Security Planning 
Headquarters under a Ministry of National Security, with guidance from the United 
States.34
Along with rearmament, Japanese economic recovery and the integration of the 
Japanese and US economy became an important part of US Cold War strategy. The 
Japanese government maintained that it needed economic stability before it could invest 
in rearmament, while the United States viewed an impoverished Japan as vulnerable to 
Soviet expansionism.35 Therefore, the immediate goals of the US Occupation and the US 
administration in Japan became the stabilisation of inflation in particular, but also the 
achievement of long-term goals such as the elimination of black markets, installation of 
effective tax collection systems, and the creation of a more balanced economic budget. 
These goals were essential in creating a single exchange rate for Japan and necessary for 
it to increase its trade and re-enter the international economy.36 The Japanese economy 
was taking longer to recover than SCAP had expected and, as a solution, the United 
States brought in Joseph Dodge, then head of the Detroit Bank and also responsible for 
the economic recovery of Germany following the Second World War.37 In March 1949, 
the “Dodge Line” was officially introduced, a stringent nine point economic 
stabilisation policy that centred on four main objectives—balancing the consolidated 
budget; establishment of the US Aid Counterpart Fund to replace the lending operations 
of the Japanese government’s Reconstruction Finance Bank (fukkö kinyü kinko)\ 
establishment of a single foreign exchange rate; and, finally, a decreased government 
intervention in the economy.38 Thus, the Dodge Line essentially integrated the US vision 
of hegemonic influence throughout the region that planned to create a “Great Crescent” 
of US influence across Asia, with Japan being its great fortress against communism.39
Japanese economic freedoms were significantly restricted during this period in the 
name of anti-communism under the Dodge Line. Initially, the reforms successfully
33 Kazuya Sakamoto, “Dokuritsu koku no Jyöken” (“The Conditions for an Independent State”), in 
Iokibe, Sengo Nihon Gaiköshi, pp. 65-104, p. 70.
34 Sakamoto, “Dokuritsu koku no Jyöken” in Iokibe, Sengo Nihon Gaiköshi, pp. 65-104, p. 70.
35 Schaller, Altered States, p. 103.
36 Ökurashö Zaiseishi Shitsu (Office of Financial History) (ed.), Shöwa Zaiseishi (Economic and 
Financial History o f the Showa Era), vol. 3, Tokyo, Töyö Keizai Shimpösha, 1976, pp. 396-99.
37 Sugita and Thorsten, Beyond the Line, p. 24 and Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, p. 37.
3S Dick Nanto, “The Dodge Line: A Reevaluation”, in Lawrence H. Redford (ed.) The Occupation of 
Japan: Economic Policy and Reform: the proceedings o f a symposium sponsored by the MacArthur 
Memorial, April 13-15, 1978, Norfolk, Virginia, The MacArthur Memorial, 1980, pp. 41-53, p. 48.
39 Yoneyuki Sugita and Marie Thorsten, Beyond the Line: Joseph Dodge and the Geometry o f Power in 
US-Japan Relations 1949-1952, Okayama, University Education Press, 1999, p. 6.
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brought down inflation rates, the number of goods and their prices on the black market, 
and some increases in currency circulation.40 However, public works, welfare and 
education budgets were cut, and exports did not increase significantly, leaving Japan 
still economically vulnerable.41 Massive numbers of workers were made redundant, 
bankruptcies and suicides in smaller businesses increased42 and, as a consequence, 
economic and social stability remained unsteady. Popular unrest rose noticeably, and a 
US government document reported that “every major power element in the Japanese 
body politic considers itself injured and its interests jeopardized” by the Dodge Line.43 
Despite these unfavourable outcomes, the international situation pressured the 
conservative Yoshida government to continue to support the reforms, consequently 
further linking Dodge’s economic plan for Japan “to serve the aims of the American 
imperium in Asia”.44
It was only when the Dodge Line was complemented by the special procurements 
of the Korean War that the Japanese economy began to show improvement. US 
operations necessitated delivery of metal products, textiles, vehicles, electric equipment, 
paper products and numerous other goods that were to be strategically ordered from 
Japan. During this time, almost 3,000 Japanese firms received war-related contracts and 
industrial production finally surpassed pre-Second World War levels in October 1950.45 
Profits were invested to upgrade Japanese domestic transportation, power, shipping and 
communications, and to purchase foreign technology.46 Debates remain on whether the 
Dodge Line itself or the special procurements were responsible for the boosting and 
recovery of Japan’s economy. Nevertheless, Japan’s domestic need for economic 
stabilisation and growth was coupled with US Cold War security interests and its 
economy integrated into a US-led economic system.
40 William R. Nester, Japan’s Growing Power over East Asia and the World Economy: Ends and 
Means, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1990, p. 25.
41 Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 541.
42 Sugita and Thorsten, Beyond the Line, p. 31.
43 United States Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research Report No. 5447, “Japanese 
Political Trends Affecting U.S. Position in Japan”, 23 May 1950, as cited in Howard B. Schonberger, 
Aftermath o f War: Americans and the Remaking o f Japan, 1945-1952, Kent, Kent State University 
Press, 1989, p. 74.
44 Howard B. Schonberger, “The Dodge Mission and American Diplomacy”, in Lawrence H. Redford 
(ed.) The Occupation o f Japan: Economic Policy and Reform: the proceedings o f a symposium 
sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial, April 13-15, 1978, Norfolk, Virginia, The MacArthur 
Memorial, 1980, pp. 53-87, p. 76.
43 Schaller, Altered States, p. 48.
46 Schaller, Altered States, p. 49.
CHAPTER TWO 74
The political and social integration of Japan into the US value system remained as 
a residual goal during the intensification of the Cold War. The Truman administration 
recognised the need for Japan “to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect 
for fundamental human rights, particularly freedom of religion, assembly, speech and 
the press.”47 However, greater independence was to be advanced within the firm control 
of the SCAP and the US government. Sugita reveals that, among the reasons for the 
change in direction, was that the United States intended Japan to be a showcase to other 
countries in Asia of the US’s benign and legitimate presence in the region. The US 
government believed that if other states in Asia saw Japan forming an alliance with the 
United States and accepting US troops on their territory of its own accord, suspicions of 
colonialism would subside and the prestige and influence of the United States in the 
region would increase.48
The San Francisco Peace Treaty concluded on 8 September 1951, which officially 
ended US occupation of Japan, also emphasised that the United States and Japan were 
“neither victors nor vanquished.. .but only equals in the partnership of peace.”49 On the 
same day, a security treaty was signed by both countries. The two treaties were drafted 
by the United States to be a non-punitive peace agreement that attempted to take into 
account Japan’s cultural and psychological concerns and, as a result, stipulated no 
reparations, economic barriers or opposition to the creation of a navy or air force, in 
exchange for maintaining US bases on Japanese territory.50 Although Okinawa remained 
under US control, the peace treaty signified the official return of Japan’s sovereignty 
and independence.51 However, the hegemonic relationship established in this first 
decade after 1945 continued to influence Japanese foreign policy significantly into the 
1960s.
US Hegemony Reinforced: 1960-1970
The developments of the 1950s established the backbone of US-Japan relations and thus 
the 1960s signified a period which saw those political and economic institutions created 
in the previous decade further develop and take hold domestically in Japan. In other
47 Dallek, The American style o f foreign policy, p. 149.
48 Yoneyuki Sugita, Hegemon! no Gyakusetsu: Ajia Taiheiyö Sensö to Beikoku no Higashi Ajia Seisaku 
1941 nen-1951 nen (The Irony of Hegemony: The Asia-Pacific War and US Policies towards East 
Asia, 1941-1952), Kyoto, Sekaishisho Sha, 1999, pp. 240-41.
49 Harry S. Truman, “A Treaty of Reconciliation”, in Vital Speeches o f the Day 17, vol. 23, 15 
September 1951, New York, The City News Publishing Company, 1959, p. 708.
30 Roger Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945-1990, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1992, p. 38.
51 Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, p. 77.
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words, the Yoshida Doctrine became firmly established, prioritising economic growth 
and the idea of leaving political and security issues to the United States. This lessened 
the urgency for constitutional reform.
Politically, the 1960s signified Japan’s resolve to restrict its political and military 
capacity under the leadership of the United States. During the 1950s, public opinion in 
support of constitutional reforms, with the eventual aim of becoming totally 
independent of the United States, was just above 50 percent.52 However, by the 1960s, 
this had dropped well below 50 percent and faded from the public and political 
spotlight.53 While there were violent protests, and even some deaths on the issue of the 
renewal of the security treaty between the United States and Japan, these 
demonstrations were not only anti-US but also in opposition to the then Prime Minster 
Kishi Nobusuke and the pre-Second World War old guard he was deemed to represent. 
This old guard was seen to be supported by the United States. As a compromise to the 
Japanese people, Kishi resigned as the security treaty was renewed, and the public 
unrest died away.54
During the 1960s, issues of burden sharing and free-riding were not yet a concern, 
as the United States perceived that increased economic growth in Japan would soothe 
domestic political tensions and stabilise the alliance between the two states. Japan was 
still economically weak during the 1960s, which meant that the level at which it could 
actually participate in military, economic and political world affairs would have 
minimal influence on the Cold War.55 In addition to Japan’s economic weakness, the 
political, economic and military confidence of the United States was still high, and the 
US administration did not yet see the need to depend on Japanese financial contribution 
and political support in the international relations of the early 1960s.
During the Vietnam War, Japan faced a difficult dilemma between the ideals of 
pacifism and the domestic unpopularity of war versus its alliance commitments with the 
United States. While the United States pressured the government for its co-operation to 
enable smooth and effective use of the US bases in Okinawa, the Japanese political left 
and student populations saw the government’s support of the war as going against the
52 Shigeki Nishihira, Yoron Chosa ni yoru Döjidaishi (Contemporary History through Opinion 
Surveys), Tokyo, Brain Shuppan, 1987, p. 187.
53 Nishihara, Yoron Chösa niyoru Döjidaishi, p. 187.
54 Sakamoto, “Dokuritsu koku no Jyöken”, p. 102.
'5 Masayuki Tadoroko, “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikö no Genkei” (“A Prototype of an Economic Power’s 
Diplomacy”) in Iokibe, Sengo Nihon Gaiköshi, pp. 105-42, p. 111.
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ideals of pacifism and participation in the Asia-Africa Movement in the mid-1950s.56 
Given that Okinawa was still under US control and that its return to Japanese 
sovereignty depended on the Japanese government’s co-operation with the United States, 
Japan had little choice but to support the US position in this instance.57
Economically, the 1960s signified a period when Japan expanded its economic 
capacities and incorporated itself into the Bretton Woods international economic 
institutions established under US leadership. Japan experienced high economic growth 
rates of 10.9 percent between 1961 and 1970, which was facilitated by the United States 
in many ways.58 As well as guaranteeing Japan’s national security and not requesting 
international military contributions, the United States acted as a market that absorbed 
Japanese goods where other industrialised countries failed. While Japan entered the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1955 (which the United States 
encouraged and welcomed), 14 countries invoked Article 35 of the GATT agreement to 
exclude Japan from free trade agreements during the 1960s, giving reasons such as 
social dumping and of “unfairness” in accepting Japanese goods because of cheap 
labour and the long hours Japanese employees worked.59 As a consequence, US and 
regional markets largely offset this discrimination towards Japan.60
This did not mean that US-Japan economic relations were trouble-free, but Japan 
frequently demonstrated its readiness to compromise its national interests in order to 
maintain its relationship with the United States throughout this period. The Japanese 
government agreed to a set of voluntary export restraints in textiles (and later in steel)61 
and Japan did not adopt comprehensive policies that upset American exports, as the 
European Economic Community (EEC) did in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
of 196462 and value added tax of 1967.63
56 Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, p. 120.
57 Michael A. Barnhart, “From Hershey Bars to Motor Cars: America’s Economic Policy towards Japan 
1945-1976”, Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler (eds.), Partnership: The United States and Japan 
1951-2001, Tokyo, Kodansha International, 2001, p. 212. The return of Okinawa was negotiated 
between the United States and Japan in 1969. Okinawa was eventually returned to Japan in 1972.
58 Tadoroko, “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikö no Genkei”, p. 115.
59 Marlis G. Steinert, “Japan and the European Community: An Uneasy Relationship”, in Robert S. 
Ozaki and Walter Arnold (eds.), Japan 's Foreign Relations: A Global Search for Economic Security, 
Boulder, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 33-46, p. 39.
60 Tadoroko, “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikö no Genkei”, pp. 113-14.
61 Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 122-24.
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Westview Press, 1991, pp. 24—26.
63 Robert E. Hudec, “Legal Issues in US-EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960-1985 in Robert E. 
Baldwin, Carl B. Hamilton, and Andre Sapir (eds.) Issues in US-EC Trade Relations, Chicago, 
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In this way, the United States established a sense of legitimate hegemony and 
consolidated its co-operative relationship with Japan in the first two decades after the 
Second World War. This was achieved through its attempts to fuse American political, 
social and ideological values and goals with the political and economic recovery of 
Japan. Japan, in turn navigated its way within the restrictions of defeat, economic 
turmoil and ideological tensions, and shifted from a position of receiving direct political 
and economic rule from the United States in the 1950s to the third largest economy in 
the world by the end of the 1960s. While, economically, the US attitude encouraged the 
economic recovery of Japan, the latter’s dependence on the former for its national 
security restricted the international impact of Japan’s economic development, and it did 
not earn the full international recognition of the new status it desired.
Hegemonic Decline? US Hegemony from the 1970s to 1990
While there is little dispute as to when US hegemony was established internationally, 
there was significant argument over whether the 1960s to the 1980s saw a decline in US 
hegemony. In terms of actual international events, this period saw a breakdown and 
significant change in the institutions borne out of the US vision for post-1945 
international stability. The Bretton Woods system began to show strains in the mid- 
1960s, and it was eventually renounced in 1971 with destabilising consequences.64 
International Free Trade arrangements for free trade were also showing signs of failure 
during the 1960s. Between the mid-1960s and early 1980s, national controls on trade 
increased for a wide variety of manufactured goods;65 moreover the GATT was not 
being utilised to its full potential as an international regime.66 Patterns in oil production, 
up to the 1960s dominated by American and British companies with the backing of their 
respective national governments, changed with the establishment of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), giving greater power to oil-producing countries, 
particularly through the nationalisation of oil production.67 Finally, the Vietnam War left 
the United States weary of military involvement in international conflicts and, under the 
subsequent Nixon Doctrine, it down-scaled its international security commitments.
64 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 184, p. 186.
65 Albert Bressand, “Mastering the ‘World Economy’”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 4, Spring, pp. 745- 
72.
66 Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy, New York, Praeger, 1975, 
p. 256.
67 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 185, p. 190.
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Theoretical Debates on Hegemonic Decline
In more theoretical discussions, hegemonic stability theorists argue that the benefits to 
the system provided by the hegemon could in fact increase the economic powers of 
secondary states, therefore reducing the hegemon’s relative power, and eventually 
“eroding hegemony”. As discussed in the previous chapter on the concept of hegemony, 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (in their discussion of co-operation during and after 
hegemonic decline) argue that, as secondary states gain greater status and autonomy 
under hegemonic international systems, they reject a one-sided dependence on the 
hegemon.
On the other hand, in response to the changes in secondary states, Keohane and 
Nye also argue that the hegemon might change and appear less likely or able to 
guarantee economic and political stability. 68 Crucially, Keohane and Nye maintain that, 
despite declining hegemony, the institutions established under hegemony can sustain 
international co-operation, as opposed to the realist interpretation of hegemonic stability 
theory, which states that a decline in hegemonic power usually leads to change through 
conflict and war. Furthermore, Nye argues in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f 
American Power that, despite the decline in US relative power during this period, it is 
still best suited to leading the international community due not only to its “hard power” 
(both military and economic) but, more importantly, to its “soft power”. Nye argues that 
what is important in maintaining international institutions and an international culture of 
stability is the “soft powers” of political philosophies, ideologies and culture, which 
convince other states of the benefits of participating in international regimes. He argues 
that, as the United States still had soft power at this time, despite a relative decline in 
hard power, it consequently remained a global leader. 69
Ruggie’s theory of embedded liberalism also supports Keohane and Nye’s 
arguments about the continuation of international regimes under diminishing hegemony. 
He maintains that the wave of protectionist economics, seen after the decline in US 
willingness to absorb trade and take leadership in international monetary stability, did 
not signify discontinuation of post-Second World War liberalism but, rather, was an 
integral feature of embedded liberalism. 70 Trade tariffs and the shift to floating exchange 
rates following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system all represented changes in the
68 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 45.
69 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York, Basic Books, 
1990.
70 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 410.
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instrumentalities of achieving an essentially unchanged shared purpose— a balance 
between domestic and international economic growth and stability—of the regime 
originally established by the United States.71 Thus, he presented the theory that “far 
more continuity can attend hegemonic decline than would be predicted by the 
hegemonic stability thesis, provided that social purposes are held constant.”72
Hegemonic Decline and US-Japan relations during the 1970s
This period of hegemonic decline and its influence on Japan was primarily represented 
in the “Nixon Shocks” of the early 1970s, which affected the security, economics and 
politics for Japan. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, the end of the 
Bretton Woods System in 1971 and US President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 
February 1972 signified dramatic changes in US policy.73 These events were viewed as a 
period following the Second World War in which US-Japan relations were the most 
strained.74.
Firstly, the Nixon Doctrine stated that the United States would continue to provide 
protection against nuclear threat, but would only assist countries that were prepared to 
take responsibility for their own basic national defence.75 During this period, Nixon 
withdrew US troops in Vietnam, and began to make adjustments to scale-down US 
participation in combating communism around the world. To signal this, the Guam 
Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine) was announced in July 1969 and confirmed in a 
congressional report in February 1970. These US policies signified decreased US armed 
forces in Asia and the Pacific region and greater security responsibilities for Japan,76 put 
new pressures on the Japanese government, and consequently cast doubts on the 
stability of the US-Japan Security Treaty.
While Green argues that, through the Nixon Doctrine, “the Japanese political 
establishment received its strongest notice yet that the time was ripe for defense 
autonomy”,77 this opportunity was largely complicated and limited by the trade frictions
7| Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 404, pp. 409-11.
2 Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change”, p. 413.
73 Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hoshö: Sengo 50nen no Mosaku, Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, 1997, pp. 
231-38.
74 Tadae Takubo, Masatoshi Öta, and Shigeo Hiramatsu, Nihon Gaikö no Saitenken: Kenshö “Yoshida 
Dokutorin ”, Tokyo, Jijitsüshin Sha, 2000, p.82.
75 Akaneya, “The Development of Postwar Japan-Australia Relations”, p. 19.
76 Akaneya, “The Development of Postwar Japan-Australia Relations”, p. 19.
77 Michael Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for 
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involving Japanese and US textile industries. As Nixon had gained office with the huge 
support of textile companies in US southern states, the restriction of Japanese textile 
imports into the United States was a major goal of the Nixon administration.78 This 
should not have been a difficult issue for the United States at this point, as the Japanese 
textile industry was not as strong an industry as it had been in the 1960s. However, the 
negotiations proved drawn out and were blown out of proportion.79 The United States 
pressured Japan to compromise, threatening unilateral quotas and the usage of the 
Trading with the Enemy legislation80. Eventually, the negotiations were rapidly tied 
together through the leadership of Kakuei Tanaka, then the Minister for International 
Trade and Industry.
The Okinawa issue also found its way into the textile conflict, when threats to 
delay the return of Okinawa were used as leverage by the United States, despite 
President Nixon having officially announced in November 1969 that the United States 
would return the southern islands by 1972.81 While the return of Okinawa did eventuate 
in May 1972, it was symbolically noteworthy, as the intervening years of occupation of 
Okinawa even after mainland Japan had gained sovereignty signified that the Second 
World War had not truly ended for the Japanese.82 The US administration had always 
been in agreement that the return of Okinawa to Japan was essential for the long-term 
maintenance of the US-Japan relationship. However, the process to do so had been slow, 
not only because of the textile issue, but also because the US military bases in Okinawa 
had proved their utility during the Vietnam War, and the US administration did not want 
to lose its influence over the bases or have restrictions on their capacities under 
Japanese sovereignty. The major point of conflict was Japan’s “Three Anti-Nuclear 
Principles”—to not produce, not possess or bring nuclear weapons into Japan.83 The 
biggest problem for the United States was the last principle of “not bringing” nuclear
78 Gerald L. Curtis, “US Policy toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton”, in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), New 
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81 Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, p. 129.
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Okinawa”), in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyüjo (ed.), Nihon Gaikö Shuyö Bunsho Nenpyö Dai 2kan (Basic 
Documents in Japanese Foreign Relations, Volume 2), Tokyo, Hara Shobö, 1984, pp. 613-14. The 
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weapons into the country. This aspect of the Three Principles was overcome through the 
recognition of the possibility that nuclear weapons might be brought into the bases in 
the event of conflict in East Asia.
Another significant factor (other than economic frictions in the textile industry) to 
impact Japan in the 1970s was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 
1971—yet another component of the Nixon Shock. As Japan’s rapid economic 
development was based on exports and the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods 
system, moves away from fixed gold rates to floating exchange rates were a significant 
disadvantage.84 However, Japan was also accommodating the United States by taking 
pressure off the US dollar and suspending its convertibility into gold. Although the 
Japanese population still feared the fragility of its economy and maintained that the yen 
needed to continue to be valued at 360 yen to the dollar, the Ministry of Finance was 
largely aware that adjustments in the international monetary system would be 
necessary.85 However, contrary to Japanese predictions that the target of the adjustments 
would be Europe, Japan instead came under pressure from both the United States and 
Europe to adjust the value of the yen. 86 Furthermore, in the same year, US 
Congressional leaders claimed openly that the US trade deficit with Japan was the 
principal cause of American economic difficulties and, therefore, “in the eyes of 
Congress and the American public, Japan became identified as economic enemy number 
one, the chief reason the United States had a payment deficit at all, and a chief cause of 
the fall of the dollar.87 Japan was therefore under pressure to relinquish its immediate 
economic advantages for the sake of the long-term partnership with the United States. 
Japan accepted a 17 percent devaluation of the yen to 308 yen to the dollar, agreed to 
permit the yen to float after 1971 and acted to reduce its overall balance of payments 
surplus, with some success through 1973.88 The collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
also signalled the beginning of the international significance of Japan and the yen, and 
one of the first incidents that encouraged Japan to expand its international role.
The changes in US attitudes toward China was possibly received as the biggest 
surprise of the Nixon shocks by Japan, and was seen as a great betrayal.89 Japan had
84 Takubo, Öta and Hiramatsu, Nihon Gaikö no Saitenken, p. 79.
85 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “Jiritsuteki Kyöchö no Mosaku” (“Searching for Independent Co-operation”), in 
Iokibe, Sengo Nihon Gaiköshi, pp. 143-86, p. 149-50.
86 Nakanishi, “Jiritsuteki Kyöchö no Mosaku”, p. 150.
87 Barnhart, “From Hershey Bars to Motor Cars”, p. 219.
88 Barnhart, “From Hershey Bars to Motor Cars”, p. 217.
89 Mochizuki, “US-Japan Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region”, p. 22; Buckley, US-Japan Alliance 
Diplomacy, p. 127.
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been looking to China and other states in the region in order to expand its export 
markets from as early as the 1950s, but US policymakers were adamant that this could 
not happen in a Cold War context.
China was regarded as part of a unified communist bloc, and continued to be 
regarded even in the face of evidence of a serious Sino-Soviet split. U.S. policy 
makers saw the world in bipolar, not multipolar, terms. There was no room for a 
U.S.-Japan-China triangle in this worldview; indeed, the United State firmly 
rejected Japanese efforts to break out of the rigid bipolar mold in developing 
Japan’s policy toward China.90
Japan had made painstaking efforts to improve its relations with China through 
the separation of politics and economic or seikei bunri,91 so that it would retain basic 
alignment and coherence with US Cold War policies. It was in this context that, on 15 
July 1971, President Nixon revealed that the United States had engaged in talks with the 
People’s Republic of China over a New Economic Policy without any prior discussion 
with, or notification to, the Japanese government.92 US resumption of relations with 
China made it easier for Japan to expand its relationship with China and was ultimately 
beneficial for Japan. It quickly established formal diplomatic relations with China in 
1972— nine years ahead of the United States.93 However, this US diplomatic style of 
“going over the head” of Japan, which improved somewhat under the presidencies of 
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, became a dominant pattern in US dealings with 
China up to the Clinton administration.94 Furthermore, while Japan’s quick recovery in 
its relationship with the People’s Republic of China and continued relationship with 
Taiwan in the wake of the Nixon Shocks appeared to be a successful demonstration of 
Japanese initiatives independent of the United States, it was again, within the 
boundaries of US interests, and the policies were conducted in close consultation with 
the US administration.95 Prime Minister Masayoshi Öhira writes that the Japanese 
government’s actions on China were made with the tacit approval of the United States,
90 Curtis, “US Policy toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton”, p. 6.
91 The Japanese private sector had signed four commercial agreements with China between 1952 and 
1958 as a result of the separation of economics and politics. See Mochizuki, “US-Japan Relations in 
the Asia-Pacific Region”, p. 18; Glen D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo 
Dobson, Japan ’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, London, Routledge, 
2001, p. 165.
92 Yoshihide Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998, p. 110. Soeya discusses in detail “that both governments would remain in close 
consultation on the China question.”
93 Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, pp. 132-33; Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with 
China, p. 110.
94 Curtis, “US Policy toward Japan from Nixon to Clinton”, p. 3.
93 Nakanishi, “Jiritsuteki Kyöchö no Mosaku”, pp. 154-55.
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which included the condition that China would be ready to accept the “international 
order established in San Francisco that pivoted on the Japan-US Security Treaty.”96
In the aftermath of the Nixon Shocks and trade conflict, US-Japan relations were 
restrained but regained some balance when President Gerald R. Ford visited Tokyo in 
November 1974— the first ever visit to Japan by a US head of state.97 By the mid-1970s, 
relations between the two states were more even-handed and trust based on cautious 
optimism was restored. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer argued that, despite 
differences with Japan, trust could be maintained by the fact that the alliance with the 
United States remained the best option for Japan in the region:
American and Japanese concepts of world order, international economic relations, 
and a desirable domestic social and political system are almost certain to remain 
much more compatible with each other than with the comparable ideologies of 
either China or the Soviet Union...even if Japan and the United States should drift 
apart for other reasons, neither is likely to develop a relationship with China or the 
Soviet Union that could be a substitute for their relationship with each other.98
Amidst this optimism, US-Japan Security Co-operation Guidelines were accepted 
by the Japanese cabinet in November 1978, which reaffirmed Japan’s reliance on the 
US nuclear umbrella and the self-defence of national territory in the event of limited and 
small-scale attacks.99 Joint military exercises were also expanded from only navy 
operations to also include air and land operations.100
The 1970s were thus a period when the United States took a turn in its approach to 
relations with Japan. As US relative power and hegemonic influence declined, curtailing 
the spread of communism through US direct involvement in the Western bloc was no 
longer a high priority— a lesson learnt from the Vietnam War. In turn, as the Japanese 
economy strengthened, the United States also looked to it to become more independent 
of the United States, and began to treat it, not in the teacher-student relationship that 
dominated the 1950s and 1960s, but increasingly as a competitor whose economic rise 
posed a threat to US trade interests and, potentially, to its position as hegemon. Despite 
the negative outlook of the United States with regard to Japan’s increasing economic 
success, the latter continued to be co-operative with the US hegemonic system, and 
disagreement with the United States over issues such as the return of Okinawa, trade
96 Masayoshi Öhira, Brush Strokes: Moments from My Life, Tokyo, Foreign Press Centre, 1979, p. 100.
97 Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford, New York, Harper and Row, 
1979, pp. 204-205.
98 Edwin O. Reischauer in Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin (eds.), United States-Japanese 
Relations: The 1970s, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 2.
99 Nakanishi, “Jiritsuteki Kyöchö no Mosaku”, p. 181.
100 Böei Nenkan Hakkökai, Böei Nenkan (Defence Yearbook), Tokyo, Böei Media Centre, 1988, p. 49.
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friction and the revaluation of the yen, and China policies were largely tolerated by 
Japan.
"Burden Sharing” and Trade Conflicts: The 1980s
The 1980s saw the Japanese economy peak and with it US demands for Japanese 
involvement in “burden sharing” in international and security affairs. The areas of 
burden-sharing largely fell into to three broad areas: increases in the Japanese defence 
budget; increased Japanese financial contributions to the running of US bases on 
Japanese territory separate to the defence budget, which became known as the 
“sympathy budget”; and increased international economic co-operation to developing 
countries, including contributions to Official Development Assistance (ODA). In 
addition, trade conflicts continued during the 1980s and soured the good security 
relations developed between Ronald Reagan and Yasuhiro Nakasone.
The Reagan administration pressured Japan to increase its defence budget from 
early in its first term and, at the first heads of states meeting in March 1981, Zenkö 
Suzuki and Ronald Reagan met to discuss these issues.101 At this meeting, the United 
States strongly urged Japan to defend 1,000 nautical miles around its territory.102 As the 
increase in the defence budget was curtailed, Prime Minister Suzuki did not make any 
concrete agreements to the protection of these areas.103 In the official statement 
following the meeting, Suzuki referred to the possibility of defending off-shore 
territorial waters and sea lanes between Tokyo and Osaka in the context of “appropriate 
assigning of roles” in the alliance. The United States took this to be officially accepting 
these defence roles, which Suzuki then denied,104 placing the Suzuki government in a 
difficult and embarrassing position.
The mixed reactions of the Suzuki government signified the ambivalent position 
that Japan held over increasing its military capabilities and maintaining its position of 
pacifism. Suzuki attempted to reconcile the two seemingly conflicting directions in 
which Japan was heading through the concept of comprehensive security.105 However,
101 Tomoyoshi Sumi, Amerika tai Nichi yokyu to Anzen Hoshö: Nichi-Bei Kankei Ron (US-Japan 
Relations Theory: America’s requests to Japan and Security), Tokyo, Shin Nippon Shuppan Sha, 
1993, pp. 22-23.
102 Mochizuki, “US-Japan Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region”, p. 23.
103 Sumi, Amerika tai Nichi yökyü to Anzen Hoshö, pp. 22-23.
104 Tanaka, Anzen Hoshö, pp. 265-80.
105 The first instance of Japan broadening its conceptions of security was during the oil shocks of the 
1970s, when the notion of comprehensive security emerged in Japanese security policy.
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Japan became more accommodating of security co-operation with the United States 
when Yasuhiro Nakasone became Prime Minister in 1982. Prime Minister Nakasone’s 
rhetoric spoke of a more internationally assertive Japan. Many in the United States 
believed that, as Prime Minister, Nakasone, a strong nationalist who wore a black tie to 
every National Diet session during the US occupation as a symbol of mourning, would 
push for Japan to distance itself from its hegemonic partner in order to pursue more 
independent defence and foreign policies.106 However, Nakasone actively sought to 
heighten national awareness that Japan’s security was inevitably linked with the United 
States, and therefore Japanese policies needed to be formulated in this context, with a 
greater global focus.107 In a series of meetings dubbed the “Ron-Yasu” dialogues, 
Nakasone agreed to participate in the US Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI), increase 
joint military exercises and to operationalise the defence of sea lanes.108 By 1984, Paul 
Wolfowitz declared that “the general consensus of administration officials and long­
term observers of U.S.-Japan relations is that our defense relationship with Japan has 
never been better”109 and, by 1987, the Nakasone government exceeded the 1 percent 
GNP defence budget.110 In other words, Nakasone’s vision brought an assertive Japan, 
which firmly held the US hegemony as the centre of its framework, into the 
international system.
While Japan made efforts to increase its defence co-operation with the United 
States, there were other burden-sharing issues. In a public hearing of the US House of 
Representatives Strategic Committee Defence Sharing Special Section meeting, Richard 
Perle, former Assistant Undersecretary of Defense stated that Japan’s citing of “political 
and psychological difficulties” in avoiding a fair defence load was “malignant free­
riding”.111 As a consequence, besides increased military co-operation and capabilities 
from the Japanese, the United States also pressured Japan for an increase in its
Comprehensive security extended security beyond the protection of the state from external military 
threats to include economic and resource security.
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no Böei Kösö ni tsuite” (“Rethinking the ‘Nakasone Plan’: Yasuhiro Nakasone’s Defence Strategy as 
the Director General of the Japanese Defence Agency in 1970-1971”), Högaku Seijigaku Ronkyü, vol. 
60, Spring 2006, pp. 33-64.
108 Laura Stone, “Whither Trade and Security? A Historical Perspective”, in Michael J. Green and 
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Foreign Relations Press, 1999, p. 258.
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“sympathy budget”—money that Japan had been paying to the United States since 1978 
for the running costs of having their bases stationed in Japan.112 What began as 6.19 
billion yen in 1978 increased more than 27-fold by 1990 to 168.29 billion yen. The 
running costs of the bases were exacerbated by the increasing exchange rate of the yen 
against the US dollar and also the large US trade deficit with Japan, which at its peak in 
1981 was 13.58 billion yen.113 As a consequence, by the time of Noboru Takeshita’s 
prime ministership in 1988, Japan was paying 50 percent for the running of the bases, 
which increased to 75 percent by 1990.114
While the increases in the Japanese military budget and security co-operation with 
the United States were lauded, at the same time the increased military capacity of Japan 
sat uncomfortably with the United States. In particular, as commercial technology 
increasingly became suited for dual military-industrial usage and Japanese commercial 
technology more advanced, the United States found itself becoming dependent on 
Japanese electronic components. This meant that not only was the United States 
dependent on Japan to maintain its own global military leadership, but that third 
countries stood to gain from incorporating Japanese technology, thereby weakening US 
relative military power.115 In this context, the United States and Japan negotiated 
mechanisms for Japanese technology to flow to the United States for military use,116 and 
the co-development of a Japanese support fighter, the FS-X. The State Department, the 
Pentagon and the US defence aviation industry negotiated a deal on the FS-X with 
Japan that would bring work and technology back to the United States at the same 
tim e.117 However, the US Trade Representative (USTR) viewed the negotiation as 
unacceptable and argued that it did not bring back enough economic benefits to the 
United States. The project was therefore re-negotiated with the inclusion of USTR 
representatives and, on the Japanese side, Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) representatives. As a result, security co-operation was disrupted and aggravated 
by trade issues, and did little to improve the tensions in the US-Japan relationship.
112 Sumi, Amerika tai Nichi yökyü to Anzen Hoshö, p. 34.
113 Köji Murata, “Kokusai Kokka no Shimei to Kunö”, (“The Purpose and Anguish of the International 
State”), in Iokibe, Sengo Nihon Gaiköshi, pp. 187-224, p. 201.
114 Böei Shisetsu Chö, “Shügiin Yosan Iinkai Teishutsu Yökyü Shiryö” (“Lower House Budget 
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34.
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To steer Japan away from excessive military advancement, the United States also 
directed Japanese burden-sharing pressures toward international development and 
greater ODA expenditure, as well as guiding it in the interests of the United States. The 
Japanese government had planned the ODA budget in the first half of the 1980s to be 
double that of the latter half of the 1970s. In real terms, this meant a budget of 2.4307 
trillion yen from 1981 to 1985. By 1989, Japan had surpassed the United States to 
become the largest donor in the world.118
The United States also encouraged Japan in the 1980s to deliver its economic 
assistance through bilateral aid rather than through multilateral organisations— a pattern 
of behaviour that maximised US interests through targeted aid delivery.119 In a US-Japan 
security discussion held in May 1988, the United States also requested Japan to 
“shoulder some of the burden” in distributing economic assistance to countries of US 
strategic interest, such as the Philippines, Pakistan, and Turkey.120 In particular, the 
United States was interested in getting Japan to support it financially in maintaining its 
bases in the Philippines through such economic assistance.121
The security front was relatively positive in the 1980s between the United States 
and Japan. However in stark contrast to this, the economic front showed deep conflict 
that even the Ron-Yasu relationship found difficult to disregard. Trade continued to be a 
problem area throughout the 1980s, with the protectionist US Congress demanding that 
the administration pressure the Japanese government to liberalise its agricultural and 
industrial markets and impose quotas on car imports. Under such demands, in April 
1984, Japan agreed to the importation of an average of 6,900 tonnes of US beef and 
11,000 tonnes of oranges. Japan also put a self-imposed quota of 1.85 million and 2.3 
million cars for 1984 and 1985 motor car imports respectively, while the US House of 
Representatives passed a local content bill in 1984 for motor car parts, again aimed at 
restricting Japanese imports.
In further attempts to ease the US trade deficit, market-oriented sector specific 
(MOSS) negotiations were held in 1985 and, in the same year, a meeting of Ministers of 
Finance and heads of national banks of the G5 met in the Plaza Hotel in New York.122
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The Plaza Accord that was consequently enforced entailed an approximate 50 percent 
appreciation in the yen in an attempt to boost US exports.123 However, Japan’s trade 
surplus with the United States was not alleviated, and was over 50 billion dollars by 
1986. Relations worsened over the 1986 Semiconductor Agreement that sought to 
prevent the dumping of Japanese semiconductors and an increased share for US and 
foreign semiconductors in the Japanese market.124 Discrepancies over the degree to 
which the agreement guaranteed market shares led to the United States imposing 
economic sanctions against Japan in 1987.125
Further complications in the US-Japan trade conflict were around the negotiations 
for the Structural Impediment Initiatives (SII), which commenced in June 1989. The SSI 
aimed to compliment the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act enacted in August 
1988 to strengthen and protect US trade, financial sectors and industries from foreign 
pressures and to also promote the competitiveness of US exports. The centrepiece of the 
US SII negotiation was the Trade Act Super 301 Provision, which stipulated the 
reporting of unfair foreign trade practices to Congress by the USTR and that, if 
negotiations to alleviate the situation were not settled in a year, retaliatory measure 
could be taken.126 Under the super Article 301, the United States pressured Japan to deal 
with its land and transport systems and to reform its anti-monopoly laws. These 
demands bordered on issues of internal sovereignty, but Japan took a non- 
conffontational position, saying that it would not take part in negotiations that pre­
supposed sanctions, and that it was willing to negotiate with the United States at 
anytime if there were problems between them.
In this context of souring economic relations, there was a marked shift in US 
perceptions of Japan, whereby the United States went from viewing Japan as a state that 
shared its democratic and liberal values to that of a foreign state which fundamentally 
did things differently. The United States thus believed it needed a more severe and 
cautious approach in its dealings with Japan. This was particularly reflected in the 
literature that appeared during the latter years of the 1980s, such as Clyde Prestowitz’s 
Trading Places: How we allowed Japan to Lead127, with other “Japan-bashing” 
stemming from Japanese direct investment in American icons such as Columbia Studios
123 Charles Smith, “With Much Appreciation: A Stronger Yen will not solve all Japan’s problems”, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, p. 62, 17 October 1985.
124 Chihiro Hosoya (ed.), Nichibei Kankei Tsüshi, Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1995, p. 269.
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and the Rockefeller Center.128 Non-Americans were also critical, such as Karel van 
Wolferen’s The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nationl2v 
and “The Japan Problem”.130
Yet what is sometime less emphasised in the economic relationship between the 
United States and Japan during this period is Japan’s financial underwriting of US 
hegemony. The economic policies of the Reagan administration had resulted in a huge 
budget deficit, but despite this, expansionary economic policies, comprehensive defence 
spending and, to a lesser extent, domestic investment continued.131 This continued 
expenditure was possible by the foreign financing of the US budget deficit through 
purchases of US treasury bonds, with Japan as a major contributor.132 Japan on the other 
hand was experiencing record financial surpluses and needed a means by which to 
eliminate them. Gilpin describes the relationship as follows:
By the mid-1980s, Japan had replaced West Germany was America’s principal 
economic ally and the financial backer of the continued economic and political 
hegemony of the United States. Japanese investment of their savings and of the 
nation’s huge payments surplus in the United States supported the dollar, helped 
finance the defense buildup, and contributed to American prosperity. More 
importantly it masked the relative economic decline of the United States. Japanese 
financial assistance enabled the American people to postpone, at least for a time, 
the difficult task of coming to terms with the classic problem that faces every 
declining power, that is, determining how to bring its power and commitment back 
to a state of economic and political equilibrium.133
US-Japan relations in the 1980s therefore signified a period where Japan was 
perceived as posing a major threat to the United States, particularly as both its military 
and economic capabilities increased. In other words, in the context of a relative decline 
in its hegemony, the United States needed greater control over Japanese defence and 
economic policy and assurance from Japan that increases in its capabilities were in 
compliance with US requests and interests. Furthermore, as the Plaza Accords 
demonstrated, while Japan objected to its portrayal by the United States as “the sole 
offending surplus country,”134 it ultimately accepted quotas and economic changes that
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did not always guarantee positive outcomes for Japan—in the name of long-term US 
relations and maintaining US hegemony. Japan was also integral to supporting US 
hegemony by being a major financial backer when the United States was struggling 
economically.
Post-Cold War and Hegemonic Renewal
It should not be forgotten that US hegemony emerged following the Second World War 
and in the context of the Cold War, and that its hegemony extended across the Western 
bloc, whilst the Soviet Union enjoyed hegemonic influence within its own communist 
bloc. However, as the Cold War came to an end, the United States became a global 
hegemon in the true sense, becoming the only international superpower. Thus, despite 
discussions of declining hegemony up to the 1980s, by the 1990s the United States had 
begun to reassert its role as hegemon in international relations.
Post-Cold War Theories o f  US Hegemony
The theoretical trends immediately following the Cold War were varied. Liberal 
proponents argued that the end of the Cold War demonstrated what Francis Fukuyama 
called “the end of history”, indicating that a period of history in which democracy and 
market economic had prevailed, and would inevitably continue into the foreseeable 
future.135 As a result, he argued, the post-Cold War era would not look much different to 
the Cold War period, and with liberal capitalism succeeding communist economies, 
international political life might now be simply a matter of achieving political means. In 
other words, Fukuyama suggested that “history understood as a single, coherent, 
evolutionary process” had reached its end point, and that this “directional History of 
mankind.. .will eventually lead the greater part of humanity of liberal democracy”.136
Fukuyama’s thesis supported other liberal theories and also the emerging political 
view in the US government that liberal democracies were less likely to go to war with 
each other, particularly as democracies had increased in the 1970s. Michael W. Doyle 
argued that zones of liberal peace, known as the “pacific federation” in Kantian 
liberalism, existed among these democracies, which were capable of appreciating the 
international rights of foreign democracies and practised peaceful restrain amongst
135 Francis Fukuyama, The End o f History and the Last Man, New York, The Free Press, 1992, pp. 45, 
71.
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them. 137 Doyle argued that, while these liberal democracies did not go to war with each 
other, they were likely to see non-democracies as threats, given they do not act under 
the same principle of peaceful restraint:
Even though wars often cost more than the economic returns they generate, liberal 
republics also are prepared to protect and promote -  sometimes forcibly -  
democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against 
nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of 
individuals, have no rights to noninterference. 138
In this manner, these liberal analyses of post-Cold War international relations 
observed the emerging of a new world order based on the leadership of the United 
States, which was supported by other liberal democracies to protect the political and 
economic order that succeeded to the old ideological conflict.
Realist views of the post-Cold War period, such as those of John J. Mearsheimer, 
Samuel P. Huntington and William Pfaff, saw that the bipolar structure of the Cold War 
had actually provided stability in the international system and that, therefore, the post- 
Cold War period would see increased conflict along old ethnic or what Huntington 
termed “civilisational” lines. 139 However, whether theorists took an optimistic liberal 
view or a pessimistic realist view of post-Cold War international relations, they were 
united in the view that the coming century would continue to be dominated by the 
United States, 140 and talk of the decline of the US hegemony dissipated.
Owen Harries points out that the renewal of post-Cold War US hegemony was 
“by default” due to the fall of the Soviet Union, and that it was therefore different from 
hegemonic changes where an aspiring power faced opposition. As Harries describes, 
“[o]ne moment the United States was part of a bipolar balance, the next it was left as the 
one superpower in a unipolar, unbalanced world.. .The speed with which things changed 
meant that American hegemony was an accomplished fact before anyone had time to 
react to it or attempt to prevent it. ” 141
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Peter Van Ness also uses US hegemony to describe the post-Cold War world. He 
argues:
Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the debate about how best to 
understand our post-Cold War world continues with no resolution in sight.. .Amidst 
the contending images, and paradigms, however, there does seem to be a consensus 
about the predominance of US power. While there is much debate about how 
sustainable America’s pre-eminent global role may be, few scholars today would 
contest the proposition that the United States is militarily, economically, and in 
most fields scientifically and technologically predominant. ” 142
Therefore, the United States emerged as the sole country with the essential 
military and economic power, superior intelligence gathering capacities and also the 
political will and clout to act as the hegemon in the post-Cold War international system.
The Cold War is over, and Japan won... ?
While Japan’s economic peak passed with the burst of the stock market and real estate 
bubble in the early 1990s, this period continued to be coloured by the trade conflicts and 
US revisionist views toward Japan that were carried over from the bad economic 
relations and misconceptions of the previous decade.
President Bill Clinton also took on the harsh revisionist position during his first 
term by insisting that Japan needed to agree on quantitative targets in trade and market 
shares. An extension of the Semiconductor Agreement was settled in 1991, where the 
Japanese government recognised that the US semiconductor industry expected the 
foreign semiconductor to make up 20 percent of Japanese markets by the end of 1992. 
Despite this, the negotiations were again met unenthusiastically on both sides.143 In the 
1993 heads of state meeting with KIchi Miyazawa, Clinton pressed the Japanese Prime 
Minister on this point, and concluded the US-Japan Framework for New Economic 
Partnership in July 1993. 144 As with the previous Semiconductor Agreement 
negotiations, while it seemed that an agreement had been concluded, the two heads of 
state came away from the negotiations with very different interpretations: Clinton 
believed he had a promise to meet qualitative and quantitative measures, while Japanese 
were relieved for not having to include numerical targets.145 A similar deadlocked heads 
of state meeting was also held between Clinton and Morihiro Hosokawa in February
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1994 and, by June 1995, the trade conflict was again reached a new low over the 
importing of car parts.146
In June 1995, Clinton tried to renegotiate a new trade deal modelled on the 
Semiconductor Agreement, this time through Representative for the USTR Micky 
Kantor. Kantor met with the then Minister of International Trade and Industry, Ryütarö 
Hashimoto, and again insisted on quantitative targets on trade.147 Because of its fixed 
view of Japan as an economic threat, the United States paradoxically opened itself up to 
criticism from the Japanese by saying that the United States was demanding a managed 
trade agreement, which was, in fact, against the principles of free trade as stipulated by 
the World Trade Organisation (which had replaced the GATT).148 However, as the 
decade developed and Japan’s economic problems became clearer, the US revisionist 
position towards Japan dissipated.
Much like the previous decade, while US-Japan relations on the economic front 
looked pessimistic, they overshadowed positive security relations. Two decades of the 
trade conflict began to have an impact on the defence relationship, and both sides of the 
alliance began to show signs of drifting apart after the end of the Cold War. During 
President George H.W. Bush’s visit to Tokyo in January 1992, he brought auto 
executives with him to highlight trade concerns,149 and when Bill Clinton came to power 
in 1993, he was determined to deal with economic issues with the same importance as 
traditional security issues.150 Interestingly, while the US Department of Defense gave 
Japan relatively harsh comments in its annual report, saying that Japan’s contribution to 
collective security was far below the average of other US allies, in reality the increases 
in its financial contributions were above the average of US and NATO contributions, 
which were commended.151
The Gulf War of 1991 caused controversy in Japan, and is often considered a 
turning point in Japanese foreign and security policy. While the Japanese government 
promised the US support, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu was slow to move and, as a 
consequence, the US House of Representatives voted for Japan to pay the entire cost of
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maintaining US troops in Japan, rather than the 50 to 75 percent it had hitherto been 
paying.152 Calls were made for greater contributions in the form of human resources in 
international conflict resolutions, and a more generally proactive Japan in international 
relations.153 To emphasise Japan’s incompetence, President Bush did not invite Japan to 
the victory celebrations held in Washington after the Gulf War, nor did the Kuwaiti 
government thank the Japanese government in a public letter of appreciation.154 Despite 
the Japanese government pushing through legislation so that it could dispatch the SDF 
as peacekeepers in 1992, its 13 billion dollar contribution was widely criticised,155 and 
received strong accusations of “cheque book diplomacy” and “single-state pacifism.”
Since then, the Gulf War has become a reference point in history for the Japanese 
government as an episode that should not be repeated. Japan did its best to send its Self 
Defence Force as quickly as possible for logistical support—the first overseas 
deployment since the Second World War—but there seemed to be an atmosphere of 
genuine shock in the Japanese government over the reactions it received. It suggests an 
unchanged Japanese attitude towards international security in the post-Cold War era, 
which relied on the United States to provide international security. It also forced the 
Japanese government to reassess its relationship with the United States, and created new 
fears of entanglement in US international ambitions and the perception that the United 
States might indeed be the new threat to Japanese security in the post-Cold War era.156
Based on these fears, some Japanese defence policymakers began to question the 
reliability of the alliance and whether alternative security arrangements should be 
considered, as manifested in the Higuchi Report of 1994.157 The Report came about as 
an initiative of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa who set up the Advisory Group on 
Defence Issues, a panel of major company executives, academics and former defence 
and foreign ministry bureaucrats, to discuss the future security role of Japan.158 The 
Report of the Advisory Group, or the Higuchi Report, advised that, while the US-Japan
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alliance remained important, Japan should pursue defence more independent of the 
United States and participate in multilateral security arrangements.159 Japan started to 
involve itself more in multilateral and regional fora and re-emphasised its commitment 
to the United Nations. Because of the drifting and sometimes acrimonious relations 
between the US and Japan, the Higuchi report, Hosokawa’s initiatives and new 
commitments to multilateralism raised some concerns that the deterioration of US-Japan 
relations had persisted for too long, and confirmed the necessity for a review of the US- 
Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era.
The resulting US countermeasure for the drifting alliance was the Nye Initiative. 
Joseph Nye was appointed as the Assistant Secretary of State in 1994, and saw the 
revitalisation of the alliance, particularly in the post-Gulf war context, as his main 
responsibility. As a result, the relevance of the alliance in the post-Cold War period to 
both states and their commitment to it was reaffirmed by the time of the Clinton- 
Murayama summit meeting in January 1995,160 despite ensuing difficulties in bilateral 
relations when a young girl was raped in Okinawa by three American soldiers later that 
year.161 The East Asian Strategic Report that resulted from the Nye Initiative firstly 
declared the continuation to station approximately 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific, 
contrary to earlier statements by Secretary of Defence William Perry and the trends 
towards withdrawal of troops from the region earlier in the 1990s.162 The report argued 
that the US presence in the region was “like oxygen; we take it for granted unless it is 
not available”.163 A guarantee of the US presence was particularly pertinent given the 
nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, and the threat of war with the Democratic 
Peoples’ Republic of Korea in June 1994. The Japanese side also responded with the 
Defence Agency’s National Defence Program Outline, which stipulated greater bilateral 
co-operation in situations around Japan that would have an affect on Japanese 
security.164
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Thus, the 1990s was a period of difficult readjustment for both the United States 
and Japan. The easing of Japan’s economic boom relieved US perceptions of Japan as a 
threat and saw a renewal of US hegemonic confidence, while Japan lost its international 
self-assurance, and struggled both on political and economic fronts. The 1990s were 
dubbed “The Lost Decade” for Japan and, given that Japan suffered its biggest 
diplomatic failure since the Second World War, it was difficult to argue that Japan 
emerged as a winner after the Cold War, nor that US influence over Japan had at all 
diminished.
US Hegemony post-11 September 2001
Trends in US Global Strategy and Theorists ’ Responses
The complexity of the continuing development of post-Cold War US hegemony 
increased after the United States was attacked by terrorists on 11 September 2001, 
unfolding a new international context of a “War on Terrorism” and US unilateralism. 
The temptation to act unilaterally was not new; indeed, conservative unilateralism has a 
long history in the United States,165 and is often referred back to a tradition started in the 
Reagan administration. Furthermore, the US administration under George W. Bush had 
already signalled its unilateralism in acts such as signing but not ratifying the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on the 
environment.166 However, the attacks served as a strong impetus to follow through with 
the neo-conservative vision that, in essence, approved the use of force—pre-emptive 
strikes— in order to achieve US national goals. Andrew J. Bacevich summarises the 
thinking behind these ideals as follows:
“[I]f the United States is founded on universal principles, how can Americans 
practice amoral indifference when those principles are under siege around the 
world? And if they do profess indifference, how can they manage to avoid the 
implication that their principles are not, in fact, universal?” To [Robert] Kagan and 
other neoconservatives the answer was self-evident: indifference to the violation of 
American ideals abroad was not simply wrong; it was un-American.. .An 
authentically American foreign policy would reject amorality and pessimism; it 
would refuse altogether to accept the notion of limits of constraints.167
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Consequently, as the sole hegemon in the international system, the United States 
is potentially able to take actions that may defy international norms in favour of its own 
perceived interests, as would a rogue state but, due to the preponderance of its power, 
without the international objections and restraints that other weaker and rogue states 
might face.
Chomsky is critical of the neo-conservative leanings of the current US 
administration, and describes the intentions of the current US administration as “the 
most powerful state in history [striving] to maintain its hegemony through the threat or 
use of military force, the dimension of power in which it reigns supreme.”168 Chomsky 
quotes the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 to highlight these goals— 
“Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a 
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.”169 
Christian Reus-Smit also bases his critical reflections of American power on “the neo­
conservative ideas about American power and hegemony that inform the foreign and 
defence policies of the Administration of President George W. Bush,”170 and describes 
its policies as “a project of hegemonic renewal.”171
Ikenberry also supports this view of post-11 September 2001 US hegemony, and 
points out the changed nature of US international leadership under the Bush 
administration when compared to its role immediately following the Second World War. 
He argues that the hegemony currently pursued by the United States seeks to cement its 
position as a hegemon with no other competitor, and is “less bound to its partners and to 
global rules and institutions while it steps forward to play a more unilateral and 
anticipatory role in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking 
WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”172 Ikenberry maintains that it is an extremely 
short-sighted and unsustainable pursuit that will not generate the international co­
operation needed to solve global problems and US interests as seen in the immediate 
post-Second World War period. Ikenberry sums up current US hegemony by saying, 
“the new imperial power grand strategy presents the United States very differently: a
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revisionist state seeking to parlay its momentary advantages into a world order in which 
it runs the show.”173
Recent discussions of US hegemony have also turned from hegemony to empire, 
questioning whether US interests constitute imperialist intent, and whether the global 
network it has built in the post-1945 period can be called an empire, particularly given 
the post-11 September 2001 emphasis on unilateralism and the Bush Doctrine. What 
concerns many of these academic discussions about current US hegemony is the strong 
conviction of the benevolence of the American Empire, and the defiant justification of 
military force that follows this belief. Bacevich invokes one of the five convictions that 
underpins neo-conservative thought and drives the current US administration’s 
aspirations for Empire:
First was the certainty that American global dominion is, in fact, benign and that 
other nations necessarily see it as such. Thus, according to Charles 
Krauthammer.. .“we are not just any hegemon. We run a uniquely benign imperium.
This is not mere self-congratulation; it is a fact manifest in the way others welcome 
our power.”174
Michael Mann argues that it is not uncommon historically for hegemons to rule by 
consent; rather what separates current US hegemony from that during the early days 
after the Second World War is its heavy dependence on military power, which Mann 
maintains will eventually undermine its legitimacy. He explains this together with his 
definition of hegemony:
“[H]egemony” [is] a word which indicates that the imperial power establishes “the 
rules of the game” by which others routinely play. They may come to also approve 
of the rules as well, so that hegemony is more of a matter-of-fact acceptance of 
things “as they are.” Then people’s own everyday action help reproduce the 
dominance without much thought...Hegemony should be an invisible hand, lying 
behind the accepted rules of the game. The catch is that to be hegemonic, visible 
militarism abandons the rules and so risks losing hegemony...But the new 
imperialists went ahead, saying that success would bring legitimacy afterwards.175
Michael Cox also analyses the discussion that emerged after the September 11 
terrorist attacks which considered the United States as having influence over a global 
empire: not in the critical ways as with the left’s previous criticisms of the US empire, 
but among conservative policymakers as having the positive aim of building a more
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stable order that could see the United States retained semi-permanently as the 
hegemon . 176
Indeed, what many of them appeared to be saying was as shocking to some as it 
was unacceptable to others: namely, that America was an Empire anyway, and in 
an increasingly threatening epoch where the United States stood in an almost 
unrivalled position, it had both the capacity and the need to act in a far more 
assertive fashion. Admittedly it would be doing so for essentially benevolent 
reasons; and its actions were more inspired by fear of the outside world than any 
desire to take it over. However, that did not mean that it should not act in an 
imperial fashion. Nor should the US apologise for doing so. 177
Therefore, Cox argues that the US Empire is backed by the neo-conservative 
philosophy of supporting US hegemony with overwhelming military power, and taking 
decisive action so that “no other power would even dream of becoming a rival” . 178
In his analysis of the American Empire in Blowback, Chalmers Johnson also 
discusses in depth the unintended consequences o f US policies on Americans and 
increasingly those under US influence179—what the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
originally termed “blowback”— encountered in the spread of America’s informal empire. 
Johnson argues that the American Empire is not an “empire” in the traditional sense— 
that is, it does not signify territorial expansion, legal dominion over another sovereign 
state and economic exploitation—but, rather, that it is a modem empire that “lie[s] 
beneath some ideological or juridical concept— commonwealth, alliance, free world, the 
W est.. .that disguises the actual relationships among its members” . 180 Like others critical 
of the neo-conservative turn that the United States has taken after the Cold War, 
Johnson argues that US hegemony has developed into blind self-righteousness which 
often justifies the use of hard-line policies and military force to achieve its interests:
.. .evidence is building up that in the decade following the end of the Cold War, the 
United States largely abandoned a reliance on diplomacy, economic aid, 
international law, and multilateral institutions in carrying out its foreign policies 
and resorted much of the time to bluster, military force and financial 
manipulation” 181
Johnson’s argument warns that the imperial overextension and hubris, employed 
by the United States as an attempt to maintain its global influence, is in fact increasing
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“blowback” scenarios and undermining its legitimacy internationally. Like Mann, he 
argues, that this is ultimately the beginning of the undoing of its own Empire.
While the conservatism of the Bush doctrine is by no means new, after the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, the optimism of liberal victory of the early post-Cold 
War gave way to the Bush administration worldview. The 11 September 2001 attacks 
challenged US complacency and, at the same time, further fuelled the reinforcement of 
American ideals and rules across the world. The context in which the United States 
exercised its hegemony—and the degree of power it held during the past sixty years— 
have varied, but there is a broad consensus that the United States is continuing to hold 
the position of hegemon in the world in the 21st century.
Japan ’s Displays o f  Military> Resolve
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks happened three days after the 50 anniversary 
of the US-Japan alliance, and thus the potential Japanese response represented a new 
test of its efficiency and commitment in the face of a crisis.'82 Two major elements have 
influenced the Japanese response to those attacks: the memories of the disastrous 
Japanese response to the Gulf war in 1991; and the unilateralist attitudes of the Bush 
administration.
While Japan is not obliged to defend the United States under the US-Japan 
Security Treaty as the Japanese constitution bans the exercise of collective security,183 
the military countermeasures undertaken by Japan within its constitutional limitations 
can be argued as being strongly influenced by the international criticism Japan received 
when it attempted to make only financial contributions during the first Gulf War. That 
Gulf crisis drew the Japanese government’s attention to the fact that it was viewed 
internationally as being an actor with significant power based on the strength of its 
economy, and a country that benefited from international stability. International 
expectations of Japan were that it should see the security of its international 
surroundings as a major concern and thus contribute to conflict resolution, despite its 
constitutional restrictions. Therefore, demonstrations of commitment and flexibility in 
military operations formed an integral part of the Japanese response after the 11
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September terrorist attacks as a sign of its commitment and responsibility to not only 
the US-Japan alliance, but also the international realm.
Secondly, as indicated in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, the 
underlying philosophy of the current administration was that states were “either 
with...or against” the universal good represented by US foreign policy.184 While the 
Japanese government had considered long-term economic and security co-operation 
with the United States, given that the Bush Doctrine had such clear cut notions of good 
and evil, the Koizumi government had little choice but to show its support for the “War 
on Terrorism”. This support was categorised by the Japanese government as “security 
co-operation” and “international co-operation”, which did not demarcate Japan’s 
activities based on the US alliance and UN peacekeeping as clearly as it previously 
had.185
Therefore, as a consequence, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi swiftly 
condemned the attacks as “an unfair and unforgivable act of violence that challenges 
democracy” and that “[Japan] does not hold back its support and co-operation [with the 
United States]”.186 These remarks were followed by a seven point emergency plan and 
an Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law passed on 18 October 2001,187 Based on this 
law, which aims to minimise the threats caused by the 11 September 2001 attacks, on 9 
November Japan’s Self Defence Force sent Aegis cruisers, supply ships and aircraft to 
the Arabian Sea in support of the US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan 
and, more importantly, to “show the flag” and demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the 
“War on Terrorism”. 188 This move was also significant as the first dispatching of
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Japanese forces in the absence of UN sanctions since the Second World War.189 
Therefore, by Japanese standards, this was a bold and remarkably quick response that 
overcame political opposition and the legal restraints of Article 9.190
Furthermore, the six-month mission of the Japanese SDF to support the US 
campaign was reviewed in May 2002 and extended for another six months on the 
grounds that the risk of further terrorist attacks against the United States remained 
high.191 Japan’s Maritime Self Defence Force (MSDF) also participated in multinational 
naval exercises off Flawaii hosted by the US Navy’s Third Fleet that simulated terrorist 
attacks and a regional conflict.192 Japan’s role was to “inspect suspected enemy ships 
and conduct other activities while looking out for attacks from the air using advanced 
radar of the Aegis air-defence system”. 193 Indications of the preparedness of the 
Japanese Self Defence Force (SDF) to participate in the US campaign in Afghanistan is 
therefore important internationally as a gauge to demonstrate Japan’s reliability as a 
partner to the United States and its support for continuing US hegemony.
Significantly, in July 2003 the Law Concerning the Special Measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was enacted, which enabled the 
dispatch of the 1,000 SDF personnel to Iraq to engage in humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance activities, particularly in the Samawah region of south-eastern 
Iraq.'94 While the Japanese government’s response to 11 September 2001 attacks and the 
“War on Terrorism” departs considerably from its response to the Gulf War, SDF 
activities in Iraq continue to be focused on humanitarian reconstruction. 195 The 
deployment of the SDF in Iraq was extended twice, each time for a year, putting the 
Japanese troops in their third year in Samawah.196 The Japanese deployment of the SDF
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for operations outside a UN mission has been received positively by the United States as 
“a victory for supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance and a validation of their strategy to 
nudge Japan toward a greater role in regional security.”197
Thus, the 11 September 2001 attacks have been instrumental in moving Japan 
further towards acquiring a “normal” military role. However, its alliance with the 
United States has restricted Japan’s choices to following the “safe option” of financial 
and humanitarian support, and has forced Japan to deploy the SDF in missions outside 
the auspices of the United Nations. In the post-11 September 2001 world, the Japanese 
government has had little choice but to respond to US calls for solidarity and action 
against international terrorism, particularly because of the criticisms Japan faced in the 
Gulf War of 1991. Whilst Japan has taken decisive military measures in the recent “War 
on Terrorism”, one can argue that it still finds the decisive action which the United 
States requests from its allies in the current war somewhat uncomfortable; as 
demonstrated by the domestic opposition to the SDF deployment and the extension of 
the Japanese mission in Iraq.198 There is also evidence that the wider Japanese 
bureaucracy is ambivalent to recent SDF deployments.199
Conclusion: US hegemony and its impact on Japanese Foreign Policy
The aim of this chapter was to answer two main questions: first, what is the extent and 
impact of US hegemony on Japanese foreign policy; and second, does the outcome of 
this reflect two differing perceptions of the hegemonic system between the United 
States and Japan?
The impact o f  US hegemony on Japanese foreign policy
The examination of the emergence of the United States as a hegemon in the post-1945 
period, its influence on Japanese foreign policy and the theoretical debates on 
hegemony in International Relations demonstrates that continued US hegemony 
throughout this period has had significant effects on Japanese foreign policy. The 
relationship is essentially hegemonic—not only from the fact that it began from unequal
19' Brad Glosserman, “Making History the Hard Way”, Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on 
East Asian Bilateral Relations, Fourth Quarter, 2001, January 2002, 
http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0104QusJapan.html, accessed 18 March 2002.
198 “SDF Mission in Iraq” Asahi Shimbun, 10 December 2005; “Jieitai Iraku Haken Enchö, Sumiyaka ni 
Tettai no jyunbi wo”, Asahi Shimbun, Morning edition, 9 December 2005, p. 3; “Zai-Iraku no Jieitai 
mata Haken wo Enchö”, Asahi Shimbun, Morning edition, 11 December 2005, p. 25.
199 Masanori Nishi, Head of the Secretarial Division, Japan Defence Agency, interviewed 23 June 2003, 
Tokyo.
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power relations after the Japan’s defeat in war, but also from the enduring legitimacy 
that the United States established globally and from the infusion of its political vision 
into Japan throughout the post-1945 period. In particular, the hegemonic relationship 
between the United States and Japan is institutionalised in the US-Japan Security 
Alliance, and Japan’s dependence on the United States for national security continues to 
characterise the relationship as hegemonic, despite dramatic increases in Japan’s 
economic and military capacities.
In the first stage of the development of US hegemony, the inequalities between 
the United States and Japan were obvious and, as a defeated state, Japan was in a 
position with little negotiating margin. While both SCAP and the United States had, in 
theory, emphasised a sense of Japanese independence, Japan was ultimately part of a 
larger strategic picture in the Cold War for the United States and, as a result, policies 
such as remilitarisation and stringent economic reforms were prescribed, to which Japan 
adapted as best it could. In particular, the “rules” established by the United States for 
the future of Japan’s military development—Article 9—were modified in the name of 
US interests. The 1960s represented a consolidation of Japan’s acceptance of restricted 
autonomy within US hegemony. While Japan was able to achieve rapid economic 
growth during this period, it faced one of its first confrontations between US and 
Japanese interests in the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty and Japan’s co­
operation with the United States in the Vietnam War during the 1960s. The threat of 
communism and the fact that Okinawa remained under American control in particular 
influenced Japan’s concession to US demands.
The United States experienced a relative decline in its power in the second stage 
of US hegemony. In the context of the US-Japan relations, US decline manifested itself 
most evidently in the Nixon Shocks and in the bilateral trade friction of the 1970s and 
1980s. A change in the US approach to Japan is exemplified both when it bypassed 
Japan to resume its relations with China and when it made tough demands in the textile 
conflict. As Japan began to excel within the rules restrictions of US hegemony, the 
United States again tried to modify the “rules” of liberal trade, by demanding concrete 
quotas and market shares in the Japanese market to suit its interests. While Japan grew 
to be perceived as an economic challenge to the United States and attempted to become 
more independent in some aspects of military equipment production, it nonetheless 
remained co-operative in the name of better long-term relations with the hegemon.
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The third stage in the development of US hegemony saw the United States 
regaining hegemonic confidence through the end of the Cold War. While some touted 
that Japan had “won” the Cold War, the burst of the economic bubble and the political 
embarrassment of its response to the Gulf War was a far cry from a victory. However, 
the criticism that Japan received during the Gulf War was again a change in the “rules” 
under which Japan operated: this time, Japan was required to act more assertively under 
US hegemony, and most significantly, send the SDF overseas in international crisis 
situations. While the greater Japanese public had become use to Japan’s position as a 
pacifist nation, US needs initiated a review of Japan’s international role in the post-Cold 
War era.
Finally, in the post-11 September 2001 stage of US hegemony, changes in the 
“rules” during the Gulf war continued to inform Japan’s decision to send the SDF to 
Afghanistan and Iraq, despite it not being a UN sanctioned mission. The changed 
characteristics of US hegemony and the “either with us or against us” mentality of the 
“War on Terrorism” has also acted as a threat to US allies, indicating that, should states 
fall out of favour with the hegemon, they could be the next target. However, more 
realistically for Japan, the changed attitude of the US administration raised new fears 
over the US commitment to its defence in the face of a terrorist attack on Japanese soil.
The chronological observation of the development of US hegemony highlights the 
fact that, while the depth of US hegemonic influence and the legitimacy of its 
international position have waxed and waned, it has steadily maintained influence over 
Japan throughout this period, and the impact of US hegemony on Japanese foreign 
policy has been significant. United States hegemony has enabled Japan to achieve 
certain goals, but often in controlled and restricted ways that usually suited US interests. 
In other words, Japan’s economic and military capacities have grown over the last 60 
years, but only as much as US interests would permit. In some instances, economic 
development was restricted and Japan was not as autonomous as it could have been, but 
on the other hand in the military context, Japanese capabilities were expanded beyond 
its comfort zones to meet US strategic needs. From this, the fact that US hegemony 
influences the boundaries and rules of Japanese foreign policy shows that Japan is 
unable to act as rationalist theories assume, and that its autonomy is significantly 
restricted.
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Two Differing Perceptions o f  the Hegemonic System
This chapter also demonstrated the two perceptions of the US hegemonic system in the 
US-Japan relationship: a pessimistic realist perspective of the hegemon, and Japan’s 
perspective of itself as being deeply integrated into US hegemony. This is most evident 
in changing US perceptions of Japan when its international influence increased or 
declined, while Japan’s support for US hegemony in comparison remained relatively 
constant. Particularly during the 1980s, the United States held a deep mistrust of its 
subordinate ally, which carried over well into the 1990s. On the other hand, Japan’s 
support of US hegemony has been stable, and it often has sacrificed immediate national 
interests for the sake of maintaining US leadership.
Between 1945 and 1970, the United States remained confident of its hegemonic 
authority and saw minimal levels of threat in Japan. There were concerns over potential 
residual militarism in Japan, but this “threat” perception was eventually overridden by 
the US’s larger strategic concerns during the Cold War, and priority was given to the 
rearmament of Japan. Japan, on the other hand, was faced with the reality of state 
reconstruction, and thus accepted its position as a subordinate state under US hegemony 
as the best way to achieve this. In this sense, to use Kang’s expression, Japan was still 
“low in the pecking order”, even amongst the subordinate states under US hegemony, 
thus causing the United States no alarm.
However, as US relative power declined during the 1970s and 1980s, its 
perception of its position in the world became unstable. As a consequence, the United 
States scaled back some of its global commitments to protect its own interests. This was 
seen in its withdrawal from military leadership in the Nixon Doctrine and also its 
withdrawal as a monetary and financial leader following the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. The United States also became increasingly suspicious of Japanese 
intentions behind its increase in economic and military capabilities, and sought to 
protect its hegemonic leadership. This was done through attempts to impose trade 
quotas on cars and semiconductors, and also by pressuring Japan to direct its money 
away from defence and technological development for greater ODA spending. Kang 
argues that “as long as the lesser states acknowledge the unrivalled position of the 
central state, the central state respects the autonomy and sovereignty of the lesser
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states”,200 and clearly, the United States did not see Japan’s newly-found confidence as 
being compatible with a continuation of it recognising US hegemony.
While the hegemon saw its own leadership as being in decline, Japan not only 
continued to perceive its world as being defined by US hegemony, but actively worked 
to support and maintain US leadership. The fact that Japan acted as a major financial 
supporter of the United States, through its disadvantageous revaluation of currency in 
the Plaza Accord and its integral position in sustaining the Reagan administration’s 
extraordinary defence spending, is particularly significant. Furthermore, Japan’s 
backing came at the height of its economic power and when it was more capable of 
challenging the United States than at any other time in the post-1945 period. As the 
United States regained its hegemonic confidence after the Cold War, residual suspicions 
over Japan’s international movements remained from the greater political freedom 
enabled by the end of ideological conflict. However, Japan’s foreign policy during the 
first decade after the Cold War and its current support of the “War on Terrorism” 
indicate an enduring perspective that it continues to function in a hegemonic system 
with the United States at the core. Therefore, the history of post-1945 Japanese foreign 
policy suggests that Japan still functions in a system of hegemony and recognises the 
United States as an unrivalled global power, while the United States functions under its 
own more distrustful outlook of the international environment. Specifically, Japan’s 
perception of hegemony does not necessarily seek to balance the United States in ways 
anarchic theories may assume. Subsequently, Japan often modifies its policies within 
the restrictions of US interests and pursues a narrower form of autonomy.
Having established that the United States has one perception of its hegemonic 
position in the world and that Japan has a differing perception of this hegemony, the 
argument developed in the following chapter seeks to illustrate that differing 
perceptions of hegemony lead to different expectations of state behaviour and, more 
importantly, differences in views on the boundaries of autonomy in hegemonic 
relationships. The next chapter evaluates Japan’s expectations of autonomy and how it 
maintains this under hegemony. More specifically, it explores Japanese conceptions of 
autonomy in Japanese political philosophy, academic discussions of Japanese foreign 
policy and also government assessments of autonomy. Based on these domestic 
conceptions of autonomy and their influences on foreign policy, a definition of Japanese 
autonomy is proposed.
200 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 168.
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JAPAN’S PURSUIT OF AUTONOMY
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the following questions: What expectations and 
experiences of state autonomy has Japan had, and how has its understanding of 
autonomy shaped its foreign policy pursued under the hegemony of the United States? It 
firstly identifies how autonomy is interpreted in Japanese philosophy and history, and 
how this interpretation has influenced its post-1945 foreign policy in addition to Japan’s 
broader perspective of the hegemonic system. The previous chapter explored the 
specific characteristics of US hegemony and how it affected Japanese foreign policy 
throughout the post-Second World War period. It also established that, within this 
context, differing perceptions of hegemony led to varying expectations of state 
behaviour and most importantly, differences in views concerning the boundaries of 
autonomy in the hegemonic relationship. Therefore, while the previous chapter 
developed US and Japanese perceptions of hegemony, the specific characteristics of the 
autonomy practised by Japan within hegemony are yet to be addressed, and these 
concerns are examined in this chapter. Secondly, it compares a more historically and 
socially specific experience of Japan’s autonomy with notions of autonomy as defined 
in International Relations theory, and relates the analyses of the chapter back to the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter One.
To evaluate the Japanese experience of state autonomy, three bodies of literature 
are examined. They are Japanese modem political philosophy on notions of the state 
through four major Japanese political philosophers; the Diplomatic Bluebooks issued 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Diet speeches and political speeches of 
Japanese Prime Ministers, and academic literature on Japanese foreign policy. An 
analysis of major political philosophy traditions in Japan is vital because it gives 
valuable insight into Japanese conceptions of modem statehood. The four philosophers 
discussed were chosen, firstly because they are philosophers on modernity and are 
representative of their time—Fukuzawa, was influential in the Meiji Restoration; 
Nishida was the founder of the Kyoto school of philosophy,1 which is considered
The Kyoto School is a “philosophical movement centered at Kyoto University that assimilated 
Western philosophy and religious ideas and used them to reformulate religious and moral insights 
unique to the East Asian cultural tradition.” See D.S. Clarke, Jr., “Introduction” in Keiji Nishitani, 
Nishida Kitarö, translated by Yamamoto Seisaku and James W. Heisig, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1991, pp. 4-6.
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“modem Japan’s pre-eminent school of philosophy”2, and Takeuchi is also touted as 
“one of the most challenging and astute thinkers of modernity” in Japan.3 Each was 
chosen for his engagement with Western ideals and concepts of modernity. None of 
them prescribe to a blind admiration to the West. Yet neither do they hold on to 
Japanese values and ideas in blind patriotism. Fukuzawa, for example, was convinced 
that Japanese tradition contained elements that could lead to the efficient adaptation of 
Western civilisation and the development of an indigenous equivalent. Maruyama also 
dedicated his intellectual life to discovering signs of indigenous modem thought within 
Japan’s own intellectual tradition.
A second reason for chosing these particular philosophers is that because they 
were not only prominent in the discussion of modernity and Japan, their ideas clearly 
influenced the Japanese government and its foreign policy. Nishida’s authority on 
modernity was expressed in academic thought passed down through his influence on 
many of his students; some whom went on to become prominent nationalists.4 
Fukuzawa, for instance, travelled to the United States as an envoy of the Tokugawa 
shogunate and also worked as an official translator and negotiator for the shogunate. He 
was invited to join the Meiji government service after the Tokugawa forces were 
defeated.5 Thus, he was effectively a political advisor to the Japanese government on 
matters pertaining to the West at the cusp of Japan’s modernisation.6 The government of 
Japan was also acutely aware of Takeuchi and Maruyama’s thoughts on post-Second 
World War Japan. Both took an active part in public debates and political movements 
surrounding the signing of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty, and advocated Japan’s 
international neutrality.7 They were also considered powerful democratic opinion 
leaders who challenged Japan’s post-1945 “reverse path” that supported pre-war 
political structures and worked to deflect issues of war responsibility away from the
2 David Williams, “In Defence of the Kyoto School: Reflections on philosophy, the Pacific War and 
the making of a post-White World”, Japan Forum, vol. 12, issue 2, September 2000, pp. 143-156, p. 
143.
3 Yoshimi Takeuchi, What is Modernity? Writings o f Takeuchi Yoshimi, translated by Richard 
Calichman, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 5.
4 For an analysis on the work of Iwao Köyama and Masaaki Kösaka and their influence on Japanese 
nationalism, see James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo (eds.), Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto 
School, and the Question o f Nationalism, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
5 Shunsaku Nishikawa, “Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901)”, Prospects, vol. 23, no. 3/4, 1993, pp. 493- 
506, pp. 495^196.
6 Carmen Blacker, The Japanese Enlightenment: A Study o f the Writings o f Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1964, p. 23.
7 Yoshimi Takeuchi, Fufukujü no Isan (The Legacy o f Non-Obedience), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobö, 1961, 
p. 106-107; Rikki Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for 
Autonomy, London, Nissan Institute/Routledge, 1996, p. 201.
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Japanese state. 8 Because of their prominence in the Japanese public, the Japanese 
government had to be constantly mindful of their ideas as a manifestation of public 
sentiment. As a result their ideas on modernity and Japan, together with Japanese 
conceptions of individual and state autonomy were known to the Japanese government 
and influenced foreign policy. 9 These insights in turn shed light on Japanese 
interpretations of state behaviour and its motivations and, as a consequence, its 
perceptions of state autonomy.
An in-depth examination of the Diplomatic Bluebooks and other government 
documentation such as Diet records and Prime Ministerial speeches are additionally 
important when tracing the influences of Japanese political philosophy upon its foreign 
policy following the Second World War. Whilst these government documents may 
contain a degree of official rhetoric, the Diplomatic Bluebooks are strong indicators of 
the international image that Japan wanted to project externally, and Diet speeches 
demonstrate the domestic discussions surrounding the external image MOFA was trying 
to project. However, in all of the government sources, the tension between Japan's own 
ideas of autonomy and greater external international leadership pressures as a result of 
its increased economic capabilities is particularly evident.
Finally, the academic literature on Japanese foreign policy in this chapter has been 
chosen because demonstrate that the tensions between domestic and international 
expectations of Japanese state autonomy as seen in the Diplomatic Bluebooks and other 
government documents, are also paralleled in academic analysis. More importantly, the 
literature selected in this Chapter particularly highlights the deficiencies in rationalist 
analysis when applied to interpretations of Japanese foreign policy analysis in general. 
They demonstrate that rationalist thinking encourages the assumption that self-help will 
lead to either defensive realism or offensive realism, which is not helpful when 
analysing Japanese autonomy. 10
8 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, p. 22; Lawrence Olson, “Takeuchi Yoshimi and the Vision of 
a Protest Society in Japan”, Journal o f Japanese Studies, vol. 7 no. 2, Summer 1981, pp. 319-348, p. 
346.
9 Without access to documents available only in Japan it is difficult to be certain about the direct 
interaction Takeuchi and Maruyama had with policymakers, and therefore their direct influence on 
the Japanese government. It is however reasonable to think that they have because of their public 
prominence and there is no evidence to suggest that they had been ignored while attention has been 
paid to other political commentators.
10 In the case of Japan, explanations pointing to neo-mercantilist maximisation of interest should be 
categorised as an example of offensive realist views of state behaviour due to its constitutional 
military restrictions.
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The analyses of the three bodies of literature demonstrate that, in addition to 
Japan’s different perception of post-1945 US hegemony, Japanese notions of autonomy 
are complicated by conflicts between the Japanese experience of independence and 
statehood, and Western notions of modernity and the sovereign state. This chapter 
reveals that Japan has not followed a linear model of modernisation and development 
into a Western state that fits neatly into a “postulated anarchic state system... [that] 
depends upon each of the major actors understanding this system in the same way” 
within a “nonhistorical mode of thinking”.11 Rather, Japanese notions of modem 
statehood and individuality are narrower than what rationalist theories of International 
Relations assume, from the very fact that it is emulating external—namely Western— 
values and ideas. In other words, notions of independence become restricted when 
sourced from an emulation of external culture and ideas. This argument again highlights 
the problematic assumptions prevalent in those rationalist theories discussed in Chapter 
One, and further strengthens the need for an explanation of Japanese autonomy under 
US hegemony that, as Cox argued, is more historically and socially detailed. This 
chapter aims to address this and also determine, with greater nuance, the meaning and 
value of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy and how it is pursued.
Japanese Philosophies on the Nation, Self, Sovereignty and Autonomy
The first chapter revealed the dominance of rationalist assumptions in International 
Relations theory and how, as a consequence, there is very little specific focus on 
autonomy as a distinct concept. This is because the distinction between official 
sovereignty and the actual capabilities of the state to pursue autonomy is often blurred, 
as autonomy is implicitly assumed as being a part of sovereign statehood in rationalist 
analyses. Further shortcomings are encountered when discussing the International 
Relations literature, in that such writings largely originate in Western experiences and 
analysis, and do not take into account differences in the experience of statehood and 
autonomy in other cultural contexts. On the other hand, non-rationalist theories of IR 
suggest that there can be no one objective interpretation of a concept, and that sovereign 
statehood, autonomy, and what they mean are historically-, socially- and purpose- 
specific. This section draws from this non-rationalist argument by examining Japanese 
philosophies of modernity and the state to address and overcome the aforementioned 
limitations of rationalist assumptions of autonomy.
i i Cox, “Social forces, states and world orders”, pp. 92-93.
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Japanese political philosophy is an important element in defining the meaning of 
autonomy in the Japanese context. It deals with the historical and social factors driving 
Japanese foreign policy through its discussions of the modem individual, civil society 
and modem nation statehood in the Japanese context. By revisiting these basic elements, 
the characteristics of the Japanese modem state in turn can be identified—a non- 
Westem state trying to define itself through the ideas and constructs of Western 
modernity. Subsequently, the Japanese experience highlights a modem state that is more 
introspective and ultimately defines its “independence” and “modernity” through 
external cues and influences. This in itself is a contradiction of autonomy as it is an 
inner force of active independence as described in the modem Western ideals that 
modernising Japan should emulate. Therefore, not only do Japanese political philosophy 
traditions confirm that statehood, state motivations and autonomy can vary across states, 
they further strengthen the argument that state autonomy for Japan is conceived within 
narrower boundaries, and add a further complementary layer to the argument that Japan 
pursues a limited conception of autonomy within the broader context of contemporary 
US hegemony.
Four Japanese Interpretations o f Modernity
Many Japanese political philosophers from the Meiji period to the Second World War 
are significantly influenced by Western notions of modem statehood and consequently 
use the same language when speaking of modernity. Yasuo Yuasa argues:
“[M]odem Japanese culture, including philosophy, is at least outwardly, a branch 
of Western culture. [Especially] in the case of philosophy, pre-modem Japanese 
could not understand the notion itself. In other words, for Japan, modernisation was 
synonymous with Westernisation. ” 12
As a result, much of the terminology of modem statehood and citizenship is 
derived from the West.
For Japan, the discovery of its modem self as a state was an externally influenced 
movement that occurred 300 years after European modernisation during the Meiji 
Restoration.13 However, the modernisation of Japan was not only an interaction between 
internal and external ideas—and an issue of “catching up” with the West—but it also 
necessitated introspection about how Japan was going to advance its state interests, and
12
13
Yasuo Yuasa, Kindai Nihon no Tetsugaku to Jitsuzon Shiso (Modern Japanese Philosophy and 
Existential Thought), third edition, Tokyo, Söbunsha, 1989, p. 4.
Yuasa, Kindai Nihon no Tetsugaku to Jitsuzon Shisö, p. 4.
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which traditions it was going to preserve within a modem Western environment. 
Despite this, Japan and its citizens’ modem self-image has nevertheless developed in 
constant reference to external images, values and ideas. This is in strong contrast to the 
Western experience of modernity, which grew internally from the Protestant 
Reformation14, the enlightenment movement and the Renaissance during the 16th 
century.15 Thus, just as “the Orient had helped to define Europe as its contrasting image, 
idea, personality, experience”16 in Orientalism, the opposite was true for Japan: the West 
was intrinsically important in defining modem Japan.
However, as the Japanese adopted these Western concepts, slight changes 
emerged. Yuasa argues that a distinct kussetsu —literally meaning a refraction or
distortion17—occurred when “Western philosophies and traditions and Japanese cultural 
traditions [became] entangled with each other”.18 This kussetsu influenced the national 
consciousness of the newly modernised Japanese citizens, and also the intellectuals’ 
sense of self at the time.19 This section examines four major Japanese interpretations of 
modernity in order to identify the kussetsu that might be found in Japanese 
interpretations of state autonomy. The discussion firstly focuses on Yukichi Fukuzawa 
(1835—1901) in order to analyse one of the most commonly cited examples of altered 
or modified Western concepts, wakon yösai ( f P ^ # ^ ) ,  translated as Japanese spirit, 
Western technology. Secondly, Kitarö Nishida’s (1870— 1945) search for synthesis of 
Western and Japanese philosophies from a Buddhist perspective is examined. Thirdly, 
Yoshimi Takeuchi’s (1910—77) critical views on the political philosophy of war-time
14 The Reformation forms the basis of rational philosophies and the notion of the rational and 
independent self. Martin Wight summarises the significant changes of the time: “The common man’s 
inner circle of loyalty expanded, his outer circle of loyalty shrank, and the two met and coincided in a 
doubly definite circle between, where loyalty before had been vague. Thus the modem state came 
into existence; a narrower and at the same time a stronger unit of loyalty than medieval 
Christendom.” See Wight, Power Politics, p. 25.
15 Many modem independent city-based states emerged in Italy during the 16th century. Citizens of the 
state were able to defy and break free from medieval religious authority by establishing their own 
free-standing political system. Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization o f the Renaissance in Italy, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1958, pp. 26-44.
16 Edward Said, Orientalism, third edition, London, Penguin, 1991, pp. 1-2.
17 As defined in Martin Collick, David P. Dutcher, Söichi Tanabe and Minoru Kaneko, Kenkyüsha’s 
New College Japan-English Dictionary, fifth edition, Tokyo, KenkyQsha 2003.
18 Yuasa, Kindai Nihon no Tetsugaku to Jitsuzon Shisö, p. 7.
19 It is thought that the concept of a nation and nation-state first appeared in Japanese ideology during 
the Edo period (1603-1867), however, this indigenous growth of nationalism was cut short due to the 
rise of Ieyasu Tokugawa and his policy of isolation. Rapid political and social modernisation 
occurred mostly under Western pressure during the Meiji Restoration of 1866 to 1869. While China 
had been the predominant external influence for Japan over many centuries, external influence 
shifted from China to Europe in the late 17th century and, more rapidly so, in the 19th century, and 
finally to the United States in the 20th century. Yuasa, Kindai Nihon no Tetsugaku to Jitsuzon Shisö, 
p. 5.
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Japan are assessed, followed by Masao Maruyama’s (1914— 96) views on subsequent 
political consciousness immediately following the Second World War.
While there are many other Japanese political philosophers, this section does not 
aim to provide a detailed history of Japanese political thought. Therefore, it concentrates 
on these four thinkers in order to present significant examples of discussion on the 
modem Japanese state.
Yukichi Fukuzawa
Fukuzawa was a political theorist and educator of the late 19 century whose thoughts 
show the influence of Western ideas on Japanese conceptions of the individual, 
autonomy, and statehood. Fukuzawa considered Japan as being in a “semi-developed 
stage”, whose advancement was slowed by the hierarchical nature of the traditional 
feudal society and Confucian thought.20 He argued that “civilisation” or bunmei (3C^ as 
opposed to “barbarism”)21 was the only choice for Japan, and it needed therefore to 
“catch up” by learning from Western modernisation. Drawing on several earlier 19th 
century philosophers such as Shözan Sakuma and Shönan Yokoi (who also advocated 
wakon yösai), Fukuzawa believed that Western ideas were not contradictory to Japanese 
ideas, and that the two could develop in a complementary and integrated way. He 
argued that integration could be achieved through the preservation of Japanese national 
culture, polity and sovereignty in the modem era by emulating the spirit of Western 
civilisation.
His main concern in his studies comparing eastern Confucian culture to Western 
culture was that, in terms of abstract ideas, the East “lacked a spirit of independence”.22 
This was a crucial deficiency, because he saw the independence of the self as being 
connected to the independence of the state. Fukuzawa argued:
Independence means to rule oneself and to not have a spirit of dependence on
others. Those who can differentiate between right and wrong, and manage without
20 Yukichi Fukuzawa, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline o f a Theory o f Civilisation), Tokyo, 
Iwanami Shoten, 1931, pp. 28-32, 161-63; Annette Schad-Seifert, “Constructing National Identities: 
Asia, Japan and Europe in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Theory of Civilisation” in Dick Stegewems, 
Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian Brotherhood, or World 
Citizenship?, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 45-67, p. 50.
21 Fukuzawa’s idea of civilisation contrasted to its pre-Meiji use. Notions of pre-Meiji civilisation were 
based on the Chinese notion of the concept, which was much more geographical in nature. The closer 
to the centre (China) the more civilised, and the peripheries of the regions influenced by China were 
considered as being “barbaric”. See Schad-Seifert, “Constructing National Identities”, p. 49.
22 Yukichi Fukuzawa, Fukuö Jiden (The Autobiography o f Yukichi Fukuzawa), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten,
1944, p. 206.
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misjudgement on this basis do not have to depend on the knowledge of others and 
is independent....If we have any patriotism at all, we must firstly consider our 
independence, whether it is public or private, and if we have any strength left, we 
must help other people become independent. Fathers must teach their children 
independence, teachers should encourage their students, samurais, farmers, artisans 
and tradesmen should all embrace independence and protect our country. 23
He wrote in Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline o f a Theory of Civilisation) that 
Japan’s inferiority to the West had also given rise to feelings of being oppressed by it, 
and that these feelings had in turn generated an anxiety over national independence. 24 He 
called upon the Japanese to cultivate independence through increased engagement with 
the West and emulation of Western values, while at the same time elevating Japan to the 
level of modem civilisation on its own terms. He argued that, unless the Japanese people 
had this spirit of independence, modem civilisation would be of no use to them. While 
he did not specify clearly as to which aspects of Japanese traditions he viewed as being 
worthy of maintaining, the main change Fukuzawa advocated was the ending of the 
feudal hierarchy that permeated Japanese society. He saw civilisation based on a more 
equal civil society as a means for Japan not to become “slave or puppets” of the West 
and to be overcome by colonialism as had occurred in other non-Westem countries. 25 To 
achieve equality and independence, Fukuzawa believed the education of individuals to 
be an important means of modernising both the broader Japanese populace and Japan 
itself as a state.
Therefore, while Fukuzawa is aware of Japan needing to become independent in 
and of itself, at the core of Fukuzawa’s enlightenment ideology is a comprehensive 
emulation of Western ideas, values and technology in order to “beat the West in their 
own game”. In other words, the rationalism and spirit of independence that Fukuzawa 
espouses is rooted in Western notions of modernity, and not necessarily based on 
Japanese ideas. Consequently, the autonomy of the state that he advocates is closer to 
rationalist definitions of autonomy, and the kussetsu or distortion of Western ideas in 
his philosophy is minimal.
23 Yukichi Fukuzawa, Gakumon no Susume (An Encouragement o f Learning), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 
1996, p. 29, p. 34.
24 Yukichi Fukuzawa, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (An Outline o f a Theory o f Civilisation), Tokyo, 
Iwanami Shoten, 1931, pp. 203-35.
23 Fukuzawa, Bunmeiron no Gairyaku, pp. 224 -  25.
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Kitarö Nishida
Like Fukuzawa, Kitarö Nishida also sought synthesis between Japanese and Western 
culture but on a more abstract level. Nishida practised Zen Buddhist meditation, which 
greatly influenced his perspectives on the differences between Eastern and Western 
notions of the self and self-consciousness, which he then related to ideals about the 
Japanese state in the face of Western modernity. Like Fukuzawa, at the core of these 
discussions lay his belief that, unless Japan adopted a strong position on how it was 
going to deal with Western modernity, it would be unable to ascertain its own position 
and existence. Nishida argued:
[The] dazzling advances in Western culture—which interprets things with form as 
being real and positive—should be respected, and there is by all means a lot to 
learn from it, but at the core of Eastern culture that our ancestors have cultivated 
over several thousands of years is to see things without form, and listen to things 
without a voice.26
In other words, under Western cultural influence, a norm of “objectivity” in 
perceiving and understanding the surrounding world was gradually being established in 
Japan. This influence gave way to the perception that there was one form of 
“modernity” and that, as long as Japan existed as a modem state, this was a positive 
development. This uncritical assumption of modernity’s positive effects dismissed the 
need for introspection and self-examination, which was crucial for implementing an 
effective and long-term modernity that would work in the Japanese context.
In response to this dilemma, Nishida sought to establish a philosophical 
expression of a Japanese consciousness of citizenship based on independence through 
unity of the self, which was significantly influenced by his practice of Zen.27 He argued 
that there was a large gap between Eastern and Western spiritual attitudes and 
perceptions of the self. More specifically, Nishida argued that, in Western philosophies, 
for things to exist positively, it must be affirmed in external surroundings, and modem 
conceptions of the self must thus expand actively and outwardly. However, in 
comparison, Nishida’s philosophy deals with the expansion of the self more passively. 
The self does not advance outwards, but “consciousness sinks to the bottom of
26 Kitaro Nishida, Nishda Kitarö Zenshu (The Complete Works o f Kitaro Nishida), vol. 4, Tokyo, 
Iwanami Shoten, 1988, p. 6.
Yoshitomo Takeuchi, Nishida Kitarö to Gendai (Kitarö Nishida and Modernity), Tokyo, Daisan 
Bummeisha, 1978, p. 231.
27
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consciousness itself’ and “transcends into the depths of where the self is”, creating a 
deeper dimension of existence and the self.28
In other words, by “passivity”, Nishida means deep self-assessment and 
introspection. This particular kind of passive expansion of the self through retreating 
into self-consciousness formed the foundations of Nishida’s philosophy, and also his 
ideal in establishing a modem Japanese self-consciousness and statehood. In 
establishing a modem Japan, Nishida considered that Japan not only needed to question 
itself in its many dimensions as possible, but by doing so, it was also questioning the 
larger world in which it was situated.
Nishida’s philosophy is therefore more critical of blindly following Western 
modernisation and encourages a modernisation that is more focused on Japanese ideas. 
However, much like the non-rationalist theories discussed in the previous chapter, his 
perspectives on the Japanese notion of the modem self are useful when dissecting the 
“objectivity” of the West, much in the same way that non-rationalist theories critique 
rationalist assumptions. However, Nishida’s philosophy does little to provide practical 
solutions on how Japan should respond to the rapidly modernising world and the 
territorial expansion occurring globally at the time. As a consequence, he gives no 
substantive outcomes of deep introspection and self-reassessment, and offers only 
limited insight into specifically Japanese forms of autonomy.
Yoshimi Takeuchi
Yoshimi Takeuchi, an early 20th century thinker, was more critical of Japanese culture 
in the face of modernity, challenged the post-Second World War Japanese intellectual 
community to critically rethink its relationship to the West, and provoked debate over 
Japan’s social and cultural identity. He agreed with Nishida that the differences between 
European modernity and Japan should not be automatically interpreted as 
“advancement” versus “depravity”. However, Takeuchi argued that Japan had 
interpreted these differences as such and, as a consequence, it had little desire to 
preserve the self, or to critically assess and resist modernity as imposed by the West. 
The lack of resistance meant that Japan was not a part of the East; but, at the same time,
28 Nishida, Nishida Kitaro Zenshu, vol. 4, p. 245.
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Takeuchi argued that its lack of desire to maintain its identity also meant that Japan was 
not a part of Europe. Therefore, he famously declared that “Japan is nothing” . 29
While he agreed with Nishida that Japanese culture had certain elements of 
passivity, Takeuchi did not necessarily interpret this as being a positive aspect worthy of 
preservation or on which to build a modem identity. He was significantly more 
pessimistic about the ability to find synthesis between Japanese traditions and culture 
and Western modernity in general, 30 and his discussions were more a reflection upon 
modem Japan with a cautious warning of where it was going, particularly in the wake of 
the Second World War. He likened the path that Japan had taken in adapting to 
modernity to that of a slave:
For a slave to become a slave master, does not mean the liberation of the slave. 
However, subjectively speaking from the slave’s point of view, it is liberation.
When this example is applied to Japanese culture, its characteristics become clear.
Japan held a deep consciousness of inferiority towards Europe in regards to 
modernity. This is why it began its furious game of catching up. It had made up its 
mind that becoming European, and being good at being European, was going to be 
its path to freedom. In other words, it sought to be a slave master in order to 
liberate itself from slavery.. .this is why no matter how hard Japan tries, there is no 
forthcoming autonomy, independence or identity.31
Again, he linked this lack of autonomy, independence and identity {shutaisei 
ffe) to Japan’s abandonment of meaningful resistance to modernisation, and it having 
blindly swallowed, and become a slave to, all aspects of European values. He also 
blamed this passivity on the tradition of culture always coming from external influences 
and not having received external ideas through struggle and resistance. Takeuchi 
argued:
Japanese culture is always looking outside for new things. Culture always came 
from the West. Confucianism and Buddhism were the same. So Japan waits...I 
believe that because Japanese culture does not have any experience of 
independence in its traditions, it cannot feel independence with a sense of reality. It 
has not once received external influence through struggle and resistance. Those 
who do not know the taste of freedom are happy enough with a hint of freedom. 32
Consequently, Takeuchi’s discussion of Japan and modernity argues that 
resistance of Western modernisation does not necessarily have to involve aggressive
29 Yoshimi Takeuchi, “Kindai towa Nani ka (Nihon to Chügoku no baai)” (“What is Modernity? [The 
Case of Japan and China]”), Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshü (The Complete Works of Yoshimi Takeuchi), 
vol. 4, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobö, 1980, p. 128-71, p. 145. This article was originally written in April, 
1948.
30 Takeuchi, “Kindai towa Nani ka”, p. 135.
31 Takeuchi, “Kindai towa Nani ka”, p. 157.
32 Takeuchi, “Kindai towa Nani ka”, p. 168. In this case, “the West” is pointing to the geographical 
direction, not necessarily Western culture.
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military conflict, but necessitates critical analysis. While his philosophy contains less 
passivity in comparison with Nishida, Takeuchi similarly argues for the need for self- 
reflection and a fundamental questioning of progress and historical change. Because 
Takeuchi’s ideas are essentially a critical philosophy, his philosophy too, is useful for 
questioning the foundations on which positive modernity is based, but provides 
restricted insight on autonomy based on Japanese culture and tradition.
Masao Maruyama
In the first half of the 20th century Masao Maruyama made several significant 
observations on perspectives of autonomy through his analysis on how European 
rationalism and individualism transferred and evolved in Japan. Maruyama also 
examined the passive nature in which modem Japan developed; yet, unlike Nishida who 
explained it in terms of Buddhist passivity, Maruyama emphasised the external 
foundations of modernisation as being a determining factor. He argued that 
modernisation in Europe could be characterised as the formation of internal 
diversification that nonetheless had the common notion of corpus christianum within 
the European community.33 In other words, Maruyama maintained that “the Renaissance 
and the Reformation were multi-directional splits within something that was originally a 
unified part of the world”.34 On the other hand, in what Maruyama called the Oriental 
world, Indian, Chinese, Japanese and various other cultures existed relatively 
independent of each other, even though there was some commonality of religion in 
Buddhism.35 As a consequence, these Asian nations did not gain modem self-awareness 
as a state through a spontaneous process within international society, but were instead 
often forced into it by military power or the threat of its use by foreign states.36 Thus, 
Maruyama explains, “the nominal national sentiments held by Oriental states were 
usually primarily a reaction to outside pressures,”37 which added to the passive and 
reactive beginnings of Japanese modernity.
To both overcome and counter the European challenge impeding modernisation, 
Maruyama, like the aforementioned scholars, discussed the issue of integrating
33 Masao Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu: Sono Shisöteki Haikei to Tenbö” (“Nationalism 
in Japan: Ideological background and Prospects”), Gendai Seiji no Shisö to Ködö (The Philosophy 
and Movement o f Modem Politics), Tokyo, Mirai Sha, 1964, pp. 152-70, p. 155. This article was 
written in 1951.
34 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu” p. 155.
35 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu” p. 155.
36 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, pp. 155-56.
37 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, p. 156.
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European and Japanese ideas. He gave a cynical and critical analysis of this 
amalgamation by arguing that old elite classes only sought to integrate European ideas 
of modernity as far as this would maintain their power. He posited that this was because 
any complete integration of modem ideas would mean introducing concepts such as 
liberal democracy and individual rights, which would in turn signify the demise of the 
old regime and the position of the ruling elites. As a result, this fear gave rise to the 
“neat” separation of European technology from the Japanese spirit or tradition, as 
manifest in slogans such as the aforementioned xvakon yösai, and also fukoku kyöhei (1i 
—rich nation, strong army.38 This kept the infiltration of modem political 
ideology into Japanese society to a minimum, while allowing the state to grow and 
modernise in terms of its industrial, technological and military capabilities.39 As a 
consequence, Japan succeeded in revolution from above in the Meiji Restoration and 
became the first modem Asian nation state with a centralised government. It not only 
pushed back the infiltration of European forces, but grew to become an imperial power 
that was regarded as ranking alongside European great powers.40
However, Maruyama maintained that this neat “division of labour” between 
European technology and Japanese traditional values in fact did not contribute to the 
cultivation of modernity and independence within Japan. Because Japan did not tie 
modem nationalism to the liberation of its citizens through democracy and individual 
choice, but rather to national unity and features of latter-stage nationalism such as 
imperialism, Maruyama argued that this “created a population of loyal but subservient 
followers that left all decisions to the authorities instead of creating the modem citizen 
who took political responsibilities onto themselves.”41 The “successful” application of 
Western modernity through the separation of European technology from Japanese 
traditions not only caused a significant slowing down in the modernisation of the 
general population, but it left a structural imbalance in Japanese nationalism and 
society.42 Maruyama saw the characteristics of imbalanced Japanese nationalism and the 
relationship of the individual and the state as follows:
The psychological structures of Japanese nationalism involved burying the 
individual within a state that expressed itself as an extension of a primary group 
(such as family or tribe)...whereas modem nationalism...expresses a high level of
38 Fukuzawa, Fukuö Jiden, p. 233.
39 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, p. 157.
40 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, p. 158.
41 Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, p. 163.
Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, p. 160.42
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individual will [jihatsusei fl H t4 ]  and independence [shutaisei The
connection between nationalism and the sovereignty of the individual was indeed 
the most important outcome historically (which shows why the nationalism seen in 
the liberal democratic movement in the early Meiji period was incomplete).43
Maruyama argued that the leaders of the Meiji government could not depend on 
the development of an independent and active national consciousness because of the 
urgency of the Restoration. The threat of foreign pressure necessitated a rapid 
generation of patriotism, and Meiji leaders achieved this from above through state 
education, which in turn crushed burgeoning liberal democratic movements in Japan.44 
In other words, Japan’s “modernisation” was quite different in character to the 
European Renaissance or Reformation, and did not have a strong emphasis on the 
autonomy of the individual, but instead involved a grossly unbalanced perception of 
state independence in the face of European powers.
Maruyama’s account of Japanese autonomy set in the context of the international 
environment of the Meiji period describes well the kussetsu that occurs when Western 
notions of the modem state intersect with the Japanese situation. It results in a state 
autonomy that is highly reactive to external circumstances. The notion of independence 
and autonomy residing at the core of Western modernisation changes when it interacts 
with Japanese political culture that essentially accepts modernisation as Westernisation. 
This acceptance means that the motivations and independence of modem statehood are 
not generated through self-will, which is prevalent in the original Western traditions, but 
rather by putting itself within the boundaries of foreign values. As Takeuchi pointed out, 
this blind acceptance is, in part, influenced by Japan’s long history of receiving new 
culture and ideas from external sources. However, Maruyama highlights that, unlike 
Europe, modernisation in the Asian region often resulted from external force, or the 
threat of force from external powers, and thus is politically motivated, rather than a 
“natural” adoption and development of superior values. As a consequence of this 
acceptance, Takeuchi argues that passivity towards introspection is manipulated by 
national elites and makes the state a slave to external values. Japan’s adoption of 
modem Western values, which were intended to be emancipating, instead resulted in its 
autocratic government that existed during the Second World War. Takeuchi argues that 
this simply turned Japan from a slave to a slave master—still working within the 
framework of slavery, and not truly liberated.
43
44
Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, pp. 161-62. 
Maruyama, “Nihon ni okeru Nashonarizumu”, p. 162.
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These political philosophers thus demonstrate that concepts such as the state and 
independence do indeed undergo some change when applied outside its social context. 
While this may be expected, this finding has two important consequences. Firstly, it 
reveals that appealing the “independence” of a state through emulation of an external 
model without critical evaluation on how to best apply it to domestic characteristics and 
circumstances leads to a diminishing of the independence itself. The very dependence 
on outside ideas narrows the foundations of independence. Secondly, given the kussetsu 
of Western concepts when applied to a non-Westem situation, and the fact that Japanese 
experience of modernisation and state autonomy is fundamentally different in nature to 
the European, it is also problematic to consider these concepts as the same across all 
states as assumed in rationalist International Relations Theory.
Japanese Government Perceptions of Autonomy
The contradictions and tensions between the Western and Japanese experience of 
modem statehood discussed in the context of Japanese political philosophy are also 
reflected in contemporary Diplomatic Bluebooks, Diet speeches and political speeches 
of Japanese Prime Ministers and it is particularly evident in issues pertaining to Japan’s 
international role. This second section examines how the Japanese government 
discusses state autonomy in its foreign policy by focusing on Japan’s role in 
international relations. In addition to the contradiction of Japan’s modem statehood 
depending on an external model that espouses political and social independence, 
contemporary Japanese autonomy also faces the contradiction of implicitly trying to 
define an “active” role within its pacifist constitution, while continuing to be dependent 
upon the US-Japan alliance for its national security.
There are two reasons for focusing on Japan’s international role in this section. 
Firstly, a certain degree of autonomy is implicit in advocating a major international role, 
and the capabilities that are perceived to be required to carry it out helps to characterise 
further Japanese autonomy. In particular, the issue of a greater international role for 
Japan is a dominant focus in the discussion in post-1945 Japanese foreign policy, 
especially after its economic growth in the 1970s and even more so in the post-Cold 
War period. It is therefore necessary to consider the pressures or motivations that lie 
behind this direction during this period and also to analyse Japan’s own expectations 
involved in assuming such a role. MOFA’s perception of Japan’s role in international 
society is an indicator of what motivates Japan’s foreign policy behaviour and can
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subsequently reveal what autonomy means for the Japanese government and how it is 
pursued.
Secondly, as highlighted in the previous section on Japanese political philosophy, 
the issue of Japan’s international role is also relevant when considering Japan’s need of 
an internally generated direction. The analyses of Japanese political philosophy and the 
issues facing Japan in current international relations suggest that these same 
observations can be applied to present-day Japan. As long as Japan does not generate a 
stronger sense of internal direction, it continues to be seen as subscribing to external 
pressures and the values of the US hegemonic system. It is accused of parroting the 
interests of the United States, being unable to define its role internationally and lacking 
in autonomy. Analysing the Bluebooks, Diet speeches and prime ministerial speeches 
offers insights into how the Japanese government has been grappling with this issue in 
the period following the Second World War.
A broad survey of the Japanese government documents from the early 1970s until 
2004 reveals that since the 1970s, Japan has become increasingly conscious that its 
economic growth has been assisted through the security and stability provided by other 
members of the international society and, because of this, it was necessary for Japan to 
demonstrate its contributions to the international community rather than solely focusing 
on its own benefits. Again, in tracing Japan’s consciousness of its position and role in 
international society, a conflict between active and passive forms of the self becomes 
evident, as discussed above in the political philosophies of Japan. This perception of the 
self, which is strongly influenced by external ideas and pressures, in turn informs 
Japanese autonomy.
The 1970s: the Re-Establishment o f Trust and International Status
The Bluebooks issued during the 1970s demonstrate that while Japan’s realisation of its 
international role was beginning to emerge, its endeavours remained minimal. The style 
in which Japan discusses its leadership in the 1973 Bluebook is still passive, suggesting 
a weak sense of policy direction at the time. The central focus of Japan’s national 
interest at this stage was still the re-establishment of trust, respectability and particularly 
status within international society, rather than international leadership. In 1973, MOFA 
reports:
...the expansion of the scale of its business activities and the sharp increase of its
presence abroad, due to the rapid growth of its economy in recent years, swiftly
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and on a broad multilateral level expanded its relations of mutual dependence with 
other countries and various areas of the world. As a result, Japan’s international 
influence and stature has increased and its activities both at home and abroad have 
come to exercise a considerable effect on the politics, economies and public 
welfare of various countries of the world.45
The importance of gaining international status is again revealed in its report on 
Japan’s relations among advanced Western countries and its implementation of 
multilateral diplomacy in that year.46 However, while it recognised the elevation of its 
international status and increased economic power, MOFA indicated that “it is no 
longer possible for it to pursue prosperity for itself alone”47 and stated that “Japan 
realises its own position and responsibilities in the world, especially in the international 
economic community, and endeavours to eliminate unstable factors in the international 
community”.48
Despite this, it is important to note that Japan drew attention to its autonomy in 
specific issue areas, and made mention that its reaction to the 1973 oil crisis was “not 
necessarily in line with that of the United States”.49 Furthermore, it clearly stated that it 
can and does take alternative policies to the United States, but only in close consultation 
with the United States:
There is an understanding between Japan and the United States that, in order to 
achieve their common goal of stabilizing international order, they sometimes might 
choose different paths...they might possibly take different approaches because 
their positions differed. It is important for Japan to further strengthen “Japan-US 
relations in a global perspective” with the broadened and deepened dialogue 
between the two countries as the background.50
By the late 1970s, the language that MOFA used to describe Japan’s role in 
international relations was more active, consequently indicating a heightened awareness 
of its international responsibilities. However, at the same time, it did not show any 
significant shift in its policies in the Cold War context. It stated that Japan needed to 
“redouble its active and constructive role in world peace and prosperity, not only in the 
economic, but also in the political and diplomatic fields”51 and that “such a positive
45 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1973, Tokyo, Public Information 
Bureau, 1973, p. 2.
46 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1973, p. 7, p. 14.
47 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1973, p. 16.
48 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1973, p. 16.
49 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1973, p. 8.
5Ü MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1973, p. 59.
51 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1980, Tokyo, Public Information 
Bureau, 1980, p. 27.
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foreign policy [would], of course, be based on friendly and co-operative Japan-US 
relations”.52
Whilst actual mention of the word “autonomy” (jishu) remained limited in the 
Diplomatic Blue books, how Japan was to become “autonomous” was debated at 
lengths in the Diet and by government officials, and was also evident in other 
government documentation during the 1970s. In October 1970, the Defence White 
Paper talked about domestic and international aspects of autonomy;53 firstly the 
importance of national security in safeguarding the autonomous lives of citizens, and 
secondly, the many autonomies that Japan needed to consider in increasingly 
“multipolar” international relations, and also “an autonomous defence system” for its 
security relationship with the United States to function effectively.54
The then Vice Minister of the Japanese Defence Agency, Takuya Kubo also wrote 
in June 1972 in his reflections and reconsiderations of the US-Japan security Treaty the 
potential of autonomy within its security relationship with the United States. Kubo 
stated that members of NATO have autonomy of policy whilst having a strong alliance, 
and that Japan’s treaty relationship with the United States is no excuse for lack of 
independent action, as the renewed security treaty had amended the one-sided US 
protection of Japan.55 Thus, he argued autonomy within the US alliance would depend 
largely on the international position Japan decides to take: either a pro-US stance, or a 
neutral independent stance.56
Prime Minister Takeo Miki also highlighted the increased consciousness within 
the Japanese government of autonomous foreign policy in a speech in the National Diet 
in 1976.
There is something I would like to appeal to our citizens. That is, the issue of 
autonomy and cooperation, the issue of national interest, and the issue of rights and 
responsibilities. Currently, we are being asked for greater autonomous foreign 
policy. However, this does not necessarily mean that opposition is autonomy, and
32 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebookfor 1980, p. 28.
53 Nihon no Böei: Böei Hakusho (Defense o f Japan: The Defense White Paper), Tokyo, Japan Defense 
Agency, 1970, pp. 1-3, 16^41.
34 Böei Hakusho (Defense o f Japan: The Defense White Paper), 1970, pp. 1-3, 16-41. In this passage, 
the document talks about “collective security”, which Japan is technically not constitutionally able to 
participate in. However, it seems that “collective security” is in reference to its alliance with the 
United States, rather than a NATO-type security arrangement in the region.
33 Takuya Kubo, Ikö Tsuitö Shü {Unpublished Writings and Memoirs), Tokyo, Ikö Tsuitö Shü 
Publication Group, 1981, pp. 40-58.
56 Kubo, Ikö Tsuitö Shü, pp. 53.
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that cooperation signifies being a follower. To make an autonomous decision to
cooperate is also autonomous foreign policy. 57
Thus, while the Diplomatic Blue books of the 1970s suggested that Japan was 
only beginning to question its role in international relations—evident in the language 
that did not venture far past its pacifist constitution and its dependence on the US-Japan 
alliance for its national security—other government sources indicated that discussion 
and debate on the topic were active. The motivations and perceived necessary 
capabilities required to carry out such a role were still unclear, and there was no obvious 
internal Japanese policy or direction that suggested what type of future role was 
envisaged. At the same time, it was clear that at this stage, Japan was quietly confident 
of its importance to the United States in taking a dramatically different stance in the oil 
crisis; which will be discussed at greater lengths in the following chapter on Japan’s 
relations with Iran.
The 1980s: A Role “Commensurate with the Peace Constitution ”
Japan’s consciousness of its international role evolved in the 1980s with an additional 
phrase which stated that its role needed to be commensurate with the capacity o f its 
peace constitution. This suggests that Japan was searching for ways to fulfil its 
international role without significant domestic controversy or change. In 1981, MOFA 
stated that Japan had “now reached the stage at which it should participate, 
autonomously and in a positive way, in the maintenance and organization of 
international relations.”58 MOFA’s consciousness that Japan needed to act on its own 
initiative and show leadership was quite clear and, whilst it appealed to the common 
values it shared with the United States and the European Community, and the 
“unshakeable trust” of the US-Japan relationship,59 it again called attention to the fact 
that Japan was nonetheless capable of autonomous policies. It specifically stated: 
“[T]hat Japan should have a common basic perception and strategy with the advanced 
democracies, including the United States, does not necessarily mean that this country’s
57 Takeo Miki, “Dai 77kai Kokkai Jyökai Shisei Höshin Enzetsu” (“Administrative Policies speech in 
the 77th Normal session of the National Diet of Japan”, 23 January 1976, Sekai to Nihon Detäbesu 
(The World and Japan Database), University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture Website, 
http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/, accessed 6 September 2007.
38 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1981, Tokyo, Public Information Bureau, 1982, p. 23. Emphasis 
added.
39 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1981, p. 25.
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specific policies should be the same as those of other countries.”60 Furthermore, this 
perception of autonomous policy and Japan’s international role followed:
The important thing for Japan is to play its due role commensurate with its own 
capability and circumstances...The role of Japan, which has its peace Constitution, 
is greatly limited in the military field, and it is natural that this role should be 
focused on the political and economic fields.61
“An autonomous role commensurate with the peace constitution” became the 
catch-phrase of the 1980s, and was repeated throughout the Diplomatic Bluebooks 
during this period.62 Again, however, there was no significant outwardly change in 
Japanese foreign policy to attempt to achieve greater international responsibility. This 
indicated some residual scepticism remaining within MOFA towards an increased 
international role, and signified that Japan was trying to tread carefully around potential 
domestic opposition.
Flowever, as the Cold War came to an end, the issues through which Japan 
appealed its “proactive leadership” changed. It began to focus on development, energy 
and humanitarian issues and, with this, came a shift in the language used in Japan’s 
policies. In as early as 1989, MOFA referred to issues of development as “a global 
problem that Japan should tackle autonomously.”63 In particular, a significant change in 
the focus of Japan’s leadership was evident in the 1990s when MOFA called attention to 
Japan’s contribution to global politics as a dynamic humanitarian power. However, 
while Japan was one of the largest donors of foreign aid during the 70s and 80s, it was 
often criticised during this period for having economically nationalistic policies behind 
its Official Development Assistance (ODA).64 For this reason, greater clarity in the 
purpose and direction of Japan’s global goals became increasingly necessary for it to 
effectively and legitimately define its international role.
60 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebookfor 1 9 8 1 , p .  26.
61 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1981, p. 26.
62 See MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1982, p. 8, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 
for 1987, Japanese edition, Tokyo, Ministry of Finance Press, 1987, p. 3, p. 5.
63 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1989, Tokyo, Ministry of Finance 
Press, 1989, p. 11.
64 Ryökichi Hirono, “Human Security and Conflict Prevention” in Japan Review o f International 
Affairs, vol. 14, no. 4, Winter, 2000, pp. 261-84, p. 278. Japan’s ODA during this period 
concentrated heavily on economic infrastructure development, often tied to Japanese profit. However, 
Japan has cut the percentage of ODA dedicated to economic development and placed emphasis on 
the development of social infrastructure in recipient countries such as education, health, population 
issues, and water sanitation. In 1986, the percentage of ODA to economic infrastructure stood at 45 
percent and social infrastructure at 16 percent, whereas by 1999 this had changed to 31.9 percent and 
19.3 percent respectively.
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made Japan’s newly found national confidence 
clear, which is evident in the language used in the Bluebooks of the time. However, in 
other government records, even nationalist Nakasone, who favoured a strong military 
and sought to challenge the anti-militarist norm, was still cautious to contextualise this 
confidence within the US alliance and the constitution. He demonstrates this in his 
general policy speech in 1982, and also in his administrative policy speech in the Diet in 
early 1983. In his general policy speech, he affirms his desire “to conduct autonomous 
foreign policy” within the cooperation with Western bloc and other liberal countries,65 
and goes on to state:
Our national defence is carried out based on autonomous judgement on the needs 
and the limits of self-defence. In that case, it is of course necessary to uphold 
policies such as the three non-nuclear principles, maintain a position of self- 
defence and also not threaten neighbouring countries as we have done up until 
now.66
The 1980s therefore represented a time when Japan was genuinely searching to 
find creative ways in which to define an autonomous and distinctively Japanese role in 
international relations. It attempted to do this by focusing on humanitarian leadership 
through aid policies, which enabled firstly the utilisation of its strong economic power, 
and secondly an “active” role within its pacifist constitution, both without significantly 
upsetting the dynamics of the US-Japan relationship. However, its hesitancy to take up a 
new international role matching its economic confidence is evident in the other 
government documents which still clearly put all of its evolving foreign and security 
policies firmly within a narrow interpretation of the Japanese Constitution. This 
tentative form of international participation that remain within its peace constitution and 
also within a framework of dependence on the United States, did not bring Japan 
international credibility or respect and eventually led to the international perception that 
Japan attempted to define its international participation only through financial 
contributions
65 Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Dai 97kai Kokkai Rinji Shoshin Hyömei Enzetsu” (“General Policy Speech in 
the 97th extraordinary session of the National Diet of Japan”, 3 December 1982, Sekai to Nihon 
Detäbesu (The World and Japan Database), University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture 
Website, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/, accessed 6 September 2007.
66 Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Dai 98kai Kokkai Jyökai Shisei Höshin Enzetsu” (“Administrative Policies 
speech in the 98th Normal session of the National Diet of Japan”, 24 January 1983, Sekai to Nihon 
Detäbesu (The World and Japan Database), University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture 
Website, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/, accessed 6 September 2007.
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The 1991 Gulf War
Greater clarity in defining Japan’s foreign policy direction in more practical terms 
became necessary after the 1991 Gulf War when Japan’s 13 billion dollar contribution 
was widely criticised and accusations of “cheque book diplomacy” and “single-state 
pacifism” became paramount.67 As a result, while Japan still depended heavily on 
“firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements” and “securing its own 
appropriate defense capacity”68, it began to define its international role and contributions 
through greater emphasis on peacekeeping, development and humanitarian fields. In 
other words, by utilising its expertise in arms control, and non-proliferation, conflict 
prevention, and development, Japan could fulfil international responsibilities without 
amending its Constitution or altering the US-Japan alliance.69
While Japan’s policies in the 1990s appeared to be a continuation from the 1980s, 
the most dramatic difference was Japan’s contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO)—a direct result of the criticisms during the Gulf War. In late April 
1991, the Japanese government made the decision to send minesweepers to the Gulf, 
which was followed by the passing of the International Peace Co-operation Bill (or the 
PKO Bill) in August and September of the same year.70 This bill allowed Japanese 
personnel to participate in all non-military United Nations PKOs on three conditions: a 
ceasefire in the conflict area; Japan’s participation receiving the agreement of all parties 
in the conflict; and the neutrality of UN forces.71 The activities included election 
monitoring and refugee transportation, and the SDF’s participation in the monitoring of 
ceasefires.72 By appealing to UN-based international contributions, Japan was able to 
expand the PKO Bill beyond the Gulf War to participate in the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in operations within Cambodia from September 1992 to 1993. 
Since establishing the PKO Bill, the Japanese government has participated in eight
67 Akiko Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic o f Multilateralism, London, 
Macmillan, 1999, pp. 65-68; p. Kuriyama, “Challenges for Japan’s Foreign Policy Future”, p. 215; 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1992, Tokyo, Public Information 
Bureau, 1992, p. 52; Kuriyama, “Challenges for Japan’s Foreign Policy Future”, p. 215.
68 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1994, Section 2, “Toward the 
Construction of a New International Framework”, accessed 12 October 2005, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/c 1 .html# 1 2 1 .
69 Yukio Takasu, “Challenges for the United Nations: A Japanese View”, Japan Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 15, no 1, Spring 2001, pp. 16-36, p. 31.
70 Fukushima, Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 68-69; Hugo Dobson, Japan and United Nations 
Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 71-72.
71 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, p. 72.
72 Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, p. 72.
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PKOs and, of these operations, the SDF has participated in Cambodia, Mozambique, 
Golan Heights and East Timor.73
M is s io n P e r s o n n e l L e n g th  o f  M is s io n
T o ta l N u m b e r  o f  
P e r s o n n e l
United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission II 
(UNAVEM II)
Election Observation September—October 1992 3
United Nations 
Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC)
Ceasefire Observation Sept 1992—Sept 1993 8x2
Civilian Police Oct 1992—July 1993 75
Installations Unit Sept 1992—Sept 1993 600x2
Election Observation May—June 1993 41
Operation des Nations 
Unies au Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ)
Headquarters May 1993—Jan 1995 5x2
Transportation Co­
ordination
May 1993—Jan 1995 48x3
Election Oct—Nov 1994 15
Observadores de las 
Naciones Unidas en El 
Salvador (ONUSAL)
Election Observation March--April 1994 15x2
United Nations 
Disengagement Observer 
Force (UNDOF)
Headquarters February 1996—Present 2x 10
Transportation Unit February 1996—Present 43 x 19
United Nations Assistance 
Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET)
Civilian Police July—September 1999 3
S u b -T o ta l 2 3 7 4
Table 3.1 Japan’s participation in Peacekeeping Operations in the 1990s. Modified from “Kokusai Heiwa 
Kyöryoku Hö ni yoru Waga Kuni no Kyöryoku” (Our country’s Co-operation based on the International 
Peace Co-operation Law”), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Website, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/kyoryokuhou.html, accessed 30 July 2006.
There were also other areas such as climate change, arms reduction and human 
security where Japan was able to exercise leadership and make autonomous initiatives, 
particularly because these issues were not subject to strong US influence or interest. 
Japan began to participate in climate change issues in 1992, when it took part in the Rio 
de Janeiro Earth Summit. This summit led to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1994, and the third session of the 
UNFCCC in December 1997 led to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
73 “Kokusai Heiwa Kyöryoku Hö ni yoru Waga Kuni no Kyöryoku” (Our country’s Co-operation based 
on the International Peace Co-operation Law”), The Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of Japan Website, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/kyoryokuhou.html, accessed 30 July 2006. The UN 
Assistance Mission to East Timor was established in 1999, whereas the UN Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in May 2002.
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Change.74 The Kyoto Protocol was largely a Japanese initiative and was seen as being a 
noteworthy international environmental policy, but its international significance has 
since been reduced due to US reluctance to ratify.75
Japan is also actively demonstrating leadership in arms control disarmament and 
non-proliferation diplomacy independently of the United States.76 Since 1994, it has 
actively participated annually in the UN General Assembly’s Disarmament and 
International Security Committee, and has proposed resolutions and gained international 
support in this forum.77 In July 2001, it served as Vice-President for the United Nations 
Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and is also involved with nuclear and 
chemical warfare reduction.78 By the end of the 1990s, Japan further attempted to define 
its international role through human security. In a speech delivered at the December 
1998 ASEAN+3 Summit in Hanoi, the then Prime Minister Keizö Obuchi presented his 
vision for Asia in the 21st century as one based on “peace and prosperity and built on 
human dignity”.79 Obuchi’s declaration attempted to shift the focus of international 
security to the individual rather than to fne state, thereby subscribing greater 
prominence to Japanese humanitarian and ODA policies. He took initiatives to raise the 
importance of human security and placed infectious diseases, crime, drugs and the 
environment among the agendas at the Kyushu-Okinawa G8 summit in July 2000.80 The 
Japanese government also had an integral role in the establishment of the United
74 Kazuhiko Takemoto (Director, Global Environmental Protection Division, Japan Environment 
Agency), “Japan’s Initiatives for Climate Change”, The China Council for International Co­
operation on Environment and Development Phase I I 1997-2003,
http://www.harbour.sfu.ca/dlam/WorkingGroups/planning/industryindex.html, accessed 3 August 
2006.
75 “No Leading Role for Japan at UN Summit”, Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 August 2002.
76 Mitsurö, Dönowaki, Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, interviewed 
10 December 2004, Tokyo.
77 “Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields: Arms Control, Disarmament and Non- 
Proliferation”, Diplomatic Bluebook for 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap2-l.pdf, accessed 3 August 2006.
78 “Japan’s Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields: Arms Control, Disarmament and Non- 
Proliferation”, Diplomatic Bluebook for 2002.
79 “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future of Asia” (a policy speech delivered by Keizö Obuchi, at the 
Lecture Program hosted by the Institute for International Relations), Hanoi, Vietnam 16 December 
1998, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs o f Japan Website, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- 
paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html, accessed on 9 June 2002.
80 “From Okinawa to Genoa: G8 Action Based on the Decisions of Okinawa”, July 2001, The Ministry
o f Foreign Affairs o f Japan Website,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/genoa.html, accessed 9 June 2002.
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Nations Commission on Human Security (UNCHS) in June 2001, headed by former UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen.81
Less evident in the survey of the MOFA Bluebooks is the prominence of the 
concept “active international contribution” (sekkyokuteki kokussai koken) in Japan’s 
foreign policy during the 1990s. This concept dominated Japanese government 
discussions at the time and was the driving force behind the increased Japanese 
contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations. Whilst the use of the term autonomy 
decreased during this period in comparison to the 1970s, suggesting that autonomy as 
establishing the reputation of the state as an individual entity was no longer a major 
issue for the Japanese government, similar concerns still drove Japan’s quest to achieve 
“active international contribution”. In continuation with the theme from the 1980s, the 
Japanese government was still tackling the need to demonstrate that Japan was 
conscious of taking up international responsibilities which were commensurate with its 
economic power. This was evident in several of the Japanese Prime Ministers of that 
decade addressing the issue of “active international contribution”, and being able to 
contribute Japanese personnel overseas within the limits of the constitution was still a 
priority issue for the Japanese government in the 1990s.82
Thus, although Japan did need some international prompting in the form of the 
damning criticisms during the Gulf War, the 1990s witnessed unprecedented vigour in 
the actions and the language used by the Japanese government to establish and promote 
Japan’s autonomous international contributions. This was a significant departure from
81 United Nations Commission on Human Security, “Introduction to Human Security”, on Commission 
on Human Security on the Web, http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/intro/index.html, accessed 9 June 
2002.
82 For example, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa’s New Year’s statement in 1992, a press conference 
given by Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata in April 1994, a press conference given by Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama in July 1994, and a lecture given by Prime Minster Keizö Obuchi in October 
1998, all talk about the need for Japan to make “active international contribution” and provide greater 
clarity in its international role. Their statements are almost always followed by a reference to the 
Japanese constitution, and whether potential actions where in line with them. See “Miyazawa 
Naikaku Söridaijin ni yoru Nentö Kisha Kaiken” (“Prime Minister Miyazawa’s New Year Press 
Conference”), 1 January 1992, in Miyazawa Naikaku Söridaijin Enzetsu Shü (A Collection o f Prime 
Minister Miyazawa’s Speeches), Tokyo, Nihon Köhö Kyökai, 1994, pp. 618-636; “Hata Naikaku 
Söridaijin ni yoru Kisha Kaiken (Prime Minister Hata’s Press Release”), 28 April 1994, in Hata 
Naikaku Söridaijin Enzetsu Shü (A Collection o f Prime Minister Hata’s Speeches), Tokyo, Nihon 
Köhö Kyökai, 1996, pp. 18M6; “Murayama Naikaku Söridaijin Shünin ni atatte no Kisha Kaiken 
(Prime Minister Murayama’s Inauguration Press Conference), 1 July 1994, in Murayama Naikaku 
Söridaijin Enzetsu Shü (A Collection of Prime Minister Murayama ’s Speeches), Tokyo, Nihon Köhö 
Kyökai, 1998, pp. 6-32; “Obuchi Naikaku Söridaijin no Naigai Jyösei Chösakai Köen ‘Tomen no 
Kadai’” (Prime Minister Obuchi’s Domestic and International Affairs Committee Lecture ‘Current 
Tasks’”), 22 October 1998, in Obuchi Naikaku Söridaijin Enzetsu Shü (Ge) (A Collection o f Prime 
Minister Obuchi’s Speeches, Volume Two), Tokyo, Nihon Köhö Kyökai, 2003, pp. 648-659.
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its tentative steps towards a greater international role seen in the previous decade, and 
paved the way for increased SDF contribution internationally.
Japan ’s Role since 11 September 2001
While Japan experimented with the notion of human security, an opportunity to rectify 
its response during the 1991 Gulf War came in the form of the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States. As discussed in the previous chapter, Japan made 
the unprecedented move of sending the SDF overseas on a non-UN sanctioned and non­
peacekeeping mission. To enable this, the Japanese government called for special 
emergency laws and, while it departed significantly from its response to the 1991 Gulf 
War, SDF activities in Iraq continue to be humanitarian focused.83 This suggests that 
Japan’s support for a militarily aggressive US administration and its military presence in 
the Middle East does not necessarily signify a shift in Japan’s foreign policy towards 
being a “normal state” and exercising greater conventional military capabilities.84 While 
the SDF deployment in the Arabian Sea was a decisive measure, it was also important 
as a gesture where Japan showed the “visible forms of participation” expected of it by 
both the United States and the international community at large. Yet, this did not 
necessarily signify an internally generated Japanese direction; rather a reactive response 
to US unilateralism.
The Bluebooks reveal that, like the tensions between Western modem statehood 
and Japanese modem statehood in the late 19 and early 20 centuries, there are 
continued apprehensions and tensions facing the Japanese government. The tensions in 
their modem form are over the international community’s expectations of how a modem 
industrialised state is expected to contribute to the international community versus 
Japan’s own differing perceptions of what state autonomy involves, its real capabilities, 
and actual room to respond to these expectations under US hegemony. As a 
consequence, the general direction of Japanese foreign policy is constantly ambiguous, 
and Japan’s international role has been a recurring theme throughout the last three and a 
half decades.
For Japan, the 1991 Gulf War highlighted international expectations for “active” 
participation; in other words, that Japanese personnel were seen as contributing to 
international fora and “showing the flag” in international crisis situations. Implicit in
83 See Chapter Two, “Japan’s displays o f military resolve”.
84 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 98.
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this expectation is the rationalist perspective that once a state reaches a certain level of 
development and prosperity, it should have the political, economic and military capacity 
and will to take an autonomous stance on international issues and make what 
international society sees as a meaningful contribution. Also implicit in this emphasis of 
“meaningful contribution” is that participation in international crisis situations and a 
true sign of sovereignty are through force, or the threat of force.
While Japan may have been attempting to meet these expectations, its efforts are 
criticised, or at best seen as being ambiguous, because it is unable to articulate 
successfully a clear policy direction due to its military restrictions and dependence on 
the United States for national security. The only constant factor throughout this period is 
the importance of the US-Japan alliance. In this respect, on a rhetorical level, Japan 
continues to subscribe to an externally defined rationalist expectation of its international 
participation. However, it is also clear that Japan has taken individual positions across 
various issue-specific areas, such as energy and human security issues. This suggests 
that the autonomous policies which international society demands of Japan differ in 
nature from those autonomous policies and international leadership actually pursued by 
Japan. Therefore, while autonomy was interpreted by the Japanese government and 
MOFA as policies that answer realist expectations of independent state behaviour, 
namely active political and military leadership in international issues, they were often 
enacted though non-realist means such as financial and humanitarian policies and also 
through United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
Autonomy in Japanese Foreign Policy Analysis
The final step in this chapter’s investigation of Japanese interpretations of autonomy, 
and the context in which it is formulated, is an assessment of autonomy in academic 
literature on Japanese foreign policy. It is important to include how specialists and 
intellectuals have explored post-1945 Japanese foreign policy, not only for the purpose 
of determining how they assess autonomy itself, but to also gauge the parallels between 
their analyses, Japanese philosophical traditions and government perspectives of Japan’s 
international role. Are the tensions found in Japanese experiences of modem statehood 
and recent expectations of international leadership and state autonomy evident in these 
analyses? An answer to this is critical in order to complete the investigation of whether 
an autonomy that is socially and historically specific to the Japanese experience exists, 
its specific characteristics, and how it is pursued under hegemony.
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This section answers these questions by dividing some influential works of 
contemporary Japanese foreign policy analysts into three categories according to their 
interpretations of Japanese autonomy: those who argue that Japan has very little 
autonomy; those who believe that Japan does practice autonomy and aims to maximise 
its national interest much in the manner of realist interpretations of state behaviour; and 
those who voice alternative analyses to these two opposing views. The divisions are a 
useful way to investigate why such differing interpretations of autonomy emerge and, as 
a consequence, help to determine the existing perceptions of how and in what direction 
Japanese autonomy is being pursued. These categorisations are also helpful in 
highlighting the trends in the academic literature on Japanese foreign policy and, more 
importantly, in reflecting the tensions between domestic and international expectations 
of state autonomy which emerge in any academic analysis.
Japan as a “Reactive State’’
The Diplomatic Bluebooks recognised that Japan demonstrated unusually little 
independence of policy in relation to the size of its economy, and argued in the 1980s 
that it needed to practise policies that were “commensurate with its economic power”. 
This assumes that greater economic capabilities should rationally lead to the pursuit of 
greater autonomy and greater influence or leadership internationally. Not to pursue such 
autonomy is to have a fundamental lack of capability which, in the case of Japan, 
translates to a lack of military capability. However, does this render Japan 
“nautonomous”? The following presents the differing arguments on autonomy from 
those that perceive Japan as being largely reactive and having little autonomy under US 
hegemony.
Kent E. Calder argues that, rather than seeking strategic patterns in Japanese 
foreign and economic policies, it is more useful to perceive Japan’s policies as being 
reactive.85 He largely views Japan’s reactive policies—a diminished capacity to practise 
systematic state autonomy—as being a result of fragmented state authority,86 an unusual 
sensitivity to domestic interest-group pressures,87 and the influence of the Japanese 
media.88 He also provides several examples where Japan showed reactive deferential 
behaviour in the face of foreign pressure—some indeed in the face of “massive and
85 Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation” p. 518
86 Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation” p. 528.
87 Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation” p. 530.
Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation” p.534.88
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rising Japanese economic capabilities throughout the 1980s.”89 One such example is the 
Plaza Accords, where Japan was pressured to co-operate actively in driving down the 
US dollar by raising the value of the yen. This move in turn reduced Japan’s export 
profit margins, but it chose to co-operate in spite of its economic power.90 Calder 
suggests that, while a more proactive Japanese leadership could be expected in sector- 
specific areas, Japan would not become an overarching political hegemon comparable to 
the United States because of the domestic constraints in expanding its military 
capacities.91 In 2003, Calder reiterated this theory of reactivity: that the external 
environment, particularly “the embedded position of the United States, as [its] principal 
ally and trading partner in a US dominated unipolar world” is the determinant of 
Japanese foreign policy, and that Japan will remain a reactive state for the foreseeable 
future.92
Yöichi Funabashi and Dennis Yasutomo support Calder’s argument about Japan 
as a reactive actor and as having little autonomy. However, they argue that the reasons 
lie in the structures of Japanese society and cultural identity. Funabashi argues that 
Japan has a history of being a “reactor par excellence”,93 because it has always found it 
necessary to adapt to external rules. This was evident in its adoption of Western notions 
of international law and diplomacy, and its entry into international society,94 and also in 
its adaptation to the international structure which emerged following the Second World 
War. Funabashi adds that the hierarchical nature of Japanese society also contributed to 
the enduring post-1945 environment of hegemony. He views post-Second World War 
Japan as being overly dependent on the United States, and argues that Japan’s 
subservient position often invites foreign pressure, or gaiatsu, which focuses debate 
away from discussion on generating independent policies and initiatives.95 This analysis 
also portrays Japan as a follower of the United States, and underplays Japan’s ability to 
formulate autonomous foreign policies.
89 Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation”, p. 525.
90 “Japan Business Leaders say Yen Overvalued”, Reuters, 14 March 1988; Michael Sesit, “Nissan 
shows how the Yen can be Overcome”, Australian Financial Review, 24 October 1988.
91 Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation”, p. 541.
92 Calder, “Asia’s Shifting Strategic Landscape: Japan as a Post-Reactive State?”, Orbis, vol. 47, Issue 
4, Fall 2003, pp. 605-16.
93 Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order”, p. 60.
94 Hidemi Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society”, The Expansion o f International 
Society, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 185-200.
95 Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order”, p. 62.
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Yasutomo further adds to the discussion of Japan as a reactive state, and attributes 
this as a characteristic deeply entrenched in Japan’s identity. He describes Japan’s 
reactivity as:
...[A] congenital defect of the body politic, deeply embedded in the postwar 
national psyche and the policy process. It constitutes the identity of the Japanese 
state and nation. This picture argues or implies that reactivity applies to Japan’s 
entire diplomacy, not just to the political dimension, that it subordinates indigenous 
motives or interests, de-emphasizes will or choice, and makes few efforts to shape, 
rather than take the shape of, the environment. This is not the profile of a great 
power; it is the profile of a dysfunctional state and a passive, stagnant diplomacy.96
The problem in Funabashi and Yasutomo’s argument lies in the fact that they 
describe Japan as being profoundly weak in the face of the United States and dismiss 
Japanese autonomy altogether, despite there being examples of Japan taking different 
and conflicting positions to the United States as discussed in the introduction.
Japan as a Maximiser o f National Interests
While there is the perception that Japan is a “reactive” state with little autonomy, on the 
other hand there have also been studies that rightly question such a simplistic depiction 
of post-Second World War Japanese foreign policy and argue that Japan is a reactive 
state, but one that is far more calculating of its own interests. 97 This perception assumes 
that the autonomy of a rational actor, with the freedom and capabilities to choose or not 
to choose the most beneficial options for the maximisation of its national interests, 
drives Japanese foreign policy.
Kenneth Pyle’s argument supports this interpretation of autonomy when he 
reasons that Japan continues to prioritise the pursuit of its national interests over 
participation in international initiatives. Pyle explains that Japan’s historical legacy of 
high dependence on the United States has created a state that remains largely introverted 
and uses its dependence strategically to serve its self interests . 98 This flows from what he 
describes as “conservative leaders’ opportunistic adaptation to the circumstance of the 
international order” and the fact that “[t]he Cold War structure of international politics 
allowed Japan to rely on the United States to guarantee its security and the international 
free trade order, while Japan was free to follow policies of economic nationalism . ” 99
96 Dennis Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy, London, Macmillan, 1995,
p. 182.
97 Pyle, The Japan Question, p. 140.
98 Pyle, The Japan Question, p. 142.
Pyle, The Japan Question, p. 4.99
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Rapid economic growth was seen as proof of extremist tendencies, and even 
during the post-Cold War period, the United States still saw itself as a “cap in the 
bottle” of Japanese militarism.100 Japan was therefore perceived as a mercantilist force, 
and residual mistrust of Japanese intentions and national character in general was 
displayed by the United States, which fuelled the vicious cycle of Japan being perceived 
as a threat. Pyle’s analysis suggests that Japan’s ability to break from the pattern of 
strategic dependence and the quietly aggressive pursuit of national interest was limited 
and, consequently, his analysis of Japanese autonomy places its economic capabilities in 
the same light as the extreme militaristic forms of autonomy pursued in pre-1945 
Japanese foreign policies.
Many other analysts argue the “strategic vulnerability” or “free-rider” line and 
suggest that Japan’s autonomy entails the choice for it to remain passive in international 
politics and to continue its alliance of dependence with the United States. William 
Nester proposed this in his argument of Japan having a “coping” strategy that enabled it 
to successfully execute its neo-mercantilist policies.101 Nester maintains that Japan’s 
strategy combined strategic aloofness, careful calculation of the international situation 
with all its alternatives, and “diplomatic jujitsu” of “public relations campaigns, playing 
various American interests off against each other, diverting attention to multilateral 
and/or geopolitical issues, and promoting the image of a poor, weak Japan adrift in a 
hostile world”.102 Richard Holbrooke also suggests that Japan is “free-riding” in his 
discussion of US pressure on Japan to increase the latter’s defence expenditure. He 
argues that Japan was able to devote more of its resources to non-military spending only 
because it spent less than 1 percent of its GDP on defence, as opposed to 5 percent in 
the United States.103
Unlike arguments that make only implicit and indirect references to Japanese 
autonomy, Michael Green and Richard J. Samuels address autonomy more explicitly. 
They argue that Japan “gave up its autonomous role in international affairs and allowed
100 Pyle, The Japan Question, pp. 11-16.
101 William Nester, “Rules of Engagement: Psychological and Diplomatic Dynamics of American- 
Japanese Relations”, Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 4, April 1995, p. 335.
102 Nester, “Rules of Engagement”, p. 335.
103 Richard Holbrooke, “Japan and the United States: Ending the Unequal Partnership”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 70, no. 5, Winter 1991/1992, pp. 41-57, p. 52. This is somewhat of a misconception, as Japan’s 
defence budget, even with US security guarantees, is the second largest in the world. See Ralph A. 
Cossa (ed.), Restructuring the US-Japan Alliance: Towards a More Equal Partnership, Washington, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 1997, p 58.
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the United States to shape its strategic environment” , 104 but that “an insulated economy 
and polity” continues to inform Japan’s policy choices and its pursuit of autonomy. 105 
They suggest that Japan’s pursuit of autonomy is unique in that it has been unusually 
successful in “reducing or avoiding the costs of interdependence” with the United 
States. They predict that Japan will continue to “dither politically and economically” 
with their “[djebates over autonomy and interdependence.. .unresolved” . 106
However, there are weaknesses in their analysis; in particular their argument that 
Japan avoided the costs of interdependence, which implies that Japan has considerable 
freedom as a “rational” actor and could act in accordance with its self-interests. As a 
result, Green and Samuels tend to overplay Japan’s ability to make independent policy 
choices and ignore the fact that Japan does in fact make some concessions and 
accommodates US interests. Again, the Plaza Accords provides a telling example of this 
point. In addition, arguing that Japan is “successful in reducing or avoiding the costs of 
interdependence” with the United States seriously under-emphasises the complex 
interdependencies of the Japanese economy, 107 and the significant financial and domestic 
costs borne by Japan in having US troops stationed on its soil. 108 These incidents are 
clearly episodes of limited state autonomy and do not signify a calculated avoidance of 
responsibilities within the alliance.
Samuels makes another analysis of autonomous Japanese foreign policy in the 
current international context by similarly suggesting that maintaining this US military 
alliance not only conflicts with Japan’s economic mercantilist policies, but will prove 
difficult to sustain. Samuels and Eric Heginbotham call this Japan’s “dual hedge”. The 
first is an economic hedge of independent diplomacy that “focuses on developing 
strategic economic and political relationship with a variety of states” 109 and “include[s] 
several that the United States identifies as present or potential military security
104 Michael Green and Richard J. Samuels, “Recalculating Autonomy: Japan’s Choices in the New 
World Order. The National Bureau o f Research Analysis, vol. 5, No. 4, 1994, p. 5.
10:1 Green and Samuels, “Recalculating Autonomy”, p. 5.
106 Green and Samuels, “Recalculating Autonomy”, p. 21.
107 It should be acknowledged that Japan has known to seek to avoid excessive dependence on one 
particular state by diversifying its trading partners. However, the Japanese economy is heavily reliant 
on trade, and some form of interdependence must be embraced, reluctantly or not. It is for this reason 
that I assert that it is mistaken to perceive Japan as a state bent on avoiding any form of 
interdependence.
108 The rape of a young school girl in Okinawa in September 1995 being a good example of this Makoto 
Iokibe, “Reisengo no Nihon Gaiko” (“Post-Cold War Japanese Diplomacy”) in Iokibe, Sengo Nihon 
Gaiköshi, pp. 225-266, p. 241.
Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 97.109
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threats” . 110 The second is a “hedge against military threats [that] continues to revolve 
around maintaining the US-Japan military alliance” . * 111 Heginbotham and Samuel argue 
that the dual hedges demonstrate “how much US and Japanese policy preferences have 
diverged” 112 and that Japan will eventually have to choose between being a more 
committed US ally or fostering relations with its other economic partners. 113
While Heginbotham and Samuels are correct in saying that these two hedges 
primarily motivate Japanese foreign policy rather than the normative constraints of 
Japan’s post-Second World War anti-militarist culture, nothing in this dual hedge is 
necessarily unique to the Japanese situation, nor are the two hedges necessarily a 
conflict zero-sum game. As Heginbotham and Samuel point out, the United States also 
engages in such hedging in its relations with China. Both Japan and the United States 
have extensive trade relations with the rising Asian power and, despite Japan’s 
percentage of overall trade with China being about double that of the United States, 114 
the United States has “recently surpassed Japanese levels in absolute terms” . 115 Also, as 
Heginbotham and Samuels point out in their examples of Japan’s relations with Iran and 
its efforts towards regional economic integration, 116 Japan can “enhance and 
complement its US alliance” . 117 It is possible, therefore, for Japan to pursue “two 
hedges” without Japanese autonomous policies necessarily either leading to conflict 
with the United States or undermining the US-Japan alliance.
Defensive Realism as an alternative explanation?
While offensive realist explanations clearly do not adequately explain Japanese foreign 
policy, defensive realist explanations of international relations might better explain 
Japan’s behaviour under US hegemony. Defensive realists could argue that Japan’s 
foreign policy is a symptom of states choosing cooperation rather than confrontation as 
a means of self-help under anarchy. 118 Defensive realists argue “that the international
110 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 98.
111 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 97.
112 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 123.
113 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 124.
114 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 113.
115 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 112.
116 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 106.
117 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan”, p. 110.
118 Jack L. Snyder, Myths o f Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1991, Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help”, 
International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, Winter 1994/1995, pp. 50-90.
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system provides incentives only for moderate, reasonable behaviour” "9, and that 
security is best achieved through the restraint of force. “Buck-passing”, or transferring 
the costs of security by relying on other sources, is one type of defensive realism,120 and 
those who subscribe to this argument might suggest that Japan can seek autonomy 
within US hegemony in this way.
When “buck-passing” theory is applied to the Japanese context, their argument 
would assume that Japan contributes to its alliance relationship with the United States in 
as limited a way as possible, and only increases its contribution when support from the 
US seemed to be waning.121 Whilst this might sound a convincing argument which helps 
to explain Japan’s increases in defence spending in the 1970s and 1980s,122 which is 
arguably an example of Japanese autonomous action which did not necessarily go 
against US hegemony in the region, Jennifer M. Lind correctly points out that defensive 
realism cannot fully explain why Japan continued to expand its military capabilities in 
the immediate post-Cold War period when security threats diminished.123 In fact, 
hegemonic pressure encouraged Japan to contribute more to the alliance in the post- 
Cold War period, particularly after Japan’s weak contribution in the Gulf War of 1991, 
and the influence of this hegemonic context is still evident in Japan’s increased military 
cooperation with the United States, particularly in its “War on Terrorism”.
On Constructivism
As mentioned previously in the Introduction, constructivist theorists such as Katzenstein 
and Berger argue that the antimilitarist norms that have developed in post-Second 
World War Japanese society have informed their “non-violent” domestic and 
international security policies. Katzenstein argues that antimilitarism causes the 
Japanese government to be largely passive in the international arena because it is 
reluctant to take action abroad when the norms on defence are so deeply contested
119 Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 10-13, 108.
120 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance 
Patterns in Multipolarity”, International Organization, vol. 44, no. 2, Spring, 1990, pp. 137-168; 
Susan J. Pharr, “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing” in Gerald L. 
Curtis (ed.), Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change, New York, M.E. 
Sharpe, 1993, pp. 235-262.
121 Pharr, “Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy”, pp. 240-242.
122 Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy”, 
International Security, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 92-121, pp. 107-109.
123 Lind, “Pacifism of Passing the Buck?”, pp. 115-116.
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within Japan.124 Berger similarly argues that Japan will not seek to become a military 
power because of the postwar culture of antimilitarism:
.. .[A]ntimilitarism is one of the most striking features of contemporary Japanese 
politics and has its roots in collective Japanese memories of the militarist takeover 
in the 1930s and the subsequent disastrous decision to go to war with America.
The chief lesson Japan has drawn from these experiences is that the military is a 
dangerous institution that must be constantly restrained and monitored lest it 
threaten Japan’s postwar democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity 
that the nation has enjoyed since 1945. This particular view of the military has 
become institutionalized in the Japanese political system and not only is supported 
by Japanese public opinion, but to a surprising degree is shared by large segments 
of Japan’s political and economic elites as well.125
To have given such an analysis of Japanese security policy is to overlook Japan’s 
deployment of the Self-Defence Force after the 1991 Gulf War, and also the impact US 
pressure had in the Japanese government making this decision. Furthermore, it also 
ignores the fact that antimilitarism and Article 9 are interpreted according to political 
needs:
[T]he pacifist article 9 has proven to be as malleable as Tokyo wants to make it. 
Because many Japanese people hold deeply antimilitarist views, U.S. leaders 
should be cognizant of the sensitivity of military issues in Japanese society. 
Nevertheless, Tokyo can bring its public along when it wants to.126
Therefore, antimilitarism does not convincingly reflect the reality of Japanese 
foreign policy, because of this, it does not shed much light on how it practices 
autonomous foreign policy within its relationship with the United States.
Japan ’s Constructive Pursuit o f Autonomy within US Hegemony
While recognising Japan’s subordinate role in the US-Japan alliance, some scholars 
have noted the potential for Japan to play a more active and autonomous role 
internationally within US hegemony. These recent works have pointed to a more 
nuanced explanation of Japanese foreign policy behaviour vis-ä-vis the United States 
and paint a more complex picture of a Japan that is neither subservient to the wishes of 
the United States nor totally pursuing its interest free from the constraints of the US- 
dominated international environment in which it finds itself.
For example, Michael Green, in his book Arming Japan: Defense Production, 
Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, addresses the issue of Japan’s
124 Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, p. 121.
125 Berger, “From Sword to Chysamthumum”, p. 120.
126 Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” pp. 120.
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autonomy in defence production and how it interacted with, and was limited by, US 
interests. Green begins by asserting that Japan’s policies of the indigenisation of 
Japanese arms production (or kokusanka) is motivated out of fear of abandonment and 
thus driven by its pursuit of greater defence autonomy.127 Interestingly, Green concludes 
that increased autonomous arms production did not necessarily bring about greater 
freedom from the United States, but rather it made Japan realise that effective arms 
production required greater co-operation with the United States.128 In other words, 
“pursuit of kokusanka forced on Japan anew calculation of autonomy—a calculation in 
which indigenous capabilities would lead to greater influence within the alliance 
structure rather than escape from dependence on the United States”.129 Furthermore, his 
historical analysis of Japan’s defence production clearly indicated a change in US 
attitudes as Japan’s economic power became stronger relative to the United States. 
While the United States originally encouraged autonomous defence production in the 
1950s and 1960s, as Japan’s economic power and technological advancement increased, 
the less supportive of Japan’s autonomous defence production policies it became.130 
Green’s analysis demonstrates a more nuanced account of Japanese autonomy within 
the confines of US influences and perception of subordinate states.
By contrast, Takashi Inoguchi and Pumendra Jain have likened Japanese foreign 
policy to karaoke—in this case, singing along to the tune of the United States.131 While 
this suggests that Japan has very little autonomy—and many of the chapters in their 
book advance this argument by demonstrating how the United States has lobbied or 
coerced Japan into more favourable policy lines—Inoguchi and Jain suggest that the 
“singer” can still maintain autonomy by choosing which song to sing, and in which style 
to deliver it.132 Concrete and notable examples of Japan’s independent and more 
autonomous foreign policies in the broad framework of US hegemony that they raise 
include Japan’s Official Development Assistance, and monetary contributions to 
regional and international institutions.133 Jüichi Inada also supports the argument of 
Japan functioning within hegemony in his analysis of Japanese foreign aid. Inada
127 Michael Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for 
Autonomy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 22-26.
128 Green, Arming Japan, p. 124.
129 Green, Arming Japan, p. 5.
130 Green, Arming Japan, pp. 72-85, pp. 86-107.
131 Takashi Inoguchi and Pumendra Jain (eds.), Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader, New York, 
Palgrave, 2000, p. xv. The authors acknowledge that the concept “karaoke diplomacy” was coined by 
C. W. Braddick.
132 Inoguchi and Jain, Japanese Foreign Policy Today, p. xv.
133 Inoguchi and Jain, Japanese Foreign Policy Today, p. xvi.
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observes that Japan continues to be a strong donor state despite criticisms of its ODA 
policies because aid is an effective and dynamic form of international input that plays to 
Japan’s economic strength and is not restricted by Japan’s military weakness.134 Japan 
therefore chooses to express autonomous policies within the restrictions of the post- 
Second World War parameters established by the United States rather than challenging 
them.
Yoshihide Soeya also supports the argument of autonomy within US hegemony. 
Over the years, the role of the SDF in the US-Japan security alliance has become 
established, and its participation in regional and international security has changed 
dramatically. However, as Soeya points out, any changes in Japan’s military capacity 
and activities continue to be well within the constitutional restraints of Article 9 and in a 
subordinate capacity to the United States. He suggests that Japanese “postwar realism” 
involves the maintenance of a dual identity in relation to security policy—that of a 
potential great power capable of affecting the international structure and that of a 
militarily seif-restraining state.135 Soeya argues that because of the alliance and Article 9 
Japan has “avoided taking unilateral action typical of other great powers”, and that 
rather, its diplomatic behaviour is better described as being akin to a middle power.136 
Therefore, not only does this militarily-restrained character depend on the continuation 
of Japan functioning under the influence of the United States, this dualism suggests that 
“realism” for Japan entails very different state motivations than commonly assumed in 
International Relations theory. This leads to a limited but not necessarily disenabling the 
conception and practice of autonomy.
Gerald L. Curtis also emphasises the potential for greater Japanese autonomy, but 
within the US-Japan alliance. He argues:
Japan does aspire to play more of a leadership role in East Asia [and].. .There is no 
necessary reason why it should not be able to do so in a manner that is consistent 
with U.S. interests in the region and that contributes to greater regional economic 
integration and growth. What needs to be avoided are U.S. government actions that
134 Juichi Inada, “Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Increasing Role for Global Security”, Japan Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring/Summer 1988, pp. 91-112.
135 Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives”, pp. 198-199; Yoshihide 
Soeya, Nihon no 'Midoru Pawä’ Gaikö, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobö, 2005, p. 20.
136 Yoshihide Soeya, “New Role as ‘Middle Power’”, Asahi Shimbun Asia Network Annual Report 2001, 
http://www.asahi.com/english/asianet/report/eng_2001_02.html, accessed 27 September 2006. Soeya 
describes the biggest difference between middle powers and as not being the difference of material 
power, but it can transform its power into influence. He argues that “great powers do not hesitate to 
use military strength as a last resort to steamroller its values and historical perspectives”, but that 
middle powers “abandon unilateralism and take one step back from the power politics played out by 
great powers, and exercise important influence in areas not usual to great powers such as multilateral 
co-operation”. See Soeya, Nihon no ‘Midoru Pawä’ Gaikö, p. 6.
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support a Japanese perception that the United States is determined to block Japan 
from taking regional initiatives except when asked to by the U.S. government, and 
Japanese actions that support an American perception that the goal of Japanese 
diplomatic activity in the region is to wrest “autonomy” from the United States. 137
Again, Curtis’s argument leads back to the fact that Japanese autonomy does not 
necessarily entail a zero-sum game, nor does Japanese autonomy have to signify direct 
competition against the United States.
Haruki Wada, Carol Gluck and Sang Jung Kang more specifically suggest that 
Japanese autonomy under US hegemony can be achieved through regional co-operation. 
In their discussions on modem Japanese and US foreign policy in Towards Autonomy in 
US-Japan Relations: from September 11 to the Iraq/North Korea Crises, Kang argues 
that, in order to become a US ally that can critically and constructively engage with 
contemporary US hegemony, Japan needs to move beyond a “unilateral” international 
position based on strict adherence to the peace constitution on the one hand, and narrow 
bilateralism between the United States on the other.138 Wada supports Kang’s argument 
and also adds that, in order to achieve this, Japan needs to reflect on its history back to 
the Meiji restoration to contemplate and address its mistakes in relation to the 
regionalism that it pursued during the decades between the 1920s and 1940s.139 The 
autonomous policies through regional co-operation suggested by Wada, Gluck and 
Kang do not exclude the United States or undermine its power in the region. Gluck 
argues that Japan would need to co-operate more closely with South Korea in order to 
create a regional network that was neither power-balancing against each other nor 
dominated by hegemony, and yet inclusive of the US.140 Gluck likens the United States 
to an “eight-hundred pound gorilla in the room”,141 whose presence cannot be ignored 
when thinking about Japan and multilateralism in the region. Similarly, the presence of 
the United States cannot be ignored when considering Japan’s autonomy.
Shinichi Kitaoka also situates his evaluations of Japanese autonomy within the 
Asian region and co-operation with the United States. Kitaoka was part of the Task 
Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, which produced a report titled 
“Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century—New Era, New 
Vision, New Diplomacy”. This was submitted to the Japanese Prime Minister in late
137 Curtis, New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations, p. 37.
138 Sang Jung Kang (ed.), Nichibei Kankei kara no Jiritsu: 9/11 kara Iraku/Kita Chosen Kiki made 
(Towards Autonomy in US-Japan Relations), Tokyo, Fujiwara Shoten, 2003, pp. 132-33.
139 Sang Jung Kang, Nichibei Kankei kara no Jiritsu, pp. 134-35.
140 Sang Jung Kang, Nichibei Kankei kara no Jiritsu, pp. 140-41.
141 Sang Jung Kang, Nichibei Kankei kara no Jiritsu, p. 142.
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November 2002.142 Kitaoka includes this report in his book on Japanese autonomy, co­
operation with the United States and Japan’s diplomacy in Asia. In this report, the 
taskforce recognised the continuing importance of the US-Japan alliance, particularly in 
the context of resolving international and regional issues, but further that a more 
autonomous Japanese foreign policy was necessary.143 With this in mind, the taskforce 
raised autonomous Japanese initiatives in Asia such as the Asian Monetary Fund and 
the subsequent New Miyazawa Initiative,144 its relations with Burma and the Middle 
East and, more globally, the Kyoto Protocol145. Another area in which the Taskforce 
suggested greater increases in autonomy was intelligence gathering.146 They argued that 
the diversification of issues in the post-Cold War era has meant that while Japan and the 
United States share many values and interests, the two countries do not always agree on 
all issues. However, autonomous Japanese policies that tackle these issues seek to act as 
constructive criticism within the US-Japan alliance and to be complementary to US 
global interests147
On the other hand, Aurelia George Mulgan gives a slightly different interpretation 
of Japanese autonomy, but still positioning it within the US-Japan alliance framework. 
She argues that Japan essentially has greater freedom within its current alliance 
structures, because constitutional constraints give Japan more strategic freedom in that it 
is less able to get entangled in regional and global conflicts.148 She argues that Japan is 
striving for greater autonomy to become a “normal” state, but does not necessarily 
desire a “normal” alliance with the United States, although its partnership with the 
United States will continue to be “a non-negotiable element of Japan’s defence 
policy.”149
The analysis of Japanese specialists and intellectuals explored in this section again 
shows two views of autonomy. Those who interpret Japan as either having little 
autonomy or having mercantilist-driven autonomy essentially have a realist perspective
142 Shinichi Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu: Tai-Bei Kyöchö to Ajia Gaikö (Independence o f Japan: Co­
operation with the US and Diplomacy in Asia), Tokyo, Chüö Köron Shinsha, 2004, p. 246. The 
taskforce consisted of nine panel members, including academics, diplomatic analysts, and the heads 
of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan Bank for International Co-operation 
(JBIC) and Toyota Motor Corporation.
143 Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu, pp. 254-55, p. 260.
144 Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu, p. 260.
145 Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu, p. 255.
146 Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu, p. 260.
147 Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu, p. 255.
148 Aurelia George Mulgan, “Japan’s Defence Dilemma”, Security Challenges, vol. 1. no. 1, November 
2005, pp. 59-72, p. 60.
149 Mulgan, “Japan’s Defence Dilemma”, p. 71.
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of state behaviour and what autonomy entails. The interpretation that Japan is reactive 
assumes that it has little autonomy to speak of because it fundamentally lacks the 
material capacities necessary to challenge the United States. On the other hand, 
academics, who interpret Japan’s autonomous foreign policies as being mercantilist, 
ultimately perceive that this is directed as a challenge to the United States. As a 
consequence, autonomy is perceived as those actions or non-actions which Japan is able 
to take in order to achieve national interests with ultimately zero-sum outcomes. In 
other words, Japan either submits to the hegemony of the United States, or challenges 
the mutual interests of the alliance.
In contrast to this, the third view of autonomy in academic analysis demonstrates 
an interpretation of active Japanese autonomy within US hegemony. This is an 
autonomy in which Japan pursues international initiatives and national interests to the 
best of its capabilities, but strictly within the confines of US hegemony and the US- 
Japan alliance. This entails increased flexibility of the SDF in support of the American 
position in the Gulf War, and more recently in operations in Iraq, but also of active 
Japanese initiatives through aid, as well as humanitarian and environmental policies. 
Japanese autonomy within US hegemony also manifests itself through regional 
economic initiatives. When viewed through a realist prism, some of these initiatives 
suggest Japanese foreign policies are in conflict with the United States. This third 
category of academics emphasise that Japanese autonomy can be away from an 
excessive dependence of the United States, although this does not necessarily mean a 
move against the United States.
The disparities found in the interpretation of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy 
in this section also reveal that the tensions discussed in Japan’s experience of modem 
statehood and more recent expectations of international leadership are also prevalent in 
academic literature. The first two academic views demonstrate an interpretation of 
autonomy that would be anticipated of a modem state. Yet the third view shows that the 
Japanese experience of autonomy is actually placed within narrower confines of US 
hegemony, and thus neither necessarily answers the anticipations of the rational actor 
under modem statehood nor follows state behaviour under anarchy.
Conclusion
In the first chapter, autonomy in International Relations theory was defined as the 
principle and the liberty of a state which enables it to exercise control over its allocation
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of resources and choice of government,150 and to determine the conditions of its own 
affairs, as long as it does not negate the rights of other states.151 After the analysis of 
three bodies of literature on Japanese foreign policy, how does this definition compare 
to the Japanese experience of statehood and state autonomy?
The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that Japan indeed has not followed a 
linear path of modernisation and development and, as a consequence, has a quite 
different interpretation of state autonomy. As discussed in Chapter Two, Japan’s 
experiences following its defeat in the Second World War place it squarely under a 
system of US hegemony. However, this chapter shows that it also has a longer history 
of being more broadly under the hegemony of Western thought in regard to the modem 
state, and the attendant expectations of behaviour. The section on Japanese political 
philosophy in particular reveals this, where the discussion identified Western modem 
statehood as arising from a history of internal liberation that broke the bonds of old 
traditions and thinking. Contrary to the Western experience, modem statehood in Japan 
was bom of an almost blind emulation of the West out of necessity to catch and keep up 
with “modernity”. Japan neither critically examined its own old traditions nor those new 
Western traditions it adopted and, consequently, continues to suffer from placing itself 
within the external values of Western modem statehood. Because Japan defines its 
statehood through external values, this essentially limits the very foundation of freedom 
and independence on which state autonomy is based.
The sections following the discussions on Japanese political philosophy reveal 
that Japan moved from functioning under the hegemony of ideals of Western modem 
statehood from the late 19th century until 1945, and then shifted to following the 
directives of US hegemony post-1945. The Diplomatic Bluebooks stand as a testament 
to the fact that a similar conflict remains today between domestic conceptions of 
autonomy and the international expectations of an economic power’s state autonomy. 
The Bluebooks also reveal the internal ambiguities about how to effectively achieve 
these expectations without disrupting US hegemony. Because Japan functions under an 
international system moulded by the United States, the origins of the values and 
pressures that inform its policies are external and, therefore, autonomy is far narrower 
than conventionally expected of a modem industrialised and economically powerful
150
151
Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations, pp. 235-36. 
Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 147.
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state. Consequently, Japan does not conform to the assumptions of state behaviour 
prevalent in rationalist theories discussed in Chapter One.
Having established that there is a specifically Japanese experience of state 
autonomy and the context in which it has come about, what are the specific 
characteristics of the autonomy that Japan practises within hegemony? As Calder 
suggests, it is reactive—it must be if Japan is constantly evaluating itself against 
external values, and it goes without saying that Japan needs also to be relentlessly 
mindful of US interests. Japanese autonomy is defined in this study as a process 
whereby state interests are reactively negotiated in order to meet domestic and 
international expectations without disrupting US hegemony.
However, the academic analyses of Japanese foreign policy suggest that this does 
not make Japan a “nautonomic” actor in its relations with the United States or in 
international relations in general. While analysts that subscribe to the rationalist 
assumptions of state behaviour tend to assess reactive Japan as either having little 
autonomy or mercantilist Japan using its autonomy to undermine US hegemony, there 
are several ways in which Japan has exercised autonomy in a capacity that, despite 
being independent, remains co-operatively with both its alliance with the United States 
and US hegemony. The following chapters present three examples of Japanese foreign 
policy where Japan has conducted autonomous policies away from, yet not against, the 
United States, with varying degrees of success. The next chapter focuses specifically on 
Japan’s relations with Iran, with particular regard to Japan’s recent bid to develop the 
Azadegan oil field.
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Japan’s Policy towards UN  
Peacekeeping Operations
KATSUMI ISHIZUKA
International criticism of Japan’s policy in the 1991 Gulf War prompted Japan to 
create a peacekeeping law, ‘the PKO law’ in 1992, to provide a legal framework 
for international peacekeeping activities. However, the PKO law imposed certain 
restrictions which complicated the missions of the Japanese Self Defense Forces 
(SDF) in operational fields. After 11 September 2001, the Japanese government 
created a new legal framework for peacekeeping and dispatched its SDF personnel 
to East Timor. Japan’s participation in peacekeeping should be motivated by 
several factors, such as its desire to develop a distinctive international policy, its 
regional considerations and the military benefits that derive from peacekeeping. 
Several official UN reports, such as An Agenda for Peace in 1992 and the 
Brahimi Report in 2000, urge Japan to broaden its options in the types of 
mission that it undertakes. The burden-sharing with the United States also 
encourages Japan’s regional role as a peacekeeper.
Japan joined the UN in 1956. Since then it has adopted a ‘UN-centred policy’ 
as a main pillar of its foreign policy. As far as Japan’s recent contribution to 
UN operations is concerned, Japan has sent 442 peacekeepers in the form of 
UN troops, to the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan 
Heights and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). At 
the end of October 2003 this figure ranked Japan at 26th among contribut­
ing UN member states.1 However, Japan’s policy towards UN operations 
has been complicated by several domestic factors, such as its Constitution 
and the right of collective defence. Meanwhile, various changes in the inter­
national political climate and the increasing demand for conflict resolution 
have compelled Japan to seek a new approach to participation in UN peace­
keeping. This essay explains that the Gulf War in 1991 and the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States were catalysts in the evolution of 
Japan’s policy towards peacekeeping, and identifies several operational pro­
blems caused by the state’s restraining domestic laws. Finally, the essay clari­
fies the national interests of Japan in relation to UN peacekeeping and 
proposes options for the state’s future peacekeeping policy.
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The Origin of Japanese Peacekeeping Policy
The first significant domestic controversy over a Japanese military role 
within the international community was brought about by the Iraqi inva­
sion of Kuwait in August 1990. US President George Bush (Sr) recognized 
Japan’s constitutional restraints and asked Japanese Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu to contribute minesweepers and other logistical support 
to the war. However, Kaifu was very reluctant to accede to this 
request. After the international coalition commenced airstrikes against 
Iraq in January 1991, Japan’s ‘non-bloodshed’ policy was the subject of 
much criticism from the international community. US pressure on 
Japan was particularly significant. Former US Secretary of State James 
Baker said during a speech to the Japan Institute for International 
Affairs in Tokyo in November 1991, ‘your checkbook diplomacy like 
our dollar diplomacy of an earlier era is clearly too narrow’.2
In Japan, the clamour for a larger role in world affairs was pervasive. 
The Foreign Ministry While Paper of 1991 stated that military personnel 
contributions were indispensable. Gradually, a consensus developed 
among the main political parties and the Japanese public that Japan 
should play a more active role in maintaining international peace and 
security rather than simply contributing money to solve global problems. 
In those days, the number of UN peacekeeping operations had sharply 
increased due to the outbreak of internal conflicts in the post-Cold War 
period. Therefore, UN peacekeeping, which was a consent-type operation 
and less coercive than multinational forces, was considered to be an ideal 
conflict resolution mechanism in which the SDF should initially partici­
pate. In fact, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa stated that Japan’s inter­
national contribution ‘should include some “sweating” or dispatch of 
personnel to assist UN peacekeeping operations’ rather than relying 
solely on ‘a lavish scattering around of aid’.3
Opinion among the Japanese public and the major political parties 
shifted significantly after the Gulf War. According to an opinion poll con­
ducted by the largest newspaper company in Japan, while in June 1988 
only 22.5 per cent of Japanese citizens said, ‘it is preferable that the 
SDF can be dispatched to peacekeeping operations’, this figure rose 
sharply to 67.8 per cent after the Gulf War in April 1992.4 In other 
words, Japanese citizens realized the significance for Japan of military 
contributions to international operations after international criticism 
for not doing so during the Gulf War.
On 6 June 1991, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party created a 
‘Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community’, 
chaired by LDP General Secretary Ichiro Ozawa, which became known
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as ‘the Ozawa Commission’. The Commission claimed that the Preamble 
of the Japanese Constitution had a clear provision for Japan’s pursuit of 
peaceful cooperation with all nations, and therefore that the dispatch of 
the SDF to UN forces under Articles 42 and 43 of the UN Charter would 
be constitutional.5 The Commission also maintained that on the subject 
of so-called ‘multi-national forces’, authorized under UN Security 
Council resolutions, as in the Gulf War, Japan would be able to contrib­
ute a logistical unit. Its conclusion, published in November 1991, strongly 
recommended Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations as 
well. The US Ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost, had already 
argued that whether Japanese contingents could be dispatched to the 
UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) would be a 
touchstone of the provision of its peacekeeping commitment in the 
future.6 The International Peace Cooperation Bill, the so-called ‘PKO’ 
bill, was presented to the Diet in September 1991. It included the 
so-called ‘Five Principles’ for the participation of a Japanese contingent 
in peacekeeping operations.
1. Agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties 
to the conflict.
2. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have 
given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and 
Japan’s participation in the force.
3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favour­
ing any party to the conflict.
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to satisfy the 
Government of Japan, it may withdraw the contingent.
5. Use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect 
the lives of personnel, etc.7
The opposition parties such as the Democratic Socialist Party and 
Komeito Party called for the creation of a separate organization from 
the SDF for Japan’s peacekeeping participation. The Socialist and Com­
munist parties were adamant in their opposition to the bill on the 
grounds that the SDF’s dispatch to peacekeeping was unconstitutional. 
However, more precisely, all of the three largest political parties -  the 
LDP, the Socialists and Komeito -  contained factions that favoured the 
SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping as well as opponents.
It was clear that the issue of the creation of a separate organization 
from the SDF was meaningless; organizations that participate in the mili­
tary sector of peacekeeping operations are internationally regarded as 
military organizations. The important thing was not ‘who would act as
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the Japanese contingent’ but ‘what the Japanese contingent could do as a 
peacekeeper’ . This issue was, however, sidelined. Providing the SDF w ith  
opportunities to participate in U N  peacekeeping operations would  help 
to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defence auth­
orities. I t  would also enhance public understanding o f the SDF and, exter­
nally, increase transparency o f the real image o f the SDF and eventually 
build confidence in Japan. However, these benefits did not receive atten­
tion in the debates. Public opinion was divided. A poll conducted by 
the Asabi D a ily  indicated that 41.6 per cent o f respondents favoured 
SDF partic ipation in UN peacekeeping operations, while 36.9 per cent 
did no t.8
The PKO B ill was finally voted in to  law in June 1992 after stormy 
deliberation and resistance by the opposition parties. Thus, the new In ter­
national Peace Cooperation Law became the legal authority fo r SDF par­
tic ipation in all peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN . It was 
significant that this debate was the first opportun ity  fo r both the Japanese 
D iet and the public to seriously discuss the possibility and perspectives o f 
their country ’s first ‘physical com m itm ent’ to international peace and 
security. I t  can be said that international criticism  o f Japan in the after- 
math o f the G u lf War urged Japan to seek a consensus on how to w in 
international respect in terms o f conflict management on the w orld  stage.
One question can be raised: what factors prompted Japan to change 
itself from  a passive observer to a more proactive contribu tor to peace­
keeping operations after the G u lf War? From a liberal internationalist 
perspective, Japan and its citizens genuinely realized the necessity to 
make not only a financial contribution, but also a human contribu tion  
to peacekeeping in order to become ‘a normal nation ’ . This psychological 
shift among the Japanese government and citizens was partly due to the 
hum ilia tion  o f Japan’s glaring omission from  K u w a it’s public declaration 
o f gratitude after the G ulf W ar.9 It is also noted that the rap id ly increas­
ing number o f U N  peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold W ar 
era required Japan to contribute physically to peacekeeping. During 
his visit to Tokyo in February 1993, UN  Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali also praised Japan and sought to encourage further partic i­
pation w ith in  the framework o f the Japanese C onstitu tion .10 Japan’s 
am bition to play a new part in peacekeeping was also encouraged by 
the fact that Germany, which had sim ilar historical experience to Japan 
during and after the Second W orld  W ar, had changed its constitution 
more than 50 times in order to meet demands from  the international com­
m unity and involve itself in international and regional conflicts.11 There­
fore, the Japanese government and many citizens felt a responsibility for 
playing a new peacekeeping role.
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This shift can also be explained from a realist perspective. After the 
Gulf War the Japanese government was determined to be a political 
power in the world and, therefore, to seek a permanent seat in the UN 
Security Council. Indeed during that war the Minister of Finance, 
Ryutaro Hashimoto, hinted at the Japanese government’s irritation at 
not having detailed information about the war because Japan was not a 
permanent member of the Security Council.12 The government con­
sidered that participation in UN peacekeeping was a minimum condition 
for obtaining a permanent seat, and Japan’s commitment to some UN 
operations was primarily due to the ambition of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) on this issue. For instance, following the termin­
ation of the Japanese SDF’s stationing in ONUMOZ in Mozambique at 
the end of 1994, Japan was no longer scheduled to participate in UN 
peacekeeping operations. However, the MFA wanted to maintain con­
tinuous involvement, and hurriedly sent 15 electoral observers to 
ONUSAL in El Salvador, although the mission stayed only a week. The 
process by which the SDF were dispatched to UNDOF in the Golan 
Heights was similar.13 The policy was also affected by external factors. 
In July 1994, the US Senate passed a resolution threatening not to 
support Japan’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat unless it 
lived up to a full commitment to peacekeeping operations, particularly 
with reference to the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula.14 
Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative to UNTAC, also argued 
that ‘If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent 
member, it needs to act in accordance with its new responsibility 
because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world peace 
and security’.15
Japan’s Response to International Conflicts after 11 September 2001
The attacks in the United States have had a huge impact on perspectives 
about how to maintain international peace and security. On the day after 
the attacks, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1368 (2001), which called on member states ‘to work together urgently 
to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terr­
orist attacks’.16 On 28 September 2001, Resolution 1373 (2001) to 
combat international terrorism was also adopted unanimously. It 
included the phrase ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations’. Resolution 1373 provided a wide-ranging list of 
measures which all states are legally obliged to implement, such as pre­
venting the financing of terrorist acts, preventing the movement of terror­
ists by effective border controls, and finding ways of intensifying and
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accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding the 
actions of terrorists and networks.17 The adoption of these resolutions 
indicated that Japan’s policy towards international peace and security 
in the post-11 September era should also respond to more complicated 
operations.
Meanwhile, since the PKO law was established, several other laws 
involving security have been modified or enacted. In June 1998, the 
PKO law was reviewed in order to meet the demands of the changing 
climate of international security. Although the 1992 law accepted election­
monitoring organized only by the UN, the current regionalization of 
conflict resolution led to an amendment expanding the scope of election 
monitoring to that sponsored by regional organizations such as the 
Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Likewise, one of the Five Principles in the 1992 
law included an agreement on ceasefires among parties to the conflicts. 
However, this principle required more flexibility in the post-Cold War 
era when many reckless and even brutal belligerent factions ignored 
agreements. Therefore, the law was modified to drop this principle in 
the case of the participation of Japanese personnel in humanitarian 
missions involving the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The 1998 amendment also allowed the use of weapons by Japanese 
personnel when senior officers ordered them to do so.18 Furthermore, 
the post-11 September period in Japan witnessed an unprecedented 
legal advance in crisis management, namely, the passage of the Anti­
terrorism Bill, and the further amendment of the PKO law.
The Anti-terrorism Bill
The day after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi ordered his cabinet members to consider the possi­
bility of dispatching the SDF for counter-terrorist activities in the near 
future.19 He subsequently mentioned in a press interview that Japan 
would fully support the United States and not hesitate to provide the 
necessary assistance and cooperation to the international community.20 
The Director of the LDP, Taku Yamazaki, also said: ‘It is against the 
national interest not to use the SDF for counter-terrorism measures. It 
is possible under the current PKO law for the SDF to conduct humanitar­
ian activities even in non-peacekeeping areas under UN resolutions 
as long as international organizations actually ask Japan to do so’.21 
On 23 September, the government and the LDP agreed to create a 
new law to enable the SDF to join counter-terrorism operations. Thus, 
the prompt response to the 11 September incidents witnessed not only 
the government’s strong desire to overcome the ‘trauma’ of the Gulf
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War in 1991 but also its commitment to contribute to the international 
community in this crisis.
According to a diplomatic source, the United States expected Japan 
to play a diplomatic role and to provide intelligence. In fact, President 
Bush positively evaluated Japan’s role in the Afghan conflict in sharing 
intelligence and providing US$40 million in financial aid to Pakistan.22 
However in the final analysis, the primary request from Washington 
to Tokyo in the Afghan conflicts was to ‘show the Japanese flag’ or to 
play a physical role in the operational areas.23
The SDF Anti-terrorism Bill was passed on 29 October after excep­
tionally speedy deliberations in the Diet. Koizumi contended that: ‘The 
focus of the legislation was whether we think of the terrorist incidents 
in New York and Washington on September 11th as other people’s 
business or as our own affair’.24 This anti-terrorism law covered such 
activities as providing supplies and services, including medical treatment 
to US forces and their allies. It also legalized search-and-rescue activities 
and humanitarian relief to refugees overseas with the consent of host 
governments. This contrasted significantly with the PKO law. Under 
the PKO law, the SDF would be involved in operational areas where 
conflicts had ended, and the SDF would take a neutral position. Under 
the anti-terrorism law, the SDF, although limited to logistic missions, 
would put itself in volatile areas, committed to ‘universal objectives’ 
of exterminating terrorists. Whereas under the PKO law the SDF was 
allowed to use weapons only for self-defence, the anti-terrorism law 
approved the use of weapons to protect those under the SDF’s care includ­
ing refugees and wounded foreign services members. In order to add 
flexibility to current restrictions on the use of force, this law would 
have a two-year time limit. Furthermore the government was obliged to 
seek Diet approval within 20 days of an SDF dispatch.25
The response from foreign states was largely positive. US Ambassador 
Baker said that the move was an important step for the bilateral alli­
ance.26 The Pakistani President stated that his country would warmly 
welcome the SDF since the Japanese force was different from those of 
other countries.27 In a press interview the Thai Prime Minister expressed 
his support for the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean.28 Meanwhile, in 
South Korea a senior official appreciated that the legislation aimed to era­
dicate terrorism, but expressed a concern that the new bills should never 
be allowed to harm peace and stability in Asia.29
The prompt passage of this bill indicated the government’s enthu­
siasm to react to the new security climate. However, it should be noted 
that in the Diet debate very few argued the constitutional validity of 
the expected operations in terms of the issues of collective security or
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collective defence. A vague but general consensus on this issue in the Diet 
was that logistical support would not be ‘unified with combat’.30 In 
addition, the SDF would not be allowed to supply and transport armed 
equipment and ammunition. However, in reality, missions that were con­
ducted under this law would be collective security missions. Furthermore, 
in counter-terrorism measures, it would be highly probable that urgent 
situations would inevitably require the Japanese SDF to engage in 
conduct beyond the missions within the new law. This urgent, flexible 
and expedient decision bypassed the controversial issue of collective 
security in Japan.
Amendment to the PKO Law
In September 2001, the Japanese government had an initial meeting to 
discuss sending SDF personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation in 
East Timor (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor: 
UNTAET). Japan’s role of simply providing logistical support had been 
debated since the establishment of the PKO law in 1992. The issue was 
viewed as increasingly urgent after September 2001 because the govern­
ment was expected to seek a broader role for the SDF in Afghanistan 
and neighbouring states as peacekeepers. For example, the Director of 
the Pakistan Office of UNHCR stated that he expected the Japanese 
SDF to play a major role in supplying mine-sweepers.31 Meanwhile, 
there had been reports from some former Japanese peacekeepers 
with experience of UNDOF in the Golan Heights that the current 
policy negatively affected Japanese SDF cooperation with forces from 
other countries. A director of the Department of Peacekeeping Oper­
ations (DPKO) in the UN also urged amendment of the PKO law: ‘UN 
peacekeeping operations require each participating state’s co-operation. 
Strict restrictions among states would lose flexibility in operating 
peacekeeping units’.32
The Japanese public became more aware of the necessity of the SDF’s 
missions in international crisis management. According to an opinion 
poll, 44 per cent of the respondents supported the SDF’s participation 
in UN peacekeeping forces beyond logistical contributions, with 27 per 
cent opposed. As for the question, ‘What do you think is the most import­
ant issue for the SDF?’, 47 per cent of the respondents answered 
‘Strengthening the ability to counter terrorism’.33
The Five Principles in the 1992 law were also reassessed after 
September 2001. For example, ‘the consent of the parties to the conflict’ 
was questioned as to its practicality, since there might be a case in which 
one could not clearly identify the parties to the conflict. The Yomiuri 
Daily suggested that Japan should modify the PKO law so that the
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SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping could be approved if the govern­
ment of a territorial state gave its consent.34 The issue of being ‘unified 
with combat’ became less significant in the post-11 September debate.
The bill to amend the 1992 law was passed in the Upper House on 7 
December 2001 in order to expand the scope of the SDF’s participation 
in UN peacekeeping operations. It was supported by the three ruling 
parties and a majority of the largest opposition Democratic Party. The 
revised bill lifted a ‘freeze’ on SDF participation in UN peacekeeping 
forces engaged in such activities as monitoring ceasefires, disarming 
local forces, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport of 
weapons, and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons. The use 
of weapons by SDF personnel under the revised law was similar in 
scope to that of the anti-terrorism law; the 2001 PKO law legalized 
the use of weapons by the SDF to protect ‘those under their control’, 
such as troops from other countries, refugees, government officials and 
personnel from the UN and other international organizations. The 
revision also lifted a ban on the application of Article 95 of the SDF 
law, which stipulated that weapons may be used to protect weapons 
stores.35
The amended PKO law was also compatible with new guidelines for 
UN peace operations, the Brahimi Report of August 2000, which advo­
cated the following in terms of peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: 
‘Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out 
their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defend­
ing themselves, other mission components and mission mandates, with 
robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commit­
ments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence’.36 
Japan’s commitment to the Brahimi Report required more robust legal 
framework for its participation in peacekeeping operations.
Lessons Learned from Participation -  Several Practical Problems
Japanese peacekeepers began to play a more significant role. Following 
the establishment of the new peacekeeping law, Japan sent the SDF to 
Cambodia (UNTAC) in September 1992, Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 
December 1992, Zaire and Tanzania as part of the Rwanda mission 
(UNAMIR) in 1994, and the SDF has been stationed in the Golan 
Heights (UNDOF) since January 1996, and in East Timor (UNTAET 
and UNMISET) since March 2002. Whereas no SDF personnel were 
appointed to headquarters in UNTAC, five SDF personnel were assigned 
as staff officers to the ONUMOZ headquarters in Mozambique. Japan 
sent the SDF to carry out humanitarian international relief operations
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as part of UNAMIR. The SDF’s deployment in Bona and Zaire was not 
requested by the UN Secretary-General, nor was a joint mission with 
other countries. It was an independent and voluntary mission by the 
SDF. Japan’s role in UNDOF, which monitors the separation of Israel 
and Syria, has been limited to transportation services; but it is a classic 
peacekeeping operation in the most politically and militarily tense 
area in the world. The dispatch of 690 SDF personnel to East Timor 
in March 2002 was its largest contribution to a UN peacekeeping 
operation.
However, several practical problems have been identified as a result of 
the SDF’s involvement in these missions, due mainly to operational con­
straints and ‘inconveniences’ caused mainly by the PKO law. In Cambo­
dia, for example, when the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and actually 
ignored the ceasefire during the SDF’s deployment, the Five Principles 
were broken. The Japanese government did not consider withdrawing 
the SDF; the Five Principles were not applied consistently. The decision 
to stay was criticized by some political parties such as the Social Demo­
cratic Party. Meanwhile, it was reported that: ‘According to UNTAC 
sources, after the first casualties in UNTAC, at least six Japanese police 
abandoned their post near Ampit and went to Thailand [claiming that 
the local situation was against the Five Principles]. By contrast when a 
police officer from Colombia was killed on April 30 [1993] in an 
ambush by suspected bandits, none of his 146 colleagues in the Colom­
bian contingent abandoned [their] post, the official said’.37
Strong adherence to the Five Principles -  in other words withdrawal 
from dangerous areas in emergencies -  could be regarded as egoism 
rather than nationalism. Yasushi Akashi, head of UNTAC and then 
UNPROFOR, later remarked: ‘If Japan had withdrawn from UNTAC 
when a Japanese staff member died, Japan would have been mocked. 
Japanese politicians and citizens would know that, for example, the 
French and British battalions implemented their missions despite the 
fact that the French had more than 50 UN fatalities and the British had 
nearly 30 in UNPROFOR’.38
Another illustration of the constraints of the Five Principles occurred 
in UNAMIR. The SDF was deployed not in Rwanda but in its neighbour­
ing countries, Zaire and Tanzania, because deployment in Rwanda, 
where the ceasefire had not been agreed, would have been regarded 
as a breach of the Five Principles. Susumu Takai, of the Japanese 
National Institute for Defense Studies, indicates the limitation of the 
SDF in UNAMIR on the grounds that it was an individual and voluntary 
mission: ‘An individual and voluntary mission without official appoint­
ment from the UN meant there was no security guarantee from the
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UN. There would have been no compensation from the UN in the case 
of casualties and fatalities amongst the Japanese SDF staff. In retrospect, 
no casualties among the Japanese contingents in Zaire was simply 
fortunate’.39
It was also noted that the standard of ‘minimum force’ was different in 
Japan’s PKO law from the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) stipu­
lated by the UN. The UN allowed peacekeeping forces to use weapons 
not only for their own protection but also for the removal of any impedi­
ment to the completion of the assigned task, whereas Japanese PKO law 
allowed only the former. Hence, serious questions remained over whether 
Japan was to act on its own initiative in the use of weapons.40 The most 
critical issue for Japanese peacekeeping was that this law was applicable 
to emergency situations. For example, if other contingents were attacked 
by local factions, the Japanese SDF could not go to rescue them because of 
the limitation of minimum force. In fact, in UNAMIR, the SDF was cri­
ticized by other contributing states when it refused a request to look for 
missing staff from UN headquarters because of Japan’s domestic law. In a 
similar context, in UNTAC, the Japanese civilian police was the only 
component that could not accept a newly-added mandate to arrest 
those who violated the election process.41 In UNTAC, the operational 
situation inevitably required the SDF to extend its original mission, 
which occasionally included the ‘frozen part’ of the core assignments of 
peacekeeping. Close to election day in Cambodia, the Japanese engineer 
units became engaged in so-called peacekeeping missions such as 
patrolling, securing election monitoring and transporting ballot boxes. 
A Japanese researcher commented that: ‘While I was researching 
UNTAC, I came across the scene many times where the SDF were 
patrolling and guarding and where they were saying “I am a member 
of the Japanese army”. Their missions were camouflaged in the name 
of “information gathering.” It was doubtful whether the tremendous 
amount of debates, pledges, and amendments to the new PKO Law in 
the Diet were meaningful’.42
The SDF’s participation in UNTAET and UNMISET (the latter with 
over 400 troops) has not significantly differed from previous missions, 
involving activities such as construction and transportation. An engineer­
ing battalion has worked in the areas close to West Timor, namely 
Covalima, Bobonaro and Oecusse, and ten military engineers have been 
based at headquarters in the capital, Dili. The work of the SDF focuses 
on the maintenance of the main supply routes, including paving Dili 
airport, and fixing bridges and holes on main roads. The writer’s field 
research in East Timor in September 2003 provided evidence that the 
Japanese engineering units have exerted a high degree of skill and
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professionalism. Many SDF members have achieved fame and popularity 
with the Timorese public. However, in specific terms, the SDF in East 
Timor faces similar issues to those involved in participation in UNTAC 
and UNDOF. Although personnel work in border areas viewed as secur­
ity risks, they are mostly unarmed and unprepared for combat. They rely 
on the New Zealand battalion in Covalima, the Portuguese in Bobonaro 
and Dili, and the Koreans in Oecusse. One NGO group has seriously cri­
ticized the Japanese SDF in East Timor:
Although both the Japanese and East Timorese governments speak 
about the humanitarian assistance of Japan’s SDF in East Timor, 
it is unclear how their contribution is humanitarian in any direct 
way. The SDF presence does nothing to provide local employment, 
and in fact seems to take jobs away from the East Timorese. It is also 
unclear why peacekeeping troops who are unprepared for combat 
are working in border areas where they may indeed face armed 
conflict.43
Some East Timorese activists also complained about the Japanese pre­
sence, claiming that a request for the Japanese government to apologize 
for the occupation during the Second World War should also include 
an apology for the 24 years that the Japanese government supported 
Indonesia’s victimization of hundreds of thousands of East Timorese.44 
Despite the SDF’s distinguished professional skills, East Timor’s case 
indicates the difficulties faced in dispatching the SDF. There are problems 
of history, diplomacy and law.
In sum, there are several problems for Japanese peacekeepers under 
the current law. In UN peacekeeping operations, contributing states 
have to cooperate with each other under a common command and stan­
dard operating procedures, and Japan cannot be an exception. Japanese 
personnel feel humiliated when they encounter situations where the law 
restrains the scope of their activities. A peacekeeping operation is an 
ad hoc mission. Furthermore, peacekeeping is not a classic military 
task, but a task conducted mainly by military personnel. Therefore, 
adherence to UN peacekeeping conventions inevitably leads to several dif­
ficulties for the Japanese contingents under the PKO law. The changing 
security situation for the Japanese missions comes into conflict with the 
practical consequences of the application of domestic law. East Timor’s 
case is particularly complicated. There was an impression that the pri­
ority for the Japanese government was to make use of the SDF overseas 
as a fait accompli for diplomatic purposes, rather than considering it as 
contributing to international peace.
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Japan’s Peacekeeping Policy after 11 September
National Interests
Contributing states to international peacekeeping normally have a 
self-interest, not simply a charitable purpose behind their decision 
to participate. Factors in addition to ‘altruism’ or ‘internationalism’ 
make contributing states more disposed towards peacekeeping deploy­
ments. In other words, as Alan James says: ‘States will move if they 
judge that response to be in their national interests, nationally con­
ceived’.45 Therefore, it is important to consider the national interest in 
Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first 
century.
One interest would be to develop a distinctive international policy as 
a new political power. Peacekeeping operations could provide Japan 
with the opportunity to own a new originality in its diplomacy. The 
reason why Canada and Ireland have been consistent international peace­
keepers is based on this conception; they needed to establish an original 
diplomatic policy to counterbalance their ‘overbearing neighbours’, the 
United States and the UK, respectively. Unlike coalition enforcement, 
UN peacekeeping is conflict resolution which usually excludes the 
bigger powers. Japan has also been placed under ‘the US umbrella’ in 
both diplomatic and military respects. Japan’s consistent commitment 
to UN peacekeeping would broaden its diplomatic options internation­
ally. Japan could have a more influential voice at the UN, and maintain 
its ‘UN-centred policy’. This is very important for Japan in the current 
period, when US unilateralism, which bypasses the UN, has been notice­
able. While Japan inevitably complies with the decisions and policies 
developed by the United States to a considerable extent, participation 
in UN operations would ensure that Japan has a balance between its 
alliance with the United States and its UN-centred policy.
The political difficulties of North Korea, Afghanistan, India- 
Pakistan, China-Taiwan and Sri Lanka mean that Asia is potentially 
one of the most insecure areas in the world. Regional stability is in 
Japan’s interests for economic and political reasons, and can be promoted 
through its commitment to peacekeeping operations. In fact, the major 
deployments to Cambodia, and East Timor involved 1,216 SDF person­
nel in UNTAC and 1,370 in UNTAET and UNMISET. Asia does not have 
a regional military alliance such as NATO. This means that regional 
peacekeeping such as the NATO-led Stabilization Forces in the former 
Yugoslavia cannot be established in Asia. Multinational forces led by 
European troops might be one option. However, in many cases, multi­
national forces are deployed only when local situations are too volatile
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for peacekeeping. They are interim measures, and therefore they are nor­
mally replaced by UN peacekeepers after situations become more stable, 
as in East Timor in 1999.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 led the United States to a much more 
hawkish policy that marginalized peacekeeping operations. For 
example, National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice remarked in a 
New York Times interview that: ‘The U.S. is the only power that can 
handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is necessary 
to protect Saudi Arabia, and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. And 
extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness for these kinds of 
global missions’.46 Therefore, the United States has been keen to 
promote Japan’s peacekeeping policy as burden-sharing. In fact, in the 
Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) in 1995, President 
Bill Clinton promised Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to supply 
Japan with the information and transport aircraft for participation in 
peacekeeping operations. This implied a continuing commitment from 
the United States and expressed a desire to increase Japan’s role and 
extend the security interest of Japan to a regional level.47 Japan’s physical 
commitment to Asian security will need to be high, and its participation 
in peacekeeping in Asia will enhance its political status as a regional 
power. This will also play a role in regional confidence-building and 
the impact of Japan’s role as peacekeepers in Asia and the Pacific 
would be highly significant.
Furthermore, activation of the SDF for peacekeeping operations 
would be significant in terms of motivation. The benefits deriving from 
participation in peacekeeping include:
• experience of an operational nature, which cannot be gained in train­
ing in Japan;
• opportunities to develop and evaluate the leadership of SDF officers 
under operational conditions;
• reinforcement of home training, enabling personnel to practise and 
develop individual and team skills;
• opportunities to evaluate strengths and weakness vis-ä-vis other 
nationalities and armies working alongside;
• positive effects on morale.
The benefits would be especially significant for the SDF, which has not 
experienced conventional warfare since its establishment. The experience 
which the SDF could obtain from peacekeeping services would also be 
beneficial in its domestic mission of national defence.
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Suggestions for Japan’s PKO Policy
Various measures can be taken to improve Japan’s role as a contributor to 
UN peacekeeping. First, the multifunctional trend in peacekeeping would 
encourage Japan to increase the number of civilian personnel dispatched 
to UN peacekeeping. As Michael Williams put it: ‘One of the most strik­
ing features of second-generation interventions (including peacekeeping 
operations) was their unique and previously unknown configuration of 
civil-military relations’.48 From the Japanese point of view, the dispatch 
of civilian personnel has fewer legal restraints than that for the SDF. In 
December 2002, a ‘Meeting for International Peace and Cooperation’, 
chaired by Yasushi Akashi, advocated consistent involvement in conflict 
resolution, from preventive measures to peacebuilding.49 This multilat­
eral approach to conflict resolution has been strongly encouraged and 
put into practice since An Agenda for Peace in 1992.50 Japan would be 
expected to train and recruit a number of civilian personnel in fields 
such as government, administration, medicine, education, infrastructure 
and civilian police. In reality, the quality of civilian police in international 
peacekeeping has not been assessed positively in terms of its function and 
effectiveness,51 and therefore, the Japanese police force, which is of the 
highest international standard, can assist in this area. For example, 
Germany has dispatched 455 police personnel to UN peacekeeping oper­
ations.52 In fact, there is increasing demand for civilian police in UN 
peacekeeping. In 1993, the proportion of civilian police as a percentage 
of all peacekeeping personnel, including military observers and troops, 
was merely 1.5 per cent. By 2003 it had increased to 14 per cent. 
Indeed, a shift in emphasis from military to non-military efforts in peace­
keeping by the SDF was strongly recommended in a symposium organized 
by the MFA in February 20 02.53 In retrospect, despite the many options 
that Japan has as a possible contributor to UN peacekeeping, there has 
been little debate on how it can most effectively participate. The 
debates have concentrated excessively on internal constitutional issues.
Second, the revised PKO law enables the SDF to join infantry batta­
lions for UN peacekeeping. This is not to say that Japan should shift its 
missions from logistical to military support completely. In fact, the 
UN’s DPKO has faced difficulty in securing logistical support from 
member states. Logistics requires high levels of training and skills in com­
munication, engineering and transportation, exactly what Japan has sup­
plied. In peacekeeping roles which focus primarily on mediation and 
arbitration, the coercive nature of some states’ forces may make host 
states feel insecure. On the other hand peacekeeping is a paramilitary 
role which requires appropriate military equipment, mission skill,
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discipline of soldiers and high morale among troops. Japan can contribute 
such qualities. Currently, the Japanese engineer units in UNMISET have a 
high reputation for their standard of skills. In reality, the DPKO has not 
had difficulty in recruiting troop contributors to provide infantry batta­
lions. This is because this mission is popular among developing countries, 
since they can supply infantry with quite basic military equipment and 
skills. For Japan, it would be necessary to respond to the current 
demands of the DPKO regardless of the revision of the PKO law.
Third, Japan should join a UN Stand-by Arrangement (UNSAS). 
UNSAS was one of the major pillars of the reform of UN peacekeeping 
operations advocated by several states such as Poland, Sweden, Malaysia, 
Canada, Holland and Austria in 1994. At present, as many as 73 member 
states have joined this system, which aims to provide the UN with a data­
base of military units and equipment available from member states for 
UN peacekeeping operations (and an estimate of the time needed to 
respond to a UN request).54 By joining this system, elements of the SDF 
selected for UNSAS would have rapid-reaction capabilities while training 
in special skills for UN peacekeeping operations.
Japan’s New Role: Its Relations with Asian and Pacific States
It is well known that the so-called ‘anti-militarism’ attitudes towards 
Japan have been deep rooted among Asia-Pacific states, especially 
ASEAN states, South Korea and China. Analysis of their views by 
Hugo Dobson shows that ASEAN members strongly supported Japan’s 
commitment to UNTAC. In March 1992, Cambodian Premier Hun Sen 
said that even if Japan dispatches its troops to the UNTAC no country 
would associate it with Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
concept which prevailed before and during the war. In May 1993, 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir stated that Japan could 
not remain removed from participation in peacekeeping operations and 
would have to do more than contribute financially. The SDF’s presence 
in UNTAC also received credit from the Singaporean Prime Minister 
Goh Chok Tong, who said in May 1993: ‘If it is the only nation to with­
draw its troops, then in the future Japan will not be regarded as a nation 
that can make an international contribution’.55 Thus, the enthusiasm of 
ASEAN states about Japan’s peacekeeping in their own region was signifi­
cant and persisted into the post-UNTAC period. In January 2002, Prime 
Minister Koizumi proposed conflict prevention in Mindanao, Aceh and 
East Timor and claimed that ‘in cooperation with the countries of 
ASEAN, we intend to make an even more active contribution to ensure 
regional stability here in Southeast Asia’.56 Meanwhile, China and 
South Korea were initially suspicious about Japan’s peacekeeping role
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in UNTAC. One Chinese official said: ‘what we are worried about is not 
the present but the future. The fear is that the [Japanese PKO] law is a 
start in a bad direction’.57 However, South Korea’s policy towards 
Japan’s peacekeeping became much more conciliatory after UNTAC. 
In July 1995 there were reports of Defence and Foreign Affairs officials 
of Japan and South Korea discussing the possibility of cooperation in 
peacekeeping operations, with joint training exercises and the mutual 
use of transport planes.58
Therefore, it has been suggested that a training centre specifically for 
peacekeeping operations in the Asian and Pacific region should be estab­
lished such as those in operation in the Nordic states, Canada and 
Ireland. Japan should create a ‘Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre for 
the Asia-Pacific Region’, which should be located in Japan with the 
cost borne by the Japanese government. If this happens the Japanese 
public and politicians would be able to obtain better knowledge about 
peacekeeping operations by observing the Japanese SDF personnel 
in special training for peacekeeping tasks with other Asian soldiers. 
This programme would also act as an incentive for SDF personnel and 
assure neighbouring states that Japan’s participation in peacekeeping 
operations is motivated neither by re-militarization objectives nor by 
neo-imperialism.59
It can be concluded that Japan’s new role as a regional peacekeeper, 
initiated in UNTAC, has been positive. This can have a huge impact on 
regional security, already recognized by Japan’s successful commitment 
to UNMISET with other Asian troops in East Timor.
Conclusion
Since the Gulf War in 1991 Japan’s policy towards UN peace operations 
has been in a state of evolution. The PKO law was created after many 
stormy debates in order to meet the demand for conflict resolution 
in the post-Cold War period. However, practical missions involving 
Japanese contingents should encourage further review of the law that 
needs to result in practical contributions in the field, in parallel with 
the UN’s ambition to reform peace operations. The current situation 
requires more coercive, emergent, multifunctional and flexible opera­
tions, to which the anti-terrorist law and the revised PKO law can 
contribute positively.
In retrospect, neither the government nor its citizens discussed 
seriously enough the national interests of Japan’s commitment to UN 
peacekeeping operations. Debates merely focused on the constitutionality 
of peacekeeping and its relevance to collective defence. Japan’s interests
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in UN operations would be to develop a distinctive international policy 
with a stronger voice in the UN, to take an initiative in Asia as a regional 
leader and to activate the SDF. The maintenance of its UN-centred policy 
by participation in peacekeeping operations is recommended for Japan to 
balance the US-Japan relationship. Japan’s peacekeeping policy should 
reflect these interests and assess how it can contribute more effectively 
to peacekeeping, through civilian involvement and expertise in logistics. 
Furthermore, burden-sharing with the United States and the decreased 
sense of anti-militarism towards Japan by its Asian neighbours encourage 
Japan to play a more significant security role in the region as peace­
keepers. Japan should continue recognizing that it has an obligation to 
contribute to peacekeeping operations -  in line with its own interests.
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CHAPTER FOUR
OIL DIPLOMACY AND THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE: JAPANESE 
AUTONOMY IN JAPAN-IRAN RELATIONS
This chapter develops the argument about limited autonomy through the analysis of 
post-Second World War Japan-Iran relations. The previous chapter discussed the 
external foundations of Japanese autonomy, and how this has caused it to continue to 
define autonomy based on exogenous values. This makes Japanese autonomy 
particularly sensitive to external dynamics, but also makes its scope much more limited 
than conventionally expected of a state with Japan’s economic status and capabilities. 
However, this study takes a constructivist approach and argues that Japan’s autonomous 
policies nonetheless remain committed to the US-Japan alliance and within US 
hegemony in general because of Japan’s post-1945 identity in international relations as a 
subordinate partner to the United States under US hegemony. To support this argument, 
Japan’s autonomous policies towards Iran during the oil crises of the 1970s, the Iranian 
Revolution, the 11 September 2001 and subsequent the “War on Terror”, and how it 
overcame US pressure with regards to its relationship with Iran are investigated in detail. 
Secondly, it assesses how Japan’s attempts to achieve autonomy in its policy towards 
Iran has affected its relationship with the United States and what these outcomes signify 
for Japan’s position under US hegemony.
Iran has an annual influx of foreign capital of approximately US$20 billion per 
annum through oil sales,1 high levels of literacy and a rapidly increasing population of 
60 million.2 In addition to this, its recent move to increase its nuclear capabilities makes 
Iran one of the most important countries in the Middle East and, as a consequence, the 
development and stability of Iran is said to hold the key to peace and stability in the 
region itself.3 Japan, on the other hand, is an economic and international aid power but a 
resource poor state and depends on the Middle East for 90 percent of its oil, with Iran 
being Japan’s third largest supplier.4 Yet, this seemingly complementary relationship is 
complicated by the US relationship with Iran and, as a consequence, Japan-Iran relations
' Simeon Kerr, “Iran’s New-Look Economy ready for Russian Price War”, Dow Jones International 
News, 20 November 2001.
2 Ukeru Magozaki, “Bunmei kan no Taiwa wo susumeru Iran” (“Iran advances conversations between 
Civilisations”), Chüö Köron, vol. 115, no. 6, pp. 152-63, May 2000, p. 161.
3 Magozaki, “Bunmei kan no Taiwa wo susumeru Iran”, p. 161.
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have often tested the boundaries of Japanese autonomy under US hegemony throughout 
the post-1945 period.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Iran 2 6 7 .0 1 3 7 .2 2 3 0 .3 3 9 5 .8 2 5 7 .8 2 5 8 .9 2 2 0 .6 2 3 1 .0 1 8 8 .8 2 9 3 .3 3 8 7 .6 3 8 0 .4
Iraq 3 2 6 .9 7 0 .7 7 0 .0 9 .3 14 .2 7 0 .5 1 6 3 .0 1 0 4 .5 1 7 1 .6 2 1 7 .2 1 4 4 .8 _
K u w a i t 2 3 2 .7 2 4 6 .3 8 3 .0 1 4 9 .9 1 7 7 .0 144.1 1 0 4 .2 2 5 5 .8 2 1 0 .5 2 6 6 .7 2 1 2 .2 59 .1
Q a ta r 1 3 6 .0 1 3 6 .4 1 3 1 .4 1 2 8 .6 2 2 0 .0 1 9 9 .8 1 6 0 .2 1 1 3 .0 1 7 5 .7 2 1 3 .4 2 4 1 .9 2 5 0 .5
S a u d i A ra b ia 1 3 7 9 .6 1 3 5 6 .2 1 3 0 9 .6 10 3 5 .5 1 0 6 2 .6 5 9 4 .4 4 4 4 .2 6 1 9 .9 5 1 3 .9 5 1 9 .8 7 0 3 .5 9 0 4 .8
UAE 5 8 3 .0 5 3 7 .4 4 9 5 .7 5 4 7 .3 5 4 0 .5 6 6 7 .5 6 9 6 .6 5 7 0 .6 6 4 1 .6 7 3 0 .6 8 1 5 .0 1 0 5 7 .0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iran 3 5 4 .8 3 6 7 .2 4 4 1 .8 3 8 0 .3 4 2 9 .6 4 6 5 .2 4 6 0 .3 4 9 6 .6 4 9 0 .5 5 3 6 .6 5 3 0 .5 6 5 2 .2
Iraq _ _ _ _ 3 .3 15.1 17 .2 9 8 .3 7 2 .0 5 .4 12 .6 1 0 .7
K u w a i t 2 3 6 .1 2 8 3 .0 2 9 3 .8 345 .1 3 4 7 .3 4 0 1 .5 3 9 1 .9 3 4 6 .4 3 9 5 .7 4 1 1 .0 5 2 2 .8 2 9 5 .5
Q a ta r 2 5 7 .9 2 7 7 .6 2 9 0 .6 2 9 5 .2 2 9 3 .4 3 2 6 .8 3 4 9 .2 3 9 1 .0 3 9 0 .3 4 2 7 .2 4 4 4 .8 3 7 1 .7
S a u d i A ra b ia 9 9 0 .0 1 0 0 9 .2 9 6 4 .9 9 8 6 .4 9 8 1 .5 1 0 1 0 .5 9 0 7 .5 7 9 2 .5 9 0 8 .1 3 5 3 .2 9 1 0 .1 9 5 7 .2
UAE 1 0 4 1 .2 1 0 8 3 .5 1 2 1 2 .9 1 2 1 5 .0 1195 .1 1 2 1 3 .4 1 2 0 5 .0 1 0 8 5 .0 1 0 6 5 .8 1 0 6 6 .8 1 1 8 2 .8 1 2 2 4 .0
^Figures indicate thousand barrels per day
Table 4.1 The Middle Eastern regions’ Crude Oil Exports to Japan, 1980-2003, modified from “OPEC 
Member States’ Crude Oil Exports by Destination, OPEC Website,
http://www.opec.org/library/annual%20statistical%20bulletin/interactive/2004/filez/xl/t51 .htm, accessed 5 
August 2005.
The Japan-Iran relationship is one area where Japan has consistently adopted a 
position that is independent and autonomous from the United States. This is evident in 
expressions such as dokuritsu ( M i ,  meaning independence), jishu  ife, or autonomy) 
or dokuji gaikö fl meaning “unique” or independent diplomacy) to describe 
Japan’s relations with Iran and the Middle East.4 5 In addition, as former president of the 
Japan-Arab Association Takeyo Nakatani has argued:
Japan should hold the US-Japan alliance as the foundation for security issues, 
particularly in East Asia and do its utmost to increase its efforts in defence issues 
as part of its responsibility as a member of the west. However, in regards to the 
Middle East, Japan should clearly distinguish itself from the US position, and 
conduct autonomous foreign policy.6
As a result, Japan’s history of engagement with Iran has presented difficulties for 
the United States, and the United States has sometimes viewed Japanese actions as 
conflicting with its own interests. Despite this, Japan continues to choose the path of
4 Eric Watkins, “Japan gains funding for Azadegan oil field development”, Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 
102, no. 15, 19 April 2004, pp. 26-29, p. 26.
5 For some examples see “Sekiyu Jishu Kaihatsu e no Nagai Michi”, (The Long road to independent oil 
production), Asahi Shimbun, Morning edition, 4 April 2004, and Kazuyuki Öno, “Tachiba ga 
wakareta Nichibei: Ima semarareru ‘Dokuji gaikö’” (Positions divided between US and Japan: Calls 
for ‘independent diplomacy’), Shükan Töyö Keizai, no. 5886, pp. 94-95.
6 Aoe Tanami, “Nihon no tai Arabu Kankeishi wo tou” (Questioning the History of Japan-Arab 
Relations), Mirai, vol. 441, June 2002, pp. 6-11, p. 10.
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engagement with Iran to this day. Through this example of post-1945 Japanese foreign 
policy, this chapter evaluates the character and significance of Japanese autonomy. In 
particular, it seeks to answer three questions: first, why Japan continually chose to 
engage with Iran, even at the risk of conflicting with US policy; how the United States 
interprets autonomous Japanese policy; and how the Japanese government overcomes 
US pressures to maintain their autonomous position on relations with Iran. The 
motivations behind Japanese autonomous policy and at what point it accedes to US 
pressure and limits its policies are examined in order to support the main argument that 
autonomy, as practised by Japan, is not balancing against the United States and is 
narrower under US hegemony.
To answer these questions, the first section addresses the historical concerns of the 
United States with regard to Iran during the post-Second World War period so as to 
highlight the issues that influence its involvement in the region. The second section then 
outlines the patterns of Japan’s relations with Iran post-1945 to demonstrate how 
Japan’s actions have often departed from US positions on the interconnected issues of 
oil, terrorism and the Israeli-Palestine issue. The discussion in this section focuses on 
four main events during the post Second World War period: Japan’s establishment of 
relations with Iran in the 1950s; Japan’s position in the first oil crisis of the early 1970s; 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the second oil crisis; and finally the Iran-lraq War of 
the 1980s. The final section examines US concerns towards Iran in the post-Cold War 
period, particularly in the context of the Bush doctrine and Japan’s more recent relations 
with Iran within US interests in the Middle East.
Post-Second World War Japan-Iran Relations—US and Japanese Interests and 
Concerns in Iran: 1950-1970
In order to investigate why Japan has continually chosen a path of engagement with Iran 
that seemingly conflicts with US interests, it is necessary to clarify US interests in Iran 
and the region. As discussed in Chapter Two, the United States began to establish its 
hegemony after the end of the Second World War through its multi-faceted international 
leadership against communism in the context of the Cold War. In contrast to Iran’s 
current relations with the United States, in this emerging post-1945 international 
framework Iran was viewed as an important US trading partner and strategic ally for two 
broad reasons. Firstly, Iran was vital for the abundant supply of oil in the Persian Gulf
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region. Control of oil in this region was a major concern for both Democrat and 
Republican administrations and efforts to keep out other competitors, in particular the 
Soviet Union, was a priority.7 Secondly, Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union made it 
strategically important in the Cold War context. Iran shared a border with the Soviet 
Union, and also with Afghanistan, and the United States feared that the Soviet Union 
would expand its sphere of influence into Iran. This fear was intensified when the Soviet 
Union resisted withdrawing from Iranian Azerbaijan and obstructed the entry of Iranian 
government troops in December 1945,8 and again when the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in 1979.9 Therefore, stability and political influence over Iran was 
perceived as being crucial to the US vision of containment of communism in the Middle 
East.
As an ally of the United States, Japan also shared these concerns with regard to 
Iran; but in particular, the securing of stable oil supplies was essential for resource-poor 
Japan. Accordingly, the prompt establishment of firm relations with Iran after the end of 
the Second World War was a priority for Japan. The Idemitsu Corporation was a 
particularly significant actor in achieving this and establishing the early stage of Japan- 
Iran relations.10 Idemitsu’s early establishment of its relationship with Iran coincided 
with the emerging nationalism movement in Africa and the Middle East and the fact that 
Japan was not a colonial power in these regions. The Iranian government approached 
Idemitsu in March 1952 in its search for an oil company from a country that had no 
colonial history in the Middle East.* 11 At the time Iran was emerging as a post-colonial 
nation and its elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadiq had declared the 
nationalisation of its oil production in 1951, shutting out former powerful oil interests 
such as Anglo-Iranian Petrol.12 However, Iran still required a company that would ship
7 Eric Hooglund, “The United States and Iran, 1981-9” in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour 
Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International Community, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 31-45, p. 
32.
8 See Louise L’Estrange Fawcett, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis o f 1946, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1992.
9 Naoki Maruyama, “ChQto to Nihon Gaikö” (The Middle East and Japanese Diplomacy) , Kokusai 
Mondai, no. 444, March 1997, pp. 49-65, p. 51.
10 Maruyama, “ChQto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 51.
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its oil.13 While Idemitsu was initially hesitant about taking on this role (for fear of 
conflict with Britain), it accepted the responsibility when US Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson expressed his support for Iranian nationalisation of its oil production.14 In 
March 1953, the Japanese tanker Nisshömaru set out to Aberdan15 and, in due course, 
the Japanese government formally backed Idemitsu’s oil development activities in the 
Middle East. This oil connection to the region also led to an influx of Japanese electrical 
and steel goods into Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular.16 As a result of the nationalist 
movements in Iran and the Middle East, Idemitsu, and many other Japanese companies 
trading with Iran, suddenly found itself with advantages over countries such as Britain 
and France that had traditionally influenced the region.17 Japan further strengthened its 
ties with Iran and the Middle East through its participation in the 1955 Bandung 
Conference—held for newly independent states of Asia and Africa.18 Nisshömaru, 
Idemitsu and Iran’s relations with Japan were therefore significantly tied to new hopes 
of a stronger Iran and Middle East that would not rely on the traditional Western great 
powers of Europe.
In this early period, US and Japanese interests in Iran were largely aligned and, as 
a consequence, Japanese foreign policy was not restricted by US interests. As the 
endorsement from Acheson indicates, Japan’s relations with Iran were less controversial 
in the context of its alliance with the United States, primarily because tensions between 
Iran and the United States did not yet exist in the early post-Second World War period. 
Indeed, as Iran was a neighbour of the Soviet Union, it was strategically important to the 
United States. It enjoyed a close and co-operative relationship with Washington and was 
permitted to purchase advanced weapons worth US$10 billion from the United States.19 
Moreover, as Iran was one of the first countries in the region to be drawn into the Cold 
War, it received extensive economic and military aid from the United States.20 
Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration supported and organised a coup that ousted
13 Idemitsu Kösan Corporation Head Office, Abadan ni Ike—Idemitsu to Iran Sekiyu Gaiko (To 
Aberdan—Idemitsu and Oil Diplomacy with Iran), Tokyo, Idemitsu Kösan Corporation, 1980, p. 2; 
Tanami, “Nihon no tai Arabu Kankeishi wo tou”, p. 10.
14 Idemitsu Kösan Corporation Head Office, Abadan ni Ike, p. 3; Tanami, “Nihon no tai Arabu 
Kankeishi wo tou”, p. 10.
15 Tanami, “Nihon no tai Arabu Kankeishi wo tou”, p. 10.
16 Maruyama, “Chuto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 51.
17 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”,p. 51.
IS Katö, “Nishi Ajia to Arabu Shokoku”, p. 132.
19 Robert L. Paarlberg (ed.), Diplomatic Dispute: U.S. Conflict with Iran, Japan and Mexico, Boston, 
Centre for International Affairs Harvard University, 1978, pp. 17-20.
20 William L. Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, p. 259.
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the Mossadiq government and ushered Shah Reza Pahlavi into power in 1953.21 As a 
result, for the next 25 years, Iran under the Shah maintained close relations with the 
United States.22 During this period, Japan also did not yet have to commit itself 
politically to any side in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which served as an additional 
benefit to its smooth relationship with both the United States and Iran.23 Because US and 
Japanese interests coincided during this period, restrictions on Japan’s autonomy from 
the United States was not yet evident in its Iran policy.
The First Oil Crisis
It would be no exaggeration to say that Japan’s experiences during the first oil crisis of 
the early 1970s dramatically influenced its decision to take an autonomous position on 
relations with Iran, and continues to shape Japan’s relationship with Iran today. The first 
oil crisis arose when Arab countries declared that they would not supply oil to those 
countries that supported Israel, which had occupied Arab land in the October War (Yom 
Kippur War) of 1973.24 Japan decided to prioritise securing oil supplies over policy co­
ordination with the United States on Iran and took a different stance in regards to Israel. 
Tensions between Japan’s relations with the Middle East and US foreign policy thus 
became increasingly apparent during and after this period. This section discusses this 
important turning point in Japan’s foreign policy towards Iran. While Iran did not 
participate in the oil embargo of the Arab states, the crisis is also important as the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict would later become the crucial background from which 
conflicts between the United States and Iran and also between Japanese and US policy 
on Iran would emerge.
There were two major reasons for Japan’s decision to side with the oil-producing 
states rather than the US line in support of Israel. The first was the realisation that Japan 
could no longer rely solely on its position as a non-colonial state in the region, and that 
its relations with the region were in fact viewed in parallel to Japan’s alliance with the 
United States. This became clear when Saudi Arabia declared during the 1973 oil crisis 
that France and Spain were “friendly nations” who had spoken out against Israeli action
21 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, pp. 272-73.
22 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, pp. 272-73.
23 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 52.
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and were therefore exempt from the oil restrictions.25 Japan had close commercial ties to 
Saudi Arabia, but was not mentioned as being part of the “friendly nations”.26 Despite 
the Japanese government’s efforts to appease the situation by condemning Israeli action 
through statements saying that Japan was opposed to seizing territory by force and that it 
fully supported UN Resolution 242,27 this was not enough to satisfy the Arab countries.28 
The issue was resolved by sending a non-government delegation to the Middle East, 
including figures such as former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and advisor to the 
Japanese oil company Arabia Oil Hideharu Tamura, and Arab specialist Keiichi 
Morimoto.29 It was only after these non-government negotiations that Susumu Nikaidö, 
the then Chief Cabinet Secretary, gave a statement on 22 November 1973 that clearly 
opposed Israel’s occupation of territory acquired in the 1967 Six Day War and 
demanded Israel’s withdrawal from these territories. Japan also emphasised the 
Palestinians’ right to sovereignty based on the United Nations Charter30 and went as far 
as to say that it would “hereafter be forced to re-evaluate its position on Israel based on 
changes in the situation”.31 Only then was the oil block lifted for Japan.
This episode indicates that the trust, which Japan had boasted it enjoyed in the 
region, was not as strong as it had thought, and Japan realised that it could no longer 
take its good relations with the Middle East for granted. It also demonstrated the 
Japanese government’s complacency, and highlighted its political naivety towards the 
Middle East. On top of this, the first oil crisis raised awareness of a severe lack of major 
diplomatic ties at the government level in this important region despite oil being crucial 
to Japanese interests and the fasade of good relations. The Japanese government was
22 Makoto Watanabe, “Nihon to Chukinto, Aratana Kankei wo Kizuku tameni” (Japan and the Middle 
East: Realising a New Relationship), Gaikö Forum, vol. 3, no. 3, March 1990, pp. 14-36, p. 25.
26 Watanabe, “Nihon to Chükintö”, pp. 25-26.
27 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (S/RES/242) was adopted unanimously by the UN 
Security Council on 22 November 1967 in the aftermath of the Six Day War. It calls for the 
“withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the... conflict” and the “[tjermination 
of all claims or states of belligerency.” It also calls for Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan to recognise 
each other and calls for the establishment of defensible boundaries for these states. It is one of the 
most commonly referenced UN resolutions in Middle Eastern politics. See Security Council 
Resolutions, United Nations Website,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf, accessed 3 
May 2006.
28 Yoshitaka Ishikawa, Oiru Gaikö Nikki (Oil Diplomacy Diaries), Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun Sha, 1983,
p. 6.
29 Kunio Katakura and Motoko Katakura, Japan and the Middle East, Tokyo, The Middle East Institute 
of Japan, 1991, p. 84.
30 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 55.
31 Masayoshi Öhira Memoir Publication Committee, Ohira Masayoshi Kaisöroku—Denki hen 
(Masayoshi Ohira Memoirs—A Biography), Tokyo, Ohira Masayoshi Memoir Publication Committee, 
1982, pp. 349-50.
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forced to realise that it was dependent on influential business people who had strong ties 
to the Middle East, rather than government and MOFA personnel, communicating the 
Japanese position on the situation to the oil exporting states and negotiating Japan out of 
the oil crisis. Nikaidö’s statement was therefore a meaningful indicator of Japan’s 
departure towards an independent foreign policy and a manifestation of an important 
change in Japan’s stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, moving away from the US 
position.32
The second reason for Japan siding with the oil-producing states was that the 
United States could no longer be relied upon for energy security. Before the first oil 
crisis, the Nixon administration was already advocating higher oil prices in 1972, so that 
it could gain economically over competition from Western Europe and Japan,33 which 
was also confirmed by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who stated “The rise in 
the price of energy would affect primarily Europe and Japan and probably improve 
America’s competitive position.”34 To further this, Kissinger made a statement during 
his visit to Japan on 14 November 1973 that the United States could not guarantee oil 
supplies during the crisis.35 In addition, after the oil embargo, the United States 
expressed its opposition when US allies such as Japan and Europe tried to negotiate 
bilateral oil-purchasing deals without going through major international companies.36 
The first oil crisis, and the events leading to it, therefore forced Japan into realising that 
economics could no longer be conveniently separated from politics, and that the United 
States would not always stand with Japan on the issue of oil. This heightened Japan’s 
sense of urgency to take a political stance on the Israeli-Palestine conflict. The United 
States supported Israel, as it had done from its inception in 1948, as a stronghold of 
democracy and US strategic interests in the Middle East, but also with regard to its own 
domestic Jewish-American lobby.37
There were factions within Japan, including the one represented by the then 
Foreign Minister Masayoshi Öhira, which argued that Japan should stay aligned with the
32 Akifumi Ikeda, “Japan’s Relations with Israel” in Kaoru Sugihara and JA Allan (eds.), Japan in the 
Contemporary Middle East, New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 84.
33 V.H. Oppenheim, “Why Oil Prices Go Up—The Past: We Pushed them”, Foreign Policy, no. 25, 
Winter 1976-77, pp. 24-57, pp. 30-33.
34 Henry Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval, Boston, Little Brown, 1982, p. 863.
35 Maruyama, “ChQto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 55.
36 Horst Mederhausen, Coping with the Oil Crisis, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1976, pp. 
60-61.
37 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, p. 337.
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US position on the situation in the Middle East.38 However, in this case, as domestic 
panic increased, people with a pro-Arab stance gained support in the Japanese 
government, including the then Minister of Transport Yasuhiro Nakasone.39 As a 
consequence, the first oil crisis was the onset of a number of incidents where Japan 
clearly differentiated itself from US policy in the Middle East.
Japan’s deviance from the United States during the first oil crisis should also be 
seen in the context of the Nixon “shocks” of the early 1970s. Japan’s relations with the 
United States were increasingly strained when President Richard Nixon announced that 
the administration was taking pressure off the US dollar by suspending the dollar’s 
convertibility into gold in August 1971 without consulting Japan,40 and when he made a 
visit to China in February 1972, again without previous notification to the Japanese 
government.41 Kissinger’s statement fuelled the sense that Japan could no longer rely 
solely on the US economically, politically or for stable resource supplies and, as a result, 
Japan’s relations with the United States continued to sour when it persisted in taking a 
different Middle East policy throughout the remainder of the 1970s. In the wake of the 
1973 oil crisis, Japan maintained its position of adopting different policies to the United 
States and sided with the Europeans in the Washington Energy Conference in February 
1974.42 The US response to the oil crisis had placed a strain on its alliances 
internationally and a divide between Europe and the United States developed over the 
international energy situation. The United States called for unity amongst the Western 
bloc, whereas European allies such as France advocated dialogue with the Middle East.43 
Japan also actively supported the Palestinian cause and agreed to the establishment of a 
Tokyo office for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in 1977.44
In this way, the first oil crisis highlighted the increasing difficulty Japan faced in 
separating its relations with the Middle East from its relations with the United States 
and the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and presents the emerging context in which its 
restricted autonomous foreign policy developed. However, in this particular situation, it 
became clear that Japan could not count solely on the United States on the issue of oil.
38 Masayoshi Öhira Memoir Publication Committee, Öhira Masayoshi Kaisöroku, pp. 349-50.
39 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 55.
40 Barnhart, “From Hershey Bars to Motor Cars”, p. 217.
41 Tanaka, Anzen Hoshö, pp. 231-38.
42 “Contributions to a Harmonious Development of the World Economy”, Diplomatic Bluebook o f 1974, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1974/1974-3-2.htm, accessed 22 August 2006.
43 “Contributions to a Harmonious Development of the World Economy”, Diplomatic Bluebook o f 1974.
44 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 57.
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Kissinger’s statement and the uncooperative stance of the United States towards 
providing oil supplies in the face of the crisis was also a “tacit signal” that the United 
States could not strongly object to Japan’s positioning with the Arab oil-producing 
states. As a consequence, Japan adopted an autonomous policy to secure resources by 
continuing its relations with anti-Israeli states and Iran during this period.
The pressures on Japan to take autonomous policies in this instance came from the 
dissatisfaction by Arab states towards Japan’s connections with the United States rather 
than US frustrations over Japanese policies. However, Japan’s pro-Arab position would 
later become the backdrop to its balancing engagement with Iran with US interests. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s position on it after the Iranian Revolution 
complicated Japan’s relations with the United States, which later influenced Japan to 
initially prioritise the path of engagement with the Middle East and Iran, and then to 
modify its policies under pressure from the United States.
The Iranian Revolution
While Japan was able to maintain autonomous foreign policy during the 1973 oil crisis, 
its relationship with the United States posed significant restrictions during the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. Japanese autonomy was compromised because of the hard-line 
stance taken by the United States in response to Iran invoking anti-American 
nationalism as the ground from which to establish an Islamic Republic. Despite the US 
position, Japan wanted to maintain dialogue and economic relations with Iran because of 
its need to secure oil. Therefore, conflicts between the Japanese and US positions 
became more clearly demarcated and progressively more difficult to reconcile after the 
Iranian Revolution.
The United States pressured Japan to co-operate with its objectives in dealing with 
Iran as tensions between Iran and the United States heightened after US embassy 
employees were taken hostage in Tehran in 1980, and this pressure did eventually 
compromise Japanese autonomy.45US demands to condemn the embassy hostage crisis, 
coupled with Cold War pressures, led Japan to eventually release a statement criticising 
Iran’s actions during this period, and this ultimately resulted in the cancellations of
45 Noriaki Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funso to Sekiyu Kiki [Ge]” (“The US Iran dispute and the Oil Crisis, part 
II”), Zenei, no. 449, April 1980, pp. 177-95.
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Iranian oil supplies to Japan.46 However, Japan did try its utmost to negotiate a path to 
maintain its long-tenn interests with Iran before finally acceding to US pressures. The 
rest of this section analyses the ways in which Japan attempted to maintain an 
autonomous position by balancing its relationship between these two opposing sides and 
how the United States interpreted the Japanese position.
The Seeds o f Discontent
The seeds of discontent in Iran that led to the Iranian Revolution were in part sown by 
the United States through its involvement in establishing the Pahlavi government. 
Because of the strategic importance of Iran to the United States, the latter had supported 
the ousting of the Mossadiq government and had helped to create the pro-US Pahlavi 
government in 1953. Under Pahlavi, the Iranian government aggressively modernised 
Iran’s economy, which promoted rapid industrialisation, but also encouraged unequal 
land distribution and irrigation rights to traditional landowners.47 This left much of the 
agricultural population unable to cultivate land and caused the demise of major 
industries such as rice production. Economically, this meant that Iran was heavily 
dependent on imported food.48 Moreover, socially, it caused mass migration into the 
cities and widespread poverty.49 This situation consequently sparked the Iranian 
Revolution in August 1978. It peaked in January 1979, with the return of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini to Iran from exile in Paris,50 and ended in February 1979.
The US Position
The United States found the Iranian Revolution problematic for three reasons. Firstly, 
the revolution posed a potentially dangerous situation to the United States because it 
was not simply a culmination of domestic frustration with the Pahlavi government but 
also a demonstration against the foreign power that helped bring the Shah to power. Iran 
challenged Western states as an assertion of radical defiance against Western hegemony
46 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funso [Ge]”, p. 180.
47 Kamran Mofid, “The Political Economy of Iran’s Foreign Trade since the Revolution: Ideals and 
Practice” in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and the International 
Community, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 143-61, p. 143.
48 Mofid, “The Political Economy of Iran’s Foreign Trade since the Revolution”, p. 143.
49 Akihiro Kasai, “Hakyoku ni itaruka Sekiyu Dankö” (Will the Oil Embargo end in Catastrophe), Chüö 
Köron, vol. 95, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 78-86, p, 81.
50 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, p. 402-05.
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and sought to establish a universal Islamic order.51 Secondly, the revolution projected 
Iran as an ideological power that challenged Arab states and their leadership of Shiite 
Muslims of the region,52 which could cause instability in an already complex region. 
Thirdly, unlike the situation at the time of the first oil crisis in 1973, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s position on Israel also put it in greater conflict with the United States. 
The conservative clerics of Iran objected to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict, arguing that the opposition against the existence of a Jewish state on “Muslim 
territory” is sacred to their worldview and an obligation of Muslims.53 Iran’s offensive 
stance on Israel consequently caused the United States and Israel to view its connections 
to pro-Palestinian terrorist groups and nuclear development through a prism of caution 
and threat. 54 Accordingly, the instability that Iran could cause regionally and 
internationally through radical Islamic terrorists was a major concern for US policy in 
the Middle East.
Overt hostility targeted at the United States began to emerge when student 
supporters of Khomeini occupied the US Embassy in Tehran and held employees 
hostage in November 1979 for over a year.55 They demanded that the United States 
deliver Reza Pahlavi (who fled to the United States) to the newly established Islamic 
Republic of Iran. President Jimmy Carter, who placed human rights as the centre of his 
diplomacy, refused this demand and, as a result, the United States stopped importing 
Iranian oil, and also halted US exports into Iran on 12 November 1979.56 These 
economic sanctions extended to the freezing of all US investments in Iran and the halt in 
exchange of Iranian oil for the US dollar.57 The deterioration of relations between the 
two states was internationally significant, as it raised oil prices and restricted oil 
distribution around the world, triggering the second oil crisis.58 While the Carter 
administration softened its position and postponed some sanctions, it greatly increased
51 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, p. 411.
52 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, p. 411.
53 Daniel Brumberg, “End of a Brief Affair? The United States and Iran”, Carnegie Endowment for  
International Peace Policy Brief, 14 May 2002, pp. 1-7, p. 4.
54 Sadao Sakai, “Seiki Matsu no Perusha wan to Nihon Gaikö” (The Persian Gulf at the end of the 
Century and Japanese Diplomacy), Chüö Köron, vol. 110, no. 13, October 1995, pp. 94-99, p. 98.
55 Ali M. Ansari, “Continuous Regime Change from Within”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 4, 
Autumn 2003, pp. 53-67, p. 57.
56 Kasai, “Hakyoku ni itaruka Sekiyu Dankö”, p. 78.
77 Kasai, “Hakyoku ni itaruka Sekiyu Dankö”, p. 78.
58 Hiroshi Iwanaga, “Bei-Iran Funsö to Nihon no Tachiba” (The US-Iran conflict and Japan’s position), 
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its military presence in the Persian Gulf.59 The situation worsened and the United States 
finally severed diplomatic ties with Iran on 7 April 1980.60
US Pressure on Japan
US pressure on Japan was more obvious during the hostage crisis, in comparison with 
the first oil crisis, owing to increasing differences in their approaches toward dealing 
with Iran. The United States increased its pressure in stages. When it announced its 
plans for its embargo of Iranian oil, President Carter sent a personal letter to the 
Japanese government the next day, urging the Japanese to adopt a similar position as 
regards its relations with Iran.61 At this early stage, US government authorities dealing 
with Japan stated “they did not anticipate that Japan would take an identical position on 
the issues, as Japan and the US are placed under two very different circumstances”.62
However, as the hostage crisis escalated, the United States was increasingly 
critical of Japanese economic activity in Iran. It was disapproving of Japanese oil 
companies buying Iranian oil at high prices despite the US embargo. US Secretary of 
State Cyrus R. Vance declared during a visit to Japan in December 1979 that it was 
“insensitive” of Japan to be purchasing “vast amounts” of Iranian oil at a high price 
when the United States was taking various economic measures to solve its diplomatic 
dilemma.63 Japan was also criticised when the Bank of Japan did not apply pressure on 
Iran to repay its financial debts.64 Other commentators in the United States began to 
directly link the slow resolution of the hostage situation to Japan’s trading with Iran:
Japan’s excuse is that its state interests necessitate the purchasing of Iranian oil, 
and by doing this, the Öhira government is prioritising national interest at all costs. 
However, as long as Japan—and other countries—think in this way, the US cannot 
hope to apply sufficient international pressure on Iran to release the fifty American 
hostages.65
59 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]”, p. 187.
60 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]”, p. 187.
61 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]”, p. 188.
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edition.
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Japan was therefore strongly pressured to co-operate with the United States, and 
Japan’s reluctance to co-ordinate with US policies represented not only an obstacle to 
US national interests, but also an undermining of its authority as the international 
hegemon.
The Japanese Position and Criticism o f US pressure
Despite US pressure, Japan’s initial position was to persevere and continue engagement 
with Iran motivated by its concerns about oil supply disruptions. In fact Japan’s relations 
with Iran actually intensified after the revolution. Two reasons explain the deepening of 
Japan’s relations with Iran during this period and why it was able to continue its 
alternative position to that of the United States. Firstly, Japan again found itself in an 
advantageous position in relation to Iran as a non-Western power, because it was seen as 
having few political and military interests in the area at the time of the revolution. Even 
after Iran had freed itself from colonial influence following the Second World War, the 
continued economic and military influence of the United States and Britain was evident. 
Their activities included exporting arms into the region.66 On the other hand, not only 
was Japan historically a non-colonial power in the Middle East, but its activities prior to 
the revolution were limited to economic ones centring on importing Iranian oil and 
exporting Japanese industrial plant technology into Iran; nor was it involved in arms 
exports.67 As a result, while US, English and French contracts in Iran were cancelled 
after the revolution, contracts from Japan were not. As other European industrial 
investments and exports to Iran came rapidly to a halt (West Germany, the United States 
and Japan had the greatest percentage of total exports into Iran, at 21.9 percent, 21.8 
percent and 15.5 percent of respectively), Japan’s percentage of total exports into Iran 
rose to 30 percent.68 Japan’s economic relations further deepened with Iran after the 
revolution. It was able to take an autonomous position in its relations with Iran as it was 
again the only industrialised “Western” country with diplomatic and economic relations 
with Iran.
Secondly, Japan’s relationship with Iran deepened after the revolution because it 
was in a position as the only economic and political channel between Iran, the United
66 Keitarö Hasegawa, “Shinkyokumen no Bei-Iran Kankei” (“The New Situation of US-Iran Relations”), 
Gekkan Jiyü Minshu, vol. 293, June 1980, pp. 81-85, p. 81.
67 Hasegawa, “Shinkyokumen no Bei-Iran Kankei”, p. 81.
68 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]” p. 187.
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States and other Westerns states. 69 In the period immediately after the revolution and 
during the US embassy hostage crisis, the United States was able to gather information 
as a result of Japan’s strong economic connections with Iran. Despite its criticisms of 
Japan, the United States had recognised the utility of Japan as a communication 
channel. 70 As a consequence of Japan’s position, anticipation for a greater international 
role for Japan, particularly with regard to the Middle East region, grew both within 
Japan and internationally.
While Japan was pressured by the United States, good relations with Iran also 
signified energy autonomy and a guarantee of stability in oil supplies, thus freeing it 
from energy dependence on the United States. Because of these positive aspects of its 
relations with Iran, the US hostage crisis raised debates in Japan of the costs and 
benefits of prioritising Japanese national energy interests over co-ordinating its policy 
position with the United States. Furthermore, the bilateral relationship with the United 
States in the context of Japan’s relations with Iran further expanded to criticism of the 
US-Japan alliance itself. Critics of the Japanese government, most notably the Japanese 
Communist Party, argued that the Iran issue clearly indicated that Japan was blindly 
following the United States to the detriment of Japanese interests, and that the real 
danger lay in Japan’s increasing commitments to the US-Japan alliance as the United 
States reinforced its military presence in the Middle East.71 These critics argued that the 
US-Iran conflict, and the restrictions it was causing Japan’s relations with Iran, 
highlighted the need for Japan to become a neutral state. 72
To balance these varied domestic opinions, Japan decided to separate the US 
hostage crisis from its bilateral relations with Iran. To do this, the government firstly 
argued that Japan needed to “clearly signal to the United States” that self-restraint was 
required on the part of the United States rather than Japan, as the conflict with Iran was 
entirely borne out of US political miscalculations. 73 Secondly, the Japanese government 
also argued that Iran was important for Japan’s energy interests, while Japan was 
important for Iran’s communication with the West. Japan argued that a constructive
69 Hasegawa, “Shinkyokumen no Bei-Iran Kankei”, p. 82.
70 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]” p. 187.
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72 Noriaki Sasaki, “Bei-Iran Funsö no Kiseki to Nihon Gaikö no Sentaku” (“Tracking the US-Iran 
Conflict and the Choices of Japanese Diplomacy”), Bunka Hyöron, vol. 231, no. 4852, July 1980, pp. 
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bilateral relation existed and should therefore be maintained, both in the interests of 
Japan and the United States, regardless of the US crisis.74
However, at the same time, Japan tried to avoid creating a situation where it 
would be forced to choose between Iran and the United States, and endeavoured to meet 
US demands while continuing its relations with Iran. As a result, it attempted to appease 
US criticism and pressure by limiting Iranian oil imports to those levels that existed 
prior to the US hostage crisis, whereby direct dealing (DD) imports would be 
maintained at 460,000 barrels and imports (through major US based oil companies) at 
620,000.75 Also, Japan eventually conceded to US pressure to freeze all financial 
commitments in Iran and to co-ordinate other trading restrictions with the United States. 
The freezing of US capital in Iran meant that Japanese and other banks around the world 
that had syndicate loans through US banks had to also freeze their cash flows and 
interest rates.76 The Japanese government agreed to this freeze after the US Deputy 
Secretary of the Treasury Robert Carswell was dispatched to Japan in December 1979.77
After the US announced the suspension of its diplomatic relations with Iran in 
early April 1980, it again pressured Japan to take a similar step.78 Japan tried to oppose 
this, but was forced to meet US demands. However, rather than completely severing its 
ties with Iran, Japan tried to align its policies with the European Community by 
withdrawing its embassy in Tehran. Yet this action proved insufficient to satisfy the 
United States. On 11 April 1980, the Japanese government finally acceded to US 
pressure when the then Foreign Minister Saburo Ökita indicated that the US-Japan 
alliance was more important than oil, and gave a clear statement that condemned the 
hostage situation.79 On 21 April 1980, the Iranian government cancelled its oil supplies 
to Japan.80 Relations were only normalised after the release of the US hostages in 
January 1981.81
74 Hasegawa, “Shinkyokumen no Bei-Iran Kankei”, p. 85.
73 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]”, p. 189.
76 Kasai, “Hakyoku ni itaruka Sekiyu Danko”, p. 79.
77 Sasaki, “Bei, Iran Funsö [Ge]”, p. 189.
78 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”p. 59.
79 “Tai-Bei Koka wo Nerau: Sekiyu yori Tai-Bei Kyöchö” (“Targeting affects on the US: Co-operation 
with the US over Oil”), Asahi Shimbun, 12 April 1980, p. 2.
80 Maruyama, “Chüto to Nihon Gaikö”, p. 60.
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Eastern Studies International University o f Japan, vol. 2, 1986, pp. 263-87, p. 279.
CHAPTER FOUR 166
Therefore, Japan attempted to maintain its relations with Iran after the Iranian 
Revolution by trying to placate the United States through measured appeasement. While 
this may seem like Japanese weakness in the face of US power, and far from being 
autonomous foreign policy, Japan’s continuation of economic and diplomatic 
engagement with Iran were crucial as a means of achieving an alternative oil supply 
given the US position that it was no longer able to assist Japan on this front. Japan 
attempted to prolong the decision of having to choose between Iran and the United 
States by making itself useful as a communications channel between the two states, and 
also appeased US demands by temporarily curbing Iranian imports and financial 
investments. Japan also sided with European states by withdrawing its diplomatic 
representation in Tehran rather than adopting the US line of completely severing 
diplomatic relations.
The United States argued that Japan was insensitive to its crisis situation, and was 
even taking advantage of surplus oil in the market because of the US embargo, and 
pressured Japan to take a united stance against Iran. The US-Japan alliance eventually 
took priority over maintaining secure oil supplies and domestic criticism of the alliance, 
demonstrated by Japan’s decision to publicly declare the importance of the US-Japan 
alliance. Japan’s position on its relations with Iran after the Iranian revolution 
consequently demonstrates that good US-Japan relations and US accommodation of 
Japanese foreign policy was eventually deemed as being more important than the pursuit 
of national interest in relation to securing oil supplies. This shows that autonomous 
Japanese foreign policy was deeply affected by US interests, and that Japan’s autonomy 
is restricted under US hegemony. While Japanese appeasement to the United States is 
seemingly demonstrates “nautonomy”, its continued engagement with Iran after the 
Iranian Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War shows that, from a longer-term 
perspective, Japan has maintained an autonomous Iran policy.
The Iran-Iraq War
In spite of the harsh criticism that Japan received from the United States, the importance 
of oil meant that Japan continued to follow a path of engagement with Iran. This section 
analyses Japan’s untiring efforts to maintain relations with Iran, despite the increasing 
hard-line stance of the United States during the 1980s in relation to the Iran-Iraq War. 
Again, Japan’s interactions with Tehran served positively for the United States during
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this period as had been the case during the Iranian Revolution and the US hostage crisis, 
thereby suggesting that Japanese autonomous policies did not seek to undermine US 
policies in the region and indeed could be constructive to US interests.
The Origins o f  the Eight-Year War*2
Many historical and political disputes were factors in triggering the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
While a long-standing cultural rivalry existed between Arab and Persian civilisations, 
tensions began to re-emerge between Iran and Iraq after the Iranian Revolution, which 
led to the start of the eight-year war in 1980.83 Previously, during 1974 and 1975, Iran’s 
Reza Pahlavi, alarmed by the rise of the revolutionary Baathist government of Iraq, had 
tried to weaken the Iraqi government by supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.84 Iran 
provided aid, weapons, Iranian Kurdish contingents, and also a safe haven for Iraqi 
Kurdish refugees in Iran. In 1975 Iran and Iraq sought to end tensions by signing the 
Algiers Agreement. Under this agreement, Iran was to close its borders to Iraqi Kurds, 
while Iraq in return agreed to redefine the borders between Iran and Iraq along the Shatt 
al-Arab waterway.85 The Algiers Agreement was violated when Iraqi Kurds in Iraq 
resumed their rebellion after the Iranian revolution, and Iran once again opened its 
borders to the Kurds of Iraq.86 The Agreement was finally nullified in September 1980 
and, with the support of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States, Iraq invaded Iran 
to stop the Shiite revolutionaries of Iran who were calling for the Shiites of Iraq to 
overthrow the secular government of Saddam Hussein.87 Fighting between the two 
countries endured for eight years.
The US Position
The United States officially took a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict. 
However, it was actually providing information and weapons to both sides in order to 
gain control over the region’s oil supplies and to achieve strategic advantage over the
S2 The Iran-Iraq War spanned from 1980 to 1988.
83 Fred Halliday, “The Iranian Revolution and International Politics: Some European Perspectives” in 
John L. Esposito and R. K. Ramazani, Iran at the Crossroads, pp. 175-90, p. 180.
84 Sir Anthony Parsons, “Iran and the United Nations, with particular reference to the Iran-Iraq War, pp. 
7-30, p. 10.
83 Parsons, “Iran and the United Nations, with particular reference to the Iran-Iraq War, pp. 16-17, 26- 
27.
86 Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, p. 370.
Cleveland, A History o f the Modern Middle East, pp. 370-71.87
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Soviet Union.88 By supporting both sides, the United States prolonged the Iran-Iraq War 
so that it could compel the Gulf States to strengthen their military co-operation with the 
United States, thereby allowing US military bases and naval rights in the Persian Gulf.89
Despite its neutrality, the United States on the one hand supported Iraq because of 
its concerns over Soviet expansion in the region, rewarding Iraq with a supply of five 
Boeing jetliners and government officials for formal talks.90 The United States also 
removed Iraq from its list of problematic states that support terrorism, and extended a 
US$400 million credit guarantee for US exports to Iraq.91 On the other hand, the United 
States was also trying to covertly engage with Iran, while it upheld an official faqade of 
condemning the Khomeini government. As a consequence, the United States backed 
anti-Khomeini factions operating in Iran,92 such as two paramilitary groups who had 
close connections to the former Shah,93 while at the same time supplying arms to the 
Iranian government as a means to combat communism in the region.94
Japan ’s Position in the Iran-Iraq War
Japan, cautious from its experiences in the US hostage crisis, was extremely careful not 
to take sides in dealing with Iran and Iraq. However, it made the decision to remain 
engaged with Iran, which again put it in direct conflict with the United States. The first 
reason for Japan maintaining its relationship with Iran was the latter’s strained relations 
with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the early 1980s, Iran was 
considered an important state in the superpower rivalry. However, Iran’s “Neither West 
nor East” slogan, which sought to play the two powers against each other, backfired and 
isolated it internationally after 1985, when relations between the United States and the
88 Mansour Farhang, “The Iran-Israel Connection” in Abbas Alnasrawi and Cheryl Rubenberg (eds.), 
Consistency o f US Foreign Policy: The Gulf War and the Iran-Contra Affair, Belmont, AAUG, 1989, 
p. 96.
89 Richard Halloran, “US Altering Strategy for Defense of Arabian Oilfields”, New York Times, 4 
December 1988, p. A32.
90 Robert O. Freedman, “Soviet Policy towards the Persian Gulf from the Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War 
to the Death of Konstantin Chernenko” in Wim J. Olson (ed.) US Strategic Interests in the Gulf 
Region, Boulder, Westview, 1987, p. 55.
91 Joe Stork and Martha Wenger, “US ready to intervene in the Gulf War”, Middle East Information 
and Research Project Report, nos. 125/126, July-September 1984, pp. 44—48, p. 45.
92 Farhang, “The Iran-Israel Connection”, p. 95.
93 Leslie H. Gelb, “US said to aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units”, New York Times, 7 
March 1982, pp. A l-2.
94 United States President’s Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text o f the 
President’s Special Review Board, New York, Bantam Books, 1987, p. 65, p. 261; Anthony H. 
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Soviet Union improved.95 As a result, Japan continued to be an important state for Iran 
as a communication channel to the Western bloc. Secondly, international opinion leant 
towards Iraq in the Iran-Iraq conflict, in recognition of the Iraqi government’s more 
positive attitude towards a ceasefire and willingness to enter unconditional negotiations 
with Iran.96 Iran, on the other hand, had rejected this statement from Iraq, and insisted 
that it was ready to end the conflict only if three conditions were met: the resignation of 
Saddam Hussein; US$100 billion in compensation; and the relocation of Iraqi refugees 
in Iran back to Iraq.97 Iran also argued that the West was too lenient towards Iraqi attacks 
on Iranian tankers, whereas Iranian retaliation attacks on Iraqi oil tankers were 
internationally admonished.98 While Iran continued to perceive itself as a victim of 
unfair international treatment, Japan saw its relations with the Muslim state as being 
crucial to maintaining a dialogue that would prevent Iran from further becoming 
internationally isolated.
There was also the anticipation of greater Japanese investment in the region. 
While Japan was a major exporter to the region and depended on the Middle East for 
70 percent of its oil, it was yet to participate in large-scale economic development 
projects.99 Due to Japan’s position vis-ä-vis the United States, Iran and Iraq, calls for 
greater Japanese political involvement in Iran and the Middle East were voiced in the 
region as the lran-lraq conflict unfolded.'00 Japan was divided on the question of whether 
it should respond to calls for greater involvement in resolving the Iran-Iraq war, chiefly 
because of the recurring issue of balancing its relationship with Iran and the US-Japan 
alliance. The then director of the Middle and Africa Bureau in the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Wasuke Miyake argued that some policymakers in MOFA worried 
about the implications of closer relations with Iran on Japan’s alliance with the United 
States.101 Others argued that relations with Iran were just as important, as Iran could
95 Fred Halliday, “Introduction”, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Manshour Varasteh (eds.), Iran and 
the International Community, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 1-6, pp. 2-3.
96 Wasuke Miyake, “Chüto Wahei Mondai to Iran-Iraku Funsö” (The Problem of Peace in the Middle 
East and the Iran-Iraq Conflict), Sekai Keizai Hyöron, vol. 29, no. 8, August 1985, pp. 36-49, p. 44.
97 Miyake, “Chüto Wahei Mondai” p. 44.
98 Miyake, “Chüto Wahei Mondai”, p. 44.
99 Tadashi Kojima, “Shiren ni tatasareru Hidömei Jishu Rosen” (The Anti-Alliance Independent Line 
Tested), Sekai Shüho, vol. 62, no. 1, 30 December 1980, pp. 74-79, p. 79.
100 Shintarö Abe, “Gekishin tsuzuku Sekai, Omomi masu Nihon Gaikö” (“The Rapidly Changing World 
and the Increasing Importance of Japanese Diplomacy”, Gekkan Jiyü Minshu, vol. 334, November 
1983, pp. 40^45, p. 42.
101 Suguru Honda, “Kasumigaseki ‘Dokuji’ Gaikö no Dasan to Seika” (“The Calculations and outcomes 
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potentially play an influential role in the region and internationally if it had greater 
political and economic stability, because it was a country rich in natural resources and 
was in a geo-strategically important position.102 In the end, the Japanese government’s 
pro-Iran supporters were able to advance a plan for a political delegation to go to Iran 
for four days on 30 October 1982.103 The pro-Iran lobby had the advantage in this 
instance, as the Japanese government had made significant efforts in laying the 
groundwork for good relations with Iran in preparation for Japanese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Shintarö Abe’s trips to both Iran and Iraq in August 1983.104 Abe’s trips were 
made as a response to calls for greater participation in the region, but they were also 
seen as a gesture of Japanese determination that its pursuit of oil would not be 
jeopardised in this conflict as had happened during the hostage crisis, and a 
demonstration that its diplomacy did not always defer to the US position.105
Japan further justified its engagement with Iran as an indirect contribution towards 
a ceasefire and peace between Iran and Iraq by “creating an environment conducive to 
peace” (“xvahei no hankyö zukuri”). 106 These efforts were evaluated positively 
internationally and led to suggestions for a more direct mediation role for Japan. A 
Japanese bureaucrat posted to the region reports of Iran and Iraq both approaching Japan 
to broker a ceasefire in 1983.107 Junpei Kato, former Ambassador to Oman, argues that 
Iran and Iraq both realised that the conflict was turning into a prolonged quagmire, and 
had secretly planned to get Japan involved.108 One of the major reasons why Japan was 
approached was because it had no obvious interests in the Iran-Iraq War: it was not an 
exporter of weapons, and it would only be in Japan’s interest for the war to end given its 
heavy dependence on oil from the Middle East.109 However, mindful of domestic opinion, 
Iran and Iraq were not keen to indicate publicly their intent to end the conflict and 
wanted to keep the negotiations a secret. Kato argued that Japan, on the other hand, did 
not want to be viewed as acting only in its “national interest” after being accused 
previously by the United States of employing mercantilist foreign economic policies 
behind its policies in the Middle East. Therefore, Japan wanted to publicly declare that
102 Miyake, “ChQto Wahei Mondai”, p. 44.
103 Honda, “Kasumigaseki ‘Dokuji’ Gaiko”, p. 90.
104 Abe, “Gekishin tsuzuku Sekai,” p. 42.
105 Honda, “Kasumigaseki ‘Dokuji’ Gaikö”, p. 91 and Abe, “Gekishin tsuzuku Sekai,” p. 42.
106 Honda, “Kasumigaseki ‘Dokuji’ Gaikö”, p. 91.
107 Katö, “Nishi Ajia to Arabu Shokoku”, p. 143.
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109 Katö, “Nishi Ajia to Arabu Shokoku”, p. 143 -  144.
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its motivations behind the ceasefire were for peace in the Middle East in general.110 Kato 
maintained that, due to these problems, actual plans for Japan to mediate did not 
eventuate.* 111 Despite Japan’s lost opportunity to directly broker peace, the Japanese 
government still regarded its role as a mediator for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War as 
being an important achievement.112 It signified that Japan’s international participation 
was not merely symbolic; it was genuinely appreciated as a reliable and important 
communication line between Iran and the United States.
Japan’s position as a relatively neutral state in the Middle East also meant that it 
could support the covert double-diplomacy of the United States more openly through its 
close relations with both Iran and Iraq. Japan’s preferential treatment and close 
communications with Iran were again due to it being the only industrialised country that 
had relations with both Iran and Iraq, and it continued to be trusted by Iran as a state that 
had not yet “got its hands dirty” in the Middle East.113 The good relations were 
welcomed because the United States was in a position where it had to take a strong 
stance on Iran due to domestic sentiment over the hostage crisis.114 Iran’s trust of Japan 
was also noticeable when it disclosed to the Japanese, several months before the official 
declaration in the latter half of 1983, that it would only block the Straits of Hormuz if it 
were totally unable to export oil.115
Therefore, in this case Japan took a different policy position to the United States, 
but managed its support of engagement with Iran and alliance with the United States by 
positioning itself as a mediator between Iran and Iraq and also between Iran and the 
United States. By presenting itself such a role, Japan was able to pursue autonomous 
polices without greatly disrupting the US-Japan alliance. The favourable interpretation 
of Japan’s Iran and Iraq policies by the United States made it easier for Japan to 
successfully maintain autonomous policies during the Iran-Iraq War in comparison to 
the previous decade. This fact demonstrates that US perceptions of Japanese foreign 
policies were an extremely important factor for Japan-Iran relations, and that Japan’s 
autonomous initiatives continued to be sensitive to and restricted by US interests.
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Post-Cold War: US and Japanese Perceptions of Iran during the 1990s
The preceding section discussed how US pressure placed limits on Japanese policy 
towards Iran across the Cold War period. This section reveals that the pattern of US 
interests restricting Japanese foreign policy in Iran largely continued during the post- 
Cold War period. Again, the main point of disagreement was over engagement or 
disengagement with the Islamic Republic. However, due to the absence of major crises 
in comparison to the previous decades, Japan was able to momentarily prioritise and 
advocate greater engagement with Iran during the 1990s over US pressures.
On the one hand, the United States perceived that Iran continued to pose a threat 
to the stability of the Middle East and US interests in the region at the end of the Cold 
War and, as a result, it maintained a hard-line stance of containment. Iran remained 
problematic for the United States for three major reasons: its persistent anti-US and anti- 
Israeli stance; its subsequent support of Arab terrorists in the region; and its desire to 
develop nuclear weapons. As a consequence, the United States increased its presence in 
the region, and militarily reinforced surrounding states throughout the post-Cold War 
era.116
On the other hand, at the end of the Cold War, Japan had extensive economic 
power and 45 years of international existence as a peaceful, non-militant state, which 
promised greater freedom for Japan to pursue its interests with less restrictions and 
pressures from the United States. However, the US-Japan alliance continued to be 
relevant and important in the post-Cold War era, and therefore Japan still had to 
manoeuvre its relationship with Iran within this framework. Japan continued to rely on 
Iran for a stable supply of oil that did not depend on the United States. In addition, Japan 
argued that it was important to engage with Iran both politically and economically, 
because the Islamic Republic’s isolation from both the United States and Russia 
persisted even after the Cold War. As a result, Japan continued juggling its position on 
Iran with US interests during this period.
US Concerns over Iran and Terrorism in the 1990s
Although earlier Iranian terrorist activities were undertaken to spread the Islamic 
revolution to other countries of the Middle East, in the post-Cold War period terrorism
116 Sakai, “Seiki Matsu no Perusha wan to Nihon Gaiko”, p. 97.
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in the region was increasingly in relation to supporting the Palestinian cause in the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. As a consequence, the United States maintained its hard-line 
position towards Iran and terrorism in the post-Cold War period. Terrorism supported by 
Iran persisted because hard-line clerics of the Islamic Republic strongly opposed a two- 
state solution to the Israeli-Palestine issue, calling for the return of all Muslim territory 
to their rightful people—in Iran’s view, the Palestinians.117 Because Iran believed that 
the Israelis were not rightfully permitted to establish a state, it viewed the attempts by 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General-Command, Hezbollah, Hamas 
and the Islamic Jihad to free their land from Israeli occupation as legitimate.118 The 
United States, on the other hand, viewing these as militant groups which killed innocent 
people and sought to undermine the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, 
consequently categorised them as terrorists.119 While Iran denies having operational 
influence over Hezbollah, it has consistently supported Hezbollah, which is believed to 
have been associated with the bombing of US Marine Corp barracks and the US 
embassy in Lebanon in 1983, as well as other killings and hostage-taking of US citizens 
throughout the 1980s.120 During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was also accused of being 
involved in maritime terrorism against Iraq, attacking commercial ships with grenades 
and floating mines.121
The moderate former President Mohammad Khatami attempted to change this 
political rhetoric and image of the Iranian government during his term in the Majlis 
(Iranian parliament) from 1997 to 2005. He opposed hard-line attitudes towards 
terrorism and publicly denounced it, defining it as the “killing of innocent men and 
women who are not involved in confrontation.”122 He also removed counter-reformist 
conservatives in the Ministry of Intelligence, who often worked to destabilise Khatami’s 
efforts of reform and rapprochement with the international community.123 However, this 
was not enough to appease US suspicions of Iran’s involvement with terrorist groups, 
and it maintained its hard-line position throughout the 1990s. The Clinton
117 Brumberg, “End of a Brief Affair?”, p. 4.
118 Gary Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 4, Autumn 2003, pp. 
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administration strengthened its strategy of containing Iran throughout the 1990s 
beginning with the “Bottom-Up Review” defence plan in 1993, which sought to contain 
rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba.124 The Clinton administration also 
banned US Conoco Petrochemical Company from developing Iranian oil fields in mid- 
March 1995.125 In 1996 the United States further upgraded its hard-line stance towards 
Iran by signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.126 This bill stated that any company 
investing more than US$40 billion into Iran would not be permitted to export its 
products into the United States.127
The Japanese Position on Iranian Terrorism and US concerns
Contrary to the US position, Japan played down Iran’s involvement in terrorism, which 
reflected the continued importance of Iran in the post-Cold War era for oil supplies to 
Japan. Japan’s dependence on oil also translated into fundamental differences between 
Japan and the United States over how to deal with various terrorist groups in the region. 
Historically, Japan did not have a comprehensive or a consistent long-term anti-terrorist 
strategy, and often negotiated with terrorists, including their own domestic terrorist 
group of the 1970s—the Japanese Red Army—which was also involved in various 
hijackings and hostage takings internationally in the name of the Palestinian cause.128 
Particularly controversial in the context of Japan’s handling of terrorism was the Red 
Army’s attack on Lod Airport in Tel Aviv in May 1972.129 In the Lod Airport incident, 
the Japanese government responded by sending an official delegation to Israel to pay its 
condolences and provided US$700,000 as compensation to the victims’ families.130 As a
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consequence, Japan was criticised internationally for supporting terrorist organisations 
by choosing to negotiate with them.131 However, Japan continues to take the position of 
negotiation in dealing with terrorists today.132 Japan’s ad hoc approach to terrorism 
demonstrated that, despite US concerns over Iran’s connections to terrorist groups, 
engagement with the Middle East remained the cornerstone of Japanese policy for 
securing oil in the post-Cold War period.
The Japanese government instead argued that stability in Iran depended on its 
economic development and advocated engagement with the moderates of the Iranian 
government. 133 For this reason, Japan continued to administer development aid 
according to the Japanese ODA scheme throughout the 1990s. In 1993, Japan granted a 
loan of ¥38 billion (approximately US$400 million) for the construction of a hydraulic 
power station, which was met with particular disapproval from the United States.134 
Then Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama refused the first appeal by the 
United States to freeze Japanese loans into Iran, on the argument that it would adopt the 
“sunshine” approach as opposed to the “north wind” approach of the United States, and 
also from optimism that it was not alone in taking a different line to the United States— 
Germany and France were also choosing to differ from the United States in regards to 
policy on Iran.135
Limitations on Japan ’s Iran policy in the early 1990s due to US influences
While Japan persisted in its position of engagement with Iran, it reconsidered its policies 
to some extent after Clinton made the Conoco decision. In June 1995, Japan and the 
European Union (EU) announced their decision not to follow the US line, but did decide 
to freeze their loans to Iran.136 As a result, Japan was forced to postpone its second loan
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132 “Japan denies ransom offer for hostage in Iraq”, Jiji Press News Service, 2 November 2004. Although 
unrelated to Iranian terrorism, the recent hostage of Japanese citizens in the aftermath of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom by an Iraqi insurgence group shows continuity in the Japanese approach of 
engagement and negotiation with terrorist groups, and the fundamentally different approach Japan 
takes in comparison to the United States.
133 Komatsu, “Iran eno Enshakkan”, p. 19.
134 Yasuhiro Takeda, “Minshuka Seisaku wo meguru Nichi-Bei Tairitsu no Katsufuku” (“Overcoming 
US-Japan Conflict on Democratisation Policy”, The Okazaki Institute, http://www.okazaki- 
inst.jp/alliance-pro-jap/takeda.jap.html, accessed 22 August 2006.
135 From Aesop’s fable “The Sun and the North Wind”, where the sun and north wind have a competition 
to see which would be able to get a man’s coat off first. The north wind blew as hard as it could and 
the man pulled his coat more tightly around him, whereas the sun beamed down on the man and was 
successful in getting the coat off.
136 Komatsu, “Iran eno Enshakkan”, p. 19.
CHAPTER FOUR 176
of ¥48.5 billion as a compromise to US pressure.137. However, US disapproval of 
Japan’s engagement with Iran was somewhat unconvincing, given that major US oil 
companies were trading Iranian oil work US$3.5 billion at the time.138 Japanese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Under-secretary Kunihiko Saitö gave a statement expressing this, 
where he objected to the freeze and emphasised that the isolation of Iran would not 
achieve “the Iran that we want to see”— one that would be open to the potential of 
stability and engagement with the rest of the international community.139 Despite this 
Japanese criticism, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act was implemented, which was 
criticised not only by Japan and the European Union, but also US domestic businesses.140
The early post-Cold War period thus showed continuing differences in Japanese 
and US policies regarding Iran. The 1990s were marked by Iran remaining important to 
Japan as a major oil supplier, and Japan’s attempts to downplay US concerns about 
improving its political and economic relations with Iran. While this autonomous policy 
was successful initially, the United States continued to pressure Japan to reduce its 
interactions with Iran in the 1990s despite the end of the Cold War, and the greater 
autonomy of foreign policy that was anticipated did not eventuate. The lack of crisis 
situations compared to the previous decade worked both for and against Japan’s 
engagement with Iran. On the one hand there were few diplomatically difficult situations 
where the United States required urgent response and support, giving Japan greater 
leeway to pursue a policy of engagement as a consequence. On the other hand, Japan 
could not argue that its relations were necessarily beneficial to the United States in 
terms of intelligence gathering, and was therefore more prone to pressure from the 
United States over enduring problems such as terrorism.
The United States therefore viewed Japan’s continuing engagement with Iran as 
problematic, but the early 1990s signified a brief period where Japan’s foreign policy 
became less restricted by US interests and when an autonomous Iran policy was easier 
to maintain. Japan kept the option for eventual US engagement with Iran open while 
still enabling the United States to maintain its hard-line rhetoric as the hegemon. Japan 
accommodated certain US pressures along the way, but it was largely able to argue an
137 Akitoshi Miyashita, “Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate”, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, 1999, pp. 695-732, p. 704.
138 Komatsu, “Iran eno Enshakkan”, p. 19.
139 Sakai, “Seiki Matsu no Perusha wan to Nihon Gaiko” p. 99.
140 Claude Salhani, “Double peril from Iran”, The Washington Times, 1 May 2006.
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autonomous line that engagement with Iran was crucial for Iran’s development and 
stability in the region, without this necessarily signifying a rift with the US position.
Iran and the Bush Doctrine
While the 1990s represented some easing in the tensions between Japan and the US 
policies toward Iran, Iran was singled out by the United States as being part of the “Axis 
of Evil” after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and also became bolder in its 
nuclear development activities. As a consequence, Japan has found it increasingly 
difficult to “conceal a gulf between the Bush administration”141 and ignore US pressure, 
in particular to follow through with the development of the Azadegan oil field. The next 
section addresses Japan’s attempts to push forward with its controversial oil field 
project in Iran, despite growing international concerns over terrorism and the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. While still an ongoing issue, the 
pressure faced by Japan regarding the Azadegan oil field project demonstrates that 
autonomous Japanese foreign policy in Iran continues to be restricted by US demands; 
and the potential that Japan may modify its involvement is high.
US Concerns over Iran and Nuclear Development
The perception of Iran as a dangerous, hard-line Islamic nation driven by anti-US 
nationalism continued under the current administration led by George W. Bush and 
forms the backbone of current US policy towards Iran. This is despite the fact that Iran 
co-operated with the United States after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. 
During the subsequent war in Afghanistan, Iran shut its borders so that al-Qaeda fighters 
would remain in Afghanistan, supplied food and arms to the Northern Alliance,142 and 
allowed the United States aircraft to make emergency landings in Iran.143 Iran was 
praised by the United States for its constructive participation in the Bonn talks to 
establish a new interim government in Afghanistan, 144 and Iran also supported
141 “Japan-US Summit: Gaps in view on Axis of Evil Issue; Japan at great pains to persuade ‘hard-line’ 
US”, Mainichi Shimbun, 14 September 2002, p. 2.
142 Brumberg, “End of a Brief Affair?”, p. 1.
143 Osamu Miyata, “Nihonjin to Iranjin: Shirarezaru Isuramu Taikoku” (“The Japanese and the Iranians: 
The Unknown Islamic Great Power”), Economist, Japanese Edition, vol. 81, no. 6, 4 February 2003, 
pp. 80-89, p. 81.
144 Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism”, p. 90.
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Afghanistan financially by giving US$560 million—the largest donation from a 
developing state.145
However, despite Iranian overtures to the United States, the latter has only 
hardened its position, and indeed Bush named Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” in 
January 2002,146 arguing that Israeli intelligence had intercepted a ship carrying 
50 tonnes of weapons and explosives originating from Iran and heading for Palestine.147 
The Iranian government was also accused of hiding al-Qaeda terrorists within its 
borders.148 The United States argued that reformists within Iran, such as President 
Khatami, had only limited influence, and that the United States should therefore take a 
pessimistic and cautious outlook on Iran.149
In addition to its connections with terrorism, the United States has recently been 
more concerned about Iran’s alleged development of weapons of mass destruction. 
Throughout the 1990s, Western analysts had been aware of Iranian nuclear activity, but 
assumed that lack of technology limited the nuclear capacities of the Bushehr plant.150 
However, US intelligence reports revealed in early 2003 that a gas centrifuge uranium 
enrichment plant in Natanz, Central Iran, was nearly ready for a pilot run.151 Michael 
Green argues that “Iran could be anywhere from five to 10 years away from having 
nuclear weapons” particularly “if Iran received help from North Korea—or from rogue 
scientists from Russia or China”.152 There are many problematic aspects of Iranian 
nuclear development, the three main issues being transparency; the actual need for an 
alternative energy source; and also conversion of civilian uranium usage to nuclear 
weapons.
145 Miyata, “Nihonjin to Iranjin”, p. 81.
146 State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002, The White House Website, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-ll.html, accessed 10 May 2006.
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149 Miyata, “Nihonjin to Iranjin”, p. 81.
b0 The Bushehr plant was constructed in the 1970s, under Reza Shah with the assistance of German 
technology. Therefore, the problem of Iranian nuclear development is not an issue particular to the 
Islamic Republic. See David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran: Furor over Fuel”, Bulletin o f the 
Atomic Scientists, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 12-15.
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On issues of transparency, although a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT),153 Iran has proved unwilling to accept new regulations that require states 
to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with plant design 
information at the time of construction authorisation, and has also refused to sign an 
additional protocol (the 93+2 Protocol) that gives the IAEA more authority to 
investigate clandestine nuclear activity.154 This has allowed Iran to develop not only two 
nuclear development plants, but one with heavy-water production capabilities for 
uranium enrichment, and has confirmed its failure to disclose the importation of nuclear 
material.155 There is also significant debate in the United States over whether Iran, a 
country rich in oil and natural gases, actually needs an alternative energy strategy.156 
Iranian hard-line clerics have argued the need to develop nuclear capacities as a more 
effective deterrent, and are quick to dismiss US criticisms on acquiring nuclear 
capabilities by frequently changing the focus of any discussion from a need for Iran to 
acquire nuclear technology to the right for such technology.157 This argument further 
fuelled US fears that nuclear development in Iran was more a challenge to the existence 
of an exclusive nuclear club, rather than an issue of national security.158
Former President Khatami and other moderates have called for the signing of the 
additional protocol and have emphasised the need to balance nuclear ambitions with
153 There are three pillars of the NPT. The first calls for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
stipulates that only five nuclear countries can possess nuclear weapons—France, China, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.‘Under the Treaty, these five states nuclear weapons states 
(NWS) are not permitted to transfer nuclear technology or weapons to other states, and other states 
must not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The second pillar calls for NWS to reduce existing nuclear 
weapons and not to take threatening postures that might induce other non-NWS to acquire nuclear 
weapons. The third pillar allows NWS and other states the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. In particular, Iran cites this third pillar to justify its desire to develop nuclear 
capabilities. See “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html, United Nations Website, accessed 20 September 
2006.
154 Albright and Hinderstein, “Iran: Furor over Fuel”, p. 12.
155 Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Calculations”, p. 12.
156 The reason given by the Iranian government is that fuel consumption has doubled in the past 11 years, 
whereas oil production has decreased and, given that Iran’s main source of foreign revenue is from oil, 
strategies to maintain its valuable resources are needed. The proposed plant in Natanz is said to be 
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reactor when completed. This energy capacity is said to be standard for plants the size of Bushehr and 
Natanz, but fears that such facilities could also be used to make approximately three nuclear weapons 
a year endure. The two plants do not make Iran’s nuclear capacities as advanced as the current 
capabilities of North Korea, but more advanced than its neighbour Iraq prior to the recent Operation 
Iraq Freedom. See Albright and Hinderstein, p, 14; “Iran Genpatsu Kensetsu Kaku wa Bei Koshö 
Zairyö” (“Iran builds Nuclear Reactor, Nuclear [Issue] Formula for US Negotiations”), Mainichi 
Shimbun, Morning edition, 28 December 2002, p. 7; Chubin and Litwak, p. 101.
157 “Answers to Questions”, Farda, no. 10, May 1999 as quoted in Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear 
Calculations”, p. 24. Farda is a moderate Iranian journal that is associated with the Foreign Ministry.
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responsibilities to the international community. On the other hand, hard-line clerics fear 
that the IAEA will pass on information gathered during inspections to US intelligence 
agents.159 Despite the divide within Iran, American analysts such as Kenneth M. Pollack 
argue that the sheer fact that anti-US ideology of the conservative clerics still exists 
within Iran makes its nuclear development a problem. Iran has supported anti-US 
terrorism since the Second World War and, while its anti-Americanism is not as strong 
as immediately after the Iranian Revolution, Pollack argues that caution is still needed in 
ascertaining Iranian nuclear intent.160
US Pressure on Japan in the Context o f the “War on Terror”
The most controversial conflict regarding current Japanese policy towards Iran in the 
context of the Bush Doctrine and the “War on Terror” involves the development of the 
Azadegan oil field. On 19 February 2004, Japan announced that it had signed an 
agreement to develop this extensive oil field through Inpex Corporation, Japan’s biggest 
oil exploration company in which the government has a 36 percent control.161 It 
announced that it would be spending US$2.5 billion to develop the Azadegan oil field— 
said to be the biggest untapped oil field in the Gulf region, containing an estimated 
26 billion barrels.162
The Japanese government had first gained a favourable negotiation position when 
President Khatami visited Tokyo in November 2000.163 Rights to develop the Azadegan 
oil fields were crucial, given that Japan’s Arabian Oil Company lost its concession in 
the Saudi Arabian KhaQi oil field in February 2000.164 Japan gave a loan of US$3 billion 
to Iran in 2001; a move that was widely criticised by the United States.165 To further
159 “Uran Nöshuku Keikaku Teishi, Iran Köritsu Kaihi, EU to Böeki Köshö Zenshin Kitai”, (“Uranium 
Enrichment stopped, Iran avoids Isolation, Anticipation for trade negotiations with the EU”), Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, Morning edition, 22 October 2003, p. 6.
160 Kenneth M. Pollack and Suzanne Maloney, “Why Iran’s Nuclear Development is a Problem”, Ronza, 
vol. 117, February 2005, pp. 299-305, pp. 300-301.
161 “Our Business: Middle East”, Inpex Corporation Website, http://www.inpex.co.jp/english/business/ 
project/middle_east-02.html, accessed 28 July 2006; George Nishiyama, “Japan walks diplomatic 
tightrope over Iran crisis”, Reuters News, 14 February 2006.
162 “Japan hopes for stronger ties with Iran”, Agence France-Presse, 17 March 2004; Peter Alford, 
“Japan the sushi in sandwich between the US and Tehran”, The Australian, 8 February 2006, p. 40.
163 “Sekiyu Jishu Kaihatsu eno Nagai Michi” (The Long road to independent oil production), Asahi 
Shimbun, Morning edition, 4 April 2004, p. 5; Öno, “Tachiba ga wakareta Nichibei”, p. 94.
164 Anonymous, “US, Japan may collide over Tokyo’s Iranian oil overtures”, Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 
98, no. 21, 22 May 2000, p. 30; Yöichi Funabashi, “Japan mustn't lose its footing in politics of oil,” 
Asahi Shimbun, 1 July 2003.
165 “Japan Plans Second Iran Loan to Secure Oil amid US Protests”, Iran Expert, accessed at 
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guarantee stability of supply, the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) 
announced on 25 March 2004 that it would grant a loan of US$1.2 billion (jointly with 
four major Japanese banks) to Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).166 Crucially, 
this second loan carried a term stipulating that Iran “must make an effort to increase its 
crude oil supplies to Japan if an emergency erupts in the Middle East”,167 demonstrating 
the importance of stable supplies of oil.
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Map 4.2 Location of the Azadegan oil field.
The sense of urgency to secure the deal was heightened when the Iranian Deputy 
Foreign Affairs Minister for Asia-Pacific Affairs Mohsen Aminzadeh delivered a 
message to the Japanese government notifying it of competition from Europe and China 
to develop Azadegan and not to “miss the bus”.168 In achieving the deal, one Japanese 
official stated “Of course the US had to say that they were ‘disappointed’ with the deal
166 Eric Watkins, “Japan gains funding for Azadegan Oil Field Development”, Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 
102, no. 15, 19 April 2004, pp. 26-29, p. 26.
167 Watkins, “Japan gains funding for Azadegan”, pp. 26-27.
“Sekiyu Jishu Kaihatsu eno Nagai Michi”, Asahi Shimbun, p. 5.168
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due to their strong attitude against Iran, but we have continually kept them informed and 
updated on the Azadegan situation.”169
In reaching this agreement, Japan needed to overcome strong pressure from the 
United States. Prime Minister Koizumi revealed to reporters “that President Bush had 
said to him that there was a limit to his patience” and that “[Bush] tried to hint to Iran 
how strongly the US was irritated”170 after a summit meeting with the US President 
before his trip to North Korea in 2002. US concerns were fourfold:
[T]he US cites several reasons why it has made...a request [to suspend the 
development of the Azadegan oil field] to Japan: 1) Japan’s continuation of the 
Azadegan oil project would greatly boost Iran’s fiscal revenue and could help that 
country to promote its nuclear program; 2) it would bolster Iran’s national strength 
and thereby help expand the political power of nuclear weapons; 3) it could disturb 
international nuclear development; and 4) if a resolution for imposing sanctions on 
Iran were adopted at the UN Security Council, an embargo on the sale of Iranian 
oil and a prohibition of oil-related investments in that country would likely be 
implemented, and in such a case, Japan’s project would violate them.171
Japan was close to sealing the deal with Iran as early as July 2003, but 
negotiations came to a standstill because the United States suggested implementing the 
Iran and Libya Sanction Bill.172 In the same month, US President George W. Bush raised 
Japan’s involvement with Iran as “a problem” in US-Japan relations in a telephone 
discussion with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.173 Vice-director of the 
Centre of Strategic and International Studies Patrick M. Cronin also commented that 
Iran is an issue area where there are gaps in approach between the United States and 
Japan, and a subject where co-operation is difficult.174
Although the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained optimistic, oil 
executives feared that a deal could not be made finalised given such strong negative 
attitudes from Washington.175 After Japan concluded its negotiations with Iran, US State 
Department spokesman Richard Boucher expressed opposition to Inpex Corporation’s 
actions saying that the US government was “concerned about such deals and 
disappointed that these things might go forward” despite Japan knowing “the
169 Watkins, “Japan gains funding for Azadegan oil field”, p. 29.
170 “Japan-US Summit: Gaps in view on Axis of Evil Issue”, Mainichi Shimbun.
171 Watkins, “Japan gains funding for Azadegan oil field”, p. 29.
172 Kazuyuki Öno, “Sekiyu wo Kakuho Seyo! Nihon ga Senryaku Daitenkan”, (“Secure oil! Japan 
Changes its Strategy 180 Degrees”), Shükan Töyö Keizai, vol. 5886, 24 April 2004, pp. 90-95, p. 94.
173 “Sekiyu Jishu Kaihatsu eno Nagai Michi”, p. 5.
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CHAPTER FOUR 183
fundamental concerns about Iran’s nuclear developments, about Iran’s support for 
violent groups that oppose the peace process, Iran’s harbouring and support of 
terrorists”.176
A major factor behind Japan’s optimism again lay in the EU’s position on its 
relations with Iran, and the fact that European oil companies were operating without 
being the targets of US sanctions.177 Despite US objections, Japan maintained the 
support of the European Union with regard to the position of engagement with Iran as in 
past decades. The United Kingdom, France and Germany had negotiated a freeze on 
uranium enrichment and IAEA inspection in October 2003 and, while the inspections 
were not implemented smoothly, European nations continue to emphasise the need to 
nurture the democratic movement led by the reformists in Iran.178 European and Japanese 
support for continued engagement, rather than punitive policies of the United States, 
have in effect isolated the United States on the issue of Iran.
However, more recently, Iran’s persistent emphasis on its right to develop nuclear 
facilities and subsequent US pressures have produced changes in the Japanese position. 
In February 2006, Japan attempted to use its relations with Iran to encourage it to 
abandon uranium enrichment before the issue was taken up by the UN Security 
Council.179 Japanese Foreign Minister Tarö Asö warned that Iran’s nuclear activities 
were causing a decline in its international credibility and suggested that it accept the 
Russian offer to provide Iran with the enriched uranium necessary for its nuclear 
program. 180 However, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected these 
suggestions, emphasising that it was only engaged in “research activities.”181
Japan consequently began to distance itself from Iran in March, as exemplified by 
Japan’s largest refiner Nippon Oil’s decision to curb its purchases of Iranian crude oil by 
15 percent for 2006.182 Government officials have argued that Nippon’s decision was a 
company decision and did not represent an official position of the Japanese government,
175 Reuters, “Japan’s Oil Needs result in slippery relations with US”, 8 July, 2003.
176 “Japan Plans Second Iran Loan to Secure Oil amid US Protests”, Iran Expert.
177 Bayan Rahman and David Pilling, “Japan’s Oil Needs result in slippery relations with US”, Financial 
Times (UK), 7 August 2003.
178 “Iran eno Bei Kyökösaku ni Usui Shiji” (“Little support for US hard-line strategy towards Iran”), 
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179 Peter Alford, “Japan leans on Iran over uranium”, The Australian, 28 February 2006.
180 Alford, “Japan leans on Iran”.
181 Eric Watkins, “Nuclear Iran worries Japan”, Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 104, issue 11, 20 March 2006, 
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while analysts at Deutsche Bank have assessed this move as an “ad hoc sanction”, 
suggesting that it was not a manifestation of changes in long-term policy.183 Nippon 
Oil’s decision came at a time when the US Congress was preparing to pass a bill calling 
for tighter sanctions on Iran and stipulating the requirements for investigations of 
suspected investments in Iran.184 This bill, passed in April 2006, replaced the 1996 Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act. Section 206 urges government and private sector investors to 
deny companies investing more than US$20 million into Iran’s petroleum sector.185
Japan’s cautious actions suggest its realisation that should discussions at the UN 
Security Council fail, further discussions of sanctions on Iran might be led by the United 
States.186 However, Japan did not voice a strong stance on economic sanctions when the 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 regarding Iran’s refusal to 
halt its nuclear development187 and, despite Tehran’s refusal to stop uranium enrichment, 
the development of the Azadegan oil field continues.188
Thus, the context of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the “War on Terror” again 
signify an intensified crisis situation in which the United States has strongly reasserted 
its hard-line position toward Iran. While Japan has maintained its autonomous position 
of engagement with Iran and undertaken negotiations to develop the Azadegan oil field, 
US pressures and concerns over Iranian nuclear development has seen Japan modify its 
activities through gestures of appeasement toward the United States, such as Asö’s calls 
for halting uranium enrichment, and the diminished crude oil importations of Nippon 
Oil. These changes in Japan’s policies demonstrate that, while sustaining a long-term 
policy of engagement with Iran, in the short-term, the Japanese government can neither
183 “Japan curbs Iran oil imports over nuclear concerns” Financial Times.
184 “US Congressional Committee approves Iran democracy promotion legislation”, Foundation for 
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ignore the Bush administration’s policy on Iran nor those autonomous initiatives that 
continue to be restricted by broader US interests.
Conclusion: “There is No Alliance on the Issue of Oil” ? 189
This chapter reveals that Japan’s policy toward Iran following the Second World War 
has been one area where autonomy is most obviously demonstrated in policy, actions, 
and language. Ever since the oil crisis of the early 1970s, Japanese policy has advocated 
“autonomy” and “independence” in its policies in the Middle East and Iran, under the 
catch-phrase of dokuji gaikö (independent diplomacy). Advocates of dokuji gaikö argue 
that Japan’s Iran and Middle East policy should consist of engagement with Iran to 
influence change in Iranian policy without necessarily changing the Islamic regime, and 
also mediating in negotiations between the United States and Iran. In practice, Japan has 
largely followed this policy line for three decades, and has maintained relations with 
Iran throughout this period, despite pressure to the contrary from the United States.
This autonomous position of engagement with Iran was an essential part of 
Japan’s energy policy to secure stable oil supplies. However, the issue of oil was also 
strategically and economically important for the United States, as demonstrated in its 
decision not to allocate any of its oil supplies to Japan during the first oil crisis. 
Consequently, it was no surprise that a senior Japanese bureaucrat in the Japanese 
Energy Agency remarked, “there is no alliance on the issue o f oil”.190 Oil diplomacy was 
an issue that seemingly put the United States and Japan in direct competition with each 
other, and securing stable and independent oil supplies from non-major US oil 
companies was a major goal for Japan. However, this chapter also shows that Japan’s 
autonomous policy did not necessarily signify the pursuit of zero-sum interests with the 
United States, but rather remained within the broader interests and framework of the 
US-Japan alliance. This fact was acknowledged by the United States when it recognised 
the utility of Japan’s relations with Iran as a communication channel.
Despite the benefits to the United States of Japan’s good relations with Iran, it was 
nonetheless difficult for Japan to balance its interests in Iran with its other crucial 
interest in maintaining the alliance relationship with the United States. Therefore,
189 Japanese Energy Agency, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry executive statement, as quoted in 
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Japan’s Iran policy periodically conceded to US pressure and recognised that its 
relations with the United States were more important than securing stable oil supplies. 
While Japan’s long-term goals were quite independent from the United States on the 
issue of oil and Iran, at the same time it clearly faced short-term pressures and 
restrictions imposed by its relations with the United States. Accordingly, Japan’s 
autonomy cannot always be explained as an outcome of a sovereign state’s freedom and 
independence of choice in policy implementation relative to its capabilities. Rather, 
Japan-Iran relations showed that Japan’s decisions were affected by its identity as a 
subordinate partner to the United States under US hegemony. Japan needed to 
frequently negotiate with the United States and demonstrate that polices contrary to the 
US line were within the boundaries of US hegemony and that, therefore, autonomous 
policies did not signify a challenge to the US-Japan alliance or the US position in the 
Middle East.
This chapter set out to investigate the many ways in which the United States 
presented obstacles for Japan’s relations with Iran throughout the post-1945 period. It 
set out to answer three specific questions: why Japan continually chose to engage with 
Iran, even at the risk of conflicting with US policy; how the United States interpreted 
autonomous Japanese policy; and how the Japanese government overcame US pressures 
so as to maintain Japan’s autonomous position on relations with Iran?
Firstly, as mentioned above, Japan consistently maintained a policy of engagement 
with Iran for the entire post-Second World War period in order to ensure that it had a 
stable supply of oil. The issue of oil was closely related to the ability of Japan to sustain 
domestic economic stability and international influence as an economic power, thus 
making it an area beyond compromise for policymakers. However, in reality, Japan 
could not secure autonomous oil supplies without taking into account pressure from the 
United States to co-ordinate its policies. Therefore, because of the importance of the 
United States to Japan, the pursuit of an autonomous policy toward Iran also had to be 
consistently within the context of the US-Japan alliance, and Japan made strenuous 
efforts to accommodate US interests, and to ensure its policies were not perceived as a 
move away from US hegemony. To demonstrate this, during the US hostage crisis after 
the Iranian Revolution from late 1979 to early 1981, Japan was pressured to disengage 
with Iran, with the United States saying that Japan was “insensitive” by purchasing 
Iranian oil at a high price when the United States was taking various economic measures
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to solve the hostage crisis. Japan was also criticised for not pressuring Iran to repay its 
financial debts. In the 1990s, Japan was also forced to postpone its yen loans in response 
to US pressure. More recently, Japan’s largest, most ambitious and controversial 
dealings with Iran, the Azadegan oil field development project, have come under US 
pressure, particularly from the heightened tensions of the “War on Terror”. The US 
Congress is preparing to pass a bill calling for tighter sanctions on Iran and stipulating 
the requirements for investigations of suspected investments in Iran. As a consequence, 
Japan’s largest refiner, Nippon Oil, began to distance itself from Iran by curbing 
purchases of Iranian crude oil by 15 percent.
Secondly, how did the United States interpret Japan’s autonomous position with 
regard to Iran? While US-Iran relations have been consistently acrimonious from the 
1970s onwards, whether Japan’s autonomous Iran policy was perceived positively or 
negatively by the United States largely depended on whether US relations with Iran were 
facing crisis. Japan’s policies towards Iran were most contentious and at odds with those 
of the United States during the US hostage crisis, and also in the current context of the 
“War on Terror”. These two periods have revealed the most vocal expressions of US 
discontent in relation to Japan’s Iran policy, because the United States has interpreted 
such moves by Japan as trying to profit economically from its relationship with a “rogue 
state”. In these instances, the United States has perceived Japan as fundamentally 
prioritising mercantilist interests, and questioned Japan’s loyalty to its alliance with the 
United States.
Finally, how did Japan overcome US pressures to maintain its long-term policy 
goal of continued engagement with Iran? Japan overcame the restrictions of US 
hegemony in its relations with Iran in several ways. Firstly, it made sure that its relations 
with Iran were useful to the US-Japan alliance. Japan held significant leverage over the 
United States precisely because it engaged with Iran, rather than following the US line 
of severing or limiting its diplomatic ties. As one of the few countries in the G7 that has 
maintained good relations with Iran, Japan’s engagement with Iran ultimately works in 
the favour of the United States. The United States can utilise the information and 
communication channels that Japan has cultivated, while maintaining its own hard-line 
rhetoric. Japan’s lack of colonial intervention in the region also enabled it to play a 
positive and autonomous role in the region, and Japan indeed often served as a mediator 
between Iran and the United States—sometimes successfully, and sometimes less so—
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yet not to the detriment of the US-Japan alliance. This was particularly true during the 
1980s when Japan was approached by both Iran and Iraq to be involved in brokering a 
ceasefire for the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, Japan’s oil diplomacy and the autonomous 
development and production of oil supplies are strong examples of Japan asserting its 
autonomy within the context of the US-Japan alliance.
Secondly, to achieve this autonomous line, Japan has relied heavily on the support 
of its European counterparts in taking an alternative position to the United States. 
Particularly, during the US Embassy hostage crisis, Japan resisted US pressure to 
condemn Iran by following the European example and recalling diplomatic 
representation in Tehran, rather than completely severing diplomatic relations.
Thirdly, Japan has also been able to overcome US pressure and pursue a policy of 
engagement with Iran because the United States itself was not willing to relinquish its 
own oil supplies during the oil crisis. In adopting this position, the United States 
consequently had to unofficially grant Japan leeway for autonomy on oil diplomacy, its 
relations with Iran and the Middle East in general. While Japan’s engagement may have 
seemed to undermine the unity between the allies behind the hard-line US position on 
Iran, if Japan, the second largest global economy, failed to guarantee a stable supply of 
oil, this would have significant repercussions on the US and global economy.
Finally, and most importantly, while Japan emphasises the positive light in which 
it is received in Iran and the Middle East, the other side of the same coin is the lack of 
real influence it has in the region. A glimpse of this was seen when Japan was snubbed 
in the first oil crisis by Arab states, unable to make the list of “friendly nations” to 
which the oil-producing Arab states would continue supplying oil. In other words, while 
Japan has economic influence in the Middle East through infrastructure development 
and trade, and has expressed some political interest in the region through hosting official 
conferences, it is by no means a major power in the region vying for influence.191 Indeed, 
a position of greater influence would be difficult for Japan, as the political instability of 
the region might oblige it to have a greater military presence. Therefore, Japan’s 
economic investment and political initiative in the Middle East has significantly 
different overtones from economic investment and political initiatives in Asia. Japan is a 
viable leadership contender in Asia, but not a realistic leader, mediator or power in the
191 Masayuki Yamauchi, “Wahei Purosesu ni Nihon wa Nani ga Dekiruka” Gaiko Foramu, vol. 10, no. 2, 
February 1997, pp. 16-29, p. 28.
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Middle East in the way the United States is. Therefore, Japan is not seen as a major 
threat to US hegemony in the Middle East.
In answering these three questions, Japan-Iran relations can be seen as an example 
of how Japan exercises a limited form of autonomy that is sensitive to external 
influences. In the example of its relations with Iran, Japan maintained a continuing 
position of engagement with Iran, but frequently demonstrated its commitment to the 
US-Japan alliance, and signalled to the United States that its different position on Iran 
did not signify movement away from the partnership. While Japan’s Iran policy took a 
different policy position to the United States, it nonetheless remained committed to the 
US-Japan alliance and conducted it within US hegemony. The United States also 
recognised that Japan required alternative avenues for securing oil supplies, and 
“allowed” Japan to pursue these policies, but this situation is becoming increasingly 
pressured. Furthermore, Japan proved the utility of its relationship with Iran within this 
hegemonic relationship, which ensured it enough leverage within the US hegemonic 
system and thus was not completely “nautonomous” in its relationship with the United 
States. Therefore, not only did Japan sustain an autonomous Iran policy within US 
hegemony, these policies did not balance US power in the region in anyway, as realists 
might argue. However, its restrictions clearly demonstrate that autonomy in Japanese 
foreign policy is not executed with the freedom and independence of behaviour which 
rationalist theories often assume.
The next chapter continues the investigation of specific examples of limited 
autonomy through the analysis of Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund proposal in 1997. The 
proposal represents a crushing blow to an initiative in Japan’s strongest and most 
competent field—financial issues—due to US concerns over financial influence in the 
East Asian region.
CHAPTER FIVE
A CLASH OF ECONOMIC IDEOLOGIES? JAPANESE REGIONAL 
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY INITIATIVES IN THE WAKE OF 
THE ASIAN MONETARY FUND PROPOSAL
The previous chapter explored how restricted autonomy in Japanese foreign policy 
unfolded in Japan-Iran relations during the post-Second World War period in the 
context of its subordinate position under US hegemony. This chapter explores restricted 
Japanese autonomy further through an examination of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
proposal of 1997. It analyses how the proposal was ultimately sensitive to US and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) criticism, and thus how autonomy is more limited in 
the practice of Japanese foreign policy. The AMF proposal also shows that Japan 
nonetheless remains committed to the US-Japan alliance and within US hegemony in 
general because both Japan and Asian region as a whole stood to benefit from US 
political, economical and military influence. Thus Japan’s post-1945 identity in 
international relations as a subordinate partner to the United States under US hegemony 
again affected the way in which it practised autonomy. In particular, it seeks to answer 
three specific questions: why Japan made such a controversial proposal that outwardly 
challenged US and IMF influence in the region; how the United States and the IMF 
perceived the AMF proposal; and how Japan overcame strong US objections in order to 
keep the AMF vision alive.
The example of the AMF differs from Japan’s relations with Iran in more than one 
respect. Japan-Iran relations were a bilateral issue of resource diplomacy, whereas the 
AMF proposal concerned regional monetary policy. The focus and scope of the two 
examples also differ, as Chapter Four discussed Japan’s restricted autonomy within US 
strategy towards Iran since the Second World War, whereas the analysis of restricted 
autonomy in the AMF example covers a decade, and also assesses autonomous policies 
in the ongoing and future projections of a potential AMF. However, Japan’s relations 
with Iran and the AMF proposal also share some crucial similarities. Firstly, although 
realists may argue that, because of its economic power, Japan would have greater 
freedom in formulating economic policies that conflict with those of the United States, 
the example of the AMF demonstrates that Japan also faced similar restrictions imposed 
by the United States in this area as it did in Japan-Iran relations, suggesting parallels
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between the two cases. Indeed, it can be argued that, in this case, Japan was operating 
under even greater restrictions placed on it because of its significant influence in 
economic and monetary areas which could see it pose a credible challenge to the United 
States in the region. Furthermore, international economic relations, particularly in the 
case of Japan, are generally an outlet for its strategic and political positioning in 
international relations, and should be analysed with this in mind. Secondly, while the 
AMF proposal was quickly quashed by the United States, the objections were overcome 
by establishing regional monetary networks that essentially modified the AMF proposal 
to appease the United States. The modified monetary initiatives made in the wake of the 
AMF proposal also share a similar pattern of process with Japan-Iran relations in that 
they proceeded, despite US objections. Therefore, both are examples which show the 
need for Japan to balance the interests of the United States with its own interests, while 
at the same time sustaining autonomous foreign economic policy within these limits. In 
addition, unlike the US perspectives at the time, the AMF and the subsequent regional 
monetary networks established afterwards were definitely moves away from US 
financial influence, but not necessarily against overall US hegemony in the region. 
Therefore, because of Japan’s continued concerns over its position vis-ä-vis the United 
States, the facets of Japan’s autonomy that were manifest in the AMF proposal and the 
regional monetary arranges that followed were restricted, yet not examples of 
nautonomy.
The Asian Monetary Fund was a proposal that was strongly driven by a single 
person, Eisuke Sakakibara, the then Vice Minister for International Finance in the 
Ministry of Finance, and an element of its failure was not just US opposition, but also a 
lack of domestic support. Whilst Sakakibara’s un-Japanese personality sometimes 
alienated him from the rest of Japanese bureaucracy, he sought to establish and 
strengthen a Japanese economic and financial identity that was not reliant on “the 
universal value of Americanism” . 1 Sakakibara’s attitude toward US financial hegemony 
as manifested in his Asian Monetary Fund proposal is a fascinating and important 
example for this investigation of Japanese autonomy. Although controversial in his 
delivery, this thesis argues that Sakakibara’s AMF proposal presents an example that 
grapples with the kinds of questions and tensions between internal and external ideas
l Edmund L. Andrews, “Blunt-Spoken Economist is Japan’s Mr. Yen”, The New York Times, 16 
September 1995. Sakakibara has been described as “[taking] a distinctly un-Japanese enjoyment in 
provoking heated arguments”.
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that Japanese political philosophers dealt with in the face of modernity, and searches for 
a Japanese practice of state autonomy. Thus, although his ideas or his view of Japanese 
and US financial values may not have been widely accepted in the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance at the time, it is still a pertinent example for this study.
The chapter addresses the above questions by first briefly following the 
background circumstances to the AMF proposal. It analyses the development of the 
Asian financial crisis and its aftermath in order to highlight the differences in responses 
between Japan, the IMF and the United States. This background is important because it 
draws attention to the deeper implications of these diverging responses, such as residual 
US suspicion toward Japan and economic regionalism from the East Asian Economic 
Caucus proposal of the early 1990s, and also fundamentally different development 
philosophies.2 Finally, it covers how Japan dealt with the rejection of the proposal and 
discusses the significance of the ensuing regional monetary networks, which 
demonstrate the tenacity of Japanese autonomous economic initiatives and vision in the 
region even after the quashing of the AMF proposal.
In discussing the AMF, a few clarifications are necessary. The Asian financial 
crisis has also been referred to as the East Asian financial crisis (despite originating in 
Thailand), and the Asian Monetary Fund has also often been discussed in the context of 
an “East Asian” monetary scheme. However, in most of these contexts, the geographical 
area of reference is consistent with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) +3 states—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, plus China, Japan and South Korea. This 
chapter refers to this region as “Asia”, and therefore, in this case, does not include 
Australia, South Asia or the Middle East.
The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal
The following section discusses the AMF proposal in detail, covering the history of a 
unified regional monetary institution within the Japanese government in the post-1945 
period, and demonstrating that Japan’s proposal in 1997 was not as impromptu as had 
been suggested at the time. It also shows that the discussion of whether or not to include 
the United States had been a long-standing issue in relation to the proposal.
2 John Williamson, (ed) Latin American Adjustment: How Much has Happened?, Washington D.C., 
Institute for International Economics, 1990.
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Despite the perception that it was an ill-planned idea at the time, when the 
Japanese proposed an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 it was not the first time such a 
suggestion had surfaced.3 The idea for creating a regional monetary fund first arose as 
early as 1966 with the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
Proponents of the idea suggested that an IMF equivalent in Asia would complement the 
activities of the ADB in the same way that the IMF complemented the activities of the 
World Bank.4 However, the idea did not take root because the founding actors of the 
ADB had difficulty in articulating clearly the role that a regional monetary fund would 
play.5 Furthermore, in the early years of the ADB, the pattern of currency crises seemed 
to suggest that such crises were limited to industrialised countries, which discounted 
most of Asia at the time.6
The idea of an AMF resurfaced again in the late 1980s when Asia’s emerging 
markets began to attract capital and, by 1995, it had progressed to become the focus of 
regular private forums amongst a group of incumbent and former Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) officials.7 Even at this point, there were varying views on the membership of the 
AMF; the primary difference being over whether or not the United States should be 
included. Some MOF officials had negative views about US dominance in the IMF and 
saw the United States in the area of finance as more as a competitor that worked against 
Japanese national interests in Asia. Others in the ministry felt that the United States 
ought to be included in a regional fund, viewing it as more of a co-operative ally in the 
region.8 Thus, the Asian Monetary Fund proposal of September 1997 already had a 
contentious history over the issue of US membership. Japan argued that the 1997 
proposal was not communicated to the United States as it did not participate in the Thai 
bailout, and because Japan believed that the United States would only accept an AMF, 
albeit reluctantly, in the situation of a fait accompli.9
Eisuke Sakakibara, who was a particularly strong advocate of the AMF, stated that 
Toyoo Gyöten and Hajime Shinohara of the Institute for International Monetary Affairs
3 Phillip Y. Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, Stanford Journal o f East Asian Affairs, 
vol. 3, no. 1, Spring, 2003, pp 93-104, p. 94.
4 Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Proposal”, p. 94.
3 Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 4.
6 Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 4.
7 Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 5.
8 Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 5.
9 Haruhiko Kuroda, Gen Kiriage (Appreciating the Yuan), Tokyo, Nikkei BP Shoten, 2004, p. 62; 
Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, p. 95.
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worked in close collaboration with Haruhiko Kuroda, the then Director of the 
International Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, to formulate the AMF proposal. Gyöten 
and Shinohara also discussed the idea for a regional monetary organisation, or an “Asian 
Monetary Organisation” in 1996 after Mexico’s rescue package from the United States 
and the IMF,10 on the assumption that the United States would not act as quickly or on 
such a scale in any crisis arising in Asia.* 11 An impetus to progress the AMF idea arose 
after the Asian financial crisis in July 1997, particularly because the IMF alone was 
unable to provide funds sufficient to rescue the nation from the throes of the crisis.12
The original Japanese AMF proposal was presented at the G7 gathering of finance 
ministers and central bankers just prior to the IMF meeting in Hong Kong in September 
1997.13 The then Japanese Finance Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka proposed to establish a 
fund of US$100 billion from contributions by member countries (China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines) that could be dispersed quickly to members or institutions without the 
cumbersome decision-making procedures of the IMF. 14 The potential speed for 
responding to crises through such a fund would help reduce the decline of confidence in 
the region and curtail the effects of crisis situations. It was reported later that Japan 
intended to contribute US$50 billion to the fund.15
The IMF traditionally set the limits of its rescue packages to four to five times the 
amount of a member’s quota, but Sakakibara argued that the AMF could potentially 
respond with greater flexibility than the IMF because it would not be bound by the 
IMF’s limit on the size of rescue packages.16 He also argued that the establishment of an 
AMF would mean pooled reserves and automated commitments and consequently cut
10 Eisuke Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi (The Day that shook Japan and the World), Tokyo, 
Chüö Köron Shinsha, 2000, p. 182. Also see Hajime Shinohara, “Chiiki kyöryoku to shite no Ajia 
Tsüka Kikö” (“An Asian Monetary Fund for Regional Co-operation”), Nihon Keizai Kenkyü Senta 
Kaihö (Japan Centre for Economic Research Bulletin), 1 December 1996, pp. 4-9, and Tsutomu 
Kikuchi, “East Asian Regionalism: A Look at the ‘ASEAN plus Three’ Framework”, Japan Review 
o f International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 23-45, p. 26.
11 Shinohara, “Chiiki kyöryoku”, p. 5.
12 Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, p. 93.
13 Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, p. 93.
14 Eric Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: A Case Study of Japanese Regional Leadership”,
Japan Economic Institute Report, no. 47, 19 December 1997,
http://www.jei.Org/Archieve/JEIR97/9747f.html#japan, accessed 3 September 2004; Anthony Rowley, 
Capital Trends, vol. 2, no. 13, Washington D.C., Nikkö Research Center (America) Inc, November 
1997, http://www.bu.edu/wgrimes/Thai6.html, accessed 26 August 2006.
15 ‘“Ajia Tsüka Kikin’ Kösö Nihon ga 500 Oku Doru Kyoshutsu e” (“The ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ Plan: 
Japan Contributes 50 Billion US Dollars”), Sankei Shimbun, 9 October 1997.
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down on the time-consuming consensus building and negotiation needed to create a 
rescue package in the wake of a financial crisis.17 He also hinted that the AMF might 
have less stringent conditions for receiving help and prescribe less drastic reforms, 
which proved popular among most regional finance ministers when Sakakibara raised it 
in informal discussions in August and September 1997.18
The proposal came as a surprise to many, because Japan had unusually put itself in 
direct competition with the United States and a US-dominated international 
organisation. It was also unexpected—particularly as it had originated from the Ministry 
of Finance, typically a conservative and cautious sector of the Japanese bureaucracy. 
The fact that the proposal became so publicly controversial was also attributed to the 
leadership styles of Kuroda and particularly Sakakibara. Phillip Lipscy argues that 
Sakakibara’s leadership in the AMF issue was crucial and that “more traditional MOF 
bureaucrats probably would have shied away from the sheer possibility that [an AMF 
proposal] would collide with the US Treasury and the IMF.” 19 While Sakakibara’s 
leadership and the timing of the crisis were certainly strong factors in the AMF being 
forcefully propelled into the regional discussion fora, a regional monetary fund was 
nonetheless a plan that had existed in the background of the Japanese financial world for 
almost three decades, and was a long-term goal in Japanese regional financial policy, 
rather than a project solely driven by Sakakibara.
Therefore, while the AMF proposal was seen as an idea that was not very well 
thought through and driven by a few strong personalities in the Japanese government, it 
was a concept with a long history of discussion in the Japanese government. Sakakibara, 
Kuroda, Gyöten and Shinohara accurately predicted before the Asian financial crisis that 
the response of the IMF and the United States might not be as efficient or as adequate as 
the situation might required, signalling to them that the AMF proposal was genuinely 
needed in the region.
16 P. Rapkin, “The United States, Japan and the power to block: the APEC and AMF cases”, The Pacific 
Review, vol. 14, no. 3, 2001, pp. 373-410, p. 395.
17 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”.
Is Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”.
19 Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, p. 95.
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Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal: The Asian Financial Crisis and the 
responses of the United States and the IMF
The Asian Financial Crisis
“The Asian Financial Crisis was of significant gravity that, in the words of Benjamin J. 
Cohen...it ‘provided one of those rare watershed moments when conventional wisdom 
could be seriously challenged’.”20 This quote gives the first clue as to why Japan made 
the contentious AMF proposal. The crisis suddenly raised several important issues, such 
as the crucial need to reconsider global financial structures, the need for a reassessment 
of the nature of capital flows, and the necessity for effective regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks in financial and corporate sectors of the emerging economies of Asia. 
However, more importantly, it was also a vital turning point in considering whether 
alternative financial and monetary solutions were necessary in the region, and 
readdressing some shortfalls of the IMF. As a consequence, the crisis itself was an 
important motivating factor behind Japan’s autonomous AMF proposal.
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea, which were the 
worst affected countries in the Asian financial crisis, all had relatively strong 
macroeconomic systems, strong export sectors and no serious inflation. Therefore, they 
did not show the typical signs that forewarn financial instability.21 For example, 
Thailand was actively encouraging foreign investment, and was experiencing high 
economic growth in the early 1990s—an annual growth rate of 8 percent.22 However, 
when this economic bubble burst, and share prices and real estate prices fell 
significantly in 1996, the Asian financial crisis ensued.22 By 13 May 1997, problems in 
Thailand’s economy were revealed24 and it faced a decline in exports as well as a sudden 
withdrawal of large amounts of international capital as domestic and foreign investors
20 G.W. Noble and J. Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis”, Gregory W. 
Noble and John Ravenhill, The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture o f Global Finance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 1-35, p. 34.
21 Noble and Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences”, p. 34.
22 Takehiko Kondö, Seiya Nakajima, Yasushi Hayashi (eds.), Ajia Tsüka Kiki no Keizaigaku (The 
Economics o f the Asian Financial Crisis), Tokyo, Marui Köbun, 1998, p. 19; Yoshihisa Önishi, Ajia 
Kyötsü Tsüka: Jitsugen eno Michishirube (An Asian Common Currency: Signposts for its 
Realisation), Tokyo, Sösösha, 2005, p. 80.
22 Charles S. Lee, “Not Again: Will South Korea go Thailand’s way?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
vol. 61,4 September 1997, p. 9.
24 Önishi, Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka, pp. 77-78; Lee, “Not Again”, p. 9, and Kenta Tsukada, “Sengo 60nen no 
Genten: Gekidö no En/Doru, Puraza Göi kara 20nen (5) Baburu go mo Kyütö” (“The Origins of 60
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lost confidence in the Thai baht.25 This led to doubts about whether the Thai government 
could maintain the pegged exchange rate between the Thai baht and the US dollar, and 
revealed weaknesses in Thailand’s foreign exchange rates mechanisms. The Thai 
government tried to defend the baht by intervening in the market, but eventually floated 
the currency on 2 July 1997 and sought IMF assistance on 28 July of the same year.26 
This set off a chain reaction in Asia, as cautious investors withdrew investment from 
other Asian economies with similar characteristics, causing the crisis to spread to 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Korea. To some degree each of these countries 
experienced the same cycle of dramatic currency depreciation, financial system failures
Years Post-War: The Yen/Dollar in Turmoil, 20 Years from the Plaza Accords (5) Sharp Rises even 
after the Bubble”), Mainichi Shimbun, 27 September 2005.
25 Nidhiprabha Bhanupong, “Economic Crises and Debt-Inflation Episodes in Thailand”, ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 301-18, p. 311.
26 Noble and Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences”, p. 2.
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and stock market collapse. In Indonesia, which had the largest foreign debt in Asia at the 
time (US$13 billion), the rupiah fell almost 30 percent in value against the US dollar 
following the events of July in Thailand,27 which led to the floating of the rupiah on 14 
August and request for IMF assistance on 8 October.28 Other economies in the region, 
such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and China, were also affected by the crisis indirectly 
through trade.29
At first, the causes of the crisis were blamed on “crony capitalism” particular to 
the Asian region— close government ties with business elites, regulations based on 
relations rather than rules, and states giving implicit or explicit guarantees that 
encouraged businesses to engage in unduly risky behaviour.30 However, as the crisis 
spread beyond Asia to Russia and Brazil, the effectiveness and stability of the 
contemporary global financial system itself also came into question. Richard P. Cronin 
summarises the situation as follows:
Economists and financial analysts differ somewhat over the exact causes of the 
collapse of currency and stock values and the likely severity and length of the 
setback for East Asia’s much vaunted economic dynamism. While each economy’s 
situation is distinct, most explanations for the crisis center around a combination 
of factors including:
excessive reliance on foreign borrowing by business enterprises and banks, 
and especially over-dependence on short-term debt;
over investment in real estate and excess manufacturing capacity;
inadequate supervision of financial institutions and politically influenced 
allocations of credit to unsound companies;
overly expansive fiscal and macroeconomic policies in several countries; and
declining terms of trade for countries whose currencies have been pegged 
closely to the U.S. dollar, which has been strengthening against the Japanese 
yen31
27 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Fund”.
28 Kondö, Nakajima, Hayashi (eds.), Ajia Tsüka Kiki no Keizaigaku, pp. 22-23.
29 Saori N. Katada, “Japan’s Counterweight Strategy: US-Japan Cooperation and Competition in 
International Finance” in Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (eds.), Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan 
Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 176-197, p. 179; 
Kondö, Nakajima, Hayashi (eds.), Ajia Tsüka Kiki no Keizaigaku pp. 22-23.
30 Saori N. Katada, “Japan and Asian Monetary Regionalisation: Cultivating a New Regional 
Leadership after the Asian Financial Crisis”, Geopolitics, vol. 7, no. 1, Summer 2002, pp. 85-112, 
p. 89; Noble and Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences”, p. 8.
31 Richard P. Cronin, “Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and 
Opinions”, CRS Report for Congress, no. 98-74, 28 January 1998, http://ncseonline.org/NLE/ 
CRSreports/economics/econ-56.cfm, accessed 28 August 2004.
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From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, large inflows of capital—particularly long­
term capital such as foreign direct investment—helped to finance Asia’s rapid economic 
development and growth. In the several years leading up to the crisis, however, 
countries had received large inflows of unhedged, short-term capital to finance long­
term projects, particularly in real estate.32 This situation was stable while the foreign 
lenders were willing to roll their loans over and real estate markets were strong, but 
stagnation in the market and exports resulted in a rapid build-up of non-performing 
loans.33 As a result, the ratios of short-term external debt to foreign exchange reserves 
rose to the point where doubts surfaced whether the loans could be repaid, and led to the 
rapid outflow of foreign capital.34
Consequently, the crisis heightened general awareness of some crucial issues 
concerning global financial structures, including an acknowledgement of regional 
domestic weaknesses—weaknesses which Japan thought could potentially be redressed 
by an institution like the AMF. Furthermore, there was no full understanding of the 
implications or the scope and magnitude of short-term capital flows, as well as a lack of 
concern over the volatile nature of capital flows.35 The crisis also accentuated the 
necessity for effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks in the financial and 
corporate sectors of the emerging economies of Asia.36 The Asian financial crisis 
therefore demonstrated that financial and monetary mechanisms could not be relied 
upon in their existing conditions, and that greater economic coherence in the region was 
necessary. These were the background issues that informed Japan’s decision to take the 
autonomous position of making the AMF proposal.
32 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”.
33 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”.
34 Noble and Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences”, p. 2.
35 Haruhiko Kuroda and Masahiro Kawai, “Strengthening regional financial co-operation in East Asia”, 
in Gordon de Brouwer and Yunjong Wang, Financial Governance in East Asia: Policy Dialogue, 
surveillance and cooperation, New York, Routledge Curzon, 2004, pp. 136-66, p. 137. It is now 
argued that the management of financial globalisation requires frameworks that reduce capital flow 
volatility and enhance domestic capacity to manage undesirable impacts of globalisation.
36 Kuroda and Kawai, “Strengthening regional financial cooperation”, p. 138. This encompasses issues 
such as improvements in the banking and financial sectors to ensure asset liability and to avoid non­
performing loans, improvements in the financial management capacities of corporations to maintain 
financial discipline, and the development of sound capital markets for alternative sources for 
domestic investments.
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The IMF and the United States versus Japanese Responses to the Asian Financial Crisis
The second factor that motivated Japan’s AMF proposal was the ineffective and 
misjudged responses of the United States and the IMF to the Asian financial crisis. As 
the financial crisis spread beyond Asia, the debate over whether crony capitalism or the 
consequences of short-term capital flows on existing global financial structures were to 
blame gave rise to different reactions from the IMF, the United States and Japan as the 
three major actors in the region.
The IMF initially assessed the crisis as a conventional demand-management 
problem requiring a prolonged monetary policy, and it therefore prescribed 
macroeconomic and structural adjustments that did not generate confidence and 
recovery.37 Because the crisis was in fact a financial system crisis that required 
supportive fiscal policy, the IMF packages and reaction were widely thought to have 
exacerbated, rather than alleviated, the crisis at critical times in 1997 and 1998.38 An 
example of this was the IMF’s inability to provide sufficient funds to rescue Thailand 
during the crisis,39 and its initial dismissal of the possible destabilising speculation in 
financial markets. Furthermore, it was unable to gather the support of the United States 
and Europe in dealing with the crisis at critical stages in 1997 and 1998.40 This fuelled 
the IMF’s reputation as being rigidly ideological in its analysis of hedge funds, and 
strengthened the regional perception of the IMF as a US-run and dominated institution 
that was inflexible and obsessed with protecting its own bureaucratic interests rather 
than being seen as an independent and reliable global player.4' It also raised the issue of 
whether the quotas of Asian countries in the IMF were commensurate with their relative 
economic weight, which further fortified the image of the IMF being an essentially 
Western-centric institution.42
The IMF also prescribed small fiscal adjustments, aimed at taking on some of the 
burden of external current account adjustment, in order to try and boost international
37 Gordon de Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia: A Changing Regional Financial Architecture”, Pacific 
Economic Papers, no. 324, Canberra, Australia-Japan Research Centre, 2002, pp. 2-4; Kuroda, Gen 
Kiriage, p. 62.
38 “Guröbaru Mane: Ajia deno IchijirushT Nihon no Shidöryoku Teika” (“Global Money: The Striking 
Decline of Japan’s Leadership in Asia”), Mainichi Economist, 10 January 2006.
39 The IMF was only able to offer 4 billion US dollars, a third of what was needed. See Amyx, “Moving 
Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 5.
40 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 5.
41 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 2.
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confidence in the crisis-hit countries. To accomplish this, it proposed signalling that the 
costs of the required bank restructuring would be met within existing budgets.43 As the 
crises progressed, private domestic demand collapsed, and it soon became apparent that 
even this extent of fiscal adjustment was extreme. In terms of monetary policy, the basic 
approach taken by the IMF was to tighten policies within the crisis-hit countries to 
counter some of the downward pressure on currencies, without attempting to hold on to 
any set target for the exchange rate to ensure a degree of flexibility in a highly uncertain 
environment. 44 The programs that the IMF prescribed were not initially successful in 
restoring confidence; capital continued to exit the crisis-affected countries and their 
currencies continued to depreciate even after the programs had been adopted. 45 Thus, 
contrary to initial projections of only a mild slowdown, the crisis-hit economies sank 
into deep recessions.
Criticism of the IMF policies in response to the Asian financial crisis was mostly 
on the IMF premise that the crisis was basically a liquidity panic resulting from short­
term foreign currency exposures, analogous to a bank run.46 It was therefore argued that 
the IMF approach only exacerbated the panic by giving investors the misleading 
impression that something was fundamentally wrong with these economies. From this 
perspective, structural reforms were a distraction that imposed costs on economies 
already coming under strain. 47 The fiscal and monetary tightening that was imposed 
damaged international confidence in the affected countries. It contributed to the 
economic downturn and raised fears of insolvency, consequently adding to downward 
pressure on their exchange rates. In hindsight, Masaru Yoshitomi and Kenichi Ohno 
argued that a more appropriate policy response was to concentrate on restoring 
confidence quickly by providing much more substantial financing to the affected 
countries through even larger official packages and imposing standstills and capital
42 For a discussion on the quota balance of Asian countries in the IMF, see David P. Rapkin and 
Jonathan R. Strand, “Is East Asia under-represented in the International Monetary Fund?”, 
International Relations o f the Asia-Pacific, vol. 3, 2003, pp. 1-28.
43 Jack Boorman, Timothy Lane, Marianne Schultze-Ghattas, Ales Bulif, Atish R. Ghosh, Javier 
Hamann, Alexandras Mourmouras, and Steven Phillips, “Managing Financial Crises: The Experience 
in East Asia”, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/107, June 2000, p. 8.
44 Boorman, Lane, Schultze-Ghattas, Bulif, Ghosh, Hamann, Mourmouras, and Phillips, “Managing 
Financial Crises”, p. 8.
45 Boorman Lane, Schultze-Ghattas, Bulif, Ghosh, Hamann, Mourmouras, and Phillips, “Managing 
Financial Crises”, p. 9.
46 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, 
Prospects”, Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 1-74; Rapkin, “The United 
States, Japan and the power to block”, p. 395.
47 Jason Furman, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia”, 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, vol. 2, pp. 1-135, p. 6.
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controls on private creditors to halt the rush of exiting capital.48 Monetary and fiscal 
polices should therefore have been eased rather than tightened from the outset so as to 
encourage economic activity. To the extent that structural reforms were needed, they 
should have been undertaken more gradually and only as the economies recovered from 
the affects of the crisis.
The US response to the crisis through the IMF was also weak. Because the IMF 
funds were in constant demand for large-scale rescues, this caused a severe drain on its 
resources, which the US administration could not finance at the time. Congress was 
strongly against US funding of IMF rescue packages, which was evidenced in the 
D’Amato Amendment passed by Congress after the financial crisis in Mexico in 1995.49 
The Amendment prohibited the US Treasury from using the Exchange Stabilisation 
Fund at the time of the Thai rescue package.50 Therefore, while the IMF agreed to 
increase quotas during the Asian financial crisis, the US administration was unable to 
make a contribution51.
In addition, the crisis spread throughout Asia at a time when the United States and 
Europe were experiencing strong economic growth, and the banks of most industrialised 
countries also had strong capital bases.52 As the crisis in Asia did not disrupt stability in 
the US and Europe, the sense of urgency to respond diminished, which explains the 
complacent reactions of both the United States and the European dominated IMF.53 As a 
consequence, these factors again reinforced the perception in Asia that the IMF was a 
Western-centric institution with little understanding of the region and was only willing 
to co-operate if states complied within a certain established economic and financial 
structure.
48 Masaru Yoshitomi and Kenichi Ohno, “Capital-Account Crisis and credit Contraction: A New Nature 
of Crisis Requires New Policy Papers”, Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper, Tokyo, 
Asian Development Bank Institute, no. 2, May 1999, p. 21; Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, 
p. 5.
49 The D’Amato Amendment was initiated by Alfonse D’Amato to prohibit funds being used for 
Exchange Stabilisation Funds (ESF) unless the President certified that there were no projected costs 
and that there was an assured source of repayment. It was passed as law in 1996. See J. Lawrence 
Broz, “The Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues”, American Journal o f Political 
Science, vol. 49, no. 3, July 2005, pp. 479-96, p. 484.
50 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 7.
51 Masayuki Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis and Japanese Policy Reactions”, in Geoffrey R. D. 
Underhill and Xiaoke Zhang (eds.), International Financial Governance under Stress: Global 
Structures versus National Imperatives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 223M2, 
p. 230.
32 Noble and Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences”, p. 2.
33 Noble and Ravenhill, “Causes and Consequences”, p. 2.
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In contrast, Japan pursued a focused and measured response to the crisis, with its 
initial reaction to co-ordinate with the IMF, especially in relation to Thailand. The Thai 
government initially asked Japan to provide bilateral assistance but the Japanese 
government did not respond to this request because the Thai government failed to 
disclose essential information about its economy, such as the exact amount of its foreign 
reserves and the extent of the government intervention in the market.54 Although an 
agreement was promptly reached between the IMF and Thailand, it soon became clear 
that the estimated US$14 billion necessary far exceeded the available resources from the 
IMF and other international organisations.55 Under these circumstances, Japan convened 
a meeting for rescuing Thailand in Tokyo on 11 August 1997 after consulting with the 
IMF, and went to great lengths to make the meeting successful.56 MOF senior officials 
flew to East Asian countries to try to persuade them to contribute to the package by 
stressing the importance of co-operation by regional countries and emphasised that 
Japan would equal the IMF contribution and give US$4 billion.57 The meeting was a 
greater success than expected, and a total of US$17 billion was committed to the 
package.58 The effort complemented the IMF response, as Japan and the other bilateral 
aid donors relied on IMF information gained through its regular surveillance of member 
countries to work out these aid packages.59 As previously mentioned, Japan had not 
included the United States in the AMF because the United States did not participate in 
this Thai bailout meeting.60
Despite these efforts, Japan was criticised for its handling of the crisis, particularly 
by the United States.61 In January 1998, US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin argued 
Japan’s responsibility in bringing the region out of the crisis, saying that it was 
“absolutely crucial that Japan take the steps necessary to deal with the issues in its 
financial system, to generate solid growth in domestic demand and to open its
34 Eisuke Sakakibara, Sekai to Nihon, p. 177.
33 Önishi, Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka, pp. 86-87. IMF assistance to Thailand was, at most, US$4 billion at the 
time.
56 Kikuchi, “East Asian Regionalism”, p. 26.
37 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 223.
38 Shigeki Kimura, “Ajia Tsüka Kiki -  Kokusai Kyoku kara mita kono Ichinen” (“The Asian Financial 
Crisis—A year as seen by the International Bureau”), Fainansu (The Finance), vol. 34, no. 7, 
October 1998, pp. 14-22, p. 17.
59 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 223.
60 Haruhiko Kuroda, Gen Kiriage (Appreciating the Yuan), Tokyo, Nikkei BP Shoten, 2004, p. 62; 
Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, p. 95.
61 Makoto Nishida, “Ajia Tsüka Kiki kara lnen—Nihongata Kyüsai no Genkai” (“One Year from the 
Asian Financial Crisis—the Limits of the Japan-Model Rescue Plan”), Shükan Töyö Keizai, pp. 30- 
33, p. 30.
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markets”.62 Later, in September 1998, Rubin was reported to have condemned Japan 
during his meeting with KTchi Miyazawa, then Japanese Minister of Finance, for lacking 
a sense of urgency in dealing with the crisis.63 Japan was also blamed for contributing to 
the escalation of the crisis, because it was unable to absorb more exports into its markets 
owing to the depreciating yen and weak economic conditions.64 At the time, Japan itself 
was suffering from its own economic problems; and the Japanese financial system was 
also unstable under the heavy load of bad loans, which culminated in the collapse of two 
major banks in the latter half of 1997.65 Critics argue that this was due to the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance’s failure to liquidate non-performing loans:
Rather than forcing Japanese banks to sell assets to cover their losses or take the 
politically unpalatable step of using public funds for a financial system bailout, as 
the United States did to deal with its savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, the 
MOF made it possible for banks to disguise the decline of their assets and to 
continue to make profitable but risky loans to the fast growing Asian economies.66
Regardless of US criticism, in comparison with the IMF, Japan was quick to 
respond to the expectations of the region. This situation furthered the sense that, rather 
than being dependent on the United States or the IMF, a specifically Asian financial 
institution was necessary to protect the economic security of the region, and added to 
Japan’s motivations to establish such an institution.
US and IMF Objections to the Asian Monetary Fund
The proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund after the Asian financial crisis was vehemently 
opposed by the United States and also by the IMF. This section analyses these 
objections, firstly to investigate the hegemon’s interpretation of Japan’s intentions 
behind the proposal, and also to identify the obstacles that stood in the path of 
potentially realising an AMF. Insights into these perspectives and obstacles suggest that 
Japan, while a firm ally of the United States, was nonetheless viewed with pessimistic
62 Christopher B. Johnstone, “Strained Alliance: US-Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis”, 
Survival, vol. 41, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 121-38, p. 127; Köhei Murayama, “Rubin urges Japan to 
take Additional Steps”, Kyodo News, 22 January 1998.
63 Christopher Hughes, “Japanese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis: Abject Defeat or Quiet 
Victory?”, CSCR Working Paper, no. 24.99, February 1999, pp. 2-3, Tadokoro, “The Asian 
Financial Crisis”, p. 223.
64 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 230.
65 Ippei Yamazawa, “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Economies”, Japan Review o f International Affairs, 
vol. 18, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 18-52, p. 25.
66 Cronin, “Asian Financial Crisis: An analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests”, p. 3 and R. Taggart 
Murphy, “Making Sense of Japan: A Reassessment of Revisionism”, National Interest, vol. 43, 
Spring 1996, pp. 50-63.
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scepticism by the United States. This was because of residual suspicions over the East 
Asian Economic Caucus proposal of the 1990s, the competition that the AMF 
potentially posed to the IMF, and finally the fact that the proposal more generally went 
against the “Washington Consensus”—the economic philosophy espoused by the United 
States and the IMF.
The US Position: “I f  you’re not prepared to follow through with the proposal, then 
don’t do it! ” 67
The United States was first notified of the proposal during an Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) meeting in Paris in early September 
1997, and it was assumed that it would also be a member of the fund.68 When Larry 
Summer, then Under Secretary of the Treasury learned that the United States was 
excluded from the fund, he called Sakakibara expressing his concern and anger.69 In the 
words of a senior US government official, “the AMF was seen as blatantly avoiding the 
IMF and weakening the US Treasury.”70 The US government sent letters to the Finance 
Ministers of the member nations of Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), 
which were signed by US Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and the US Federal 
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan. Their report was that the United States was 
ready to consider actions to manage the economic crises co-operatively across the region, 
and that the IMF had to be at the centre of any such attempt rather than an AMF.71
Other than being affronted by the exclusion, the United States was also concerned 
about the AMF because of perceived competition over economic leadership and 
influence in the Asian region. Its exclusion from the AMF, and Japan’s active 
involvement in co-ordinating the funds for the Thai rescue package, indicated that Japan 
had played a role where the United States had failed. This resonated with US concerns 
about its declining influence in East Asia while Japan, and also China, appeared 
increasingly dominant. Indeed, because Japan had hitherto often been criticised for its
67 Perception of the US government as summarised by Eric Altbach, Director for Asian Economic 
Affairs, US National Security Council, interviewed 15 March 2005, Washington D.C.
68 Eisuke Sakakibara, “Kokusai Mane no Köbö: Sakakibara Eisuke Kaisöki IMF tai AMF”, 
(“International Monetary Battle: Eisuke Sakakibara Reminisces IMF versus AMF”), Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 26 November 1999.
69 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, pp. 224-25. According to the now famous incident the angry 
call was made to his home in the middle of the night.
70 Eric Altbach, Director for Asian Economic Affairs, US National Security Council, interviewed 
15 March 2005, Washington D.C.
71 Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai ga Furuetci Hi, p. 186.
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failure to exercise leadership internationally and regionally, the Asian financial crisis 
presented the perfect opportunity for it to demonstrate foreign economic policy 
leadership. Japan proved in this instance that it was capable of a role that exceeded 
“chequebook diplomacy”72 and “leadership from behind”.73
The implications of US exclusion from the AMF were further exacerbated by a 
previous omission from a regional economic proposal—the East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC). The EAEC had been proposed by the then Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mohamed Mahathir in December 1990 after the failure to conclude the Uruguay Round 
for the negotiations of the GATT.74 Mahathir promoted the EAEC as an institution that 
aimed to protect free trade within Asia, but it was met with fierce objections from then 
US Secretary of State James Baker.75 Japan distanced itself from the proposal and in the 
end back-tracked on its support for it, saying it would only join the EAEC upon the 
inclusion of the United States.76
Sakakibara, on the other hand, interpreted US concerns more in relation to the 
independence of the AMF from the IMF and the impact that this may have on US 
influence, rather than an annoyance at their exclusion from the fund.77 Independence of 
the AMF from the IMF had significant implications for US policy in Asia, because the 
IMF was an important channel for US foreign policy. Miles Kahler wrote that the US 
utilised the IMF “as a buffer in awkward bilateral relations, imposing economic 
conditions that the United States would find it hard to impose bilaterally,” 78 and 
Benjamin Cohen also argued that the IMF served as a convenient cushion in 
implementing stringent reform policies:
72 Japan was accused of being only willing to commit financially to international relations during the 
1990-1991 Gulf War, and Japanese foreign policy was thus given this negative label. Refer to 
Chapter Two.
73 Alan Rix describes Japan’s foreign policy style as avoiding bold public initiatives and cultivating 
behind-the-scene support, particularly in institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
(APEC). See Alan Rix, “Japan and the Region: Leadership from Behind”, in Richard Higgott, 
Richard Leaver and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Conflict or 
Cooperation?, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1993.
74 Yamazawa, “Japan and the Asia-Pacific Economies”, p. 28.
73 Jun Onozawa, “Japan and Malaysia: The EAEC Test of Commitment”, Japan Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 
3, July 1993, pp. 277-82, p. 277; “Malaysia says EAEC viable without Japan”, Agence France- 
Presse, 8 November 1991.
76 “Malaysian Daily calls Japan, US hypocrites over EAEC”, Asian Economic News Kyodo News 
International, 18 November 1991.
11 Sakakibara, Nihon to Sekai ga Furueta Hi, pp. 185-86, and Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”.
8 Miles Kahler, “The United State and the International Monetary Fund: Declining Influence or 
Declining Interest?” in Margaret P. Kams and Karen A. Mingst (eds.) The United States and 
Multilateral Institutions: Patters o f Changing Instrumentality and Influence, London, Unwin Hyman, 
1990, p. 110
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Any effort by Washington itself to impose unpopular policy conditions on troubled 
debtors would undoubtedly have fanned the flames of nationalism, if not 
revolution, in many countries. But what would be regarded as intolerable when 
demanded by a major foreign power might, it seemed, be rather more acceptable if 
administered instead by an impartial multilateral agency.79
Also, at the time of the crisis, the IMF acted as a primary mechanism through 
which the United States exerted its influence in world monetary affairs, due to the 
constraints imposed by the D’Amato Amendment. As mentioned above, the US 
administration was restricted by Congress from committing substantial monetary 
resources to international initiatives and increasing US funding to the IMF during the 
Thai crisis because of this amendment. While the D’Amato amendment had expired by 
the time of the Indonesian and Korean crises, thereby allowing the United States to 
contribute to rescue packages, financial contributions through the IMF were much more 
likely to get the support of the American people, as well as that of Congress, than 
bilateral assistance. 80 As a result, the IMF was a useful tool in exerting US interests, and 
consequently, the United States could not support an institution that potentially 
threatened IMF authority.
The IMF’s Position
The IMF also objected to the Asian Monetary Fund proposal for similar reasons to the 
United States. The IMF perceived the AMF not only as a redundant institution, but that 
it would also undermine its authority in the region, particularly with its proposed less 
stringent conditions to lending and reforms. IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus 
and his deputy Stanley Fischer both criticised the AMF proposal, arguing that, unless 
the IMF was the only possible source of financial assistance in crisis situations, the IMF 
would lose its effectiveness in obtaining member state agreement to the reforms 
required for economic recovery. 81 Furthermore, the IMF also feared that the flexible 
nature of the proposed AMF could potentially encourage poor banking and business 
practices and create a “moral hazard” in the region. 82 In other words, the lack of 
conditionality would remove the necessary incentives for reform, which would 
encourage the continuation of risky loans under the assumption that the failure to pay
79 Benjamin J. Cohen, In Whose Interest? International Banking and American Foreign Policy, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1986, p 229.
80 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”, p. 10.
81 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”, p. 10.
Önishi, Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka, p. 89.82
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would be covered by funds from the A M F.83 In fact, in order to counter the 
ineffectiveness of the IMF during the Asian financial crisis, the IMF itself then moved 
to raise the mandate and resources of the institution, and increased its quota by 45 
percent.84 The IMF argued that because these increases were being enforced, the 
establishment of an AMF was not necessary.
The AMF more generally presented a challenge to the neo-classical economic 
philosophy of the “Washington Consensus” that underlies the policies of the IMF, 
World Bank, senior members of the US administration and Congress, economic 
agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, associated think-tanks and 
also the Inter-American Development Banks.85 It adhered to “macroeconomic prudence, 
outward orientation, and domestic liberalization”86 and became the prevalent economic 
philosophy in the industrialised world to remedy the failed state-centred development of 
the 1950s and 1960s.87 Neo-classical economic thinking dominated the Western world— 
most notably supported by the Reagan administration in the United States and the 
Thatcher administration in the United Kingdom— and became the backbone of views on 
economic development in the World Bank and the IMF in the 1970s.88 During the 1980s, 
the World Bank and the IMF began to prescribe structural adjustment policies such as 
comprehensive reforms of institutions, liberalisation and privatisation as conditions of 
IMF and World Bank loans. David Held identifies the following traits as forming the 
core of the Washington consensus:
The narrow agenda is focused typically on free trade, capital market liberalization, 
flexible exchange rates, market-determined interest rates, the deregulation of all 
markets, the transfer of assets from the public to the private sector, the tight focus 
of public expenditure on well-directed social targets, balanced budgets, tax reform, 
secure property rights and the protection of intellectual property rights. It has been
83 Cronin, “Asian Financial Crisis: An analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests”, p. 11 and Edward A. 
Gargan, “Asian Nations affirm IMF as primary provider of Aid”, New York Times, 20 November 
1997, A16, A18.
84 Altbach, “The Asian Monetary Proposal”, p. 10.
85 Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, p. 7. It is debatable whether such a consensus exists. There 
are diverse opinions within the World Bank, IMF and the United States, and the three do not always 
share the same outlook. However, Williamson argues, with regard to Latin American development, 
that there are “9 or 10 policy areas in which ‘Washington’ could muster something like a consensus 
on what countries ought to be doing” (p. 1), and is therefore a useful categorisation.
86 Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, p. 1.
87 Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, p. 18.
88 David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, p. 54.
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the dominant orthodoxy over the last twenty years in leading OECD countries and
in the international financial institutions.89
The Washington Consensus was therefore an important economic philosophy that 
was essentially US-centric: “both a specific, US designed neoliberal economic project 
and, more broadly, a political project which underwrites the current US administration’s 
unilateralist ambitions”.90 This viewpoint emphasised a “big bang” approach; in other 
words, swift liberalisation of the economy through strict macro-economic restraints, and 
domestic and external deregulation.91 It argued that impediments to a free market should 
be removed as soon as possible so that market mechanisms could begin to work 
properly and countries could begin to prosper. 92 Those who prescribed to the 
Washington Consensus were particularly sceptical of state involvement in the economy, 
in particular with regard to industrial policy, and advocated the privatisation of state- 
owned projects.93 The policies which the IMF prescribed on the affected countries after 
the Asian financial crisis adhered to the basic values of the Washington Consensus.
However, the United States did not always follow the philosophy of the 
Washington Consensus itself. When financial difficulties with a major US hedge fund, 
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), surfaced in September 1998, instead of 
letting the fund go bankrupt according to the liberal market mechanisms usually 
espoused by the United Stated and the IMF, US authorities came to LTCM’s assistance, 
with the help of major financial institutions in Wall Street.94 It seemed hypocritical that 
the US-backed IMF should implement harsh reforms for countries that suffered from 
speculative attacks, while it rescued a troubled hedge fund when global financial 
disorder threatened the US stock market and the stability of the US economy.95 This 
double standard suggested that, behind the stringent conditions required in the IMF 
reforms and the philosophy of the Washington consensus, lay the politics of power 
moulded to the requirements of the hegemon, and not a philosophy that espoused the 
efficient access to a global market economy for the greater economic benefit of 
developing economies.
89 David Held, Global Covenant, p. 55.
90 Held, Global Covenant, pp. xiv-xv.
91 Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, p. 18.
92 Williamson, Latin American Adjustment, p. 18.
93 “Guro-baru Mane”, Mainichi Economist.
94 Tadokoro, ‘‘The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 231. 
Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 231.95
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Despite the hypocrisy of US policy, there was significant opposition to the Asian 
Monetary Fund from the United States and the IMF, which strongly suggested 
disapproval from the “Western world” in general. These objections highlighted the 
perceived threat of the AMF towards the dominant position of the United States in the 
financial sector of the region, and suggested that the United States viewed Japan’s 
initiatives as straying from existing financial arrangements. It can therefore be 
concluded that the AMF was seen as hindering US interests in the region and perceived 
as a challenge to US hegemony in Asia.
The Japanese Defence o f  the AMF
Japan defended the AMF by arguing that the Asian financial crisis was a panic-driven 
liquidity problem and that the crisis could have happened anywhere—indeed, it did 
spread to countries outside the region—and that blaming the situation solely on the 
economic failure of the region was problematic. Japan argued that, in order to ensure 
greater global stability, not only did Japan and the crisis-affected countries have to 
reassess their economies, but inherent faults in the global financial markets also needed 
to be identified and scrutinised.
Several issues motivated Japan’s proposal of the AMF. Firstly, at the more 
immediate level of financial and trade dealings with the region, Japan was by far more 
engaged, particularly with Thailand, and therefore had more at stake in the Asian 
financial crisis. Compared to the European Union and the United States, which lent 
US$20 billion and US$4 billion respectively to Thailand, at the time Japan had lent 
US$38 billion, and was the largest foreign investor in terms of stocks.96 Japan’s patterns 
of large investment also applied more broadly to the rest of East Asia and, accordingly, 
Japan was at far greater risk in the event of the crisis, and would also therefore benefit 
more from a stabilising mechanism such as an AMF.
Secondly, as mentioned above, on a practical level, the proposal for an Asian 
Monetary Fund responded to a need to diversify exchange rate arrangements in the 
region. The 1997 crisis indicated that there was a high dependency on the US dollar in 
the Asian region. Thailand, Indonesia and Korea all implicitly pegged their currencies to 
the dollar, which made them more vulnerable to external shocks. This implicit dollar- 
peg meant that, as the dollar appreciated relative to the yen and Deutschmark (now
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Euro) from the mid-1990s onwards, these Asian currencies also appreciated, thereby 
weakening the export competitiveness of the affected states and deteriorating their 
current account positions.97 Yet, had these countries tied their exchange rates even 
loosely to a basket peg—meaning some weighted combination of the dollar, yen and 
Euro— they would have experienced less appreciation of the effective exchange rate and 
hence been less vulnerable in 1997. 98 Previously, there were suggestions to 
internationalise the yen, which had been raised by the Japanese government not long 
after the crisis and was supported by former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mohammed 
Mahathir, as an alternative monetary solution.99 While the AMF fell short of this, it 
certainly acknowledged the need for an alternative monetary system.
Thirdly, there was widespread dissatisfaction in Asia over the actions of both the 
IMF and the United States during the crisis. There was a strong sense in the region that a 
specifically regional support network was necessary because of the IMF’s inaccurate 
diagnosis of the crisis and inefficient response, and also the lack of involvement by the 
United States. Moreover, after the crisis, the IMF was increasingly perceived by 
academics and policymakers in the region as a US-run and Western-centric institution.100 
The structure of the IMF and its location were telling signs of a European and US-bias. 
The First Deputy Manager of the IMF, who undertook many of the sensitive 
negotiations, was often a US citizen with close ties to the US Treasury; the IMF head 
office was based only a few blocks away from the US Treasury in Washington D.C.; and 
the United States had effective veto power over key decisions of the IMF Executive 
Board.101 The Managing Director of the Fund was European, and the First Deputy 
Managing Director was American and, therefore, the IMF, as an institution, under­
represented Asia as a whole.102 In terms of quotas, the IMF Executive Board had 
European over-representation by 6 percent, and Japan was under-represented by 
12 percent. 103 Because of this under-representation, Japan found it difficult to
96 Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal”, p. 98.
97 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 4.
98 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 4.
99 Masayuki Tadokoro, “Ajia ni okeru Chiiki Tsüka Kyöryoku no Kösatsu: Yöroppa tono Hikaku no 
Kanten kara” (“Examining Regional Monetary Co-operation in Asia: A Comparative Viewpoint with 
Europe”), Leviathan, Spring 2000, pp. 45-69, p. 58-59.
100 For example, see H.H. Lee and D.Y. Yang, “Reforming the International Financial Architecture” in 
T-J Kim and D.Y. Yang (eds.) New International Financial Architecture and Korean Perspectives, 
Seoul, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2001, pp. 9-33.
101 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 5.
102 Rapkin and Strand, “Is East Asia under-represented in the International Monetary Fund?”, p. 11.
103 Rapkin and Strand, “Is East Asia under-represented in the International Monetary Fund?”, p. 11.
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successfully lobby on behalf of its region in the IM F.104 Furthermore, there were 
differences in the leniency of the IMF reforms, with stricter reforms imposed on 
Indonesia in comparison with Russia during the financial crisis, which gave rise to 
accusations of double standards.105 As a result of this Euro-US-centrism, the perception 
that the United States and the IMF were bent on exposing the weaknesses of the Thai 
economy, even at the expense of a crisis in a traditional ally country, also gradually grew, 
and fuelled the desire for a regional monetary system.106
Fourthly, Japanese dissatisfaction with US criticism cannot be overlooked as a 
motivating factor behind the AMF proposal. As previously mentioned, the United States 
was critical of Japan’s reactions to the Asian financial crisis, and argued that the poor 
state of its economy exacerbated the crisis. Japan made the largest financial 
contribution—US$4 billion to Thailand, US$5 billion to Indonesia, and US$11.3 billion 
to South Korea.107 Given the inability or unwillingness of the United States to allocate 
money to the IMF for a quota increase, from the viewpoint of Japanese policymakers it 
did not seem fair to blame the exacerbation of the crisis on Japan. The fact that the 
United States and the IMF blocked the AMF proposal indicated that the United States 
wanted to dictate how Asian economies should be run and also to maintain its 
hegemony in the region, without making any significant financial contribution.108 Yöichi 
Funabashi argued:
Japan [has] learned the hard way...that the United States regards an economically 
strong Japan as a rival but disregards the country when its economic power 
weakens...Washington, while disregarding Japan, keeps pressing it to take 
measures to prop up the economic side of the [US-dominated] unipolar world -  
especially through steps that continue to finance the US current account deficit.109
104 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 8.
105 “Tokubetsu Repöto: Ajia de Tsuzuku ‘IMF Banare’” (“Special Report: Moves Away from the IMF 
Continues in Asia”), Shükan Töyö Keizai, 12 September 1998, pp. 54-55; “Tsüka Kiki— ‘Ajia Kinyü 
Anteika Kikin’ no Teishö” (“Financial Crisis—Calls for ‘A Fund to Stabilise Asian Currency’”, 
Shükan Töyö Keizai, 10 October 1998.
106 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 6. Thailand in particular felt betrayed by the United 
States—while the D’Amato amendment was the effective cause of the United States being unable to 
contribute to the Thai rescue package, from the Thai perspective, the United States provided financial 
aid to South Korea, despite Thailand also being an ally in the US fight against communism in 
Vietnam.
107 Jathon Sapsford, “Japan makes a big bridge loan to South Korea”, Wall Street Journal, 19 December 
1997, A13.
108 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 230.
109 Yöichi Funabashi, “A US-led Unipolar World Negative for Japan”, Asahi Shimbun, 16 June 1998, 
Evening edition.
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The issue of US inconsistencies in financial matters was also a point of Japanese 
frustration. As seen in the US reaction to the failure of the LTCM hedge fund, the 
United States did not always practise what it preached. Actions such as these 
demonstrated that what was perceived as “moral” was dependent on the perpetrator, and 
that the concerns about “moral hazards” raised by the United States and the IMF were 
not genuine worries about good financial and monetary control, but rather concerns 
about preserving and fortifying US hegemony in the region. As a result, the Japanese 
regarded the “moral hazard” argument as an insubstantial reason to block the AMF 
proposal.
Finally, as discussed previously in the section on US’s objections to the AMF, 
there were fundamental differences in the economic development philosophies of the 
United States and Japan, which influenced their two reactions to the financial crisis. The 
United States broadly followed the “Washington Consensus” line, whereas Japan 
supported a gradual, government-assisted transition of developing countries into the 
market economy. 110 Contrary to the Washington Consensus, Japan’s basic development 
philosophy questioned whether all countries could effectively enjoy the benefits of the 
free market irrespective of their level of economic development. Largely based on its 
own experience as a developing country after the Second World War, Japan argued that 
liberalisation and economic reforms should not be carried simultaneously, but should be 
sequenced properly from a longer-term perspective than that assumed by neo-classical 
economists. In order to achieve stability and growth, Japan advocated the gradual 
integration of developing economies into the global market depending on their 
economic and social situation and the ability of their governments, and argued that there 
was no universal economic rule governing this process. 111
110 Juichi Inada, “Washinton Konsensasu vs. Nihongata Apuröchi: Kokusai Haihatsu no Paradaimu 
Ronsö to Nihon no Chiteki Koken” (“The Washington Consensus vs. The Japanese Approach: 
Paradigm Conflicts in International Development and Japan’s Intellectual Contribution”), Gaikö Jihö 
(Revue Diplomatique), no. 1341, September 1997, pp. 13-29, pp. 19-20.
Inada, “Washinton Konsensasu vs. Nihongata Apuröchi”, pp. 18-19.in
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Washington Consensus Japanese Model
Role of 
Government
Small (Deal with market failures) Large (Lead economic 
development)
Industrial Policy No effect, rely on market forces Effective and necessary in early 
stages of economic development
Speed of Reform
“Big bang” (Shock therapy), 
comprehensive liberalisation in one 
hit
Gradualism, with emphasis on 
sequence- and system-building
Privatisation Implement early and speedily
Emphasis on management 
efficiency and tackling 
unemployment, rather than anti­
nationalisation
Trade and 
currency 
exchange
Early liberalisation and abolishment 
of control mechanisms
Gradual liberalisation depending on 
the state of domestic 
industrialisation
Administrative
Organisation
Emphasis on transparency and 
effectiveness, abolishment of 
corruption and monopolies
Emphasis on the role of a 
competent bureaucratic 
organisation
Political
Liberalisation
Civil society a pre-condition o f a 
market economy
Gradual liberalisation as the 
economy develops
Table 5.2 A comparison of the Washington Consensus and the Japanese Approach to economic 
development and reform. From Juichi Inada, “Washinton Konsensasu vs. Nihongata Apuröchi: Kokusai 
Haihatsu no Paradaimu Ronsö to Nihon no Chiteki Koken” (“The Washington Consensus vs. The 
Japanese Approach: Paradigm Conflicts in International Development and Japan’s Intellectual 
Contribution”), Gaikö Jihö (Revue Diplomatique), no. 1341, September 1997, pp. 13-29, p. 18.
Japan saw rapid liberalisation as a potential cause for domestic industries to 
collapse, resulting in more economic damage than benefit. Japan therefore placed 
greater emphasis on the role of the state based on the opinion that certain sectors of 
developing economies should receive special support by their governments to realise 
faster and more sustainable economic growth. It believed that the government could 
minimise the social cost of economic transition if it retained some control over the 
economy until the establishment and stability of those new institutions that would allow 
for the free operation of market economies. 112
The motivations behind Japan’s AMF proposal and its autonomous position can 
be appreciated in light of these varying factors. Japan had more investments in Asia and, 
as a consequence, had more to lose should a similar crisis reoccur. There was also a real 
need for the region to unpeg currencies from the US dollar and establish a more
112 Inada, “Washinton Konsensasu vs. Nihongata Apuröchi”, pp. 20-22. For a detailed analysis of 
Japan’s role in establishing economic growth in the wider East Asian region, see Hughes, “Japanese 
Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis”, pp. 8-17.
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balanced monetary system. However, the IMF and US response to the crisis, and their 
subsequent objection to the AMF proposal, indicated different approaches to 
development and the integration of developing states into the global market. While it 
recognised the need for fundamental structural reforms in the crisis economies, Japan’s 
defence of the AMF proposal and the less stringent terms for loans essentially reflected 
the priority it placed on securing stability and growth over aggressive economic 
liberalisation. On the other hand, the IMF’s response and its priorities were summed up 
in Richard Higgott’s statement that “Michel Camdessus [of the IMF] described [the 
crisis] as ‘a window of opportunity’ to consolidate the Anglo-American model of 
economic development at the expense of the Asian developmental state.”113 Therefore, 
opposition to the AMF was not merely a conflict of opinions on how best to deal with 
the situation at hand, but also part of the long-standing ideological differences between 
Japan and the Washington Consensus. Again, Higgott argued that the crisis of the East 
Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) challenged the very model on which they 
built their success in the late 20 ' century, and that “it should be seen not only as an 
economic crisis, but as an ‘ideas battle’ or an ideological battle.”114
However, Japan did initially co-ordinate its response with the IMF when the crisis 
first emerged in Thailand, and had traditionally co-operated with the IMF. Because of 
this, its proposal to establish a regional monetary fund should not have been 
immediately interpreted as a move away from existing structures, despite Japan’s 
dissatisfaction with US criticism being a strong undercurrent. In reality, the United 
States and later the IMF incorporated Japan’s concerns and changed their Washington 
Consensus position after the Asian financial crisis from emphasising the narrow 
economic perspectives of globalisation to one that recognised the role played by the 
state in driving economic reforms.115
Thus, the proposal to establish an AMF was the result of an undercurrent of 
different philosophies between the Washington Consensus and Japan. It showed that 
Japan embraced the idea of multiple processes of industrialisation and economic
113 Richard Higgott, “Contested Globalization: The Changing Context and Normative Challenges”, 
Review o f International Studies, vol. 26, 2000, pp. 131-53, p. 135.
114 Richard Higgott, “The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment”, New Political 
Economy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1998, pp. 333-56, pp. 338-39.
115 See International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentAVorld Bank, World Bank Annual Report 
1991, Washington, D.C., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank. 1992. 
However, this shift also suffers a similar shortcoming to the Washington consensus, in that the post- 
Washington consensus is “no less universalizing, and attempts to be no less homogenizing”. See 
Higgott, “Contested Globalization”, p. 146.
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modernisation, rather than one standard pattern as endorsed by the IMF, which 
accordingly required different responses in crisis situations. Japan’s policy was 
autonomous of the United States, and Japan proposed this initiative despite knowing 
that the United States would object, demonstrating that it was confident about its views 
on integrating developing economies into the global economy to the extent that Japanese 
policymakers were willing to follow an autonomous foreign economic policy based on 
these values, even if they seemed to conflict with US interests. While Saori N. Katada 
argues that through the AMF proposal Japan acted as a counterweight to US financial 
hegemony in Asia, 116 as Christopher Hughes argues, “Japan’s ambitions for regional 
leadership or hegemony should not be exaggerated” as “the underlying Japanese strategy 
has always been to maintain economic dominance in East Asia, but at the same time ... 
to keep the US ... engaged economically and politically in the region” . 117 This supports 
the argument that the AMF proposal ultimately remained within the broader context of 
the US-Japan alliance, and the continuation of an active US presence in Asia.
Overcoming US and IMF objections—Alternative Financial and Monetary 
Developments after the AMF proposal: Stepping Stones towards a Future AMF?
The AMF proposal without doubt signified the region moving away from the dominance 
of the dollar. Many of the region’s currencies were pegged to the US dollar, and Japan’s 
initiatives were certainly an attempt to resolve this over-dependence on the dollar. 
Furthermore, the US response to the Asian financial crisis “radically affected the 
region’s perception of the United States as a reliable partner in the domain o f 
international finance” 118 and, in this sense, the AMF was an autonomous Japanese 
proposal that signified movement away from IMF and US influence. On the other hand, 
because of the central role of the United States in other domains, this was not 
necessarily autonomy against US hegemony in the region as a whole. Japan, and many 
of the other countries of the region, recognised the vital role played by the United States 
with regard to regional security and trade. As a reflection of this, US-Japan relations had 
been a priority in Japanese foreign policy for the previous six decades. The challenge of 
Japan’s AMF proposal was thus not only to promote the AMF proposal, but also to
116
117
118
Katada, “Japan’s Counterweight Strategy”, p. 185-88.
Hughes, “Japanese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis, p. 2. 
De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, pp. 5-6.
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maintain US strategic, economic and financial involvement that would prove compatible 
to the needs of the region.
The following discussion analyses Japanese initiatives, introduced after the 
controversial AMF proposal, which endeavoured to incorporate US and IMF interests 
yet gradually move towards self-regulation. This indicated caution and strategy in 
Japanese policy to balance national, regional and US interests, and demonstrated how 
Japanese autonomy was maintained in the face of US objection. No matter how 
practically useful and meaningful an AMF was for the region at the time, it could not 
proceed because of Japan’s inability to achieve unified support in the region. Although 
the AMF proposal was initially received positively by a large majority of Southeast 
Asian countries, support began to fade rapidly when the United States and the IMF 
expressed their objections. 119 Also, while Malaysia was particularly enthusiastic about 
the proposal, China and Singapore were not. China’s support for the plan was crucial as 
it was the second-largest holder of foreign exchange reserves in the region. 120 However, 
few countries wished to move forward with the AMF proposal with such strong 
opposition from the United States, thereby indicating that US hegemony was important 
not only for Japan, but for the region as a whole.
Several Japanese-led initiatives following the Asian financial crisis aimed to 
achieve similar goals to the AMF. All were established in a genuine attempt to attain 
financial stability in Asia; yet all had some element of compromise with the United 
States. Some of the proposed frameworks have even been described as “face-saving” for 
the Japanese, with a strong undertone of the structures being established under US 
consent and supervision. 121 It analyses how Japan modified the AMF proposal to suit US 
and regional needs. It argues further that, despite the new financial and monetary 
networks being fundamentally different to the original AMF proposal, they represented 
small steps towards a larger, long-term Japanese vision which includes regional 
monetary integration. More importantly, these newly established monetary networks 
revealed that Japan overcame US opposition in order to pursue a Japanese autonomous 
policy.
119
120
121
Kuroda, Gen Kiriage, p. 81.
Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 7. 
Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 225.
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The Manila Framework Group
The Manila Framework Group (MFG) was the first of the monetary initiatives 
developed after the AMF proposal. It was established in November 1997 by a number of 
APEC members as a framework to discuss monetary and financial co-operation to 
supplement the IMF, and to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crises. 
Fourteen countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
United States) attended the meeting, along with the IMF, the World Bank and the ADB 
as observers.122 They agreed on four broad principles, on which the framework was 
based. Firstly, the framework was to work as a mechanism for regional economic 
surveillance to complement global surveillance by the IMF. Secondly, it would serve to 
enhance economic and technical co-operation particularly by strengthening domestic 
financial systems and regulatory mechanisms. Thirdly, the framework would take 
measures to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crises; and fourthly, it 
would establish a Co-operative Financial Arrangement (CFA) where members agreed to 
assist other members in crisis and supplement the IMF resources.123
Because the MFG included Canada and the United States, it was not strictly a 
regional forum as envisaged in the AMF. Furthermore, it did not have any permanent 
staff or financial resources and, therefore, was not realistically a strong mechanism for 
policy surveillance. By the end of 2001, there had been nine MFG meetings, but US 
participation saw the MFG effectively driven by US interests, making the ASEAN + 3 
the preferred forum of the regional participants, and rendering the MFG essentially 
redundant.124 With respect to the MFG, it was reported that Japan had lost to the United 
States and the IMF, or that Japan had bowed to US pressure and been defeated in the 
struggle for currency hegemony in Asia.125
Therefore, the Manila Framework Group was clearly a compromise on the original 
AMF in terms of membership and format of the network, and Masayuki Tadokoro
122 Mashiko Ishizuka, “The Politics of Rescue Packages”, Asian Business, vol. 34, no. 1, January 1998, 
pp. 6-7; Önishi, Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka, p. 197.
123 “Text of the G7-Manila Framework Joint Statement”, Jiji Press English News Service, 20 June 1998, 
p. 1; Jennifer Amyx, “Japan and the Evolution of Regional Financial Arrangements in East Asia” in 
Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel (eds.), Beyond Bilateralism: US-Japan Relations in the New Asia- 
Pacific, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 198-218, p. 206.
124 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 15.
125 “Ronten: Henshü Iin Iwasaki Keiichi, ‘AMF’ SeikyQ sugita Nihon” (“Discussion Point: Senior Editor 
Keiichi Iwasaki, Japan too impatient in the ‘AMF’ [Proposal]”), Sankei Shimbun, 7 December 1997.
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described it as “as face-saving measure, [that] the United States allowed Asian countries 
to set up.”126 The inclusion of countries outside the Asian region such as Canada and 
New Zealand, and more crucially the United States, ensured that a Japanese-led Asian 
system that was clearly separate from the IMF failed to materialise. The Manila 
Framework also had no pooling of money or any permanent institutions, which made it 
deficient as a multilateral fund. Furthermore, implicit in US membership and 
compatibility with the IMF was that the Manila Framework was to remain within the 
limits of US interests. Without doubt the compromises were strongest in the Manila 
Framework, because it was established shortly after the Asian financial crisis when US 
and IMF suspicions of Japanese intentions were at their peak.
The New Miyazawa Initiative
A second Japanese proposal was made during the annual meeting of the IMF and the 
World Bank in October 1998. The New Miyazawa Initiative (NMI) was announced by 
the then Japanese Finance Minister, KTchi Miyazawa, and its aim was to establish a 
regional financial assistance framework based on bilateral assistance from Japan. The 
funds would total US$30 billion, and the initiative targeted Thailand, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines.127
Various measures were featured in the New Miyazawa Initiative. Half of the funds 
were to be used for the medium to long-term financial needs for economic recovery in 
East Asian countries, while the remaining funds were for potential short-term financial 
needs during the process of implementing economic reforms.128 There was also the 
traditional direct official financial assistance, such as yen loans through the Export- 
Import Bank of Japan, and also indirect ways to support East Asian countries in raising 
funds from international financial markets, such as the provision of guarantees. In 
addition, Japan proposed the establishment of an Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility 
(ACCSF) (worth approximately US$3 billion) within the ADB as part of the New 
Miyazawa Initiative.
126 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 225.
127 Amyx, “Japan and the Evolution of Regional Financial Arrangements in East Asia”, p. 208; Önishi, 
Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka, p. 89, Kuroda, Gen Kiriage, p. 62.
128 “Asian Economic Crisis and Japan’s Contribution”, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Japan Website, 
October 2000, accessed at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html accessed 
12 November 2004.
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Like the Manila Framework Group, the NMI differed from the original AMF 
proposal, and the United States consequently accepted the initiative. It was deemed 
tolerable because it did not involve a pooling of resources from member countries, and 
its characteristics were more like an extension of Japanese official development 
assistance.129 In addition, by this time, the United States had also changed its position on 
dealing with financial crises—particularly with the spread of the crisis to Russia and 
Brazil—and began to better appreciate Japan’s efforts in the region because the crisis 
was now significantly closer to the United States.130
However, Japan had also made greater efforts to make this initiative more co­
operative with the United States, so that it would not be perceived as the start of a more 
independent initiative. It was important for both the United States and Japan that a co­
operative element between them both be incorporated into the NMI proposal. As a 
result, the Asian Growth and Recovery Initiative (AGRI) was consequently announced 
jointly by the United States and Japan in November 1998, along with the Asian 
Currency Support Facility within the ADB, which drew on the NMI funds solely 
provided by Japan.131 The AGRI was still essentially a Japanese-funded project, the only 
difference being that it functioned specifically with the backing of the United States. 
The aforementioned Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility was also to be utilised in 
conjunction with the AGRI by aiding the payment of interest on ADB loans or ADB co- 
financed projects, financing technical assistance grants and as guarantees for co-finance 
loans with the ADB and bond issues by the affected countries.132
However, while the Manila Framework was founded under the watchful eye of the 
United States and the IMF, it is evident that Japan had not abandoned its goals of setting 
up a broader regional financial network. This was evident in the New Miyazawa 
Initiative. Indeed, the NMI stated that “it is hoped that in the long run the establishment 
of an international guarantee institution with a prime focus on Asian countries will be 
seriously considered.”133 While it was also far from the original AMF proposal and can 
be perceived as being an extension of development aid, the NMI nonetheless had a
129 Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, pp. 231-32.
130 Amyx, “Japan and the Evolution of Regional Financial Arrangements in East Asia”, p. 209.
131 “Asian Growth Initiative”, Prime Minister o f Japan and His Cabinet Website, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ele055.html, accessed 16 September 2006.
132 “Asian Economic Crisis and Japan’s Contribution”, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Japan.
133 Shuhei Kishimoto, “Miyazawa Kösö no Shimei to Ajia Tsüka Kikin” (“The Role of the New 
Miyazawa Initiative and the Asian Monetary Proposal”, Fainansu (The Finance), vol. 35, no. 2, May 
1999, pp. 31-48, p. 43.
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regional dimension that would not emerge simply from the provision of ODA, and left 
open the possibility for the initiative to develop along regional lines. Shühei Kishimoto, 
then Director of the Office of Regional Financial Co-operation on the MOF, who was 
involved in implementing the New Miyazawa Initiative, stated that Japan saw that the 
Asian Currency Crisis Support Facility within the ADB could potentially move forward 
to a regional organisation within a multilateral framework in the future.134 He envisioned 
the possibility of other countries establishing similar arrangements with the ADB, which 
could eventually be reorganised into an independent regional fund.135 While Japan still 
faced surveillance and restrictions by the United States in the case of the NMI (which 
was evident in the conclusion of the AGRI with the United States), Kishimoto’s 
arguments strongly support Japan’s continuing motive to create some type of regional 
framework.
The Chiang Mai Initiative
In 1999, the New Miyazawa Initiative moved beyond simply providing aid, loans and 
credit guarantees. The NMI was succeeded by the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which 
was launched in May 2000 during the ADB annual meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand. Its 
purpose was to be an institutional framework able to prevent contagion of financial 
crises, and it was broadened to include the establishment of backup facilities in the form 
of currency swap agreements. 136 The CMI expanded on existing currency swap 
arrangements among ASEAN members, which had already been established in 1997, to 
provide up to US$40 billion to other members to help minor liquidity deficits.137 In other 
words, countries with liquidity problems could draw US dollars from one another’s 
foreign exchange reserves against their local currencies. The major step forward was the 
establishment of bilateral currency swaps and repurchase agreements between the 
ASEAN+3 countries.138 This network was to be implemented by mid-2002 and by 
November 2003 Japan had established bilateral swap arrangements ranging from US$1- 
3 billion with five ASEAN states (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and
134 Kishimoto, “Miyazawa Kösö no Shimei to Ajia TsQka Kikin”, pp. 42-43.
135 Kishimoto, “Miyazawa Kösö no Shimei to Ajia TsQka Kikin”, pp. 43.
136 Önishi, Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka, p. 199.
137 “The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting, 6 May 2000, Chiang 
Mai, Thailand”, ASEAN Website, http://www.aseansec.org/1026.htm, accessed 12 November 2004.
138 ‘“Tsüka Suwappu Kyötei’ Nihon to ASEAN ga Seishiki Göi” “(‘Monetary Swap Treaty’ Japan and 
ASEAN make an Official Agreement”, Mainichi News Sokuhö, 10 May 2001.
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Singapore), and also South Korea and China.139 The swap arrangements were effective 
for 90 days and renewable for up to two years, with 10 percent of the swap available for 
allocation based on the judgment of the lender. For the remaining 90 percent, the 
borrowing country was subject to IMF conditions for financing.140
Although the CMI was IMF-compatible, the United States was cautious in its 
responses to the initiative. The US representative to the ADB meeting, Edwin M. 
Truman, commented that the CMI was “fine”, but that the ultimate position of the 
United States would depend on the nature of the financial arrangements stipulated in the 
details which were, from its perspective, lacking.141 These comments reflected the long­
standing US concerns about the danger of “moral hazard” should a regional monetary 
system be implemented. However, the Asian ministers attending the meeting were 
careful not to give the impression that the CMI was forming the basis of an institution in 
direct competition with the IMF. Miyazawa stated “[that there were] suspicions that it 
may be replacing what the International Monetary Fund is doing, but that is not our 
intention at all.”142
The CMI was still a small-scale initiative, but its significance stemmed from the 
fact that it could be used in conjunction with the IMF as a temporary measure to fund 
member states in financial difficulty, and thereby minimise the potential for a financial 
crisis. It was still a bilateral network, which was far from the ideal multilateral goal of 
the AMF, but it was widely seen as small step towards regional financial co-operation. 
One negative aspect of the CMI was that it was simply a regional mechanism for 
financial assistance, with no permanent structure. Therefore, in the event of a crisis, 
negotiations between the lending and borrowing countries would have to take place in 
order for the currency swaps to occur, which would take time and was far from the ideal 
automated form of response that a multilateral organisation could provide. Furthermore, 
it was argued at the time that the CMI had advanced regional co-operation “well beyond 
pre-crisis levels;”143 yet, despite this, at the recent review of the CMI, member states 
decided to postpone the decision on whether to increase the central bank swap lines and 
change the rules governing the initiative for a further year, thus suggesting the
139 “Progress of the Chiang Mai Initiative”, Ministry o f Finance Japan Website, 
http://www.mof.go.jp/jouhou.kokkin/pcmie.htm, accessed on 12 November 2004.
140 “Asia gives itself more time to review financial exchange safety net”, Reuters News, 6 April 2004.
141 “US cautious about Chiang Mai Initiative”, The Nation, 8 May 2000.
142 Rosario Liquicia, “Japan-Asia: Regional Monetary Fund still out, currency swap in”, Inter Press 
Service, 7 May 2000.
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Diagram 5.3 The Network of Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) under the Chiang Mai Initiative 
(CMI), Ministry o f Finance Japan Website, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/CMI_060504.pdf, accessed 
9 September 2006.
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complexity and political sensitivity of expanding the CMI to a greater regional financial 
system. 144
While some in the US government argued that the Chiang Mai Initiative was a 
“far cry” from the Japanese autonomy and leadership seen in the AMF proposal, 145 it 
also showed signs of being part of a process towards establishing an AMF, as it had also 
been described as “[representing] another step towards the realisation of an AMF as 
originally conceptualised. ” 146 The President and Chairperson of the Board of Directors at 
the Asian Development Bank, Tadao Chino stated that the CMI was “the first step to 
[regional] financial integration”, and that it prepared the region for a monetary union 
comparable to the European Union or North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) . 147 Chino’s statement on Asian monetary union was also supported by 
Haruhiko Kuroda, who argued that financial and monetary integration “will not be a 
dream within the next thirty years, presupposing that the political will to do so 
remains. ” 148 More importantly, Japan was not alone in its vision for an AMF. Philippines 
President Gloria Arroyo and Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra voiced their 
support for a common regional initiative, 149 and China’s central bank has also 
investigated such an initiative jointly with Japan. 150 The CMI was therefore a crucial part 
of keeping the Asian Monetary Fund alive in the discussions of the region, and was 
indeed part of a longer-term vision for the region.
143 “Leader: Swap Network”, Financial Times, 10 May 2000, p. 22.
144 “Asia gives itself more time to review financial exchange safety net”, Reuters News, 6 April 2004.
145 Eric Altbach argued that, in the CMI, “Japan doesn’t get sole credit” and that it was “just a member” 
because the CMI was closely linked to the IMF and involved a collective currency swap. Eric Altbach, 
Director for Asian Economic Affairs, US National Security Council, interviewed 15 March 2005, 
Washington D.C.
146 Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 12.
147 ‘“Ajia Tanitsu Tsüka wo’ Ajia Kaihatsu Ginko Chino Sösai Köen de Uttae” (“A Monetary Union for 
Asia: ADB President Chino appeals in Speech”), Asahi Shimbun, Morning edition, 10 July 2004,
p. 12.
148 “Daiöshü ni Manabu Ajia Keizaiken -  Haken Shugi sake Tayösei Ikase”(“Lessons from Europe for 
an Asian Economic Bloc: Avoid Hegemony and utilise Diversity”), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Morning 
edition, 24 May 2004, p. 5.
149 “Daiöshü ni Manabu Ajia Keizaiken”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun. Thailand did not renew its currency 
swap agreement with Japan under the CMI in late July; however, this is seen largely as a re-election 
stunt by the Thai cabinet, and the Thai Ministry of Finance was in favour of renewal. It is seen that 
this incident will not derail the economic integration process in the region. See Alan Wheatley, “Thai 
moves raises questions over Asian economic ties”, Reuters News, 28 July 2004.
150 “Daiöshü ni Manabu Ajia Keizaiken”, Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
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The East Asian Community
A vision of greater monetary and economic integration was also incorporated in 
subsequent discussions about establishing an East Asian Community (EAC). While this 
proposal is still in the early stages, it seeks ultimately to organise an EU-style regional 
bloc that co-operates on a broad range of issues, such as monetary, finance, trade, 
investment, energy, technology and security policies and also aims to establish an Asian 
Currency Union (ACU). 151 The idea for the EAC developed out of ASEAN+3 
discussions dealing with the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and seeks to 
fonnalise further the de facto economic bloc that exists in the region.152 So far, the EAC 
is loosely formed around the idea of initially establishing Free-Trade Agreements in the 
region and liberalised trade and investment.153 The first East Asian Summit was held in 
Malaysia in December 2005 as the first formal discussions for creating an EAC.154 
However, there remains ambiguity and contention over the actual membership of states 
within the proposed EAC. While China in particular argues that EAC membership 
should be limited to ASEAN + 3 states,155 others (such as Japan, Singapore and 
Indonesia) have advocated the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand, mainly as 
an attempt to curtail China’s influence in the prospective organisation.156 However, 
neither option extended membership to the United States.
The Japanese Ministry of Finance in particular made concerted leadership efforts 
to establish the EAC, and launched the Asia Bond Website as an initiative to promote 
transparency in the Asian bond market and to improve the decision-making process for 
investors and bond-issuing bodies.157 A MOF executive also mentioned that they were 
aiming to have concrete plans for the EAC by 2015:
151 Kuroda, Gen Kiriage, pp. 68-69; Higashi Ajia Kyödötai Hyögi Kai (East Asian Community Council), 
“Tenbö: Higashi Ajia Kyödötai” (“Prospects: An East Asian Community”), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
28-part series, 20 October -  26 November 2004.
152 “Guröbaru Mane”, Mainichi Economist.
153 Takashi Toriumi, “Autorukku: Higashi Ajia Kyödötai—Tsui ni Miete Kita Jitsugen eno Michisuji” 
(“Outlook: The East Asia Community—At Last the Path to its Realisation can be Seen”), Shükan 
Töyö Keizai, 18 December 2004.
154 Satoshi Amako, “Strategic Dialogue required among Japan, the US and China”, Asahi Shimbun, 15 
February 2006.
155 Amako, “Strategic Dialogue”, Asahi Shimbun; “Asia: dead on arrival; East Asian diplomacy”, The 
Economist, vol. 377, issue 8457, 17 December 2005, p. 62; Barry Wain, “East Asia Summit: 
Exclusive or Inclusive? Rift over countries to be invited, nonmember invitations widens to a point 
where some observers expect a delay”, Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 April 2005.
156 Edward Cody, “East Asian Summit marked by Discord, New group’s role remains uncertain”, 
Washington Post, 14 December 2005; Wain, “East Asia Summit”, Asian Wall Street Journal.
157 “Tokubetsu Kikaku: Ugoki dashita Higashi Ajia Keizai Kyödötai: 3 bu Higashi Ajia Kigyö no Nihon 
shijyö shinshutsu, konfidensharu ‘Higashi Ajia Kinyü kösö’ de shudöken kakuho wo nerau Zaimushö
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W hy 2015? Because that is when we anticipate that China will over take Japan in 
terms o f its national pow er...W e would like to take the initiative and have 
organised this [EAC] plan by then. If we don’t do this, Japan will virtually have no 
presence in East Asia.158
While there are similarities between the AMF and the EAC in that they both 
exclude the United States, the EAC has very different overtones to the AMF proposal 
because the international circumstances of the region have changed in the last decade. 
The United States is now in a better position to recognise how an AMF-type institution 
could function alongside US interests in the region: it can see the utility of having such 
an arrangement for regional economic stability, and also as a mechanism to engage 
constructively with China. However, Michael Vatikiotis argues that “[t]he unspoken 
fear in Washington is that an East Asian Community that excludes the United States 
could become the core of an alliance against it. ” 159 It is important then for Japan not 
simply to turn China into a common enemy of the United States and Japan, but to steer 
the EAC in such a way that it restrains both US and Chinese dominance.
Building blocks towards an AMF?
While the MFG, NMI and the CMI that resulted in the wake of the Asian financial crisis 
were much more modest than the original Asian Monetary Fund proposal, should they 
be perceived as compromises on the AMF? Has Japan indeed failed in its opposition 
against US and IMF financial biases and in its goal to establish a regional financial 
architecture? Like the differing development philosophies towards economic reforms in 
developing economies between Japan and the Washington Consensus, Japan’s “failure” 
to establish a regional financial framework seems to be also a matter of the timeframe in 
which this question is being asked.
The short-term answer would be that Japan’s AMF proposal did fail. While 
Japan’s intentions were to maintain regional monetary stability for the greater goal of 
stability in global finance, it failed because this particular autonomous policy was 
deemed to be in conflict with existing institutions, and did not stand up in the face of US 
objection. However, in the long-term, the various financial and monetary frameworks
no shitatakasa”, (Special Project: East Asia Community Begins to Move Forward: Part 3 East Asian 
Businesses Move into the Japanese Market, Confidential the Ministry of Finance Shrewdly aims to 
Secure Leadership in the ‘East Asia Finance Plan’”), Keizaikai, 11 January 2005.
158 “Tokubetsu Kikaku”, Keizaikai.
b9 Michael Vatikiotis, “East Asia club leaves US feeling left out”, International Herald Tribune, 6 April, 
2005.
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that emerged in the years since have kept alive the long-term goal of regional monetary 
stability and, from this perspective, Japan’s autonomous initiative is still under 
discussion. Furthermore, the initiatives are not as blatantly in conflict with the IMF, and 
now sit even more within the overall US hegemonic framework.
The perception that the AMF proposal is not yet dead is seen in many parts of the 
Japanese government. Japanese officials, such as Hiroshi Watanabe, Deputy Vice- 
Minister for Policy Co-ordination in the Bureau of International Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance, have expressed the view that those bilateral monetary swap programs that 
Japan was leading in the Asian region supplemented IMF funds, and should be 
expanded, and that while there were still difficulties in establishing an AMF type 
institution, it remained a longer term goal.160 This opinion was echoed by Haruhiko 
Kuroda, former Vice-Minister of Finance for International Affairs, who stated at an 
address in Jakarta in May 2002 that “Japan had not necessarily abandoned the AMF. It 
is something that should be aimed to be achieved in the mid- to long-term future”, and 
that “the introduction of an Asian common currency was not an inappropriate goal” for 
the region.161 The Chairman of the Japan Federation of Economic Organisations {Nihon 
Keidanren), Hiroshi Okuda, also advocated his support and argued: “It is essential to 
advance regional co-operation through the creation of things like the AMF so that a free- 
trade area can operate smoothly.”162 The potential creation of a future AMF is aided by 
the easing of US threat perceptions towards Japan, and the United States now sees the 
utility of such an institution in curtailing the rapid spread of financial and monetary 
instability, and also in keeping China’s influence in the region under check.163 Former 
Foreign Minister Köji Kakizawa argues that Japan needs to convince the United States 
that the proposed “enlightened regionalism” is in step with US interests.164
160 “Ajia Tsüka Kikin no Setsuritsu niwa Izen toshite Jikan ga Hitsuyö: Watanabe Zaimu Shingikan” 
(“The Establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund still Necessary: Deputy Vice-Minister Watanabe”), 
Reuters Japan, 5 April 2002.
161 “Kuroda Zaimukan: ‘Ajia Kyötsü Tsüka wa Kanö Indoneshia de Köen” (“Kuroda Vice-Minister of 
Finance: ‘An Asian Common Currency is Possible’ in an Address in Indonesia”), Mainichi News 
Sokuhö, 29 May 2002.
162 “Higashi Ajia Shokoku to FTA Köchiku wo = Nögyö Kaihö ni Muke Sannyü Hitsuyö” (“The 
Creation of a FTA with the Countries of East Asia: Preparations for Entry through the Liberalisation 
of Agriculture Necessary”), Jiji Tsüshin, 6 February 2003.
163 “Higashi Ajia Kyödötai Kösö: Hirakareta Chiiki Togo Jitsugen wo, Kokusai Föramu ga Teigen” (The 
AMF plan: Realising an Enlightened Regional Integration proposed by International Forum”), 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 June 2003, and Toriumi, “Autorukku: Higashi Ajia Kyödötai”.
164 Köji Kakizawa as quoted in “Higashi Ajia Kyödötai kösö”, Yomiuri Shimbun.
CHAPTER FIVE 227
Can a regional fund be compatible with the IMF?
Given the potential utility of a regional monetary mechanism, the discussion needs to 
consider what consequences a future AMF would have on the position of the United 
States in the Asian region. Would a regional monetary fund undermine US hegemony? 
Asia still depends heavily on the United States for economic and strategic stability and, 
therefore, proposals for a regional monetary fund must consider how it can co-operate 
with existing monetary and financial mechanisms led by the United States. The crucial 
question about Japan’s leadership in creating a regional economic system is whether it 
will be designed to provide temporary liquidity support, prevent financial crises or help 
in the resolution of these crises once they have begun, and whether a regional 
mechanism will serve needs better than a global institution.
The IMF does not currently provide short-term liquidity support. Therefore, in this 
respect, there is no tension in the roles between potential regional arrangements and 
existing global institutions.165 As mentioned previously, the greatest tension lies in 
whether a regional fund would cause moral hazard and undermine the authority of the 
global institution. Those in support of a regional institution firstly maintain that the 
global versus regional argument assumes that a regional fund is inherently redundant or 
in competition with the global institutions. It is quite possible that the best solution for 
the region is to have a combination of the two, given that sound understanding of the 
economic, institutional and market processes in the region is likely to come from the 
region, and experience in dealing with financial reform and surveillance from global 
institutions.
Secondly, supporters of a regional institution argue that the regional/global divide 
does not focus on which form might actually be better for regional stability. At the 
beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the IMF failed to gain international support 
outside the region, which weakened its credibility. A regional economic institution, on 
the other hand, would commit its members to supporting each other, and could also 
provide a means to support its members in larger international institutions such as the 
IMF. Again, in this instance, co-operation between regional and global economic 
arrangements would be the most beneficial solution for the region.
165 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, p. 18.
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Thirdly, the argument that policy consistency can be better maintained at a global 
level is weak, given that the IMF has strong political pressures from the United States 
and is therefore not always consistent in its programs. 166 A regional economic 
mechanism would not necessarily disrupt global mechanisms to maintain stability in the 
region, but could help to assist or balance the political biases that the global institutions 
might hold.
Fourthly, besides the economic influence of the United States through the IMF, 
there is the other crucial strategic factor in the region that is critically dependent on the 
United States. Economic stability cannot be achieved without political stability in the 
region, and a US military presence is an essential factor in maintaining this situation. 
Consequently, despite the disappointing response by the United States during the Asian 
financial crisis, Asian states are reluctant to establish a regional financial architecture 
that is explicitly in conflict with the United States or the IMF. This dilemma has been 
made easier with the US change in attitude towards Asian regionalism, and Japan’s 
initiatives in the region were more greatly appreciated when the financial crisis spread 
beyond Asia to Russia and Brazil.167 Furthermore, the IMF had undergone reforms 
reflecting the lessons learnt from the Asian financial crisis, meaning that IMF 
compatibility with regional networks such as the NMI, the CMI and potentially the EAC 
was subsequently quite different in nature to IMF policy in 1997.168 When these four 
factors are considered, Japan’s proposal to establish a regional monetary fund should not 
be seen as a move away from existing structures, and indeed the potential for a regional 
and global monetary fund to work co-operatively should be recognised.
Conclusion: The AMF and Japanese autonomy?
This chapter showed that the AMF proposal was an autonomous policy that actually 
originated from internal Japanese ideas, as opposed to an external benchmark. It was an 
initiative that critically questioned blind economic modernisation in order to “keep up” 
with a Western model, and represented an initiative that recognised the changes or 
kussetsu that Western ideas undergo when encountering the non-West.
166
167
168
De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, pp. 18-21. 
Tadokoro, “The Asian Financial Crisis”, p. 236. 
Amyx, “Moving Beyond Bilateralism?”, p. 16.
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However, Japan also recognises the vital role that the United States plays in 
regional security and economic stability. In addition to this, the United States is an 
important economic partner and, therefore, US-Japan relations have been a priority in 
Japanese foreign policy, as argued in the previous chapters. However, this does not 
mean that Japan is satisfied with the relationship on all fronts and, as the second largest 
economy in the world, it has enough confidence and leverage over the United States to 
voice these objections without necessarily challenging outright the US position as the 
global hegemon. The Asian financial crisis was just such an example. The fact that it 
made such a sudden proposal and that it eventually took US criticisms and demands into 
account in the post-AMF proposal currency network strongly suggested that Japan was 
aware of the objections that it would face from the United States, and employed the 
tactic to deal with this restriction.
This chapter set out to answer three specific questions. Why did Japan make such 
a controversial proposal that outwardly seemed to challenge the United States and the 
IMF? How did the United States and the IMF respond to the AMF, and how did Japan 
overcome various objections to keep the AMF vision afloat? There were three main 
reasons why Japan made such a controversial proposal. Firstly, both the IMF and the 
United States were inefficient in responding to the Asian financial crisis and, 
furthermore, both misdiagnosed the situation. Thus, had the United States and that IMF 
response been more efficient and accurate, Asia might not have perceived the need for a 
regional mechanism. Moreover, as a consequence of US and IMF’s failings, Japan took 
the initiative to prepare for a regional approach to future crises, which was supported by 
the region. Secondly, Japan and the countries hit directly by the crisis were disillusioned 
by the double standards of the IMF and the United States. While stating their concerns 
about the “moral hazard” an AMF could create in the region, the IMF was far more 
lenient in the reforms prescribed for Russia, and the United States contradicted its 
opposition to state intervention in neo-liberal economics through its involvement in the 
LTCM hedge fund bailout. Thirdly, Japan’s AMF proposal revealed fundamental 
differences between the economic development philosophies of Japan and the United 
States. Japan recommended the creation of an AMF in the region because it believed 
that economic development would benefit from gradual economic liberalisation based 
on the economic and social capabilities, rather than the “big bang” approach of the 
Washington Consensus. Japan also believed that the state should mediate to realise 
stable and faster economic development in the long-term. The AMF would have
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reflected these values which Japan viewed as being more suited to the economies of the 
region.
The United States and the IMF initially responded to the AMF with strong 
objections, and ultimately quashed its realisation in the short-term. However, Japan 
overcame these objections by establishing informal alternative financial and monetary 
networks in the region. The new networks represented steps towards establishing an 
AMF in the long term and Japan’s change of the timeframe for the established of a 
future AMF. The Manila Framework Group, the New Miyazawa Initiative, the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, and subsequently the proposal for an East Asia Community, all represent 
Japanese-led arrangements that have modified Japan’s position on excluding the United 
States, and which keep alive discussions on eventually forming a formal regional 
economic network. However, although far from the original proposal for the AMF, they 
represent neither failure nor signify the helplessness of Japan in the face of the United 
States. Rather, in order to better exercise autonomy in its foreign economic policy, Japan 
made adjustments to the AMF proposal and the timeframe in which it would be realised. 
More importantly, the utility and need for such an institution is still recognised today 
and, because of this, the United States has changed its attitudes toward the idea. In 
addition, the rise of China as a potential regional power has altered US perceptions of an 
AMF could potentially help to maintain United States’ position in Asia.
Finally, on the question of whether the AMF proposal signified a move away from 
US influence, the answer is two-fold. The AMF proposal without doubt signified 
Japan’s leading the region away from dependence on the United States or, more 
specifically, it signified a move away from the dominance of the dollar. Many of the 
region’s currencies were pegged to the US dollar, and Japan’s initiatives were certainly 
an attempt to move away from this framework. Furthermore, the US response to the 
Asian financial crisis “radically affected the region’s perception of the United States as a 
reliable partner in the domain o f international finance” 169 and, in this sense, the AMF 
was an autonomous Japanese proposal that represented a movement away from IMF and 
US influence. On the other hand, because of the central role played by the United States 
in other domains, this was not necessarily autonomy against US hegemony in the region 
as a whole. Japan, and many of the other countries within the region, recognised the 
vital role of the United States in regional security and trade. The challenge of Japan’s
169 De Brouwer, “The IMF and East Asia”, pp. 5-6.
CHAPTER FIVE 231
AMF proposal was not only to promote the AMF proposal, but also to maintain the 
strategic, economic and financial involvement of the United States in a way that was 
compatible with regional needs.
Therefore, the Asian Monetary proposal was a good example that supported many 
of the arguments of the overall study on Japanese autonomy. It firstly demonstrated that 
Japan’s scope of autonomy, and its success in achieving it, were influenced significantly 
by how its intentions were perceived by the United States. The United States saw the 
AMF as a potential threat to existing economic and financial institutions in the region, 
and therefore quashed this initiative. However, because it is more influenced by a 
perception of hegemony than anarchy, Japan not only tried to initially push the proposal 
through, but also conceded under strong US criticism. Finally, these two observations 
mutually support that Japanese autonomy is more limited and restricted by US 
hegemony, which makes it unable to act as freely as theorised in rationalist theories.
The next chapter presents the final example of Japanese autonomy, and analyses 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, a surprise 
Japanese diplomatic manoeuvre that was not communicated to the United States 
beforehand. The visit was particularly controversial because of the US hard-line position 
towards North Korea in the context of the “War on Terror”.
CHAPTER SIX
MILITARY STRIKES, SANCTIONS OR ENGAGEMENT? 
JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA
As a final example of restricted Japanese autonomy in the context of US hegemony, this 
chapter investigates Japan’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK or North Korea). It contrasts Japan’s post-1945 relations with the DPRK with 
US-DPRK relations in order to uncover how Japan negotiated its interests with the 
DPRK in the context of its relations with the United States.
As discussed in previous chapters, the most significant reason for Japan aligning 
closely with the United States in the post-1945 period was to ensure economic recovery 
in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and national security during the 
Cold War. The need to remain aligned perpetuated even after the end of the superpower 
conflict as global instabilities continued. Yet, despite Japan’s dependence on the United 
States, differences between their policies towards North Korea have persisted. Since the 
Second World War, Japan has chosen to engage with North Korea in much the same 
fashion as with Iran, contrary to the US position. In particular, Japanese Prime Minster 
Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002 represented a move that was received 
unfavourably by the United States but went ahead nonetheless. This example is 
therefore comparable to the previous two examples, and Japan’s relationship with the 
DPRK represents an important example of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy.
However, more importantly, while Japan’s interactions with the DPRK were 
undertaken despite opposition from the United States, they were rarely 
uncompromisingly in opposition to US policy. Masao Okonogi’s description of 
Koizumi’s first journey to Pyongyang is particularly indicative of this point. He 
described the visit as “far-sighted and level-headed diplomacy that skilfully combined 
co-operation with the United States with independence away from the US”. 1 This 
restricted autonomy or jishusei (§  i t t )  that Okonogi raises is the central focus of this 
study and also this chapter. Japan’s concerns for US interest suggest the limitations of it
1 Masao Okonogi, in Masao Okonogi, Hajime Izumi, Sang Jung Kang, Naoki Mizuno and Jong Wong 
Lee, “Sögö Töron: Nicchö Pyonyan Sengen no Rekishiteki Kokusaiteki Igi” (General Discussion: 
The Historical and International Significance of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration”), in Sang 
Jung Kang, Naoki Mizuno and Jong Wong Lee (eds.), Nicchö Köshö: Kadai to Tenbö (Japan-North 
Korea Negotiations: Issues and Prospects), Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 2003, p. 4. The Japanese reads,
KLfc • • • .
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exercising what Held called “ideal autonomy” within the broader parameters of US 
hegemony, and makes autonomy narrower and achieved within US interests.
This chapter seeks to answer the following three questions: What were the reasons 
behind Japan’s decision for engagement, despite the hard-line position of the United 
States toward the DPRK? How did the United States perceive Japan’s position? And 
finally, how did Japan overcome the restrictions imposed by US interests and were 
Japanese policies in conflict with broader US interests? The chapter answers these by 
comparing Japanese and US relations with the DPRK from 1945 until 1992, and 
investigating in greater detail the Japanese and US position during the first and second 
North Korean nuclear crisis, and also Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. By analysing these 
episodes in detail, the chapter highlights the particular circumstances in which Japan’s 
autonomy is negotiated and how Japanese goals are achieved.
The North Korean issue was influenced by a small number of officials close to 
Koizumi, and thus, some may argue that Koizumi’s visit to the DPRK is not an 
appropriate example representing a Japanese worldview on US hegemony. The 
negotiations were advanced under the leadership of Hitoshi Tanaka, former Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was the Director General of the Asian and Oceanic 
Affairs Bureau at the time of Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. It is true that Koizumi’s 
Pyongyang initiative invoked criticism from within the Japanese government, which 
suggested that the move did not have wider Ministry and government support, and that 
many perceived that stronger mechanisms were required to prevent the endangering of 
the US-Japan alliance.2 Tanaka was also known as a bureaucrat who harboured strong 
desires for greater autonomy from the US-Japan alliance, and had similarly 
demonstrated his support for autonomous policies during the revision of the US-Japan 
Guideline for Defence Co-operation in the late 1990s.3 However, a senior Japanese 
government official stated that “Koizumi’s efforts [were] appreciated by everyone”, 
suggesting that Tanaka’s initiative was supported more widely than anticipated.4 Thus, 
whilst Tanaka’s view on the US and North Korea may not reflect a mainstream position
2 Chüö Köron Editorial Division, “Nichi-Bei Dömei wo mushi shita ‘Tai-Bei Himistu Gaiko’”, 
(‘“ Secret Diplomacy towards the US’ that ignored US-Japan Alliance Protocol”), Chüö Köron, vol. 
117, issue 1423, no, 12, December 2002, pp. 38-45, p. 45.
3 Chüö Köron Editorial Division, “Nichi-Bei Dömei wo mushi shita ‘Tai-Bei Himistu Gaiko’”, p. 45. 
Tanaka at the time encouraged a guideline that moved away from the traditional US-Japan security 
framework and this was supported by bureaucrats from the Japanese Self-Defence Force who were 
unhappy about being an “underclass organisation of the US military”.
4 Saiki, Deputy Director-General, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, interviewed 13 December 2004, 
Tokyo.
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in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was one that was recognised as being significant 
within the Japanese government and the Prime Minister himself. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that Koizumi’s DPRK initiative is an example in Japanese foreign policy that is 
representative of Japanese worldviews on US hegemony.
The discussion of autonomy in Japan’s relationship with the DPRK begins firstly 
with an account of its relationship with the DPRK immediately following the Second 
World War II and the historical, social and domestic factors that led Japan to a policy on 
North Korea that differed from that of the United States. The second section analyses 
Japanese policy towards North Korea in the first Korean nuclear crises in the 1990s and 
the second in 2002. The third section then examines Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang, 
and the subsequent Pyongyang Declaration in the context of the George W. Bush 
administration’s foreign policy at the time. Finally, the chapter assesses the 
developments after Koizumi’s visit, in particular the Six Party Talks. The purpose of 
this survey is to outline the historical context and complexities of the Japan-DPRK 
relationship and also to analyse the patterns of North Korean policy as an example of 
Japanese autonomous policy. The chapter concludes by analysing the character of 
Japanese autonomy as pursued in the case of North Korea, how it is maintained in policy 
negotiations, and the reasons behind Japan following an autonomous line of policy from 
the United States.
Origins of Japanese Autonomous Policy towards the DPRK: US-Japan-DPRK 
Relations 1945-92
At various points in its post-1945 relations with the DPRK, Japan has held a 
fundamentally different position from the United States despite Cold War politics and 
Japan being mindful of US reactions to Japanese initiatives towards the North. The 
following section briefly discusses Japanese and US relations with the DPRK from 1945 
until 1992. This timeframe roughly coincides with the Cold War period, and shows the 
historical background to both states’ current policies toward North Korea by revealing 
that Japan’s decision to take an alternative position to US policy emerged just after the 
Second World War. Japan’s DPRK policy can be explained by both domestic factors 
and the history of Japan’s relations with the Korean Peninsula. These factors help to 
explain why Japan needed to combine its engagement with the DPRK with its co-
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operation with the United States and why it practises restricted autonomy under US 
hegemony.
The Japanese Position: 1945-1992
Japan had an intermittent process of political dialogue and economic ties with North 
Korea throughout the post-1945 period and also within a couple of years after the end of 
the Korean War, making Japan’s interactions with the DPRK significantly greater than 
that of the United States. The DPRK was a point of some anxiety for the United States, 
particularly because the Soviet Union and China had trained and armed the DPRK not 
long after the end of the Second World War. At least 10,000 North Korea youths were 
taken to the Soviet Union for military training, and the Korean Volunteer Army that had 
fought in the Chinese Civil War was trained by China.5 However, the United States had 
not anticipated a major military conflict so soon after the Second World War and had 
therefore downsized its forces between 1945 and 1950. The US downsizing and the so- 
called “Acheson Declaration”6 emboldened the DPRK to attack South Korea, which 
ushered in the Korean War on 25 June 1950.7 The Korean War lasted three years and an 
armistice was concluded between the military commanders of the North Korean Army, 
the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the United Nations Command on 27 July 1953.8
Japan’s position of engagement was influenced firstly by the existence of a 
significant Korean minority living in Japan. Both Japan and Korea have Korean and 
Japanese minorities in their populations due to the long history of engagement between 
the two countries.9 In addition to this, Koreans were brought to Japan as forced labour 
during the Second World War, of which approximately 600,000 remained.10 Some of
Miriam S. Farley, “Crisis in Korea”, Far Eastern Survey, vol. 19, no. 14, August 1950, pp. 149-56, 
pp. 150-51.
6 The then Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a statement on 12 January 1950 at the National Press 
Club that the United States would maintain a “defensive line” in the Pacific that went from Alaska, to 
Japan and Okinawa and the Philippines and would not interfere with the issues between China and 
Taiwan. See Takeshi Igarashi, Nichi-Bei Kankei to Higashi Ajia; Rekishi teki Bunmyaku to Mirai no 
Kösö (US-Japan Relations and East Asia: Historical Context and Ideas for the Future), Tokyo, 
Tokyo University Press, 2001, p. 120.
7 Igarashi, Nichi-Bei Kankei to Higashi Ajia, p. 121.
8 Young Whan Kihl, “North Korea in 1983: Transforming ‘The Hermit Kingdom’? (A Survey of Asia 
in 1983: Part I)”, Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 100— 11, p. 106.
9 A Japanese attack on the Korean Silla Kingdom was made under Hideyoshi Toyotomi as part of its 
major expansion on to the Chinese mainland in the 16th century. See Don Oberdörfer, The Two 
Koreas: A Contemporary History, New York, Basic Books, 2001, p. 4.
10 Oberdörfer, The Two Koreas, p. 53; Chung Dae-Kyun, “Japan’s Korean Community in Transition”, 
Japan Echo, vol. 30, no. 2, April 2003, pp 30-33, pp. 30-31. Koreans in Japan were often in low- 
paying jobs, and even those bom and raised in Japan who were unable to speak Korean could not
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these Korean residents in Japan were sympathetic to the North and illicitly sent funds to 
the DPRK with the assistance of credit unions associated with the pro-North Korean 
Chongryun, or Chösen Sören (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan).* 1 
Therefore, it was important for the Japanese government to maintain open diplomatic 
channels with North Korea in order to prevent Japan’s ethnic minority from becoming a 
source of domestic instability.12
The second influence on Japan’s engagement with the DPRK were the economic 
and political ties established in the early post-1945 period through the repatriation of 
Korean residents back to North Korea.13 Despite DPRK criticism of Japan’s colonial 
past, its discrimination of Koreans living in Japan and its active contribution of 
stevedores and other personnel, minesweepers, and training areas for US forces during 
the Korean War, 14 as early as 1955 official statements from the North Korean 
government called for the normalisation of relations with Japan.15 The repatriation 
scheme of Korean citizens to the DPRK was seen as a potentially central factor in this 
process and the scheme was also seen as generating positive economic growth in the 
port cities on the Sea of Japan.16 Repatriation began in 1955, principally from ports in 
NTgata Prefecture and, consequently, the general outlook between the two countries in 
the early post-Second World War period was positive. There were even assumptions 
during this period that relations between the two countries would be normalised within 
10 to 15 years.17
easily become Japanese citizens and many, until recently, were registered as foreigners. Since the 
mid-1990s, resident Koreans have been acquiring Japanese citizenship at the rate of about 10,000 per 
year.
11 While this number may seem insignificant given Japan’s current population is approximately 127 
million (see “The Population Japan”, The CIA World Fact Book,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html, accessed 22 June 2006), 
foreign residents only make up approximately 1 percent of this figure. Within this 1 percent, 
approximately 57 percent are Koreans, making them a significant minority group within Japan. See 
Tsutomu Nishioka, “North Korea’s Threat to the Japan-US Alliance”, Japan Echo, vol. 30, no. 2, 
April 2003, pp 38^13, pp. 39-41. Also see Nicholas Eberstadt, “Financial Transfers from Japan to 
North Korea: Estimating the Unreported Flows”, Asian Survey, vol. 36, no. 5, May 1996, pp. 523^42.
12 Chung, “Japan’s Korean Community in Transition”, p. 32.
13 Köichi Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kanren Shiryö” (“References related to Japan-DPRK relations”), in 
Sang Jung Kang, Naoki Mizuno and Jong Wong Lee (eds.), Nicchö Köshö: Kadai to Tenbö (Japan- 
North Korea Negotiations: Issues and Prospects), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 2003, pp. 231-46, 
pp. 232-33.
14 William J. Sebald, With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History o f the Occupation, London, 
Crescent, 1965, pp. 198-99.
15 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kanren Shiryö”, pp. 232-33.
16 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kanren Shiryö”, pp. 232-33.
17 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kanren Shiryö”, pp. 232-33.
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While Japan’s relations with North Korea were briefly interrupted when the 
DPRK rejected the legitimacy of normalisation between Japan and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK or South Korea) on 22 June 1965,18 there were two reasons why relations 
resumed. Firstly, the DPRK found itself increasingly isolated internationally, after 
declaring itself independent of both the communist and Western blocs in the Cold War.19 
Thus, relations with Japan continued to be an attractive option for North Korea. 
Secondly, Japan also reconsidered improving its relations with North Korea after the 
Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s. Umio Ötsuka argued:
Tokyo’s pursuit of an autonomous security policy derived from scepticism 
toward...the Nixon Doctrine. The US-Sino diplomatic negotiations [that occurred] 
without any consultation with Japan, promoted [Japan’s] relationship with North 
Korea.20
In other words, Japan’s engagement with the DPRK was also a measure to ensure 
that the United States did not unexpectedly resume diplomatic relations with North 
Korea without consultation with Japan, as it had done in the case of China.21 Therefore, 
while it maintained co-operation with the United States and South Korea, Japan adopted 
a policy of seikei bunri (meaning the separation of politics and economics), and 
continued a “two Koreas policy” by sustaining relations with both North and South 
Korea.22
The official Japanese justification for maintaining relations with the DPRK during 
the 1970s was “to bring about correct mutual understanding”23, and so that Japan could 
act as a mediator between not only the two Koreas, but also the United States and North 
Korea.24 The League for the Promotion of Japan-DPRK Friendship, established in 1971,
18 M.T. Haggard, “North Korea's International Position” Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 8, August 1965, 
pp. 375-88, p. 384.
19 While the DPRK enjoyed stable relations with the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin’s rule in the early 
1950s, after Stalin’s death and the increase of anti-Stalinism within the Soviet Union, North Korea 
could no longer rely on the communist superpower. It then turned to China in the late 1950s to the 
early 1960s, but fell out of favour with the Chinese government after the Cultural Revolution of 1964. 
See Masao Okonogi and Jong Wong Lee, “Kita Chosen no Kaku ni dö taisuru bekika” (“How should 
North Korea’s nuclear issue be dealt with?”), Sekai, vol. 716, July 2003, pp. 53-64, p. 55.
20 Umio Ötsuka, “Prospects for Japan-Korea Defense Cooperation: Partners or Rivals”, Robert Dujarric 
(ed.), The Future o f Korea-Japan Relations: Proceedings o f the Hudson Institute/East Asian Security 
Study Group Conference, 1997, Indianapolis, Hudson Institute, 2001, pp. 41-63, p. 43.
21 Ötsuka, “Prospects for Japan-Korea Defense Cooperation”, p. 44.
22 Jung Hyun Shin, Japanese-North Korean Relations: Linkage Politics in the Regional System o f East 
Asia, Seoul, Kyunghee University Press, 1981, pp. 133-35.
23 United States Joint Publication Research Service, The Japan Report, vol. 22, no. 5, 1 March 1976, 
p. 1-24, p. 18.
24 Seung K. Ko, “North Korea’s relations with Japan since Detente”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 50, no. 1, 
Spring 1977, pp. 31-44, p. 32.
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signed the Japan-DPRK Trade Promotion Agreement.25 The then Foreign Minister 
Masayoshi Ohira (who became Prime Minister in 1978) voiced his support for the 
expansion of ties with North Korea through economic, cultural, humanitarian ties and 
sporting links in a diplomatic speech in 1974.26 In the same year, 30 delegates visited 
Tokyo for the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the head of the Asia Bureau in the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masuo Takashima stated that “North [Korea] was 
not a threat”.27 This comment was criticised by South Korea and the United States, but it 
signalled closer political ties between Japan and North Korea. North Korea also began 
showing flexibility by changing its position on Japan-ROK relations. Initially, Kim II- 
Sung argued that normalisation with Japan could not proceed unless the normalisation 
treaty with South Korea was invalidated, but in 1972 he changed this position in a 
statement to the Yomiuri Shimbun,28
However, from 1974 onwards, the tempo of normalisation negotiations began to 
lag and the increasing importance of Japan’s relationship with South Korea meant that 
the economic ties with the DPRK did not expand in real terms.29 The oil crisis also 
caused North Korea economic difficulties, making it unable to repay ¥60 billion in loans 
back to Japan.30 These economic obstacles in the DPRK, combined with increased co­
operation between Japan, the United States and the ROK, became the backdrop for an 
increasingly isolated and aggressive North Korea.31 Köichi Ishizuka suggests that the 
increasing co-operation between these three states was one reason which led to the 
abduction of Japanese citizens—predominantly in 1977 and 1978.32
25 Ko, “North Korea’s relations with Japan since Detente”, p. 35.
26 Masayoshi Öhira, “Dai 72kai Kokkai Jyökai Gaikö Enzetsu” (“Diplomatic speech in the 72nd Normal 
session of the National Diet of Japan”, Sekai to Nihon Detdbesu (The World and Japan Database), 
University of Tokyo Institute of Oriental Culture Website, http://www.avatoli.ioc.u- 
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/fam/19740121.SXJ.html, accessed 29 June 2006.
27 Masuo Takashima, 73rd National Diet Session, Third Account Settlement Committee Meeting,
10 September 1974, National Diet Sessions Upper House Meeting Records, 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/073/1410/07309101410003c.html, accessed 21 August 
2006. The statement in Japanese reads J .
28 Statement to the Yomiuri Shimbun said that Japan and North Korea should work towards “closer and 
friendlier” relations. See “Nihon to Kita Chosen: Chikakute ShitashT Kuni ni” (“Japan and North 
Korea: Closer and Friendlier”), Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 January 1972.
29 Ko, “North Korea’s relations with Japan since Detente”, pp. 40M1.
30 Ko, “North Korea’s relations with Japan since Detente”, pp. 40^11.
31 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kamen Shiryö”, p. 236.
32 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kamen Shiryö”, p. 236.
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Map 6.1 A map of suspected abductions of Japanese nationals as of 10 February 2003, from East Asian 
Strategic Review, Tokyo, The National Institute for Defence Studies, 2003, p. 24.
Acts of terror continued in the 1980s with the bombing of Rangoon in 1983 when 
the South Korean president visited Burma, and a Korean Airlines airliner in 1987.33 
While Japan retaliated against the incident in Burma with sanctions in November 1983, 
it also found itself in a delicate position after the arrest of two Japanese citizens in North 
Korea accused of being spies, in what became known as the Fujisanmaru incident.34 
Japan’s sanctions were, therefore, low-key.35 Japan again began to initiate normalisation 
negotiations and soon ended these sanctions in January 1985, but, under US pressure, it 
again placed sanctions on North Korea in January 1988 in protest against the Korean 
Airline bombing.36 Thus, the economic sanctions that Japan imposed on North Korea
33 “Controversy Surrounds KAL Bombing Case”, Chosun Ilbo, 6 July 2004, 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200407/200407060043.html, accessed 10 August 2004.
34 A North Korean former soldier was found to have secretly boarded a Japanese ship, the Fujisanmaru. 
When he was handed over to the Maritime Safety Agency and returned to North Korea on the same 
ship, the captain Isamu Beniko and chief engineer Yoshio Kuriura were arrested upon reaching the 
DPRK and accused of being Japanese spies. They were sentenced to 15 years in jail. Ishizaka, 
“Nicchö Kankei Kanren Shiryö”, p. 237.
35 In response to the Rangoon incident, Japan placed restrictions on the entry of North Koreans into 
Japan and also restriction on the travel of Japanese nationals to, and interaction with, the DPRK. See 
Gaikö Seisho 1984 (Diplomatic Bluebook for 1984), Tokyo, Public Information Bureau, 1985, 
pp. 428-29.
36 After the KAL bombing, the then U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz designated North Korea as a 
country supporting terrorists. Since then, the United States has demanded (as conditions for taking 
North Korea off the list) that the Japanese kidnapping issue be settled; the Japanese Red Army 
members who fled to North Korea after hijacking a Japanese airliner in 1970 be sent to Japan;
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during the 1970s and 1980s were relatively short and were often instated under pressure 
from the United States.
The Japanese government reverted to its line of engagement with the DPRK and 
issued a statement in January 1989, which indicated that it did not maintain a hostile 
policy toward North Korea, and was prepared to “enter discussions of any type...on the 
entire range of peninsula issues with no preconditions whatsoever.”37 In September 
1990, a delegation of senior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Socialist Democratic 
Party of Japan (SDPJ) members led by the then Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru 
visited North Korea.38 The Fujisanmaru Incident was resolved during this visit, and 
Japan promised “appropriate reparations” once normalisation was achieved.39 A Three 
Party Declaration was also signed on 28 September, which started the process of 
negotiations between the DPRK and Japan on 30 January 1991 in Pyongyang and 
spanned across eight rounds that concluded on 5 November 1992.40 Japanese negotiators 
placed on the agenda issues such as the abducted Japanese citizens and suspicion over 
North Korea’s nuclear development, both of which were sensitive issues for the North 
Koreans, and because of this, negotiations broke down.41 From this point onwards, the 
DPRK shifted its efforts to achieving direct negotiations with the United States, rather 
than concentrating on normalising its relations with Japan.42
The US Position towards the DPRK and attitudes towards Japan-DPRK relations
While Japan had engaged with the DPRK, by contrast the US policy toward North 
Korea was marked by political distance and economic non-particularity after the Korean
apology for the KAL bombing; and agreement by North Korea to include itself in all anti-terrorism 
agreements. See “Controversy Surrounds KAL Bombing Case”, Chosun Ilbo, 6 July 2004, 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/htmPnews/200407/200407060043.html, accessed on 10 August 
2004.
37 “Tekishi sezu to Gaimushö ga Kyöchö” (“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasises that Japan does
not hold a hostile view”), Asahi Shimbun, 21 January 1989. MOFA made this statement just before a 
delegation of DPRK Worker’s Party entered Japan at the invitation of the Japan Socialist Party. The 
statement reads, r 0 L T  Jo ;&I2] L ft
38 “Nicchö 3tö Kyödö Sengen no Zenbun” (“Full text of the Japan-DPRK Three Party Joint 
Declaration”), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 29 September 1990, p. 7.
39 “Nicchö 3tö Kyödö Sengen no Zenbun”.
40 Keitarö Oguri, “In search of Rapprochement: Tokyo and Pyongyang,” Japan Quarterly, vol. 38, no.
3, July 1991, pp. 262-71, p. 264; Janice M. Heppell, “Confidence-Building Measures: Bilateral 
versus Multilateral Approaches”, in Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes (eds.), Peace and Security in 
Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1997,
pp. 269-301, p. 285.
41 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kamen Shiryö”, pp. 240-41.
42 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kanren Shiryö”, pp. 240-41.
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War. US apprehensions over North Korea were dictated by its concerns to maintain 
advantage in the Cold War. With regard to Japan, the United States had two concerns. 
Its first priority was Japan’s economic recovery so that it could become a solid member 
of the Western bloc as a buffer in the region, and also as a strategic base for the United 
States. Secondly, the United States was wary that closer relations between Japan and the 
DPRK could increase Japanese dependence on China for raw materials, which might 
make it susceptible to Chinese pressure.43 Because of these concerns, the United States 
made a swift military response to the North Korean attack in June 1950 in support of the 
ROK, fearing that inaction would indicate appeasement to the communists. 44 
Economically, the Trading with the Enemy Act was enforced in 1950 with the outbreak 
of the Korean War with a ban or limitation on exports and imports into the DPRK, 
which effectively severed all formal ties between the United States and North Korea.45 
This Act remained in force largely unmodified until June 2000.46
While the impact of the Sino-American Detente in 1971 eased US concerns over 
China, US-DPRK relations remained distant. The United States and the Republic of 
Korea were critical of Japan’s “two Koreas policy”, mainly because Japan’s relations 
with the DPRK helped to legitimise the Kim II Song government.47 Between 1972 and 
1983, it was reported that only 64 Americans visited the DPRK on 14 separate occasions, 
while 23 North Koreans entered the United States from 1977 to 1983.48 The US 
Ambassador to Seoul Richard Walker argued that improved relations with the DPRK 
would not improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula given the continuation of the 
Cold War.49 As a result, the United States maintained a general policy of minimal 
diplomatic relations with North Korea for the majority of the Cold War. It continued to 
follow a hard-line policy of disengagement with North Korea, while at the same time
43 Igarashi, Nichi-Bei Kankei to Higashi Ajia, p. 121.
44 “Statement by the President of the United States (Truman) on the Korean Question, June 27, 1950”, 
International Organization, vol. 4, no. 3, August 1950, p. 551.
45 “An overview of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations as they relate to North Korea”, US 
Department o f the Treasury, Office o f Foreign Assets Control,
www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/tl lkorea.pdf, accessed 21 August 2004.
46 “An overview of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations as they relate to North Korea”, US 
Department of the Treasury, 18 August 2000.
47 David Fouse, “Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging toward Autonomy?”, Asia- 
Pacific Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper, February 2004, p. 2.
48 Kihl, “North Korea in 1983”, p. 106.
49 Kihl, “North Korea in 1983”, p. 106.
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communicating to Japan the importance of political, strategic and economic co­
operation between Japan and the United States, and also South Korea.50
Kanemaru and his delegation’s visit to Pyongyang in September 1990 was seen as 
particularly controversial, and “set alarm bells off in Seoul and Washington.”51 The then 
US Ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost, requested a meeting with Kanemaru on 7 
October 1990 in which he emphasised that financial assistance to the DPRK would be 
potentially used for funding nuclear development programs,52 Whereupon Kanemaru 
apologised for acting without prior consultation.53
Japan’s policy towards North Korea during the Cold War period therefore already 
displayed differences from that of the United States. This was due to unique Japanese 
domestic concerns, such as the issue of Korean minorities domestically, but also 
reflected the desire to follow distinctly non-US policies, particularly after the Nixon 
Shocks. While the United States did not enthusiastically support Japan’s seikei bunri 
and “two Koreas” policies, Japan’s interactions with North Korea were maintained. 
Japan overcame its different position by establishing its North Korea policy with 
broader US Cold War politics in mind. In other words, Japan was sensitive to US and 
ROK interests and endeavoured to make its relations with the DPRK as useful to the 
United States as possible. As a consequence, its ties with North Korea only took the 
form of narrow economic relations and were otherwise quite limited and intermittent 
until the 1990s. Early post-1945 Japan-DPRK relations never fundamentally strayed 
from the politics of the Western bloc, nor did Japan establish firm relations with the 
DPRK; Japan thus demonstrated a restricted but autonomous foreign policy line.
The First Nuclear Crisis
This section analyses the first nuclear crisis in North Korea. It is an important example 
of Japanese autonomy in the context of the US-Japan alliance, as it reveals Japan’s 
insistence that peaceful means be used to resolve the crisis, despite the hard-line 
position of the United States towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era.
50 Seung K. Ko, “South Korean-Japanese Relations since the 1965 Normalization Pacts”, Modem Asian 
Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 1972, pp. 49-61, p. 50, 54.
51 Fouse, “Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy”, p. 3. Also see Michael H. Armacost and 
Kenneth B. Pyle, “Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for US Policy Coordination”, NBR 
Analysis, vol. 10, no. 1, March 1999, pp. 3-38, p. 18.
52 Armacost and Pyle, “Japan and the Unification of Korea”, p. 18.
53 Armacost and Pyle, “Japan and the Unification of Korea”, p. 18.
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Furthermore, it shows that Japan was in close co-ordination and communication with 
the United States in exercising its autonomy in the crisis, which contrasts starkly with 
the second nuclear crisis of 2002.
Confrontation between the DPRK and the Region: The First Nuclear Crisis
The first nuclear crisis occurred when the DPRK renounced its membership of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993. This triggered a deadlock in negotiations to 
halt further development of nuclear weapons in North Korea.54 The crisis was an indirect 
outcome of the meeting between the then Under-secretary of State for political affairs 
Arnold Kanter and the DPRK Workers’ Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun in New York on 
January 1992.55 At this meeting, Kim agreed to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and 
accept IAEA inspections later that month.56 However, the DPRK under-estimated the 
surveillance capacities of the IAEA and gave incorrect information,57 and IAEA General 
Director Hans Blix revealed discrepancies in the declared and actual periods of 
plutonium separation in the DPRK reactors in his 1992 inspections, indicating that 
North Korea possessed more plutonium than it had actually claimed.58 As a result, the 
DPRK renounced the NPT and effectively put the Korean Peninsula into crisis.59 Due to 
this crisis, the Clinton administration entered into negotiations with the DPRK using 
extreme caution, but with the view that the DPRK needed to do more than merely 
comply with its responsibilities under the NPT. While the United States indicated that it 
was prepared to make military strikes, the main US strategy was to engage with North 
Korea in order to try and talk the DPRK out of its nuclear posture. The crisis on the 
Korean Peninsula peaked in June 1994 when the DPRK, against international warnings, 
unloaded fuel rods from its nuclear reactor.60 This caused the United States to seriously 
consider the option of air strikes on North Korea’s nuclear facilities.61 At the same time,
54 Daniel B. Poneman, “Information Brief: The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework”, The Forum for  
International Policy, 7th March 2003, http://ffip.com/infobriefs030703.htm, accessed 14 June 2006.
35 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert. L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis, Washington D. C., Brookings Institution, 2004, p. 172.
56 Poneman, “Information Brief’.
57 Andrew Mack, “Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula”, Department o f International Relations 
Working Paper, no 1994/9, Canberra, Department of International Relations, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, p. 8.
38 Mack, “Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula”, p. 9.
59 Takeshi Igarashi, Mikio Sumiya and Haruki Wada, “Setogiwa gaikö kara no Dakkyaku wo (Töron) 
Tokushü: Chosen Hantö no Kiki to Nihon” (Special: Japan and the Korean Peninsula Crisis -  Break 
away from Brinkmanship Diplomacy [Debate]), Sekai, vol. 598, August 1994, pp. 193-212.
60 Mack, “Nuclear Endgame on the Korean Peninsula”, p. 9.
61 Igarashi, Sumiya and Wada, “Setogiwa gaikö kara no Dakkyaku wo” p. 195.
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the Clinton administration was mindful that measures to save North Korean face could 
make it easier for North Korea to step back from brinkmanship diplomacy.62 For these 
reasons, it instead put forward a motion at the United Nations for the imposition of 
sanctions against the DPRK.63 North Korea responded defiantly by declaring that it 
would infer such sanction as a declaration of war and cautioned the world that, if 
enforced, it would turn Seoul into a “sea of fire”.64 Ultimately, imminent conflict was 
avoided as a consequence of former US President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang.
The outcome of Carter’s intervention was the Agreed Framework. It was signed 
by the DPRK and the United States in Geneva on 21 October 1994. The then Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher summarised the aims of the Agreed Framework as follows:
Our goal in crafting the Framework was thus three-fold: to stop the North’s 
existing nuclear program; to devise a larger strategy that would address the threat 
posed by the North’s missile program and conventional weapons build-up; and to 
reduce tensions in the region by bringing North Korea out if its international 
isolation and into the broader community of nations.65
To achieve these goals, the Framework centred around four major points: the 
freezing of existing DPRK nuclear facilities; moves towards normalisation between the 
two countries; co-operation towards peace and security; and the strengthening of 
international nuclear non-proliferation. The freeze on North Korea’s graphite-moderated 
nuclear reactor was to come into force within the first month of signing the Framework, 
with the view that it would be eventually dismantled.66
The US argued that the Framework achieved three positive outcomes. The first 
was that it provided inspection mechanisms that went beyond NPT requirements.
Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), North Korea would be allowed 
to keep its existing gas graphite reactors and to accumulate stockpiles of
62 In an interview with US negotiators Robert Gallucci and Daniel Poneman, Poneman recalls President 
Bill Clinton’s comment on the necessity for the United States to prepare and provide a situation to the 
DPRK where it could come out of its international isolation without losing face. Robert Gallucci and 
Daniel Poneman, “Bei-chö göi Hiwa—Sensö Kaihi ga Kettei sareta Shunkan” (“The Unknown Story 
behind the US-DPRK Agreement: The moment war was avoided”), Gaikö Föramu, no. 133, 
September 1999, pp. 58-65, p. 64.
63 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. xv.
64 Masao Okonogi, “Dealing with the Threat of a Korean Crisis”, Japan Review o f International Affairs, 
vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 73-85, p. 76.
65 Warren Christopher, “A Comprehensive Strategy for Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program, US 
Department o f State Dispatch, vol. 6, no. 5, 30 January 1995, pp. 54-57, p. 54.
66 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, “Text of the US-North Korea Nuclear Accord”, Reuters News, 
21 October 1994, p. 1.
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plutonium, albeit under IAEA safeguards. Under the Agreed Framework, North 
Korea must freeze and dismantle its nuclear facilities.67
The agreement was also a positive move forward in that it promoted North-South 
dialogue, which the United States argued had the broader possibility of increasing 
stability in Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim and fostering economic growth.68 Finally, 
the Framework was designed in such a way that the United States and members of the 
international consortium could withhold co-operation at any point should the DPRK 
cease to comply, without significant gains for North Korea.
The Japanese position in the First Nuclear Crisis: Peaceful Negotiations
Japan’s involvement in the first nuclear crisis had been overshadowed by US direct 
negotiations with the DPRK, but it nevertheless had a central role in the events leading 
to the conclusion of the Agreed Framework and was able to sustain an autonomous 
DPRK policy during the negotiations. Japan’s influence was principally through its 
financial power, and its crucial role during 1993 and 1994 in concluding the Agreed 
Framework is captured in the following statement:
With the mounting crisis [in discussing sanctions and military attacks on North 
Korea], Japan had become even more critical. According to one Japanese 
diplomat, until 1994, Tokyo was riding in the back seat of a ear driven by 
Washington and Seoul. With the events that spring, it moved up front.69
It is also clear that, throughout these negotiations, Japan and the United States did 
have differences in their positions towards the DPRK. Japan was adamant that sanctions 
and military strikes were to be avoided,70 the main reason being that the crisis on the 
Korean Peninsula had more domestic implications for Japan than for the United States. 
These differences were the key to Japan’s influence over the United States; but rather 
than taking independent initiatives to resolve the issue directly with the DPRK, in the 
case of the first crisis, Japan played a support role to the US negotiations.
Despite Japan not taking its own initiatives to negotiate its interests directly with 
the DPRK, it had significant influence over the United States to the point where US
67 Robert L. Gallucci, “The Agreed Framework: Advancing US Interests with North Korea”, US 
Department o f State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 50, 12 December 1994, pp. 820-22, p. 821.
68 Gallucci, p. 821. The DPRK agreed to engage with South Korea and make efforts to implement the 
North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, which it concluded 
with the ROK in early 1992.
69 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 194.
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credibility in negotiating with North Korea rested on support from Japan. Therefore, 
ensuring its utility to US negotiations with the DPRK was a vital part of Japan’s policy 
in maintaining a different stance from the United States in the first nuclear crisis. Firstly, 
Japan held power over the United States on how and when the “sticks” should be 
implemented on North Korea. Should military attacks be implemented, Japan’s support 
of US policy was crucial:
[It was] an open secret at the Pentagon [that] the United States could not fight a 
war in Korea without Japan. Bases in that country would be critical to support 
forces on the Korean Peninsula, since American troops stationed in and around 
Japan would be involved in a conflict.71
The United States also requested various forms of rear area logistical support from 
Japan in the event of military strikes, such as intelligence gathering, usage of civilian 
harbours and airports and facilities for repairing warships. 72 The United States also 
wanted the SDF to participate in naval blockades in the event of imposing sanctions, 
and the dispatch of minesweepers to Korean waters. 73 However, from Japan’s domestic 
point of view (a view also shared by the ROK), military attacks were continually seen as 
a last resort throughout the negotiations due to concerns over the affect of military 
conflict domestically and across the region and Japan’s geographical proximity to the 
potential conflict zone. 74 As a result, the Japanese position in the issue was of vital 
importance for the United States. Threats of military strikes on the DPRK could not 
have full impact without Japanese support, and Japan was able to act as a brake on the 
United States in this instance.
Japan also exercised influence over the United States in its position as the 
DPRK’s second largest trading partner after China and in being a major source of 
capital, technology and other transfers of expertise through the Chösen Sören, 75 Given 
Japan’s economic ties, the negotiating points made by the United States necessitated 
Japanese support to have their full impact on the DPRK, particularly in the case of 
economic sanctions. Domestically, the imposition of economic sanctions had two 
potential negative affects on Japan. The major concerns for Japan were domestic
70 Janice M. Heppell, “Confidence-Building Measures: Bilateral versus Multilateral Approaches”, 
p. 276, pp. 280-81.
71 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 176.
72 Fouse, “Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy”, p. 4.
73 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan ’s Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea, London, 
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instability through increased acts of terrorism, as seen in the abductions of Japanese 
citizens by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s, and also the negative impact on 
aspects of the Japanese economy itself.76 Takehiko Yamamoto argued that economic 
sanctions on the DPRK could potentially stop the flow of capital between small and 
medium businesses operated by ethnic Koreans in Japan, and further decelerate the 
speed at which North Korea’s cumulative debts (estimated at ¥130 billion), were repaid 
to Japan.77
Japan’s official support for sanctions fluctuated during the negotiations, and 
though the Japanese government appeared to initially support US motions for sanctions 
by making contingency plans in its preparation, it had also showed signs of reluctance in 
its warnings to Washington that such sanctions would prove difficult to implement 
without the approval of the UN Security Council.78 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and 
Robert. L. Gallucci, who were all involved in the Agreed Framework negotiations, 
argued that “a senior Japanese official conceded that...[ambivalence towards sanctions] 
was largely a ‘smoke screen’ [and that] Japan had imposed its own sanctions against the 
North before”, and gave the example of the sanctions imposed after the 1983 Rangoon 
bombing (which had killed four South Korean cabinet officials).79 However, as 
previously mentioned, the sanctions imposed during the 1980s were low key and more a 
symbolic gesture toward the United States. Wit, Poneman and Gallucci’s reading of the 
Japanese sanctions were therefore misleading, as Japan’s motives behind the Rangoon 
bombing sanctions and its position in the first nuclear crisis were both very different. 
Therefore, this argument did not convincingly support Japan’s lack of reluctance on the 
issue of sanctions in a convincing manner.
Secondly, Japan had significant influence over the United States and could ensure 
that its interests were being met because it held power over when the “carrot” (namely 
economic assistance), would be offered to the DPRK. One example was a suggestion 
made by the “pragmatists” of the US government, who were more concerned about 
physically blocking North Korean access to nuclear material that could be used for
73 Nishioka, “North Korea’s Threat to the Japan-US Alliance”, pp. 39-41.
76 Takehiko Yamamoto, “Point of View: Takehiko Yamamoto— Examining pros, cons of N. Korean 
Sanctions”, Asahi Shimbun, 9 April 2004, accessed at
http://www.asahi.com/english/opinion/TKY200404090196.html, accessed 17 September 2004.
77 Yamamoto, “Point of View”, Asahi Shimbun.
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weapons production.80 In July 1991 they suggested the idea of tying the normalisation of 
Japan and the DPRK with a ban on North Korea reprocessing nuclear material.81 While 
the United States was aware that banning nuclear processing could potentially place 
restrictions on Japan’s reprocessing capabilities itself, it nonetheless received positive 
feedback from Japan, indicating that the threat from North Korea was a far greater issue 
and that Japan was willing to co-operate with US initiatives, rather than prioritise the 
inconveniences it could face without nuclear energy processing.82 Japan’s bilateral 
relations with the DPRK were consequently a key point that was intrinsically tied into 
US strategy.
Most crucially, Japan’s financial support was instrumental to the Agreed 
Framework and, throughout the negotiations, US strategies and concessions were based 
on Japanese money. From early on, US Ambassador to South Korea, James Laney, 
suggested that the United States should depend on Japanese funds allocated for North 
Korea in the event of normalisation, in order to fund the building of the new light-water 
reactors.83 Laney was working in Seoul when Japan provided US$800 million to assist in 
South Korea’s economic development after the two countries normalised their relations 
in 1965, and therefore knew that similar financial support could be expected for the 
DPRK.84 Because normalisation between Japan and the DPRK in the near future seemed 
unlikely, this problem was overcome by using Japanese capital instead for the US- 
initiated consortium.85 One reason the consortium, which later became the Korean 
Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), was formed as a multilateral organisation 
was so that Japan’s financial support would not appear to be “[bankrolling] American 
diplomacy.86 At the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, Japan agreed to pay at least 
US$100 million of the US$400 million necessary to build the reactors,87 which later 
increased to 30 percent of the expected costs.88
80 Mark E. Manyin, “Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues”, CRS Report for Congress, 
26 November 2003, pp. 1-18, p. 1.
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The Japanese position in the first nuclear crisis and the negotiations leading up to 
the Agreed Framework demonstrated that, while it had influence on the process leading 
to the Framework, the United States was the central force driving the negotiations, and 
Japan and the other states were co-operating with US-led initiatives. At the same time, 
even as differences between US and Japan policy towards the DPRK existed, in this 
situation Japan could afford to leave leadership in the hands of the United States. This 
was because the Japanese government was aware that the United States recognised the 
strategic importance and economic influence of Japan and that, as a result, the protection 
of Japanese interests would be of significant consideration in the negotiations. 
Therefore, because of the more co-operative stance of the United States, the first nuclear 
crisis necessitated less negotiation with the United States to get Japan’s voice and 
interests heard. In other words, Japan did not have to fight hard for its autonomy and 
was able to maintain its position of constructive engagement with the DPRK.
The US position: Military Strikes, Economic Sanctions
The United States had adopted a hard-line stance towards the DPRK that at times clearly 
conflicted with Japan’s position due to three regional and international concerns with 
regard to North Korea’s nuclear developments. First, on an international level, the 
DPRK’s threat to withdraw from the NPT could seriously undermine the safeguards 
system and damage the NPT’s international authority; 89 and second, a nuclear North 
Korea could prospectively become a supplier of weapons to pariah states in the Middle 
East. 90 Finally, but most importantly, a nuclear DPRK could affect the United States’ 
alliances in the region. In other words, “a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and
Assistance for North Korea’s Light-Water Reactors”), Mainichi Shimbun, Late Edition, 19 October 
1994, p. 1.
88 “Keisuiro no Futan kin Nihon wa 3 wari Kankoku ga 5 wari ijyö Honbu wa Nyüyöku” (“Light-Water 
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New York”), Sankei Shimbun, Early Edition, 5 January 1995, p. 1.
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Hiroshi Tosaki, “Kita Chosen Kaku Mondai to Kaku Fukakusan Taisei” (“North Korea and the Non- 
Proliferation Regime”) in the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Hökokusho: Töhoku Ajia no 
Anzen Hoshö to Nihon (North-East Asia Security and Japan), Tokyo, the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs, 1993, pp. 11-29, p. 12. International wariness towards North Korean nuclear 
development was surprisingly low during this period—due to administrative delays, North Korea did 
not conclude the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard agreement (which was mandatory 
within the first eighteen months of becoming a signatory of the NPT) and was therefore able to further 
develop its nuclear capabilities for as long as three years after signing the NPT. See Wit, Poneman 
and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 3^4.
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Politics”, in Tong Whan Park (ed.), The US and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle, London, Lynne 
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ballistic missiles could in time lead the governments in Tokyo and Seoul to reconsider 
their relations with the United States as well as their own commitments to refrain from 
developing nuclear weapons.”91 Therefore, on a regional level, a nuclear North Korea 
could spark an arms race in the region and, potentially, international nuclear 
proliferation.
The US hard-line resolve was also evident in the lead-up to the crisis, and it was 
also firm in its resolve that it would not take significant diplomatic initiatives until the 
DPRK halted its nuclear development.92 While the DPRK’s nuclear card achieved a 
bilateral meeting between Kim Yong Sun and Arnold Kanter, who was under strict 
instructions to mention neither what North Korea could expect in return or the 
possibility of normalisation of relations between the two countries.93 Kanter had gone 
through the US agenda with Japan and South Korea beforehand to get both states’ 
approval and urged the DPRK to permit IAEA inspections and to abandon its nuclear 
development program.94 In other words, the United States was not prepared to move 
forward without North Korean concessions on nuclear development and, as a result, 
when Kim Yong Sun pushed for another meeting with the United States, or at least a 
joint statement at the conclusion of the present meeting, both requests were refused and 
a year later another request by North Korea for a meeting with Kanter was also rejected 
by the Clinton administration.95
Japan’s reluctance to support military strikes or offer military assistance raised the 
question of whether the alliance was functioning effectively.96 However, Japan’s 
influence on the United States, and the accommodating position of the Clinton 
administration, was reflected in the Agreed Framework, which eventually ended the 
crisis and the many US concessions made to the DPRK. The United States was to 
organise KEDO to replace the existing reactor with light-water reactors by 2003.97 It also 
promised to supply alternative energy—principally 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil
91 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, p. xiv.
92 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir, New York, Miramax Books, 2003, p. 456.
93 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, p. 12.
94 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, pp. 12-13.
95 Oberdörfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 266-67.
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97 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, p. 1. Light-water reactors were seen as being more “proliferation 
resistant” because they produced a type of plutonium that was more difficult to reprocess into 
weapons-grade material, and also produced far less nuclear waste. Also, to refuel, the light-water had 
to be shut down, making it easier to detect by inspectors and monitors. See Terence Roehrig, “One 
Rogue State Crisis at a Time! The United States and North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program”, 
World Affairs, vol. 165, no. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 155-78, p. 159.
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annually for heating and electricity production, while the graphite reactor underwent the 
freeze. 98 In return, North Korea agreed to co-operate with the IAEA and allow IAEA 
inspectors to monitor the freeze during this time, which was a major achievement of the 
negotiations. 99 In conjunction with the successful resolution of the nuclear issues, the 
United States approved the reduction of trade and investment barriers, and agreed that 
the DPRK and the United States would establish liaison offices in their respective 
countries as a step towards bilateral relations on the ambassadorial level. 100 The United 
States also officially assured that they would not use nuclear weapons against the 
DPRK. 101 It made these concessions to meet Japan’s position, despite risking almost 
immediate criticism on concessions such as the oil, the light-water reactors and the costs 
involved in building them. 102 The chief US negotiator, Robert L. Gallucci, maintained 
that negotiation with the DPRK and the provision of some concessions was the “least 
worst alternative”103—other options being economic sanctions or a military attack, to 
which Japan and the ROK were strongly opposed out of concerns for geographical 
proximity and the effects that a military attack could have domestically.
Thus, the first nuclear crisis demonstrated that Japan’s position towards the DPRK 
was successfully maintained and communicated to the United States in the negotiations 
that led to the Agreed Framework. Furthermore, Japan played an important and 
influential role as a brake on the United States. Japan’s reluctance to enforce economic 
sanctions and military strikes led the United States to adopt a strategy that combined 
negotiating a solution and imposing sanctions—a gradual escalation “that would seek to
98 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, p. 1.
99 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, p. 1.
100 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, p. 2.
101 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, p. 2.
102 In an interview with US negotiators Robert Gallucci and Daniel Poneman, Gallucci recalls various 
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göi Hiwa—Sensö Kaihi ga Kettei sareta Shunkan”, p. 61. Senator John McCain criticised the 
Framework, saying that the Clinton administration had “extended carrot after carrot, concession after 
concession, and pursued a policy of appeasement based, in my view, on the ill-founded belief that the 
North Koreans really just want to be part of the community of nations and want diplomatic 
relations....” See Roehrig, “One Rogue State Crisis at a Time!”, p. 164. Karen Elliot House viewed 
the agreement as a reversal of the US position of unacceptability of a nuclear North Korea, and 
argued that the Agreed Framework represented “[a rescuing of the DPRK] regime at the moment of 
its maximum economic and political vulnerability and [rewarding] its intransigence”. She went on to 
suggest that firm resolve over the issue should have entailed Clinton convincing Congress and the US 
public of war against the DPRK. For a “superpower to dally for nearly a year over invasion”, she 
argued, and without “clear and consistent foreign policy”, it was unlikely that the DPRK would take 
the United States seriously, and that the Framework would end unsuccessfully. See Karen Elliot 
House, “A Dangerous Capitulation”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 14 November 1994, p. 8.
103 Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. xv.
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build a coalition, and increase pressure on North Korea” . 104 Japan’s heightened concerns 
over how the DPRK could respond to strong pressure ensured the implementation of a 
diplomatic solution in the form of gradual sanctions. Japan was also prepared to co­
operate with the United States, which was demonstrated by the suggestion of tying 
Japan-DPRK normalisation with a ban on North Korea reprocessing nuclear material. 
This indicated that the threat from North Korea was a far greater issue and that Japan 
was willing to co-operate with US initiatives rather than prioritise its own energy 
concerns.
However, more importantly, the braking effect of Japan’s autonomous position on 
the United States was only possible because the Clinton administration recognised 
Japan’s importance in US strategy. The United States understood that uncompromising 
policies towards the DPRK would not be effective without full Japanese backing. It also 
understood that it was unlikely that Japan would support a hard-line position given that 
the risks were considerably higher for Japan compared with the United States. In other 
words, without US willingness to accommodate co-operation with Japan, any efforts to 
maintain Japan’s autonomous policy towards the DPRK would most likely have failed. 
This fact demonstrates that Japan’s ability to defend its autonomy and fulfil an 
influential role in regional and international situations is strongly tied to the level of 
acceptance of Japan’s policies by the United States. Co-operation with the United States 
was possible in this instance, because the United States was not displaying as unilateral 
a position as it later adopted under the Bush administration, and was therefore more 
open to the concerns of its allies such as Japan. Therefore, in this instance, Japan’s 
autonomous position of constructive engagement was successfully maintained, although 
not without significant negotiation and co-ordination with the United States.
A Comparison with the Second Nuclear Crisis: Koizumi goes to Pyongyang
The chapter now juxtaposes the first crisis on the Korean Peninsula to the second 
nuclear crisis. It investigates how changes in US perceptions of its position in the world 
under George W. Bush and the US-led “War on Terror” affected Japan’s pursuit of an 
autonomous foreign policy. While it was much easier for Japan to negotiate an 
autonomous position in the first nuclear crisis, in the second it faced a US 
administration that was less inclined to modify its stance in the light of allies’ concerns,
104 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 32.
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and had a particularly aggressive stance toward the DPRK. When Bush was sworn in as 
US President in January 2001, the Agreed Framework was failing105 and, in his State of 
the Union address in January 2002, he denounced North Korea as part of the “Axis of 
Evil”.106 This confirmed the administration’s strong distrust of the DPRK regime and 
Kim Jong II and illustrated how little room there existed for diplomatic negotiations in 
resolving outstanding issues.
In these international circumstances, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a 
surprise announcement on 30 August 2002 with his decision to travel to Pyongyang in 
September to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong II.107 As Koizumi had previously 
voiced firm support for the US attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq in the “War on Terror”, 
his plan of direct diplomatic negotiations with North Korea was widely perceived as “a 
break out from the old security arrangement” with the United States.108 There was 
speculation at the time about whether the trip was made with Washington’s consent, but 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage was the first to be informed of Koizumi’s 
visit on 27 August.109 However, the then US ambassador to Japan Howard Baker 
indicated that he was informed of Koizumi’s trip only after the official announcement.110
105 The implementation of the Agreed Framework faced many obstacles and was slower than anticipated. 
The construction of the light-water reactors was delayed and Pyongyang expressed its frustration, 
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the United States held several rounds of talks, and the United States was granted permission to survey 
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denied that the inspections and the food aid were connected, the deal came under criticism from the 
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A senior MOFA official commented that “the United States is most suspicious about the 
planned Japan-North summit”.1"
US suspicions of the DPRK’s clandestine enrichment of uranium were confirmed 
during the then Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s trip to Pyongyang in early 
October 2002. The second nuclear crisis arose when the then DPRK Deputy Foreign 
Minister Kang Sok Ju made it clear that North Korea was pursuing a separate nuclear 
program, which was in violation of the Agreed Framework, the NPT, safeguard 
agreements of the IAEA and also the joint North-South Denuclearisation Declaration it 
made in 1992.112 Furthermore, Kang stated that, on top of highly enriched uranium, the 
DPRK possibly possessed “more powerful things”, namely chemical and biological 
weapons."3 The DPRK proposed relinquishing its nuclear program if the United States 
was prepared to guarantee that it would pre-emptively strike North Korea and would lift 
economic sanctions; however Kelly refused this offer."4
Given the circumstances before and after Koizumi’s trip, the visit was 
controversial, and it was also a significant departure from Japan’s negotiating style 
during the first nuclear crisis. There was seemingly minimal consultation with the 
United States prior to Koizumi’s visit, and his visit represented engagement with a 
rogue state that had ignored previous international initiatives. To explain this change, 
this section briefly summarises the outcomes of Koizumi’s trip and its significance, and 
then investigates the Japanese thinking behind the controversial visit amidst heightened 
tensions between the United States and the DPRK. It then analyses how the United 
States reacted to Koizumi’s visit, the outcomes of the visit and its implications for 
Japan’s stance in the “War on Terror”. Despite Koizumi’s lack of communication with 
the United States, it continues by arguing that Japan’s position was, as Okonogi argued, 
a combination of independence away, yet co-operation with, the United States."5
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The Pyongyang Declaration and the Significance o f September 2002
The Pyongyang Declaration was signed by the two leaders during Koizumi’s visit, and 
centred around four major points. The first declared Japan and the DPRK’s strong 
determination for the normalisation of relations and their mutual trust in achieving this 
goal.116 The second dealt with Japan’s colonial past on the Korean Peninsula, and 
“expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology.”117 The demands for compensation from 
North Korea had also softened, and the second point referred only to the provision of 
economic co-operation upon normalisation, which included grants, long-term loans with 
low interest rates and humanitarian assistance.118 More importantly, Japan and the DPRK 
agreed that they “would mutually waive all their property and claims and those of their 
nationals that had arisen from causes which occurred before August 15, 1945”.119The 
third point confirmed that both sides “would comply with international law and would 
not commit acts threatening the security o f the other side.” 120 The DPRK further 
confirmed that it would take appropriate measures so that “regrettable incidents” such as 
the abductions would not occur again, and that the lives and the security of Japanese 
nationals would not be threatened in the future.121 The final point confirmed that both 
Japan and North Korea “would co-operate with each other in order to maintain the peace 
and stability of North East Asia ... based upon mutual trust among countries concerned 
in this region” .122 By this, the DPRK recognised the necessity of resolving the nuclear 
and missile issues that existed on the Korean Peninsula, and that they “would comply 
with all related international agreements”.123
The Pyongyang Declaration was significant in several respects. Firstly, it was an 
important step in resolving the historical obstacles hindering normalisation,124 which was
116
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Japan’s colonial legacy and the reparation issue were points of contention throughout the history of 
normalisation negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. Japan was essentially waived of reparation 
responsibility by its incorporation into the US hegemonic system in the North East Asian region. The 
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evident in the section in the agreement where both states agree to “mutually waive all 
their property and claims” from the Second World War.125 Secondly, the DPRK agreed 
to a “comprehensive approach” to normalisation with Japan, which included the settling 
of abduction issues, nuclear and missile issues and regional security before Japan would 
give substantial economic assistance.126 Kim Jong II’s admission that North Korea had 
abducted Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s was a watershed achievement in 
itself, given that the DPRK government had consistently denied this in previous 
normalisation talks.127 Thirdly, the Declaration was an ambitious attempt to integrate the 
DPRK into international society by getting North Korea to comply with international 
law and limit behaviour that threatened security within the region. This was again 
directed at the abduction of Japanese nationals and also the suspicious vessels that had 
entered Japanese waters, the most recent being a North Korean ship disguised as a 
Japanese fishing vessel, which was intercepted by, and exchanged fire with, the 
Japanese Maritime Safety Agency off the coast of Amami Öshima in Kagoshima 
Prefecture in December 2001.128 While the general terms in the Declaration itself could 
not prevent the DPRK from sending more ships into Japanese waters or launching 
missiles, “the Pyongyang Declaration [stated] what kind of reaction this would invite 
from Japan”.129 If it wanted to foster good relations with Japan, it had to abide by the 
statement and halt its operations. Finally, with regard to security issues, the Declaration 
suggested a commitment to easing tensions in Northeast Asia. Although the Declaration 
was criticised as being vague, Shinichi Kitaoka maintained it was an important 
indication o f Japan’s realisation that it could no longer continue to have acrimonious 
relations or ignore the problems, particularly because of its geographical proximity to
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the Korean Peninsula.130 On the other hand, Izumi Hajime argued: “Settling past 
grievances alone will not lead to normalisation; this goal will only be achieved if it is 
seen to contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” 131 The Declaration also 
indicated a positive change of attitude in the DPRK’s approach to security on the 
Korean Peninsula. In previous discussions, North Korea evaded serious discussions on 
nuclear and missile developments with Japan, saying that this was an US-DPRK issue 
unrelated to North Korea’s relations with Japan.132 However, a change could be seen in 
its agreement to comply with international agreements.
The Pyongyang Declaration, and the resumption of dialogue with Japan, also 
indicated changes in North Korean foreign policy, particularly in relation to the United 
States. Kim Jong IPs willingness to meet with Koizumi indicated that the DPRK was 
employing “Südpolitik” as a diplomatic strategy, or appeasing its relations with 
Washington via Tokyo.133 The DPRK had previously tried to focus its main diplomatic 
attention on the United States from the end of 1992 until early 1993, after the eighth 
round of normalisation negotiations broke down between Japan and the DPRK.134 Given 
the Bush administration’s hard-line stance, progress in North Korea’s relations with the 
United States was unrealistic, and yet it was a serious concern that could influence the 
survival or demise of Kim Jong IPs regime. Therefore, it was crucial that the DPRK 
pursued other diplomatic avenues, particularly with Japan, not only because it was a 
firm ally of the United States, but also because Koizumi had close personal relations 
with George W. Bush.
The US response to the Koizumi ’s Visit and the Declaration
While there has been no official criticism of Koizumi’s overture to Pyongyang from the 
United States, at the same time, the secrecy under which the Japanese orchestrated the 
visit initially caused great tensions in the relationship. There was some uncertainty on
130 Shinichi Kitaoka, “Koizumi Höchö no Rekishi teki igi” (The Historical significance of Koizumi’s 
visit to North Korea), in Shinichi Kitaoka, Nihon no Jiritsu: Taibei Kyöchö to Ajia Gaikö (Japan 's 
Autonomy: Co-operation with the US and Diplomacy in East Asia), Tokyo, Chüö Köron Shin Sha, 
2004, pp. 183-92, p. 187.
131 Hajime Izumi, “Nicchö Kokkö Seijyöka no Jyöken: Anzen Hoshö Mondai Kaiketsu ga Zentei” 
(“Resolution of Security Issues the condition for Normalisation between Japan and North Korea”), 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 September 2002, p. 13.
132 Hajime, “Nicchö Kokkö Seijyöka no Jyöken”, p. 13.
133 Okonogi, “Dealing with the Threat of a Korean Crisis”, p. 76. Also see Chung Ok-Nim, “The New 
US Administration’s Korea Policy and its Impact on the Inter-Korean Relations”, East Asian Review, 
vol. 13, no. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 3-30, p. 23.
134 Ishizaka, “Nicchö Kankei Kamen Shiryö”, pp. 240-41.
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the part of the United States about how best to read Japan’s action, and its implications 
for the “War on Terror”, and on the Bush administration’s foreign policy in general. 
With regard to Koizumi’s visit, the US reaction was, at best, ambivalent.135 President 
George W. Bush merely expressed that he would support whatever Koizumi felt 
necessary,136 and the United States “officially encouraged Japan’s rapprochement with 
North Korea” while remaining “wary about the prospects of genuine dialogue with a 
country that it has characterised as part of an ‘axis of evil’” .137 Upon being notified by 
Koizumi of his visit to Pyongyang, Richard Armitage strongly urged against it, based on 
information suggesting North Korea’s enrichment of uranium and nuclear 
development.138 Furthermore, in a press conference in Tokyo on 30 August 2002, he 
indirectly pressured Japan not to take independent measures towards North Korea that 
strayed from the US-Japan co-operative framework, saying that it was important to keep 
in mind the broader context of the “War on Terror” and the DPRK’s development of 
weapons of mass destruction.139
US ambivalence about Koizumi’s overture stemmed from its concern that Japan’s 
economic assistance to the DPRK would directly contradict the US position of cutting 
off economic co-operation until North Korea stepped back from nuclear development.140 
Despite the fact that Japan backed the United States in the “War on Terror” in the 
broader international arena, Koizumi’s visit and the Pyongyang Declaration highlighted 
those aspects of Japanese policy towards the DPRK that differed from the US approach. 
The United States held the position that they would not engage in one-on-one 
discussions until the DPRK made unilateral concessions on three major points: 
improving its implementation of the Agreed Framework concluded in October 1994— in 
other words, full compliance with IAEA inspections and a freeze on existing nuclear
135 Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korea Initiative and US-Japan Relations”, Orbis, vol. 47, issue 3, 
Summer 2003, pp. 527-39, p. 527; Gavan McCormack, “North Korea in the Vice”, New Left Review, 
vol. 18, November/December, 2002, pp. 5-27, p. 22.
136 “Koizumi’s Dangerous Gambit”, Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 8.
137 David Pilling, “Koizumi vows to Revive Stalled talks with N Korea, Japan Engagement Pledge may 
worry US”, Financial Times, London edition, 16 December 2002, p. 8.
138 Yoneyuki Sugita, “Beikoku no Kita Chosen Seisaku” (“The United States’ North Korea Policy”) in 
Yöichi Hirama and Yoneyuki Sugita (eds.), Kita Chösen wo meguru Hokutö Ajia no Kokusai Kankei 
to Nihon (Japan and the International Relations o f Northeast Asia over North Korea), Akashi 
Shoten, Tokyo, 2003, pp. 89-111, p. 90.
139 “Kurözu Appu 2002: Raigetsu Hatsu no Nicchö Shunö Kaidan” (“Close Up 2002: Next Month, the 
First Japan-DPRK Heads of State Meeting”), Mainichi Shimbun, Osaka Edition, 31 August 2002; 
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reactors and related facilities;141 the verification of constraints on North Korea’s missile 
program and missile exports; and finally, a less threatening conventional military 
posture.142 This ran counter to the views of Japan and the other main players in the 
region, namely South Korea and China, and put pressure on the administration to engage 
in bilateral talks with North Korea.143
It was highly likely that Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang caused problems for the 
Bush administration, given that influential senior officials “[did] not really believe that 
diplomacy [could] accomplish anything with regimes that form part of Bush’s ‘axis of 
evil’”.144 Only a day before Koizumi’s announcement of his Pyongyang visit, John 
Bolton, the then Under-secretary of State had emphasised North Korea’s extensive and 
antagonistic military build-up at an address in Seoul on 29 August 2002. He stated that 
“President Bush's use of the term ‘Axis of Evil’ to describe.. .North Korea was more 
than a rhetorical flourish—it was factually correct” and that the United States was “in 
lockstep with [its] allies.”145 To have this statement seemingly negated the next day by 
Koizumi, Bruce Cuming argued, indicated “Koizumi...departed dramatically from 
Bush’s... doctrine of pre-emptive war, and from a half-century of close co-ordination of 
foreign policy between Washington and Tokyo”.146
While Cuming’s analysis of the visit is slightly overstated, various Japanese 
foreign policy analysts have interpreted the hesitant and unclear stance of the United 
States as representing potentially conflicting policies between the two allies. Hisahiko 
Okazaki argued that the United States did not want rapid normalisation between Japan 
and North Korea, especially while it maintained commitments in Iraq.147 Other than the 
obvious US fears of the Pyongyang Declaration simply ending up as a temporary cover 
for North Korea before Kim Jong II went back on the agreements to extract more out of 
Japan, Okazaki also reasoned that swift settlements towards normalisation between 
Japan and the DPRK would suddenly give North Korea the appearance of “a well-
141 Oberdörfer, The Two Koreas, p. 357.
142 Hideya Kurata, “North Korea’s Renewed Nuclear Challenge”, Japan Review o f International Affairs, 
vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 86-104, p. 90.
143 Dao, “Korean Issue Shapes Powell’s Agenda”, p. 17.
144 Cumings, “Pyongyang visit a challenge to the US”.
145 John R. Bolton, “North Korea: A Shared Challenge to the US and the Republic of Korea”, (Remarks 
to the Korean-American Association) 29 August 2002, US Department o f State Website, 
http://www.state.gOv/t/us/rm/13219.htm, accessed 21 June 2006.
146 Cumings, “Pyongyang visit a challenge to the US”.
147 Hisahiko Okazaki, “Nicchö Köshö no Gogensoku” (“The Five Key Principles of the Japan-DPRK 
Negotiations”), Voice, vol. 299, November 2002, pp. 48-61, p. 50.
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behaved child”,148 and would create an awkward situation for the United States, where it 
found “enemy number two” in the “Axis of Evil” suddenly co-operating and thus 
weakening the justification driving the “War on Terror”. 149 Jitsurö Terashima also 
interpreted US ambivalence towards the Koizumi initiative as a mark of divergent 
policies, and linked it to US desires “to remind everyone that it planned to call the shots 
on the Korean Peninsula”.150 Terashima argued that, when Kim Dae Jung visited the 
DPRK in June 2000, the United States had officially assessed the overture positively, 
but it was in fact displeased with the initiative, and reversed its support towards the 
Sunshine Policy in an attempt to regain US influence on the Korean Peninsula.151 In a 
similar vein, Terashima maintained that the United States outwardly supported 
Koizumi’s visit to the DPRK and the ROK’s Sunshine Policy, but was in fact somewhat 
uneasy, and consequently organised Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2002.152 He 
argued that the United States was able to delay normalisation negotiations between 
Japan and the DPRK and restore US dominance in the resolution of issues on the 
Korean Peninsula through Kelly’s visit.153 The United States was successful in achieving 
this outcome when the DPRK revealed its nuclear program.
Japan ’s stance of continued engagement with the DPRK
Koizumi made the overture to Pyongyang and took autonomous action despite the 
United States cautious and ambivalent response for three main reasons: to settle bilateral 
security issues and regional security issues, and partly to respond cautiously to US 
overtures toward the DPRK in 2000. The trip was the brainchild of Yasuo Fukuda, the 
then Chief Cabinet Secretary and Hitoshi Tanaka, the then director-general of the Asian 
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (subsequently 
promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister), and was negotiated under much secrecy.154 
Firstly, while some argued that Koizumi’s visit was “not about security”,155 there were
148 Okazaki, “Nicchö Köshö no Gogensoku”, p. 50.
149 Okazaki, “Nicchö Köshö no Gogensoku”, p. 55.
b0 Jitsurö Terashima in KTchi Fujiwara, Keiko Sakai, and Jitsurö Terashima, “Iraku Kögeki wa Nani wo 
Motarasu ka” (“What will Result from an Attack on Iraq?”), Ronza, vol. 93, February 2003, pp. lb -  
35, p. 34.
151 Terashima, “Iraku Kögeki wa Nani wo Motarasu ka” p. 34.
152 Terashima, “What will Result from an Attack on Iraq?”, p. 34
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134 James L. Schoff, “Political Fences and Bad Neighbors: North Korea Policy Making in Japan and 
Implications for the United States”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, June 2006, p. 4.
133 “Koizumi’s Dangerous Gambit”, Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 8. This editorial argued that “Mr. 
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practical bilateral security concerns which it sought to address with the DPRK. 
Immediate discussions and the resolution of security tensions between Tokyo and 
Pyongyang were a practical necessity, given the numerous examples of aggressive 
behaviour toward Japan in the preceding years. Particularly alarming for Japan was the 
launching of the Taepodong missile from the DPRK into the Pacific Ocean in August 
1998.156 The missile had a striking range of 2,000 kilometres, which made it capable of 
reaching US bases stationed in Japan.157 The aforementioned trespassing of a suspicious 
DPRK vessel disguised as a fishing boat in Japanese waters near Amami Öshima was 
also problematic, given that the vessel was “armed to the teeth, with two antiaircraft 
missiles, two rocket launchers, a recoilless gun, twelve rockets, an antiaircraft gun, two 
light machine guns, three automatic rifles, and six grenades, as well as ‘an underwater 
scooter of a design rarely seen’”.158 The abduction issue, a sensitive and emotional 
domestic issue that touched on issues of human rights and national sovereignty, was also 
a major security issue that was on Koizumi’s agenda for resolution.
Secondly, Japan’s position in terms of regional security prioritised the prevention 
of military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and, accordingly, Koizumi’s initiative 
placed importance on the potential regional security gains from engagement with 
Pyongyang. Political tensions were high in the United States, given the mood at the time 
that North Korea was potentially second in line for military strikes after Iraq.159 With 
regard to this US position, Koizumi’s securing of the DPRK’s promise to comply with 
international security agreements and North Korea’s acceptance of Japan’s offer of 
assistance through economic co-operation, rather than insisting on reparations, was 
significant. The promise of normalisation between Japan and the DPRK also created the 
potential for a multilateral security network in the region and a diversification of 
stakeholders in the issue away from a US-DPRK confrontation.160 This was seen as 
potentially contributing to international stability in Asia and deterring the proliferation
proliferation or any other related matter” in Koizumi’s conversation with the US President the day 
after the announcement of his visit to Pyongyang.
156 “N. Korea fires ballistic missile into Sea of Japan”, Kyodo News, 31 August 1998; Kenji Hiramatsu, 
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of weapons of mass destruction.161 More practically for Japan, normalisation of relations 
with North Korea and a formal framework in which to negotiate was the best solution to 
avoid a potential military conflict on the peninsula. Military conflict would have had a 
significant impact on Japan through potential attacks on its military bases, refugee flows 
into Japan, the movement of investment capital out of the region, and the substantial 
financial burdens of reconstruction, and such a situation was also temporarily avoided 
through Koizumi’s initiative.162
Thirdly, Japan’s assertive policy of engagement towards the DPRK also reflected 
some wariness about the United States going over Japan’s head as it had done 
previously in normalising its relations with China in the Nixon period. These fears were 
reignited when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung held a summit meeting with Kim 
Jong II in June 2000, followed closely by an official visit to Pyongyang by the then US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.163 Even now, the impact of the “Nixon Shock” on 
Japan has not been forgotten, and the absence of consultations with the United States 
before Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang invoked images of a “Nixon Shock in reverse” in 
the Japanese media.164
In addition to fears of “Japan passing”, Japan also prioritised engagement with the 
DPRK because it saw a rare chance to gain concessions on issues of nuclear and missile 
development and to settle its colonial history on Japanese terms because North Korea 
was facing food shortages and economic disaster at hom e.165 It therefore took full 
advantage when North Korea began to signal its willingness to reopen dialogue.166 The 
DPRK became particularly co-operative after George W. Bush named the DPRK as part 
of the “Axis of Evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union address and, in February of 
the same year, North Korea released a Japanese citizen held captive in the DPRK. The 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs patiently negotiated over the next several months, 
which eventually led to Koizumi’s historic visit to Pyongyang. The Foreign Ministry
161 “Kita Chosen no Tenkan dokomade”, Asahi Shimbun.
162 “Kita Chosen no Tenkan dokomade”, Asahi Shimbun.
163 Masao Okonogi, “The Nightmare Scenarios Promoting Negotiations”, in Masao Okonogi, Hajime 
Izumi, Terumasa Nakanishi, Hisahiko Okazaki, “Four Views of the Pyongyang Summit”, Japan 
Echo, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 43-47, p. 43.
164 Chüö Köron Editorial Division, “Nichi-Bei Dömei wo mushi shita ‘Tai-Bei Himistu Gaiko’”, p. 40.
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also wanted to ensure that the DPRK had a soft landing in the event of economic crisis 
or regime collapse.167
These were the Japanese government’s motivations in supporting Koizumi’s visit 
to Pyongyang amidst growing tensions in the United States. However, most importantly, 
Koizumi’s visit and Hitoshi Tanaka’s secret meeting with the DPRK officials in the 
lead-up to the visit were in fact communicated to the United States.168 In early to mid- 
2002, when Tanaka was conducting his negotiations, “Koizumi kept US Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage informed of key details at critical times”, to which 
Armitage responded with information about the DPRK’s development of highly 
enriched uranium.169 Koizumi’s announcement had caught several US policymakers off 
guard, but there had been some communication with the United States, and Japan was 
proceeding with US interests in mind: “Armitage later recalled, ‘The Prime Minister 
assured me that none of our interests would be harmed...and the Bush administration 
was confident that [Koizumi] would protect our joint interests.’” 170 Japan’s 
communication of Koizumi’s impending visit signified that its autonomous policy was 
far from a “Nixon Shock in reverse”. Japan’s reassurance also demonstrated the 
importance of its autonomous policies being conceived within the framework of its 
alliance with the United States.
Implications for Japanese Autonomy
Opinions were divided on the extent to which this episode in Japanese foreign policy 
signified a major break away from Japanese alignment with US foreign policy. Many 
senior officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticised the secrecy surrounding 
the visit as a slight on the US-Japan alliance.171 One of the main reasons why the US- 
Japan security alliance continued to exist in the post-Cold War period was the threat of 
military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and also in the Taiwan Strait, and Koizumi’s 
action did not seem to take this into account.172 Despite the endurance of these security 
issues in the region, a senior Japanese diplomat acknowledged that “if Japan had
167 “Shushö Höchö Ketsudan no Butai Ura”, Nikkei Shimbun.
168 Schoff, “Political Fences and Bad Neighbours”, p. 4.
169 Schoff, “Political Fences and Bad Neighbours”, p. 4.
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173consulted with the US prior to Koizumi’s visit, the plan would have been crushed”. 
However, Koizumi and Tanaka’s “autonomous break” from US policy could not be 
fully carried out without some acquiescence on the part of the United States, just as the 
other domestic issues surrounding Japan-DPRK relations could not be resolved without 
US co-operation. The Pyongyang Declaration attempted to address regional security 
concerns over the DPRK but, because North Korea was not a signatory to the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), there were no international laws preventing it 
from legitimately producing and exporting missiles and missile technology, 174 and the 
Declaration itself could not stop North Korea from developing and testing missiles. As 
the MTCR is an informal and voluntary non-proliferation regime, Japan is dependent on 
powers such as the United States to apply pressure on North Korea to participate in such 
regimes. 175 Therefore, however autonomous a foreign policy Japan adopted as an 
economic superpower in the region, as a subordinate alliance partner of a global 
economic and military superpower, it needed to be constantly aware of its continued 
dependence on the United States for support in other areas. Therefore, while Koizumi’s 
visit to Pyongyang departed from the Bush administration’s policies towards the DPRK, 
Japan had not strayed far from maintaining its general compliance with broader US 
policies.
The differences in policy stance between the United States and Japan in the 
second nuclear crisis can also be summed up as differences in their general attitude 
towards regime change in the DPRK. It was clear that the hard-line position of the 
United States under Bush signified an eagerness for immediate political change in the 
DPRK. On the other hand, as Okonogi argued, if Japan were in support of regime 
change, it would have supported the US position by maintaining a hard line and 
demonstrating greater support for military attacks. 176 However, Koizumi’s decision to 
engage with a member of the “Axis of Evil”, along with the signing of the Pyongyang 
Declarations, indicated that Japan was favouring a gradual transition of power in the 
DPRK. Kitaoka interpreted the Pyongyang Declaration as the Japanese government’s 
recognition that its regional neighbour was potentially facing political and economic 
collapse and was in need of a soft-landing, regardless of the DPRK’s unfavourable
173 Ambassador Mitsurö Dönowaki (Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan), 
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international standing in the “War on Terror”.17'7 Therefore, normalisation potentially 
held out the prospects of far greater benefits for the DPRK than it did for Japan.178 
Therefore, while engagement with the DPRK had been criticised by the United States as 
a means of prolonging the survival of the Kim Jong II regime, Japan saw that 
engagement could influence gradual regime change.
Therefore, in comparison with the first nuclear crisis, autonomous policy as 
represented in Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang necessitated greater negotiating with 
the United States after the visit. It was less likely in the second nuclear crisis that the 
differences of opinion between the United States and Japan would be combined 
constructively for a resolution as seen in the first nuclear crisis, given the more openly 
hostile stance of the Bush administration towards the DPRK. As a result, the Japanese 
government avoided confrontation with the United States through bolder action and less 
prior consultation. Despite the “special relationship” between President George W. Bush 
and Junichiro Koizumi, the Japanese government took the move of engaging directly 
with the DPRK from the sense that it needed to secure its own interests within the 
context of US unilateralism. However, the fact that Koizumi’s visit was communicated 
to the US government beforehand demonstrates that autonomous Japanese foreign 
policies are still sensitive to the scrutiny of the United States.
Post-Pyongyang Declaration: Six-Party talks and Koizumi’s Second Visit
Despite Koizumi’s visit and the Pyongyang Declaration, the DPRK did not stop its 
nuclear development program, and the second nuclear crisis remained unresolved. The 
next section briefly discusses the developments after Koizumi’s initial visit and analyses 
Japanese autonomy within this context. Japan had not made any further “surprise” 
diplomatic manoeuvres since September 2002, but continued to choose engagement 
with North Korea and played a mediatory role between the United States and the DPRK. 
However, it was forced to support a more hard-line position because of the escalation of 
the abduction issue domestically. It remained in consultation with the United States 
throughout the Six-Party Talks, and also in the lead-up to Koizumi’s second visit to 
Pyongyang in May 2004.
177
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Six-Party Talks
After Koizumi’s initial visit, the DPRK again returned to its position of demanding 
direct negotiations with the United States, but the United States remained adamant that 
it would not meet bilaterally until North Korea halted its nuclear activity.179 Therefore, in 
an attempt to resolve the escalating tensions between the United States and the DPRK, 
China convened a trilateral meeting, which was then extended to include Russia, Japan 
and South Korea and became the Six-Party Talks.180 The first round of talks was held in 
August 2003, the second round in February 2004, the third round in June 2004, the 
fourth round in July, August and September 2005, and the fifth round in November 
2005. However, despite the talks, little headway has been made as yet in disarming 
North Korea.
The only tangible achievement of the Six-Party Talks thus far was the Joint 
Statement issued in the fourth round of September 2005. While South Korean President 
Roh Moo Hyun declared it an “epoch-making” accord, its actual content was vague, 
indicating the continuing conflict between the hard-liners (the United States and to and 
extent Japan) and DPRK sympathisers (China, South Korea and, to some extent, 
Russia).181 It was more a statement confirming the intention of all parties to continue the 
talks rather than achieve specific results by a certain deadline.182 In the statement, the 
DPRK declared that it was “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards”, but “stated that it has the right to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”183 To this the United States and “other parties” had 
“expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the
179 John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six Party Talks”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4, 
Autumn 2005, pp 75-91, p. 76.
180 Tae-Zhee Kim, “Six-Party Talks and Korea”, Korean Observations on Foreign Relations, vol. 6, 
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provision of light water reactors to the DPRK. ” 184 In other words, the statement simply 
documented the US and the DPRK’s intent to “agree to disagree”.
Although Japan was essentially sided with the United States within the Six Party 
talks, again there were still slightly diverging positions between the two states, the main 
point again being that the United States adopted a hard-line position while Japan 
continued to favour greater engagement. 185 The United States argued that the DPRK 
should follow the Libyan model of voluntary nuclear disarmament if it wanted to engage 
with the United States and international society more broadly. 186 While Japan supported 
the US position, its officials were somewhat sceptical of the success of the Libyan 
model, and had several reasons to take a divergent position from that of the United 
States. Japan was firstly particularly concerned that excessive pressure on North Korea 
would drive it to launch nuclear- or chemical-warhead-armed missiles on Japan. 187 As a 
result, Tokyo argued that eliciting gradual changes in the DPRK through dialogue and 
engagement were important, and was the presentation of at least a road map to the 
DPRK in resolving the nuclear crisis. 188 The Japanese Foreign Ministry also supported a 
report by a special taskforce, which declared that “Japan’s objective [was] not to 
overturn the regime in North Korea but to gradually change the nature of its political 
and economic systems. ” 189 However, the United States was hesitant to offer anything 
that North Korea might interpret as a concession. 190
Secondly, Japan continued to emphasise engagement with North Korea, because 
there was also an emerging difference of priorities between Japan and the United States 
in resolving the problem on the Korean Peninsula. In both the first nuclear crisis and the
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beginning of the second, there was the fear that military conflict could break out on the 
Korean Peninsula. However, because the United States was more concerned with 
international Islamic terrorism (even though the DPRK in fact engaged in regional 
terrorist activities against South Korea and Japan), particularly after it launched 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, it became comparatively less concerned about 
regional instability caused by North Korea.191 On the other hand, decreasing US interest 
was unfavourable for Japan, as instability on the Korean Peninsula affected Japan 
directly. The DPRK’s testing of two Taepodong missiles in June 2006 increased these 
concerns.192 While there were some in the Defence Agency of Japan who previously 
voiced support for pre-emptive strikes against North Korea,193 besides the obvious 
obstacle of the pacifist constitution, Japan could not carry this out without extensive 
support from the United States in terms of intelligence and other military resources.194 
Therefore, because of the immediate danger North Korea still posed, Japan continued to 
maintain a more moderate position than the United States.
Koizumi ’s Second Visit to Pyongyang
However, while the Japanese government was concerned about excessive hard-line 
pressure from the United States, at the same time, it came under increasing domestic 
pressure to adopt a hard-line stance toward North Korea, particularly after Kim Jong IPs 
admission of abducting Japanese citizens.195 The admission evoked a strong emotional 
domestic response, and the Japanese government was fervently pressured to demand a 
resolution of the abductions issue as a condition for the resumption of dialogue, 
negotiations and aid.196 As a consequence, Koizumi and the Japanese government had to 
maintain the semblance of a hard-line stance despite Japan’s concerns that such an
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approach could drive North Korea further towards rash, dangerous behaviour and 
brinkmanship diplomacy.
In order to ease the situation surrounding the abduction issue, Koizumi made a 
second visit to Pyongyang in May 2004.197 This visit was criticised as demonstrating 
“under-prepared and amateurish negotiations” by Koizumi,198 but the DPRK nonetheless 
benefited with 250,000 tonnes of food and US$10 million in medical supplies.199 No 
progress was made with regard to the nuclear issue, and Koizumi was also harshly 
criticised for his inability to bring back all eight family members of the abductees (in the 
end only five returned) to Japan in October 2002, and for only coming back with an 
unconvincing DPRK promise to restart investigation of another 10 missing Japanese 
citizens.200 However, Koizumi was careful not to let the abduction issue overtake other 
broader issues of regional stability, and sought to re-start normalisation negotiations 
between Japan and the DPRK, and clearly stated in his press release after his visit that 
changing the Japan-DPRK relationship into one based on co-operation was the most 
beneficial for the interests of both states.201
Koizumi’s second trip was also successful in more subtle ways, particularly vis-a- 
vis the United States. Because the United States had launched Operation Iraqi Freedom 
in early 2003, its primary interest was to avoid a two-front war.202 Since the United 
States was in a position where it had little room for political movement due to the “War 
on Terror”, Japan found it useful to confirm the intentions of DPRK nuclear
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disarmament and to mediate the tensions between the United States and North Korea in 
preparation for the third round of the Six-Party Talks.203
Thus, the second visit to Pyongyang was not an episode of “surprise” autonomous 
diplomacy and was not therefore criticised by the United States. However, it was 
nonetheless interpreted as being an extension of the original autonomous plan that 
sought engagement with the Kim Jong II regime.204 Okonogi argued that it was unlikely 
that the DPRK government would collapse in the near future even though the DPRK 
government was by no means stable, given that it survived the acute economic crisis of 
the late 1990s.205 Consequently, Japan displayed foresight in assuming the continuation 
of the DPRK government and to instead encourage gradual regime change through 
economic reform within North Korea. Whilst there was little objection from the US 
administration with regard to the second trip, the fundamental difference of attitude 
towards the DPRK regime between Japan and the United States remained. Therefore, it 
was important for Japan to assure the United States that it would act with US interests in 
mind, demonstrating that its autonomous policies were independent of the United States, 
but at the same time conducted within the restrictions of broader US hegemony.
Conclusion—Considerations for Carrots, Sticks and the United States
The comparison of the US and Japanese position toward the DPRK demonstrated that 
the United States maintained a hard-line policy while Japan adopted a pro-engagement 
policy throughout the post-1945 period. While both countries had no official relations 
with the DPRK, Japan clearly had greater economic and social connections with North 
Korea by means of individual politicians and its domestic Korean population even 
during the Cold War years in comparison with the United States.
However, there were three broad factors that influenced Japan to take an 
autonomous foreign policy line: its domestic Korean population; fears of regional 
instability; and fears of the United States going over the head of Japan. Firstly, a 
significant portion of Korean residents in Japan were sympathetic to the North, and
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Mainichi Shimbun, 24 May 2004.
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supported the DRPK regime through Chösen Sören illicit capital transfers.206 Given 
these ties and the fact that Koreans were the largest ethnic minority in Japan, it was 
necessary for the Japanese government to maintain good relations with their regional 
neighbour for the sake of domestic stability.207 This was achieved in the early post-Cold 
War period through the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan back to North Korea.
The second factor influencing Japan’s autonomous policy was the serious security 
threats to it which the DPRK posed, particularly from the 1970s onwards. During this 
period, North Korea built up its nuclear capabilities and kidnapped Japanese citizens. 
However, unlike the United States, Japan addressed this threat through engagement, 
from the viewpoint that this would encourage gradual regime change. The DPRK’s 
belligerent international behaviour also made the Korean Peninsula a possible scene of 
military confrontation, which would have substantial negative consequences for Japan’s 
security given its geographical proximity. Particularly at the height of the first and 
second nuclear crisis in 1993, 1994 and 2002, military strikes were a real possibility.208 
Japan’s security also came directly under threat when the DPRK launched Taepodong 
missiles into the Pacific in 1998,209 and sent armed vessels into Japanese waters in 2001. 
Because of this, the swift resolution of these regional security issues through 
engagement was a matter of priority, despite the US hard-line position toward North 
Korea at the time.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Japan’s autonomous engagement with the DPRK 
was conducted with the aim of extracting some potential political leverage over the 
United States in mind. Japan’s primary concern was that the United States might initiate 
political rapprochement with North Korea without consulting Japan. This had happened 
in the Sino-American rapprochement of the “Nixon Shocks” and, based on this 
experience, Japan wanted to maintain a degree of political self-sufficiency and have a 
head start in its relations with North Korea to avoid another “Nixon Shock” situation.210 
This fear was reignited when Kim Dae Jung held a summit meeting with Kim Jong II in
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June 2000, which was followed closely by an official visit to Pyongyang by Madeleine 
Albright.211 While this US overture was not directly connected to Koizumi’s first trip to 
Pyongyang in September 2002, it was significant that the visit did resemble a “Nixon 
Shock in reverse”.212 Engagement with the DPRK autonomously became increasingly 
important as the Bush administration began to show signs that the resolution of the 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula was diminishing in its priorities. This was particularly 
evident as it became increasingly engrossed in combating international terrorism after 
the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.2,3
US attitudes to Japan’s autonomous initiatives can be summarised as co-operative 
with respect to Japan’s concerns about regional security, but ambivalent and cautious of 
Japan’s later autonomous initiatives. During the early Cold War period, the United 
States did not actively encourage Japan’s policy of seikei bunri and engagement with the 
“two Koreas”, but neither did it strongly object to Japan’s interactions with the DPRK, 
despite the Korean War of the 1950s. This was mainly due to the fact that, following the 
Korean War, the United States had almost completely disengaged itself diplomatically 
from the DPRK, and it was not a major issue on the US foreign policy agenda.
More recently, US co-operation in regional security issues was reflected in its 
tolerant position towards the Japanese stance of engagement during the first nuclear 
crisis. The United States at times questioned the utility of the US-Japan alliance during 
the first nuclear crisis, particularly in the face of Japan’s reluctance to support military 
strikes.214 However, it was saved by the Clinton administration’s sensitivity to regional 
interests, which was also reflected in the content of the Agreed Framework. The United 
States also continued to demonstrate an understanding of Japan’s concerns about 
regional security issues during the Six Party talks, but displayed some differences in its 
approach to disarming the DPRK of its nuclear capabilities. While Japan feared 
excessive pressure would only exacerbate North Korea’s belligerent attitude, the United 
States insisted in the Six Party Talks that the DPRK needed to halt all its nuclear 
development activities before any concessions would be made.
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However, in contrast to the co-operation in the first nuclear crisis and the Six 
Party Talks, the United States was ambivalent about Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 
September 2002—a Japanese initiative to defuse tensions caused by the DPRK in the 
lead-up to the second nuclear crisis. US ambivalence about Koizumi’s overture 
stemmed from US fears that Japanese economic assistance to the DPRK would work 
against the US position of cutting off economic co-operation until North Korea halted 
its nuclear development program.215 Rapid normalisation between Japan and the DPRK 
could also potentially lead to a lessening of US political influence in the region in 
general. Therefore, the US impression of Koizumi’s first trip was not entirely favourable, 
despite official reports to the contrary. Koizumi’s following trip in May 2004 was less 
alarming for the United States because it had commenced its attack on Iraq, and its 
primary interest was not to fight a two-front war.216 Given that the United States was 
occupied with the “War on Terror”, it was useful for the United States to have Japan 
confirm DPRK intentions of nuclear disarmament and mediate the tensions between the 
United States and North Korea in the interim.217 Consequently, in the unresolved second 
nuclear crisis, the Bush administration did not raise military strikes on North Korea as 
an option, despite its strong unilateral position.
In conclusion, Japan managed to resolve tensions between its autonomous policies 
and US foreign policy through the separation of economics and politics, or seikei bunri, 
political and economic mediation, and also “surprise diplomacy”. These policies show 
that while Japan pursued autonomy in order to gain independence away from the United 
States, it was not pursued against the US. Like its relations with Iran, the Japanese 
government justified its relations with North Korea in the 1970s by saying that it could 
act in a mediatory role both between the ROK and the DPRK and between the United 
States and the DPRK.218 Japan overcame its different position by establishing its North 
Korea policy within broader US Cold War politics and endeavouring to make its 
relations with the DPRK as useful to the United States as possible. It was sensitive to 
US and ROK interests and, as a consequence, its ties with North Korea consisted of
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narrow economic relations through seikei bunri and were otherwise quite limited and 
intermittent until the 1990s. Moreover, the strategic separation of economic issues from 
political issues ensured that Japan was able to adopt autonomous policies within the 
Cold War framework. Thus, while Japan’s relations with the DPRK in the early post- 
1945 period seemed contradictory to US Cold War policy; it never fundamentally 
strayed from the hegemony of the United States.
US sceptical reactions to Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang suggest that Japanese 
autonomous policy was perceived with caution. Anticipating this suspicion, it was 
pursued by initially formulating a “surprise” policy or presenting a plan as a fait 
accompli. In other words, like the AMF proposal, in order to push through an 
autonomous policy, Japan came up with the plan first, and then dealt with the US 
reactions later. It chose not to discuss the Pyongyang visit with the United States in 
detail prior to the public announcement, because policies perceived as straying too far 
from the US line or as possibly threatening US influence in the region would be nipped 
in the bud at the discussion and negotiation stage. “Surprise” diplomacy ensured that 
once the policy position was officially announced, the United States could object to, yet 
not easily stop, the subsequent signals Japan sent about its role and vision for the region. 
The only US influence was over how Japan consequently modified its autonomous 
initiatives after making them and, as a result, in the case of Japan’s relations with the 
DPRK, the United States supported Japanese initiatives to ensure that Japanese 
autonomous policies at least remained within broader US goals. Japan-North Korea 
relations illustrate the patterns of restricted autonomy practised in Japanese foreign 
policy.
Nevertheless, Japan still needed to maintain co-operation with its more powerful 
alliance partner because the United States could apply greater pressure to the DPRK in 
addressing concerns over nuclear and missile issues. For this reason, however 
autonomous a foreign policy Japan adopted as an economic superpower in the region, as 
a subordinate alliance partner of a global economic and military superpower, it needed 
to be constantly aware of its continued dependence on the United States for support in 
other areas. Therefore, Japan’s post-Second World War relationship with the DPRK 
demonstrated that autonomy for Japan was not necessarily the freedom to unilaterally 
assert unilaterally its interests in its foreign policy, but the freedom to operate within its 
main restriction, namely the US-Japan alliance. Bolder initiatives such as Koizumi’s
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initial visit to Pyongyang appeared to be away from the US diplomatic line in 
comparison to Japan’s position in the first nuclear crisis. However, Koizumi’s action in 
effect remained within the restrictions imposed by US-Japan relations, and, autonomy 
for Japan thus equated to its ability to achieve differing interests within these 
restrictions. The case study clearly shows how Japan worked within the US hegemonic 
system and how its identity, formed within this hegemonic system, guided Japan’s 
restricted pursuit of autonomy.
The conclusion which follows revisits the earlier discussions on US hegemony 
and autonomy in International Relations Theory and Japanese political philosophy in 
light of the findings of the three examples. It concludes the thesis by contrasting the 
characteristics of autonomy seen in the three examples, answers the original central 
research questions and discusses the implications of this study for the broader literature 
on International Relations and Japanese foreign policy analysis.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has investigated the nature of autonomy as practised in Japanese foreign 
policy and how it has been pursued under US hegemony. It has argued that, as a 
consequence of Japan’s worldview being predominantly influenced by US hegemony 
and the US-Japan alliance, autonomy as practised in post-1945 Japanese foreign policy 
has been more limited and restricted than conventionally conceptualised and suggested 
in International Relations theory. It overturned the idea that Japan has functioned with a 
view of the world as anarchy by proposing instead that its worldview and foreign 
policies were more influenced by its position as a subordinate state under US hegemony, 
and that this perception of the world and its position within it shaped its pursuit of 
restricted autonomy.
Through an analysis of autonomy across a broad spectrum of International 
Relations theory in Chapter One, this inquiry established how autonomy has often been 
framed by the notion of sovereign statehood. Inflated assumptions about autonomy as a 
tool to achieve state interests were prevalent particularly in rationalist theories, because 
they placed priority on “rational” behavioural patterns inherent in actors that assumed a 
high degree of freedom of action. As a consequence of these assumptions, there were 
many disparate and misinterpreted accounts of Japanese foreign policy and the direction 
of Japanese autonomy.
The argument of the thesis challenged existing interpretations of Japanese 
autonomy by examining three episodes of restricted autonomy under US hegemony in 
Japanese foreign policy: Japan’s relations with Iran; the Asian Monetary Fund proposal; 
and Japan’s relations with North Korea. In each of these, Japanese policies ran counter 
to the US policy position, but were pursued within the boundaries of Japan’s 
relationship with the United States. Three questions were posed: What does autonomy 
mean in Japanese foreign policy?; How is autonomy pursued in Japanese foreign 
policy?; and does Japan pursue autonomy in order to gain independence from the United 
States?
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Characteristics of Japanese Autonomy
In order to identify autonomy, this study focused on those specific examples where 
Japan’s state interests differed from the US policy position, and how this autonomous 
position was negotiated amidst US objections. In the introduction and Chapter One, 
constructivist theory was coupled with hegemony and David C. Kang’s theory of 
hierarchy to not only question competitive, aggressive self-help state behaviour as being 
an inherent part of an anarchical international system, but also to question whether 
Japan’s worldview was based on the principle of anarchic self-help at all.
Chapter Two detailed Japan’s socialisation into US hegemony after the end of the 
Second World War, and the examination of Japanese political philosophy in Chapter 
Three also highlighted Japan’s long history of referring to external values and ideas, 
namely Western models of industrial and political modernisation when defining 
statehood and autonomy. These two chapters supported the argument that Japan’s 
foreign policy was strongly influenced by its subordinate position in a system of US 
hegemony and the external values and interests of the United States and US hegemony 
more broadly. It concluded that Japan’s perceptions of itself and the world are based on 
the restrictions under US interests and US hegemony, which in turn informed its foreign 
policy. Therefore, not only is Japanese autonomy more limited and restricted than 
assumed in rationalist theories, but Japan did not seek to compete with the United States 
for a position of hegemony as realist analyses of Japan in particular often assumed it 
would.
The findings of this thesis suggested that autonomy as practised in Japanese 
foreign policy was narrower than conventionally assumed in rationalist International 
Relations theory. The findings in Chapters Four, Five and Six confirmed that, as a 
consequence of being embedded in US hegemony, Japanese autonomy was necessarily 
reactive, because it needed to constantly evaluate its interests against the interests of the 
United States and, more broadly, the values of US hegemony itself. Japanese autonomy 
was therefore significantly different from the definition of autonomy in International 
Relations theory—the liberty of a state which enables it to exercise control over its 
allocation of resources and choices of government. Rather, Japanese autonomy was 
reactively negotiated and motivated by meeting domestic interests and international 
expectations without disrupting US hegemony, even as its economic capacities and
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international status increased. Because of the different nature of Japanese autonomy, its 
foreign policy did not follow rationalist assumptions.
Patterns in Pursuing Restricted Autonomy: Key Strategies
The investigation of the three examples found that autonomy varied across issue areas, 
but, more significantly, that it was asserted in areas that were not necessarily where 
Japan was perceived to have greatest influence. Given Japan’s economic and financial 
power, rationalist theories would assume that Japan’s ability to exercise independent 
policies was the greatest in this policy area; however, this thesis demonstrates that this 
was not necessarily the case.
Of the three examples, Japan’s relations with Iran revealed that resource 
diplomacy was actually the area where Japan was most openly assertive in its 
autonomous policies. During most of the post-Second World War period, Japan 
overrode US concerns over terrorism, human rights and nuclear development in Iran to 
favour a policy of engagement, or what it termed dokuji gaikö, which also more 
practically signified a determination to secure supplies of oil for Japan. The need for an 
autonomous stance can be traced back to the first oil crisis, when US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger declared that the United States was unable to supply Japan with oil in 
the absence of Arabian supplies. As a consequence of this US statement, Japan’s 
relations with Iran have been implicitly accepted by the United States, even when they 
contradict US interests. This policy continued after the Cold War, and also persists in 
the current context of the “War on Terror”.
In contrast, the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) example demonstrates that Japanese 
autonomous initiatives were not necessarily most evident in economic and financial 
issues, despite Japan’s status as an economic power. This finding conflicts with 
rationalist International Relations theory, which assumes that greater material 
capabilities can achieve greater state interest. Furthermore, the AMF proposal itself was 
quite original and innovative and had its origins in a truly Japanese standpoint of 
regional financial and monetary regulation, but was quashed immediately by the United 
States. The force of the objections from the United States indicated that Japanese 
autonomous policies—especially those that insinuate a position of leadership in the 
Asian region—were seen as threatening US authority, and being particularly vulnerable 
to the restrictions of the US-Japan alliance.
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More significantly, key findings of this thesis were the patterns of restricted 
autonomy as practised in Japanese foreign policy. There were three strategies that were 
used in order to maintain Japan’s autonomy within the constraints of US hegemony: 
maintaining utility to US interests, surprise diplomacy, and appeasement of the United 
States, particularly under crisis conditions.
Maintaining Utility to the United States
Japan did practise autonomous policies in order to seek independence from the United 
States. This was seen in its relations with Iran, the AMF proposal and its relations with 
North Korea but, in all examples, autonomous policies remained within a framework of 
US hegemony. Japan was able to carry out these policies by making sure that its 
autonomous initiatives were useful to US interests and the US-Japan alliance. While 
Japan argued that an AMF proposal would ensure regional financial stability and 
therefore benefited US interests, this “utility” approach was particularly pronounced in 
Japan’s relations with Iran and North Korea. Japan’s engagement with Iran was 
convenient for the United States, because it could utilise the information and 
communication channels that Japan cultivated, while maintaining its hard-line rhetoric. 
Like its relations with Iran, Japan also endeavoured to make its relations with the DPRK 
as useful to the United States as possible and promoted itself as a mediator between the 
ROK and the DPRK and between the United States and the DPRK. It also toned down 
its relations with North Korea by only engaging in narrow economic relations through 
seikei bunri. The same can be said of Japan’s engagement with North Korea, both 
during the Cold War and the Six Party Talks, which enabled a “good cop” (Japan), “bad 
cop” (United States) approach to the DPRK. Nevertheless, it was crucial for Japan to 
remain within US hegemony, as it depended on the United States in addressing concerns 
over nuclear and missile issues. For this reason, however autonomous Japanese foreign 
policy was as an economic power of the region, as a subordinate alliance partner of a 
global economic and military superpower, it needed to be constantly aware of its 
continued dependence on the United States for support in other areas.
Surprise Diplomacy
All three examples demonstrate that Japanese policymakers pursued autonomous 
policies within the US-Japan alliance framework by establishing the proposed policies
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or initiatives as an existing reality. In other words, Japanese autonomous policy, in the 
case of the three examples analysed in this thesis, was developed as a fait accompli or 
through “surprise” diplomacy. Japan continually engaged with Iran, establishing long 
commercial and diplomatic relations with the country, such that the United States could 
not ignore Japan’s historical involvement, even if it went against US foreign policy. The 
Azadegan oil field development was an example of this. The AMF was a proposal 
where the “surprise” tactic was also employed, and the Japanese government did not 
include the United States in its discussions. While Japan gradually built up an “existing 
reality” of imminent normalisation with the DPRK throughout the post-Second World 
War period, notification to the United States of Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was also 
delivered as a fait accompli. Once a proposal or a policy was made official with 
diplomatic backing—be it from the Iranian government, the Asian region or the 
DPRK—the United States could object, but it could not as easily stop the momentum or 
the signals that Japan’s position sent out internationally. All it could really influence is 
how Japan modified its autonomous initiatives after US objections. Thus, rather than 
formally discussing the plan with the United States beforehand, the cases showed that 
Japan pursued autonomous policies by going ahead with the plan first, and then dealing 
with US reactions later.
Modification o f Policies under US Pressure for Temporary Appeasement
While Japan often deployed surprise diplomacy in pushing through autonomous policy, 
it usually modified its policies in an ad hoc fashion in the face of US doubt or criticism, 
particularly in crisis situations. The cases therefore demonstrate that Japan did sustain 
autonomous policy positions in its foreign relations, but that they were subject to 
negotiation and modification, depending on US responses. Furthermore, the negotiation 
process also demonstrated that autonomy in post-Second World War Japanese foreign 
policy was restricted within the boundaries of US hegemony. This meant that Japan 
needed to formulate its foreign policy decisions by factoring in US interests and, 
therefore, it had a significantly narrower scope of liberty in determining its state 
interests.
Japan’s reactive adjustment to the US position was seen in all three cases. Japan 
made adjustments to US policies and it declared that the US-Japan alliance was more 
important than securing oil at several crucial moments in history. Adjustment to US
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pressure was seen firstly during the Cold War period in Japan’s quick amendment of its 
relations with Israel after Japan took a clearly pro-Arab position during the first oil crisis. 
It was seen again during the US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran 1979, with the 
Japanese government making a difficult decision to publicly prioritise the US-Japan 
alliance over secure oil supplies and relations with Iran. Japan also attempted to soothe 
US pressure on its relations with Iran in the post-Cold War period by postponing major 
yen loans to Iran on several occasions across the 1990s and, subsequently, in the 
deployment of the Japanese Self Defence Force to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Therefore, the Japanese stance on its relations with Iran and the Middle East in general 
indicated that it did not tow the US line, yet at the same time did not diminish the 
importance of the US-Japan alliance in Japanese foreign policy either.
While Japan’s AMF proposal did indeed challenge some fundamental ideas 
behind US and IMF attitudes toward financial and monetary crises, it did not necessarily 
intend to ultimately challenge US hegemony in the region. This was because Japan and 
the region depended on the United States for security. Therefore, adjustments were also 
made after the United States objected. Japan instead implemented new regional 
monetary systems such as the New Miyazawa Initiative in 1998, and the IMF- 
compatible Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000. The new initiatives assumed functions similar 
to those proposed for the AMF, but, significantly, they also included the United States 
or were compatible with the IMF. In addition, there was a significant difference in 
leadership of the new institutions’ more modified monetary proposals. Japan had 
designated itself as the leader in the AMF, but the new initiatives had toned down 
elements of Japanese leadership. Japan also modified the timeframe in which to achieve 
a formal regional monetary and financial institution and changed the AMF into a longer- 
term goal.
Early post 1945 Japanese relations with the DPRK were less restricted by US 
policies due to a lack of US engagement with North Korea after the Korean War. 
However, Japan was never completely free of US pressure, and still had to modify its 
modified its relations with North Korea by separating economics and politics (or seikei 
bunri) during the Cold War period. It also consciously balanced its relations with the 
DPRK alongside co-operation with South Korea and the United States over economic 
and regional security issues. This was particularly evident in Japan’s behind-the-scene 
support during the negotiations of the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94. In the second
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nuclear crisis, while Japan did not communicate its plans for Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi’s historic first visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, it tried to 
counterbalance this diplomatic initiative by sending SDF support to Iraq in the US-led 
“War on Terror” and co-operation with the US position in the Six Party Talks. Japan’s 
relations with North Korea throughout the post-1945 period demonstrated that there was 
no indication that it was a move that signified a shift away from the Japanese 
government’s support of existing US foreign policy, and that it was not an initiative that 
sought to move away from the US-Japan alliance or challenge US hegemony. This was 
made clear in the Japanese government’s balancing of engagement with North Korea 
within broader US Cold War politics and continued co-operation with the United States 
during the post-Cold War period.
Autonomy against the United States? Answering the Central Research Questions
To return to the central research questions, the findings of the three examples lead to the 
following answers to the three central research questions. Firstly, the meaning of 
autonomy in Japanese foreign policy involved restricted state actions reactively 
negotiated within US-dominated values and interests. Japan’s main motivation in 
pursuing this form of autonomy was to meet domestic interests and international 
expectations without disrupting US hegemony. It was important for Japan to maintain 
US hegemony because, as Ruggie argued, Japan was “embedded” into the US 
hegemonic system and benefited from the system both in economic and security terms. 
Thus, Japan recognises its subordinate place within US hegemony, and this position 
within US hegemony informs its restricted pursuit of autonomy.
Secondly, Japan pursued autonomy by constantly adjusting to US reactions and 
criticisms or by ignoring the initial co-ordination process in directly presenting policies 
through “surprise diplomacy”. This strategy indicated the Japanese government’s 
awareness that it functioned within the restrictions of US hegemony and that its foreign 
policy options were restrained. It also shows that Japan endeavoured to pursue its 
interests within the restrictions while knowing that there would be a reaction from the 
United States. The adjustments that Japan made and its “surprise diplomacy” revealed 
that autonomy in the Japanese context did not come with sovereign statehood, and thus 
it did not act as a rational actor as expected in rationalist theories. From this observation, 
this study argued that autonomy was not a characteristic inherent in state sovereignty,
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but depended on the political, historical and social circumstances surrounding a 
particular state.
Finally, all three examples demonstrate that Japan may pursue autonomy in order 
to gain independence away from the United States, but does not pursue autonomy 
against it. In this study, this meant the pursuit of Japan’s own foreign policy position 
when it conflicted with the United States, but not necessarily representing a conflict 
with the US position or a direct challenge to US hegemony. Therefore, Japan’s pursuit 
of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy should not be interpreted as seeking to break 
away from the US-Japan alliance. While some may argue that the pursuit of this kind of 
autonomy is not necessarily specific to Japan’s alliance with the United States and is 
applicable to other unequal alliances, the degree to which Japan is integrated into US 
hegemony and restricted by it, particularly in its Constitution, is far greater than other 
alliances that the United States has maintained since the Second World War.
Implications
Implications for understanding Japanese autonomy and Japanese foreign policy
A major implication of this study in understanding Japanese autonomy and Japanese 
foreign policy is connected to the interpretation of autonomy under US hegemony as a 
process of negotiation, rather than as a tool that enables Japan to pursue its national 
interest. The argument of this thesis was that autonomy for Japan was influenced by the 
historical and social contexts in which foreign policies are pursued, and should not be 
seen as a monolithic concept that is applicable equally across all states. Japan’s pursuit 
of restricted autonomy within the boundaries of US interests demonstrates this, as does 
the consistency with which Japan’s autonomous positions were maintained across the 
three examples.
Proposing that autonomy is influenced by socio-historic contexts has implications 
for interpretations of Japanese autonomy and Japanese foreign policy on several levels. 
Firstly, by arguing that Japan perceives a world based on US hegemony rather than 
anarchy, it challenges existing interpretations of Japanese foreign policy which 
suggested that Japan was either too weak to stand up to the United States and was 
simply jumping on the bandwagon of US hegemony, or that it can and will convert its 
economic power into greater military power and aspire to challenge the United States.
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Through the historical analysis of the development of US hegemony and Japan’s 
integration into it, this study has established that Japan’s view of itself and the world 
were based on its perception of US hegemony, and that existing interpretations of 
Japanese foreign policy applied the characteristic of self-help too literally to Japanese 
state actions. Furthermore, the three examples clearly demonstrate that Japan was 
neither blindly subservient to US hegemony, nor that its autonomy was seeking to break 
away from the US-Japan alliance.
Secondly, in proposing Japan’s perception of autonomy as being based within US 
hegemony, this thesis has attempted to go beyond explanations that treat the Japanese 
experience as being “abnormal” or “exotic”. Both the “abnormal” and “exotic” 
explanations attribute Japanese state action to a particular aberrant Japanese 
characteristic that maintains it permanently as an “Other” in Western theories. Often 
Japan is treated simply as an “anomaly”, because it does not fit into understandings of 
state behaviour as assumed under an anarchic international system. Therefore, in realist 
theory, if Japan was not assessed as a rising threat, it was contrarily deemed abnormal 
for not going beyond its current capacities as an economic power and not asserting 
greater international military power. Conversely, some constructivist theories recognise 
the influence of identity, culture and norms in state behaviour, but their conclusions 
regarding Japanese foreign policy behaviour are explained as being as a result of its 
“unique” culture of anti-militarism. While this thesis has drawn from constructivist 
theory, it interprets anti-militarism as being a part of Japan’s functioning under a wider 
culture of US hegemony because anti-militarism cannot be sustained without the 
Japanese constitution and the US-Japan alliance. In other words, by arguing that the 
scope and means by which autonomy is pursued is influenced by the specific 
circumstances of the state and their worldview, this thesis was able to argue that Japan 
was “normal” to pursue autonomy in a restricted manner within US hegemony.
Implications for understanding US hegemony
By focusing on the historical and social context in which Japan conducted its post-1945 
foreign policy, this thesis also has implications for the understanding of US hegemony. 
It refined the characteristics of US hegemony in the context of US-Japan relations 
through analysing the discussion on hegemony in International Relations theory in
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Chapter One, and also by weaving the theoretical discussion through the historic 
development of US hegemony and also Japan’s incorporation into it in Chapter Two.
Firstly, the analysis of hegemony established that legitimacy based upon 
consensus, political culture, social norms and rules was a strong defining characteristic 
of the hegemony in which Japan was integrated. Chapter Two demonstrated that the 
United States crafted its hegemony by building a broad ideational consensus 
internationally that allowed the United States should take leadership in world order as a 
dominant power. Its leadership was also supported by social institutions, norms, rules, 
principles and decision-making procedures shared across states internationally. 1 
Consequently, the recognition of legitimacy as a part of hegemony not only focused on 
the power of the hegemon, but also the acceptance of the subordinate states, making it 
possible to analyse hegemony as a two-way reliance. The subordinate states depend on 
the hegemon for the benefits of hegemony and the hegemon on the subordinate states for 
recognition and support of authority, which fits the pattern of hegemony as seen in US- 
Japan relations. While legitimacy as a characteristic of US hegemony may appear 
unremarkable, it challenges realist accounts of hegemony which describe it more as 
“domination resulting from superior power’’.2 However, even realist theories accept that 
recognition from others (or what Gilpin describes as “status”) is important and, hence, it 
was important to explore and clarify this aspect of hegemony.
Secondly, by acknowledging legitimacy as an important part of hegemony, this 
thesis challenges the utility of theories of hegemony that simply focused on the 
viewpoint of the hegemon. In other words, this thesis argues the necessity of separating 
the worldviews of the hegemon and the subordinate state in order to more accurately 
analyse expectations of autonomy. The United States and Japan have very different 
views on the boundaries of autonomy in the US-Japan relationship because different 
perspectives formed the basis of differing threat perceptions and expectations of state 
behaviour. Chapter One argued that the hegemon, despite having the capacity to 
dominate over other states based on a preponderance of material resources and 
legitimacy, often had a pessimistic realist perspective worldview of anarchy amongst 
equal states, while the lesser states, in this case Japan, saw itself as being deeply 
integrated into US hegemony.
1 Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, p. 43.
2 Harries, Benign or Imperial? pp. 3-4.
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The three examples support this idea that Japanese foreign policy behaviour was 
not solely about how Japan perceived and carried out autonomous policies, but also a 
matter of how the hegemon perceived Japanese actions. The United States did not view 
Japanese autonomous policy on Iran as being politically significant enough to threaten 
US influence or interests in the region. Therefore, despite Japan’s relations with Iran 
being a strong example of dokuji gaikö, it was not perceived as being a policy that went 
against the US-Japan alliance. The case of the Asian Monetary Fund demonstrates that, 
while Japan attempted to take leadership on regional financial issues, the United States 
perceived Japan as a genuine threat to its position of authority in the region. The 
unenthusiastic support of the United States for Japan’s relations with the DPRK has also 
caused Japan to place sanctions on North Korea and concede to US pressure since the 
Second World War. Therefore, US perceptions and interests in particular influence the 
successful or unsuccessful pursuit of Japanese autonomy, and not simply how Japan 
views the notion itself.
Thirdly, the usage of Kang’s theory in addition to hegemony based on legitimacy 
imparted significant insights into the perspective of lesser states in unequal power 
relations, while at the same time also explaining that greater autonomy of states under a 
central power can potentially exist. When the leadership of the central power is accepted 
and subordinate states accept their place in the “pecking order”, there is greater scope 
for stability and co-operation. In other words, the characteristics of a hierarchical 
international system are formal inequality of power, but informal equity that recognises 
“substantial autonomy and freedom among the lesser states”. 3 Autonomy under 
hegemony may seem contradictory, but it is possible when the assumptions of rationalist 
theories that assume the equality of states and its consequent ability to translate this into 
rational autonomous action are dispelled. Autonomy can therefore be sustained when 
hegemony is thought of as a system closer to Kang’s theory of hierarchy.
Implications for International Relations Theory
The implications of this thesis for the broader analysis of Japanese foreign policy in 
International Relations are twofold. Firstly, this thesis contributed to International 
Relations by focusing on autonomy as a concept worthy of study in its own right. 
Autonomy was often given only a token reference in International Relations theory, and
3 Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability”, p. 166.
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then forgotten in the discussion as autonomy often merged into notions such as 
sovereignty and state independence. From its attention to autonomy, this study was able 
to separate autonomy from sovereignty, and identify the ways in which the two often 
became entangled.
Secondly, it became apparent that the difficulties in explaining Japanese state 
behaviour and autonomy occurred due to biases hidden in rationalist theories. The 
assumption that humans and states will act in self-interest in an environment free of 
constraints is derived from West-centric views of human nature that evolved to overturn 
the Christian view of human society in the beginnings of modem European social 
science.4 The concept of anarchy in International Relations and state behaviour in this 
context rests on the absorption of these Western traditions of human nature, which was 
touched upon in Chapter One. The concepts that are consequently drawn from theories 
that take anarchy and rational choice as their theoretical foundation largely ignore 
cultural diversity in the international experience of statehood and state autonomy, as was 
explored in the discussion on Japanese political philosophies of Chapter Three. Because 
it ignored the influence of socially, historically and culturally specific contexts, 
rationalist theory has tended to be conceptually West-centric and therefore struggles to 
explain phenomena outside the Western experience, of which Japan is no exception. 
The findings of this thesis demonstrated that stagnant notions of autonomy that can be 
applied consistently to all states do not exist, given the socio-historical and political 
contexts of individual states, and the uneven power distributions caused by each 
particular relationship. Thus, the idea of a circumstance specific explanation of 
autonomy can potentially lead to more culturally nuanced analyses of autonomy across a 
greater cross-section of states.
Implications for Further Studies
As a final point, there are three areas of possible further research that emerge from this 
study. Firstly, Japan’s relations with Iran, the AMF proposal and Japan’s relations with
4 Peter Hamilton, “The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Sciences” in Stuart Hall and Bram 
Gieben (eds.), Formations o f Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992, p. 36. A universal, secular 
understanding of human nature was developed for a more scientific conception of the world and, thus, 
the concept of human nature under anarchy developed through a mixture of social contraction and 
early British anthropology. At the same time, this scientific and universal understanding of human 
nature was pitted against the “discovery” of “primitive societies” in America. Also see Beate Jahn, 
The Cultural Construction o f International Relations: The Invention o f the State o f Nature, New 
York, Palgrave, 2000, p. 109.
CONCLUSION 28 8
North Korea are all ongoing policy areas in Japanese foreign policy, which means that 
they will continue to unfold under the pressures of US interests. The development of the 
three examples therefore would be worthy of further study in their own right. It goes 
without saying that it would be extremely interesting to see whether Japan gives in to 
US pressure on its development of the Azadegan oil field, particularly if tensions 
between the United States and Iran escalate. Similarly, given the DPRK’s launch of 
seven missiles into the Sea of Japan in July 2006 and recent threats to conduct nuclear 
explosive tests, it would be worthy to investigate whether Japan continues its traditional 
position of engagement, or instead adopts a more hard-line position which is closer to 
that of the United States. The continuing development of the East Asian Community 
may provide Japan with yet another opportunity to propose an AMF in the near future. 
To do this, it must face the challenge of asserting leadership and keeping the United 
States engaged in Asia, whilst also maintaining good relations with China. In relation to 
the EAC and the AMF, it would also be interesting to follow how Japan navigates its 
increasingly strong economic but deteriorating political relations within the context of 
the US-Japan alliance. Therefore, the US position in the “War on Terror”, relations with 
Iran and the DPRK and US attitudes towards China are increasingly crucial elements 
with regard to continued analysis of the three examples.
Secondly, a context-specific notion of autonomy can potentially be further applied in 
International Relations, particularly in other relationships of unequal power. A comparison of 
autonomy as exercised in Japan, and also in states such South Korea and Australia, would be 
an excellent way to investigate other ways in which states have been integrated into US 
hegemony, and the ways in which the United States exerts restrictions and boundaries in 
their foreign policies. Furthermore, in this context, it would be particularly interesting to 
investigate other philosophical perspectives of modem statehood and independence, 
particularly in non-Western states, and how these affect contemporary state identity and 
interests.
Finally, a pressing question with regard to Japanese autonomy is how it might 
develop or alter if the nature of US hegemony changes in the near future. In other words, 
this question relates to the international concerns over US unilateralism, and how this 
will affect the legitimacy on which the United States bases its hegemony. It was 
expected that the Japanese SDF would come to the support of the United States in the 
strikes on Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, even when the missions were not
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sanctioned by the United Nations. No doubt the critical subject on the minds of Japanese 
policymakers is how to continue Japan’s association with the United States should the 
latter’s unilateralist position become more aggressive, and whether Japanese autonomy 
will become more restricted or enabled as a result. As scholars begin to argue that the 
legitimacy of the United States is in decline internationally5 and discussions over 
Constitutional reform begin in Japan, an investigation of the Japanese government 
perceptions of US legitimacy, the future direction of US hegemony and Japan’s 
potential roles within it would be a challenging but fascinating future task.
5 Reus-Smit, “International Crisis of Legitimacy”, forthcoming.
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